If you have been following the insurgencies in the Sahel region, you will no doubt have seen reports of military bases being captured by JNIM, ISSP, the Tuareg FLA, or one of many other groups.

These base raids and captures are fairly regular, and seeing them continue to crop up on your news feeds can quickly give the impression of a steady, continuing advance by these groups into government-controlled areas.

That’s largely not the reality though. The attacking forces will attack the army bases not to seize territory but to gather supplies. While not impossible, it can be challenging for these non-state actors to obtain new equipment through other means.

These military outposts will contain various military vehicles: trucks, technicals, motorbikes; they will also have weapons and ammunition, and fuel. Not to mention the attacking forces will sometimes take members of the garrison as prisoners, as occurred just recently in Niger.

A leaked internal radio dispatch 2 weeks ago confirmed that a Nigerien National Guard outpost had been raided by JNIM, who had seized 3 technicals and 7 motorbikes. There was later confirmation from JNIM itself that small arms, as well as 7 members of the garrison, were also captured.

In the footage, shared by Hamid Amadou N’gadé on Twitter (X), much of the captured equipment can be seen set out and includes more than a dozen AK-type rifles, at least 5 LMGs, a drone, radios, and a significant quantity of ammunition.

The captured equipment allows the groups to sustain themselves and carry on their insurgencies more effectively. The army will then return to the bases to allow them to project force in and around the nearby settlement until another attack occurs.

So why do these bases seem to fall so easily, and why don’t the groups hold onto them?

Why do they fall?

The reason for the bases falling in what appears to be such an easy way is down to a few different factors.

Objectives

Firstly, the objectives of the Army and the insurgent groups are very different. The army’s goal is to project force across the whole country they are responsible for, and secure as much of that territory as possible. Therefore, they deploy forces to outposts across the country and conduct patrols from those bases to secure the nearby towns and villages.

This is somewhat similar to the objectives of a group like the FLA, who intend to capture territory. This is why they have held onto the base in Kidal, Mali, after seizing it last month.

The primary objective of a group like JNIM or ISSP, on the other hand, is to cause damage to the state's armed forces and destabilise the government. Ultimately, they will want to secure territory, but the main goal is to weaken the army significantly first.

If the army can be successfully weakened, then when these groups do attempt to take control of territory, the state will be weak, and any organised resistance will be reduced.

This difference in strategy is why the bases can fall so easily. JNIM typically don’t operate from any easily identifiable or permanent bases that the army could target. They are more scattered and mobile, coming together for attacks. The army, however, has clear static bases where they are stationed, which the insurgent groups can plan attacks on far in advance.

After the FLA/JNIM coalition took control of Kidal and the base there, the government forces have carried out strikes on the City and the Base.

Strategy

JNIM and ISSP are outnumbered by any one of the states which they are fighting and therefore utilise defeat in detail to achieve successes. Defeat in detail is a straightforward strategy, where the attacker concentrates its forces to strike and overwhelm the dispersed defending forces.

The simple diagram below illustrates the strategy. The Red side is outnumbered overall 7-to-3, so defeating Green is only possible by overwhelming one position at a time. In this case, changing the odds to 3-to-1 in their favour.

It seems obvious and is the normal way breakthroughs are achieved in any war. It is used by both Russia and Ukraine to attempt advances. The attacking side will spread forces more thinly across the line to concentrate forces in one area. The goal there is to reduce forces by a small enough amount that they aren’t creating weaknesses in their defences.

Another diagram. The one below shows a more conventional method of the strategy. Where bases have to be held. In this scenario, both forces have 500 units. Green spreads them evenly along the line, while red brings a small section from each to concentrate them in the centre. This gives them a near 2-to-1 advantage here while keeping the ratios elsewhere along the front close enough to even to prevent an attack by Green.

The difference is that in an insurgency like that in the Sahel, the strategy is enhanced by the attacking side not needing to defend any territory at all, while the other side must attempt to defend everywhere all at once.

The defender is far less mobile, and the attacking side can therefore overcome the defender’s overall numerical and any technological superiority by being numerically superior in just one location.

Base design

Another reason for the failure of the bases is their design.

Many of the bases in Mali, for example, are former MINUSMA central bases or outposts and follow very similar layouts. The design of the bases, though, is not appropriate for the strategies available to the Malian Armed Forces or the era of conflict that we are now in.

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This week, a map was shared online by M0nstas purporting to be a leaked internal Russian MoD map of the frontline in Ukraine, along the Zaporizhzhia axis.

The map, dated April 9th 2026, quickly drew criticism from map makers and conflict trackers across the board, from pro-Ukrainian to even some pro-Russians, for how extreme the extent of Russian control was shown to be.

And that was easy to do. If you compare the frontline with almost any mapper that claims to be at least partly neutral, you can see some stark differences in where the frontline is shown to be.

Almost all map makers for the war in Ukraine will base their information on geolocations, bringing in non-visual information from frontline units’ public posts, or direct contact with people along the line.

Inevitably, working with almost exclusively open source information will mean that the maps online lag, to some extent, behind the true movements of the frontline. Even those who make use of information from people on the front who can pass messages on in near real time, the most important information will likely be held back for operational security and the general safety of units involved.

That being said, the map being circulated is from 7 weeks ago, which is more than enough time for even the slower methods of confirmation to catch up.

So what is going on with the map?

Bending the truth

One option, of course, is that the map has been made to appease higher-ups in the Russian command structure. As those who follow the conflict even from a distance will know, advances are now generally quite slow-paced and focused on just a handful of sectors of the frontline.

Regardless of the side which you support in the conflict, the casualty rates are significant and can be difficult to justify without tangible advances being made. Even in a “war of attrition“, making very little progress territorially, particularly 4 years into the conflict, is not a good sign.

It would then make sense that if you are a commander in the Russian army, you might report the situation in your area as being better than it is. Better performing units will often be prioritised for reinforcements, resupply, and new equipment. In that sense, there is a motivation to over-report successes.

Ukrainian drone units have been known to be prioritised for providing evidence of successful hits.

On the other hand, without actually making progress, this strategy doesn’t work for long and can come back to bite you in the long term. That’s particularly true if your progress is broadcast by those higher up in the command chain.

On the opposite end of the frontline is Kup'yans'k, which Russia had claimed to be in full control of in mid-November last year. Most mappers, though, marked large parts of the city as never being any more than contested, with some parts of the south and west never leaving full Ukrainian control.

We know for certain that the city was not fully captured, as Ukrainian President Zelenskyy visited the entrance to the city just 2 weeks after the announced capture. While he has been very close to the frontline before, the extent of drone warfare would have prevented a visit this close had the whole city been under Russian control.

What is thought to have happened is that advances here were internally exaggerated, contested areas were reported as secured, and the initial Ukrainian positions were reported as being the contested spaces.

The fight for the city was far from over, and just over 6 months later, many mappers now show the city to be primarily or completely under Ukrainian control again. The propaganda victory at the time was valuable, but now, while the loss can be somewhat talked around, it can’t be fully ignored.

The city is a key target along the line, and to take it properly in the future, significant resources will need to be prioritised there. Making the argument back up the chain for those resources will be a lot more difficult now if they still think or had thought that the city was effectively already taken.

Defining the frontline

Another option is that the definitions used by the Russian MoD are very different to how the map is being read by external observers. While deciding how to mark the frontline has been a challenge since the very start of the war, it has become increasingly difficult as the grey zone expands further and further.

The full-scale invasion

At the very start of the full-scale invasion, there were two types of frontlines.

The first was the old frontline from the ongoing 2014 conflict. This line had been almost static for years and was covered in complex fortified positions with hundreds of miles of trenches along it.

This part of the line was fairly straightforward to map, a solid frontline with the odd breakthrough to track. Most positions were clearly identifiable and unmoving.

The other was the border positions. Simple border checkpoints, in some areas with limited fortifications, while in others, little more than a gate and a guard house.

The advances along these axes were more complex to mark. Russian vehicles were driving down roads deep into the country, not stopping to secure positions, as it was thought there was little reason to do so.

On the Crimea to Kherson advance, there is even footage of Russian vehicles and Ukrainian vehicles driving down the same roadways. There was no frontline to speak of initially. The only thing to mark was the routes of advances and the concentration of forces when they stopped pushing.

Below is one of the best displays of this contrast. Mappe Nathan Ruser clearly distinguishes here between the two areas of Russian firm control, in the Donbas and Crimea, and the axes of advance out of these areas and across the Russian and Belarusian borders.

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Some of these are quite obvious to spot, but others, at least at first glance, look quite good. For all of them, though, once you really start to concentrate on the details, the flaws stack up, and the fact that it’s been generated by AI becomes clear.

Here’s one that is very wrong and hopefully easy to spot. Niger is pretty accurate, but Mali is the wrong shape, and Chad has been labelled and coloured as Burkina Faso, which should be under Mali, bordering western Niger.

The map below is one that came up several times for me over the past week from multiple different accounts. Due to the scale of the map and the largely familiar shapes of some of the countries, even someone familiar with the Sahel insurgencies could be forgiven for not taking a closer look and instead just accepting its validity.

Take a look at it yourself. Would you assume this was AI?

The map itself has clear professional styling. An indicator just a few months ago would have been vaguely correct, but still an inaccurate spelling of place names. But spelling in the title, description, legend, and the map itself is all good. The map even cites some solid, reliable sources such as ACLED.

Take a closer look at the map and compare it with a Google Maps screenshot of the same area, and some issues start to become obvious.

Some of the issues include:

1. Extra countries. See between Togo and Benin, Mali and Burkina Faso, and Mali and Niger.

2. Countries aren’t the right shape. What is labelled as Benin takes up a large part of northwestern Nigeria, and Guinea is cut in half.

3. Cities aren’t quite right. Some are hard to clearly critique as the borders you would use as a reference point are off themselves, but Ouagadougou (incidentally, my favourite capital city name) in Burkina Faso, and Dakar in Senegal are in the wrong places.

4. The presented data is wrong. Aside from the base map inaccuracies, despite referencing good quality sources, the area marked as being ‘JNIM presence/reach’ isn’t right. The marking goes much too far east in Niger and not far enough west in Mali. Compare the marking to the map of the area made last month by Thomas van Linge and me. JNIM operating areas are shown in pale Grey.

Bonus countries

In the same way that a language model may hallucinate events or other details, maps generated by AI currently have hallucinated countries. In the example above, there were multiple extra countries added in. The origin for them is fairly straightforward. Some of them are just an additional false line added inside an otherwise real country. Others are repeats of largely accurate borders, such as the one between Mali and Niger, or the second Burkina Faso.

Here is another example of a map that looks reasonable at first glance, but has an additional country.

There are inaccuracies with most of the borders, but you could argue that it is a stylistic choice and doesn’t take away from the message being conveyed by the map. The key issue is western Niger, on the border with Burkina Faso; in this map, it’s been cut off into its own country. Gabon, in the bottom right, has also apparently annexed the Republic of the Congo.

Inaccurate borders and places

This one can be much more difficult to spot if you aren’t familiar with the country or region being displayed. Sometimes the boundary of the focus country and the labels of locations within it will be more or less accurate, but the closer to the edge of the display, the more inaccuracies crop up. An example of that in the map above is Libya, where the northern coast should be visible, but has not been rendered at all.

The map below shows the countries along the Gulf of Guinea. Again its vaguely familiar, particularly the slimness of Togo squished between Ghana and Benin. But the borders of all four countries are off and the wrong shapes and overall sizes, as with the first map, Benin eats into a large part of Nigeria.

Style clues

All AI-generated content has styling preferences that carry across to almost all of its outputs. This is because of the way generative AI works, trying to predict what should appear based on its training data. For language models, if a certain phrase has appeared enough in its training set, then it will favour using it.

Lots of you will likely be able to identify a handful of tells that a piece of text has been written by AI. Wikipedia has quite a good “Signs of AI writing” article on some of these tells.

Although they can tell of something being written by AI, or in our case, a map created by AI, the fact that AI uses these stylistic choices is because they are actually used legitimately. So obviously, if a piece of text uses the em dash (—) or the common “Not just X, but also Y” structure, it could very well be written by a human, but it is one clue to note when trying to identify whether something has been made by AI.

When it comes to maps, AI also has a couple of repeated stylistic choices. One that I’ve noticed quite a lot is a dabbed paintbrush effect visible particularly clearly in the visualisation above, but you can also spot it in the Gulf of Guinea map further up (more clear in the sea), and in the first map as well.

Ghosting

Another thing that I’ve noticed for the AI maps that have come across my feed is faded markings. Sometimes it’s for a bit of text, or something that has been coloured in, others it’s a sort of ghosted line where the AI is trying to guess where a marking should be, but seemingly not committing to or completing the marking.

The map below shows a few examples of that. Some of the arrows are faded, the three dashed blue lines, but also the red line in the bottom right. The borders are the biggest tell for this one, though, for fading. At several points along the border, the line fades out, and where the top blue dashed line crosses the border, the border juts sideways into the arrow instead of following the actual path.

Beyond that, we see some of the earlier errors mentioned as well. The cities are vaguely in the correct locations relative to one another, but other than the capital Bamako ( باماكو ), the rest aren’t in the right locations.

Here is another example of an AI-made map. You should be able to spot quite a few of the issues covered above. The paint blotching, colour blocks and issues with sharpness of edges, both in the text and in other markings and borders.

There are also the borders, largely pretty accurate but with a couple of errors inspired by the real borders. Check the Libya/Sudan border in the bottom right of the map with the actual border from Google Maps below. The distinctive right-angle border is there, but the AI has hallucinated it in a second time.

It’s not just simplified graphic maps that AI has been used to generate. I have had what appears at first to be an annotated satellite map. Below is an example of that. It’s also quite zoomed in, and the orientation is unclear, so trying to spot an inaccuracy in the border shape becomes more difficult.

This one was quite quick to spot, though, because even though only one town has been marked, it’s been marked on the wrong side of the border.

While some of the maps do look quite high quality and professional at first glance, it’s important to be aware that AI maps exist, and some ways that you can spot them.

As AI continues to get better, these tells will change and become more subtle and spotting AI-generated maps will no doubt become more challenging. At least for now, hopefully, when one comes up on your feed, you’ll be able to spot it before unintentionally sharing and boosting unreliable information.

Early in the morning of Saturday, 16 May last weekend, a compound in Borno state in the Lake Chad area of northeastern Nigeria was struck by a joint US / Nigerian operation.

Several members of the ISWAP (Islamic State West Africa Province) leadership were killed in the attack. Reportedly including:

• Abu-Bilal Al-Minuki - IS global leadership

• Abd-al Wahhab - ISWAP senior leader responsible for coordinating attacks and distributing propaganda

• Abu Musa al-Mangawi - ISWAP senior member

• Abu al-Muthanna al-Muhajir - ISWAP senior media production team manager

The Nigerian Director of Defence Information also claimed that as many as 175 other terrorist fighters were killed in this and preceding strikes over the previous few days.

The operation was reportedly a joint air and ground operation with Nigerian Special Forces units deployed close to the compound that was targeted, with the main strike being carried out by air assets.

“The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoW)
visual information does not imply
or constitute DoW endorsement.”

The New York Times reports that the helicopter-borne ground assault was carried out by a combined US and Nigerian force, including SEAL Team 6. They report that the US forces were attempting to seize al-Minuki rather than kill him, though during the 3-hour battle, to avoid allowing him to escape, an airstrike was called in to eliminate him.

Nigerian authorities, however, have claimed that there were no foreign boots on the ground for the operation and that US support came in the form of ‘intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and other force enablers’.

What is worth noting is that the Nigerian military high command had already claimed back on 2nd April 2024, that Al-Minuki had been killed in an operation. This serves as a reminder of the challenge in confirming the success of targeted strikes in a conflict such as this.

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On the 13th May, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that during the conflict with Iran, he had secretly travelled to the United Arab Emirates with a delegation and met with UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed.

He stated that the visit had “led to a historic breakthrough in relations between Israel and the UAE”.

Shortly afterwards, however, the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement of its own. In it, they categorically deny that the UAE received either Netanyahu or any Israeli Military delegation. The wording of their statement (shown below) is odd, calling the reports “unfounded”, adding that media outlets reporting it were promoting misleading political narratives.

There is some evidence to suggest that a visit did occur. Data visible on Flightradar24.com and adsbexchange.com shows that two private jets travelled between Israel and the UAE on 26 March.

The UAE was heavily targeted by Iran during the conflict due to accusations of close collaboration with the US and Israel. The response by the UAE is likely an effort to avoid these accusations being seen as valid, and consequently, the strikes on the UAE being ‘in some way justified.

Negotiations are going nowhere

Talks between the US and Iran have been ongoing for some time now and apparently have made very little headway. The Iranians submitted a proposal this week, which President Trump called “unacceptable”.

According to sources speaking to CNN, Donald Trump has become frustrated with the lack of progress from discussions. He is reportedly considering resuming strikes.

Donald Trump is currently on a state visit to China, and while the primary purpose is to discuss the current trade and tariffs between the two, there will almost certainly be discussions relating to Iran due to China’s close ties with the Iranian regime.

China will want to push for an end to the conflict that restores trade through the strait while also protecting its allies in Iran. The recent trade war between China and the US hurt them both, and Trump may attempt to offer a return to more stable trade in exchange for China exerting its influence over Iran and pressuring it to back down.

The visit itself was already impacted by the conflict. Originally, the visit was scheduled for March but was pushed to this week after the war broke out.

Regardless of the outcome of these discussions as they relate to Iran, any resumption of strikes is very unlikely to happen until Trump and his delegation return to the US. President Trump is expected to head back to the US on Friday.

Indications from the Chinese government and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio are that Taiwan will be another major topic of the visit. While the US does not formally recognise the Taiwanese state, they do provide military equipment to them and has indicated support in a defensive conflict.

I plan to send out a focused write-up on the tensions between China and Taiwan and the probable outcomes, so look out for that.

An attempted ground attack

Kuwait has revealed that a small number of Iranian IRGC forces attempted to land on Bubiyan Island, located on the northeastern side of the state. The IRGC attempted the crossing to the island on several small watercraft but were unsuccessful. The Kuwaiti Interior Ministry claims to have arrested four IRGC officers involved in the attempt.

The island was used as a firing position for US Marines during the strikes on Iran. The attempted landing was likely intended to target these positions.

It’s worth noting that Iran has commented on the arrests, stating that the individuals arrested were not IRGC members, but instead sailors who became lost when systems onboard malfunctioned.

The Israeli base in Iraq

During the air campaign against Iran carried out by the US and Israel earlier in the year, Israel established and operated an air base inside Iraq. The site functioned as a station for Israeli Special Forces as well as Israeli Air Force assets. The base’s location and secrecy would enable the covert initiation of search and rescue operations for any Israeli pilots downed over Iran.

The base wasn’t only used as an insurance for such an issue, though, and was also used directly to launch air strikes on Iran.

The existence of the base was initially reported by the Wall Street Journal before the exact location was identified by @Obretix and separately by members of the FaytuksNews community. The abandoned airstrip was located deep in the desert in western Iraq, an incredibly sparsely populated area, some 180km southwest of the city of Najaf.

According to @Obretix the base was likely unusable and abandoned by mid-March due to heavy rainfall in the area. As the base was only constructed between 1st and 2nd March, it would have had limited use.

Until as recently as Sunday, Iraqi Government officials denied the presence of a foreign base in the area before admitting to an incident at the beginning of March where their security forces clashed with an unidentified force and took casualties, with one member being killed.

The full statement of the Joint Operations Command from 11th May is below.

The Iraqi army and the Hashd al-Shaabi paramilitary group launched an extensive clearing operation in the region surrounding the location of the air base, which was then secured by the Iraqi armed forces.

Over the course of April, Russian control in Ukraine has continued to expand at a gradual pace. The net change to verified Russian control is an increase of approximately 214 km². This is lower than the average for the previous 12 months, of just over 300km². These advances were primarily focused within the Oblasts of Donetsk and Kharkiv, with small advances in Zaporizhzhia. There were relatively large expansions of the ‘Russian forward operating area’ within Zaporizhzhia and along the border regions in Sumy, though in both of these areas, the increase to verified control last month was minimal.

Russia currently controls an estimated 4,173 settlements in Ukraine. (1,881 of those since before the February 2022 invasion). At least 158 further settlements are currently being fought over. This does not include recon groups crossing the northern and northeastern borders.

As has been the case for some time, limited manpower has forced the Russian Armed Forces to focus operations on a limited number of sections of the front. This focused effort has allowed Russia to make gradual and somewhat consistent progress and has largely prevented Ukraine from being able to bring sufficient forces together to reclaim territory on a large enough scale.

Kupiansk

Russian advances into the areas southeast of the city of Kupiansk have continued with forward units now confirmed to be present in the south of the settlement of Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi and the north of Kivsharivka. This area has been an awkward one for Ukraine due to the difficulty of supply. The salient backs onto the Oskil River, and when Russian forces entered parts of Kupiansk and reached the Oskil at Kruhliakvika (further south) in 2024, it looked as though the area would fall.

It has managed to hold on, though, for quite some time, and the Russian advances in Kupiansk and further south both stalled. Recent Russian attacks, though, show that the area is now gradually being taken.

This new progress, and a lack of any Ukrainian forces being spotted further northeast of these positions, confirms that the area under Russian control has also moved with the expansion of their operational area.

Sloviansk

The most significant changes to the map over the course of April have been on the approaches to Sloviansk and Kramtorsk. The Russian forward forces here have continued to advance south of their positions along the Siverskyi Donets and west from their positions near Siiversk. They have now reached the eastern buildings of Rai-Oleksandrivka.

Further south, they have also crossed the canal near Malynivka. This combination of advances and new forward positions brings the Russian line of control forward to include the territory between the city of Siversk and the village of Bondarne.

Kostiantynivka

Another area of continued Russian advances in April has been in the vicinity of Kostiantynivka. While advances within the city itself have been minimal since Russia first entered the settlement several months ago, they now operate more extensively on the southwestern and northern flanks of the city. Russia has pushed through Stepanivka and into the eastern side of Dovha Balka while also advancing into Illinivka. Russian forces also continue to clear and secure the fortified positions south of the city.

Huliaipole

Russian advances also continued west of Hulyaipole. Russian forces were spotted in the south of the settlement of Novoselivka, directly along the first Ukrainian fortified line. This advance will likely force the Ukrainians positioned in Charivne to withdraw to the fortified line before retreat becomes even more challenging.

The Ukrainian attacks north of the city of Hulyaipole earlier in the year, though they did stall advances in the immediate sector, appear not to have been able to prevent the progress further down the line, where Russian forces continue to advance parallel to the fortified positions.

Sumy and Kharkiv

Along the Sumy and Kharkiv borders with Russia, Russian forces have been carrying out small attacks on the settlements and Ukrainian positions there. These have been small-scale and brief raids and are therefore recorded on the maps as expansion of the forward operating area, rather than new areas of Russian control.

These may be sectors to keep an eye on as Russia has previously crossed these Oblast borders to seize territory and continues to hold on to some of that near Vovchansk and Lyptsi in Kharkiv, and Bilovody and Ynakivka north of Sumy.

The Islamic State - Sahel Province

As Malian bases fell or came under siege over the weekend and the Malian Army attempted to respond to minimise the impact, the Islamic State initiated its own attacks.

ISSP (Islamic State Sahel Province), another jihadist group fighting against the government, and also against JNIM, attempted to take advantage and expand their control. ISSP operate in the far east of the country in the tri-border areas between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. The goal was to seize bases of their own while FAMa and the Africa Corps support forces were focused on the JNIM/FLA offensive elsewhere.

Read about that here:

Their first strike was on the town of Labbezanga, located on the Mali-Niger border. Labbezanga hosts the iconic former French Army fort styled in the 17th-century “Vauban” star fortress style.

The base at Labbezanga is one of the smaller outpost bases used by FAMa and was quickly overwhelmed by the ISSP attack as reinforcements were unavailable for quick deployment. The FAMa and AC forces withdrew north towards the fortified town of Ansongo. This withdrawal was notably different to where they had withdrawn from JNIM and FLA attacks. Elsewhere in the country, where a base has been given up, the JNIM/FLA coalition has allowed for the escorted withdrawal of FAMa and AC forces. In this case, however, ISSP continued to attack, hitting the government forces as they retreated.

After their success in Labbezanga, ISSP then attempted to take their prime target. The eastern city of Menaka. Menaka sits some 200km east of the nearest town, Ansongo. The city is completely isolated, surrounded by rural areas with relatively unrestricted ISSP movement.

ISSP moved in and took control of the residential areas of the city. But on the western entrance, there is the former MINUSMA military base, now occupied by FAMa and the Africa Corps. This base is one of the largest and is almost twice the size of the base in Kidal.

Despite initially taking control of the city, ISSP could not breach the camp. The government forces then carried out a counterattack and, after several hours of fighting, took back complete control of the city, forcing the ISSP fighters out.

ISSP was unable to recreate the successes seen by JNIM and the FLA elsewhere in the northeast of the country, likely due to a lack of planning, equipment, and a more sizeable garrison.

Further bases fall to the coalition

Since the initial bases captured over the weekend, the coalition has continued attacks and taken control of new bases. In the FLA heartland, the coalition took control of the city and nearby military base of Tessalit, the most northerly FAMa deployment.

The only bases thought to still be under control of FAMa and the Africa Corps in the Kidal region are the bases at Anéfif and Aguelhok. The forces that withdrew from Kidal over the weekend were reportedly escorted to Aguelhok by the FLA, via Anéfif.

JNIM militants also seized the Gold mines of N'tahacka and the military base nearby, located west of Gao. Gao itself, although almost taken in the attacks over the weekend, appears largely to be back under the control of the garrison.

Importantly, the coalition has also moved west towards the ancient city of Timbuktu, taking control of the base in Ber on the northern bank of the Niger River. Ber is the last FAMa outpost before the city of Timbuktu. Coalition fighters also attacked outposts south of the River, though whether they were able to take control is unclear.

The JNIM/FLA arsenal grows

In previous attacks on the smaller government outposts over the past years, JNIM and the FLA have often managed to secure more ammunition, small arms, pickups, and occasionally cash.

This time, things have been different. They have struck much larger bases and prevented the forces within from withdrawing with the more valuable equipment. This has meant that they now have in their arsenal some new toys to play with.

Equipment that has been confirmed to have fallen into the coalition’s hands is heavy armoured vehicles, including Chinese Norinco VP11 and Russian Checkan MRAPs (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles). A BTR-82A, as well as other MRAPs and armoured vehicles, have been seen captured and operational since the attacks began.

The base in Kidal included an airstrip where Malian TB2 drones were operated from. Left at the base was a TB2 control station. So far, no imagery has been shared to suggest that any drones were captured at the base.

Further north, at the Tessalit base, the coalition was seen with a Malian Mil Mi-24P helicopter and a stockpile of S8 rockets, which can be fired by the aircraft. The coalition almost certainly does not have personnel capable of operating the aircraft, and the helicopter may well not be operational; if not already, it would almost certainly have been made so before the army withdrew from the base. That being said, pickup trucks operated by rebel groups have regularly been modified to install the rocket pods on the back to create improvised rocket artillery technicals, so these captures are not irrelevant.

As it happens, the Mi-24P in question is TZ-07H, an airframe that, according to Oryx, was previously damaged after an attack on Mopti airfield back in April of 2022.

Bamako

Aftermath of attacks

One of the primary targets in the Bamako area was the very large military base located in Kati, directly north of the capital. Kati was also the location of the Defence Minister, who was killed in the SVBIED attack on Saturday morning.

High-resolution satellite imagery has now been published by Vantor, showing the aftermath of the attack on the Defence Minister’s home. The damage is significant. Not only was the Minister’s home totally destroyed, but almost all buildings within a 100m radius of the blast were also completely wiped out.

Defence Minister Camara was not the only official directly targeted in the attacks. National Intelligence Chief Modibo Koné was also reportedly attacked and, while injured, has survived.

Initially, after the attacks, there was silence from the ‘interim’ President (5 years and counting), Assimi Goïta. As a result, there was growing speculation of an internal power struggle to replace him or that he had been killed in another attack. On Tuesday evening, though, he made a televised address to the nation, apparently unharmed and in control.

Fighting in Kati continued into the beginning of the week as FAMa began clearing operations. After the initial attacks, JNIM militants had been seen roaming relatively freely within and around the capital.

JNIM begins a siege

On Tuesday, JNIM spokesman Abu Hudhaifa Al-Bambari announced that a blockade would begin on the capital. JNIM previously imposed temporary blockades for fuel entering Bamako and other major cities. This blockade is broader and covers all vehicles entering or leaving the capital.

This blockade is a significant move under the current circumstances. It shows that this operation was not a one-weekend hit and grab. Applying this pressure on the capital now will force the government to focus its efforts here, rather than allowing it to deploy reinforcements to the precarious positions in the northeast of the country.

Instead of likely being able to secure frontline bases and carry out operations to push back and reverse coalition gains, the government is on the back foot, having to focus its attention on the heart of the country.

What to look out for next

The actions taken by the government forces over the next few days will be crucial. With discontent in the army structure, claims by Malian officials that the Russian forces “betrayed” them, and a possible attempt at a leadership change, there are significant internal issues that must be addressed quickly.

Distrust between forces and leadership being distracted by internal power struggles would make decisive, broad actions against the coalition more challenging than it already is.

Counterattacks are being carried out, but not to the degree required yet to start retaking territory. With the blockade of the capital now underway, decisions must be made about where resources are deployed. JNIM have shown that they are capable of infiltrating deep into the most secure parts of the city and can strike at leadership.

A decision to deploy forces to better secure the city will mean fewer reinforcements to positions elsewhere in the country. As the coalition advances towards Timbuktu and pushes west of Gao, the bases in their path must be reinforced to ensure they hold.

Forces in Sévaré were only just able to hold on to the city during the initial attacks, with reinforcements gradually arriving in the area that was involved in the successful attacks further north and east; another attack on the city could be imminent. The same is true for Gao, where the forces have managed to retain control of the airport and main military base, but have not been able to resecure the city.

On Saturday, 25th April, Mali was struck by a large-scale coordinated offensive across multiple cities and military installations simultaneously. The attacks were carried out jointly by the jihadist group JNIM (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin) and the Azawad separatist group, the FLA (Front de libération de l’Azawad). From the capital Bamako in the southwest to Kidal in the northeast, the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) came under pressure on several fronts at once. These attacks were a significant escalation in an insurgency that has plagued the country for years.

Kidal

The most consequential attacks of the weekend unfolded in Kidal, in the far northeast. Kidal was the unofficial capital of the Azawad separatists until it was retaken by FAMa and Wager forces at the end of 2023.

FLA and JNIM forces entered the city and rapidly gained the upper hand. FAMa and Africa Corps quickly lost control of the city itself and fell back to their stronghold at the former MINUSMA base and airfield to the south of the city.

What followed was a significant moment for the Russian presence in Mali. An agreement was reached between Africa Corps and the FLA, allowing the Russian forces to withdraw north to the city of Tessalit. Crucially, this agreement only covered the Russian forces, and their FAMa colleagues were left encircled.

Not all Russian equipment at the base was permitted to leave. Pickup trucks and lorries were seen departing with their beds filled with the mercenary fighters. But none of the armoured vehicles the Africa Corps is known to have in Kidal was seen in the departing convoy. Some of these were already abandoned inside the city when the forces withdrew to the main base.

In a further blow to the Malian government, some pro-government GATIA militiamen (a local Tuareg defence group) who had arrived as reinforcements for the government reportedly ended up defecting to the FLA.

The FLA subsequently released a statement declaring full control of Kidal city. The statement carried additional significance beyond the military outcome: in it, the FLA formally announced their partnership with JNIM. JNIM released a parallel statement of their own claiming control of Mopti and Kidal and similarly acknowledging the alliance.

While cooperation between these two groups has been an open secret for some time, with fighters frequently moving between them, this is the first formal public declaration of partnership. It is a development that could complicate international support for the FLA, which has until now attempted to present itself as a more secular separatist movement rather than an Islamist one.

Gao and Bourem

In Gao, FLA forces captured a military base on the northern road into the city. As was the case in Kidal, it appears that the core of the FAMa and Africa Corps forces took up positions in the airport, where a military base is located.

Mirroring events in Kidal, talks were reported to be ongoing between the Africa Corps contingent and the FLA to allow another Russian withdrawal from the former MINUSMA camp. At the time of writing, no agreement is confirmed to have been reached.

In Bourem, a small town on the road between Gao and Kidal, JNIM captured the local military base.

Bamako

The capital was not spared in the attacks, though this part of the country is out of the FLA’s reach and well within JNIM’s operating areas. JNIM struck FAMa and Africa Corps forces at Modibo Keita International Airport, as well as hitting the major military base at Kati on the northern outskirts of the city.

The video below is of a Russian mercenary defending Bamako International Airport from the JNIM attack early Saturday morning.

Most significantly, Defence Minister Sadio Camara was killed in an SVBIED (suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device) attack on his home. Several members of his family were also killed in the strike. Sadio Camara had been a central figure in Mali’s deepening relationship with Russia, and his death may have significant implications for that partnership going forward.

By the afternoon, JNIM had withdrawn from Bamako or been defeated within the city. Footage circulated online of alleged attackers being lynched by members of the public. Fighting at the Kati base, however, continued on Sunday morning after an initial withdrawal by JNIM overnight.

Sévaré and Mopti

JNIM forces attacked and took control of the two main military bases in Sévaré, capturing a significant quantity of ammunition in the process. FAMa and Africa Corps once again were forced to withdraw and take up positions at the airport. JNIM reinforcements reportedly continued flowing into the city for hours after the initial assault began. Fighting in Sévaré was some of the most intense over the weekend and continued all of Saturday.

Africa Corps conducted helicopter strikes against JNIM positions during the battle in defence of the airport. An SVBIED attack was attempted but stopped by the pro-Government forces, with Africa Corps releasing an image of the vehicle.

By nightfall, JNIM had withdrawn from Sévaré, with the Malian army largely retaking control and gradually clearing the city amid sporadic gunfire. Mopti, which lies close to Sévaré, was entered by JNIM and briefly claimed by them, though it appears to have been largely uncontested. The main FAMa deployments in this area are within Sévaré, with no major bases in Mopti itself. This likely meant that resistance there was limited. As is the case with JNIM, they do not intend to hold the urban areas they capture long term, and they withdrew when they left Sévaré, with the city returning to normal shortly after. While JNIM ultimately do want to seize control of Mali and beyond, they currently do not have the capabilities required to secure the territory they attack.

Russia’s Role

Despite the agreement in Kidal, Africa Corps was heavily involved in the Malian response throughout the weekend. They conducted airstrikes, participated in ground combat, and provided aerial reconnaissance. There are confirmed Russian deaths from the fighting, and a Russian helicopter operated by the Africa Corps was shot down near Wabaria, with its crew killed.

At the same time, JNIM made a notable gesture toward Russia, calling on Africa Corps to stay out of the conflict in exchange for not targeting Russian forces sheltering inside besieged FAMa bases. Though they have continued to fight in the stronghold cities, Russia appears, to some degree, to have made the most of this early offer, withdrawing from Kidal, where the situation was more precarious and reinforcements unlikely to arrive in time.

According to local sources speaking to analyst Brant Philip, the Russian negotiations go beyond just Kidal. According to him:

The dynamic raises questions about the nature of the Russian commitment to the Malian government, particularly following the death of Camara, who had been instrumental in building that relationship. While forces that fought alongside the Russian mercenaries in cities like Sévaré will appreciate the support, FAMa troops and the Malian population will no doubt hear of Kidal, where they withdrew instead of standing by their allies.

The AES confederation

The FLA issued a request to the other members of the AES confederation, Niger and Burkina Faso, not to intervene in the fighting in Mali. In practice, neither member state is in a position to do so in any significant way anyway. Both are deeply engaged in their own counterinsurgency fights and lack the resources to deploy meaningful forces long-range, which would make involvement beyond a token force impractical.

The request, though, carries little weight as the FLA have little ability to carry out attacks inside Nigerwith only loose control along the border between Mali and Niger. Burkina Faso is a long way from FLA territory and likely not at risk from any possible retaliation for getting involved.

Drones were used by the FLA during the offensive to track their own forces and coordinate the offensive. This is a capability previously seen in the Islamic State’s attack on an airport in Niger, and a sign of growing tactical sophistication and use of drones among non-state armed groups in the Sahel.

So what has changed in Mali?

While the attacks were widespread and coordinated, most of the bases taken or attacked have already been resecured or will be over the coming week. This is not surprising. The strategy employed by JNIM across the areas they operate is to overwhelm FAMa bases, seize as much equipment as they can, and withdraw again.

As was the case when I covered the attacks back in November last year (see the article below), the apparent initial success of the attacks could give the impression that the Malian government is on its last legs. In both the November strikes and the ones this weekend, even the capital city was not safe from infiltration and attack.

However, it would take significant resources to successfully hold bases they capture long-term. If they did, the Malian armed forces would be able to use the same strategies, with the added benefit of air support, to retake the bases with heavy JNIM casualties.

JNIM’s objective is to create an Islamic State beyond Mali, but in their current position, that is a future goal. The Malian armed forces will need to be weakened significantly before JNIM can start to transition to securing territory.

The notable territorial change is not with the JNIM attacks, but the FLA. With the capture of Kidal, they have returned to holding a city. Unlike JNIM, the FLA do attempt to hold onto territory, and the fact that Bourem and Gao have been taken, at least temporarily, will allow for some degree of preparation for a counterattack. Due to the location of Kidal, government reinforcements take quite some time to reach the city. If they have to fight on the route there, that will delay further and require a more significant force. That is not to say that it’s not doable, after all, the Azawad movement was in control of Kidal briefly in 2023, before a convoy of FAMa and Wagner forces advanced from Gao and took the city. Although the force was harassed for much of the journey, it was only slowed and not stopped entirely.

The relationship between Mali and Russia will be one to keep an eye on over the coming months and years. Defence Minister Camara being killed, and Russian mercenaries accepting the offer to withdraw from Kidal, leaving behind their Malian colleagues, will harm the relationship between the two countries. The reaction from Russians has, as it has been in the past, been highly critical of the Malian Armed Forces. Mocking their capability and professionalism. It’s not likely to be fatal for the relationship, but it may open the door to a easing of tensions between Mali (and possibly the wider AES) and the West.

The most significant outcome of these attacks, though, is not the losses or the territorial changes (or lack thereof). It is the open alliance between JNIM and the FLA. It has long been known that the separation between the groups is fairly loose, and coordination to some degree has happened before. Some forces have even moved between fighting for one group or another. However, until now, it has been unofficial. That ambiguity has enabled greater international support for the Azawad movement, at least in the public sphere. This clear announcement of an effective alliance makes the chance of any future Western support for the Azawad Liberation movement all but impossible.

The shaky start to the deal

When the ceasefire was announced just over two weeks ago, one of the key provisions, according to Iranian state media, was a “limited daily passage” protocol for the Strait of Hormuz. While some ships passed through, it was largely in line with the previous days, around a dozen per day. A wider reopening didn’t fully develop. On the 18th, traffic peaked at 53 before collapsing back down to the levels of the previous weeks.

The negotiation breakdown was fairly immediate. Either there was a misunderstanding about what the ceasefire was, or Iran attached additional conditions to the reopening of the Strait. They demanded that the conditional ceasefire agreement also cover Hezbollah and Israeli operations in Lebanon. Israel and the US rejected this demand outright.

What has made the situation harder to read from the outside is an apparent growing fracture within the Iranian government. With much of Iran’s senior leadership killed over the preceding months, different factions appear to be vying for control. The hardline IRGC has shown little appetite for concessions of any kind, while other figures within the government structure appear more open to negotiation.

In Venezuela, it seems that the equivalent, more moderate factions were negotiated with in order to ensure a smoother outcome after the capture of Maduro. In Iran, the IRGC appears to be largely in control. While this is a working theory rather than a confirmed fact, it would go some way to explaining the pattern of contradictory signals coming out of Tehran in the past month.

In a series of social media posts on April 9th, Trump claimed Iran was charging fees to tankers attempting passage of the Strait.

He followed this with a second post calling Iran’s handling of the passage of oil.

On April 11th, it briefly looked like a partial opening might be underway. Reuters reported that Iran had allowed a pair of Chinese supertankers carrying oil for energy giant Sinopec to cross the Strait, along with an additional Liberia-flagged vessel. It was a narrow, selective opening to Iranian-aligned states. It would also prove to be short-lived.

The US blockade

On April 12th, Trump announced that the US Navy would blockade “any and all Ships trying to enter, or leave, the Strait of Hormuz,” and would interdict any vessel that had paid a toll to Iran.

He drew a comparison to the blockade implemented against Venezuelan ports, stating that it would be similar, but to a higher level.

The Venezuela blockade sharply curtailed that country’s oil exports, with only ships associated with Chevron and bound for the US continuing to operate as normal. The US blockade of Hormuz will block ships that have used Iranian ports, or are cooperating with Iran’s tolling system.

While the Strait had been effectively closed to most international shipping, Iran had continued to export its own oil and was partly benefiting from the elevated prices the disruption was causing. The US blockade was designed to stop Iran from being the only one determining who could transit the Strait.

Oil Prices: High and unstable

Throughout Operation Epic Fury, oil markets have been swinging sharply in both directions. Prices have spiked repeatedly on escalating tensions, then fallen back each time Trump announced a deal was close, that Iran was on the verge of agreeing, or that the Strait was about to reopen. When those statements proved premature, prices climbed again. Since the start of the campaign, oil prices have bounced between around $85 and $110 per barrel compared to the $65 before the conflict began.

As so much of the world’s oil passes through the Strait, the impact across the globe has been significant. Limited supply and dwindling reserves have led to queues at petrol stations in less prepared countries and significant flight cancellations across Europe.

A brief, chaotic reopening

April 17th produced one of the more chaotic days of the crisis in the Strait. Iranian Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi announced that, in line with the ceasefire in Lebanon, passage through the Strait of Hormuz was “declared completely open for the remaining period of the ceasefire” for all commercial vessels. Trump acknowledged the opening but added that the US naval blockade would remain “in full force and effect as it pertains to Iran only.”

In response to this apparent good news announced by both sides, a large number of vessels began heading toward the Strait to exit the Gulf. But within hours, dozens of the ships had turned back.

This was because of a new statement out of Iran, this time from the parliament speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. Ghalibaf stated that the Strait would not remain open while the US blockade was still in place, and any vessel wishing to pass still required explicit IRGC permission. The brief opening had collapsed almost as quickly as it was announced. It was another example of the disagreement in fundamental agreement conditions between the US and Iran.

On April 18th, the UKMTO (UK Maritime Trade Operations Centre) reported that an unknown projectile near the Strait had struck a vessel. The same day, IRGC gunboats attacked and fired upon the Sanmar Herald, an Indian-flagged crude oil tanker that had departed the UAE only the day before, bound for India.

According to Reuters, Iran broadcast the following radio message to ships in the Strait:

Two days ago, the UKMTO reported that a further two commercial vessels had been attacked by Iranian gunboats. This time, the ships were boarded and seized by Iran. Both were MSC-operated cargo ships, the MSC Francesca and the MSC Epaminondas.

According to maritime tracking group TankerTrackers.com, those two seizures bring the total number of foreign vessels currently being held involuntarily by Iran to six. The oldest has been in Iranian custody since October 2022.

Three Carrier Strike Groups

With the arrival of the USS George H.W. Bush carrier strike group (CSG) south of Iran, CENTCOM has confirmed that the United States now has three Navy carrier strike groups operating in the Middle East simultaneously. This is the first time that has occurred since the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

This new CSG arrival brings the total US Naval CSG deployment in the region to 12 ships, 200+ aircraft, and more than 15,000 sailors and marines. That is a significant concentration of naval and air power, and goes beyond what would be needed to enforce the blockade.

Israeli media outlet N12 has reported that Trump has set a deadline of this Sunday (26th April) for a deal with Iran. This is unconfirmed, and other sources suggest that it is instead the end of next week or that there is no hard deadline at all. If there is any substance to a Sunday deadline, the positioning of three carrier strike groups would indicate preparation and willingness for a renewed strike campaign, possibly to a greater degree than before.

What to look out for?

As suggested in the last post on Iran negotiations, the purpose of the ceasefire was very likely to allow the White House to avoid carrying out its threats of total annihilation of Iran. It also bought both the US and Iran time to reorganise and regroup.

While there was a possibility of a resolution to the conflict, it was very clear from the start that each side had red lines that directly contradicted the other side, making constructive negotiations nearly impossible. Added to that was the clear disconnect for what the ceasefire itself even was and what it covered. Both sides made numerous statements over the past few weeks regarding agreements or terms as though they were understood and accepted by both sides. Only for the other to quickly make their own statements contradicting this.

Negotiations were held in Pakistan last week that didn’t come to a positive close. Today, reports are that Iran is sending another delegation to Pakistan to resume talks. Whether this is a genuine effort to come to a resolution or is intended rather to avoid the possibility of US military action being taken on Sunday.

Once again, this would mirror what was seen with the ‘goodwill’ shown by Russia in the Ukraine negotiations. Deadlines were set by the White House for deals to be made, then just before they were passed, Russia would show willingness to make an agreement, and the deadline would be pushed. No deals were reached, and the cycle repeated. It looked as though this was going to be the case again with Iran. We will see this coming week if that’s true.

With just hours to go before Trump’s deadline to Iran, a two-week ceasefire was announced between the United States and Iran.

Earlier the same day, in a post on TruthSocial, President Trump stated that “a whole civilisation will die” if Iran did not agree to his terms to end the war.

In response to Trump’s threat to target infrastructure and power plants, the Iranian regime called for ‘human chains’ to be formed around power plants across the country. Images shared on social media showed that in some areas, there was a response, with large groups of civilians linking arms around power plants.

In the first hours of the ceasefire, it was unclear what the deal would cover, with initial reports suggesting that it was narrow and the combat in Lebanon between Israel and Iranian proxy Hezbollah would not be included. It was later reported that it would be.

It now appears that it doesn’t matter what parts of the conflict were intended to be included, as neither side has ‘ceased firing’. In fact, strikes have largely escalated. In Lebanon, the IDF carried out over 100 strikes in just 10 minutes, the largest wave of airstrikes on Lebanon since the start of the fighting. Iran launched waves of missile strikes on Israel and drone strikes on the Gulf states. The UAE carried out airstrikes on an Iranian oil refinery in retaliation for Iranian drone strikes.

Both sides have framed the agreement of a ceasefire as a victory. The US Secretary of Defense declared Operation Epic Fury “a historic and overwhelming victory”. Meanwhile, Iranian officials have declared it an “undeniable, historic, and crushing defeat” for the United States.

Iran’s declaration of victory is based on the fact that it had already rejected the terms Trump had set forward and presented their own 10-point plan as a counterproposal. As Trump did not follow through on his threat and agreed to negotiate, they see this, or at least present it, as a fundamental agreement to their terms.

The Iranian foreign minister announced that Iran would allow safe passage through the straits of Hormuz. Since the war began, the straits have been effectively blocked with an average of 3 ships passing through per day, down from over 100 per day seen before the conflict began.

A senior Iranian official has since told Reuters that any opening of the straits would be ‘limited’ and require vessels to ‘coordinate with the Iranian military’. They also stated that it would not be reopened until Thursday or Friday.

Iran’s Navy announced to ships anchored in the area:

"You must receive permission from Iranian Sepah Navy* for passing through the Strait. If any vessel tries to transit without permission, [it] will be destroyed"

*The Iranian Sepah Navy is the IRGC naval force.

According to TankerTrackers.com, there has been little change to commercial ship movements so far in the straits since the announcement of the ceasefire.

According to the Iranian Fars News Agency, an Iranian state-affiliated outlet, the Iranian 10-point plan is as follows:

1. A complete halt to any aggression against Iran and allied resistance groups.

2. The withdrawal of American combat forces from the region, a ban on any attacks on Iran launched from bases, and refraining from adopting a combat posture.

3. Limited daily passage of ships through the Strait of Hormuz for a period of two weeks, under the title of a safe passage protocol, subject to monitoring and specific rules set by Iran.

4. The lifting of all primary, secondary and UN sanctions.

5. Compensation of Iran’s damages through the establishment of an investment and financial fund.

6. Iran’s commitment not to build nuclear weapons.

7. US acceptance of Iran’s right to [nuclear] enrichment and negotiations over the level of enrichment.

8. Iran’s agreement to negotiate bilateral and multilateral peace treaties with countries of the region in line with its own interests.

9. Extension of non-aggression to all aggressors against all resistance groups.

10. The termination of all Board of Governors and UN Security Council resolutions, and the codification of all commitments in an official UN resolution.

Many of these positions would be non-starters for the US administration. The only points that would likely be acceptable to them would be the end of hostilities and the commitment not to build nuclear weapons.

Interestingly, though, Iran’s 10th point would remove the Board of Governors’ resolutions against Iran. The Board of Governors is the governing board of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which enables inspection of the Iranian nuclear program to monitor whether enrichment is for civil or military uses. Removing these resolutions would make the verification of point 6 challenging.

The Financial Times has reported that part of the agreement would involve a toll collected by Iran from ships passing through Hormuz. The reported toll would be $1 per barrel. This would work out to approximately $20 million per day or $7.3 billion per year.

The operational confusion on the ground is, in many ways, beside the point. We have seen that vague negotiations towards a possible concrete deal are agreed in time to push back hard deadlines set by the Trump administration. We saw this with tariffs and trade deals, and similarly with negotiations with Russia over the war in Ukraine. For the war in Ukraine, the US set deadlines for a peace deal to be agreed between Russia and Ukraine. As the deadlines neared, Russia indicated openness to negotiation, and the deadlines were pushed. Almost a year on, and the war in Ukraine seems no closer to ending.

In Iran, it seems to be very similar. As part of the pressure tactics to bring Iran to the table with favourable US terms, Trump gave them a deadline with the threat of severe consequences. Iran, however, called his bluff, forcing a brief change in approach. It wouldn’t be surprising if the negotiations over the next two weeks don’t lead anywhere and a new deadline is created, pushing the threatened consequences ever further down the road.

We can be almost certain that the US will not agree to the terms, and the terms will either change substantially over the next two weeks, or the ceasefire will simply be a way around the hard deadline, and the conflict will carry on as it was. The clock, as it has before, will just reset.

The US government quickly knew the exact location of the crew. As the Iranians did not, the US held an advantage in getting to them first. If the Iranians had known of the precise location, extraction would likely have been far more complicated.

It appears that the US made a significant attempt to mislead the Iranians as to the location of the WSO. The CIA reportedly carried out a misinformation campaign regarding the location of the airman and the planned route of his extraction. This included spreading information that the rescue phase had already begun and the airman was on the move.

There are reports that clashes occurred close to the city of Dehdasht in the Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad Province that resulted in the deaths of 5 Iranian fighters. It is unclear whether this was part of the deception or actually part of this or a separate mission.

Iran, as well as many analysts, was apparently under the impression that the stranded WSO was located in the Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad Province. This was initially the suspected crash site of the F-15E, and several videos were geolocated of American CSAR flights over the area. These may have been transiting the airspace en route to the actual location, though it is more likely that this was a part of a decoy operation.

The actual crash site was located south of the city of Isfahan, as shown in the geolocation by @obretix below.

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Diego Garcia became a focus point this week after Iran fired two missiles towards it. Part of the Chagos Islands, Diego Garcia lies in the Indian Ocean, roughly 3,800km from Iran. The island is home to a US air base, which has been used for long-range strikes on the Middle East.

Neither missile reached the target, with one falling into the sea and the other being intercepted. What is notable about the attempt is that, as far as was publicly known, Iran did not possess missiles that would be able to strike that far from Iran. That is, unless they had significantly reduced or entirely removed the payload. In that case, their longest missiles would be able to travel that far. This attack was more than likely an attempt at achieving a symbolic victory rather than damaging the base itself. Iran would have been very much aware of the Naval deployment in defence of the island, and if they intended for a destructive attack, they would have launched more than just 2 missiles.

Even the attempt, unsuccessful as it was, opens the door for positive Iranian messaging in its depiction of the balance of the war. Targeting the base allows Iran and its supporters to claim several things. Firstly, they can point to a capability to strike nearly 4,000 km away, a distance that would put even parts of Western Europe within range. Secondly, the targeting of a base at that distance can be used to demonstrate that Iran’s focus is not purely defensive and they retain an ability not only to strike back, but strike back at sites America and its allies would previously have considered ‘safe’.

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An overview map of the control situation in Ukraine as of 11 March 2026. Over the past two weeks, we have seen a continued expansion of Russian operating areas.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s localised counterattacks in the Huliaipole have been further clarified, putting Russian control back, but not enough to prevent Russian progress.

Lyman

In northern Donetsk Oblast, Russia has continued to advance in the vicinity of the key settlement of Lyman. The primary advances here are in Drobysheve, where Russian forces reached the main street passing through the settlement.

Russian units have reached the defences on the northern edge of the city of Lyman while gradually expanding their foothold in the south.

The northern advances indicate that the combat within Stavky may be drawing to a close, as any Ukrainian forces holding out in the settlement are at risk of being fully cut off. For now, the Russian presence between Stavky and Lyman is limited, though increasing.

Slov’iansk

On the approach to Slov’iansk, Russian forces have continued their progress, taking up positions throughout Fedorivka Druha. Behind their advances in the area over the past 2 months, Russian forces are consolidating control.

Based on my assessment, the settlements of Bondarne, Khromivka, and Vasiukivka are now firmly under Russian control.

Fortifications in the areas Russia has been advancing through have been relatively limited, though Russia is approaching a line of fortifications along and behind the Siverskyi Donets canal. This defensive line has been crossed by forward units at Novomarkove, 13km to the south, and fully breached by Russian forces 22km south, at Kalynivka and Chasiv Yar.

Russia may advance parallel to the fortifications from the breaches in the south to reduce their effectiveness and reduce losses trying to take them head on. This strategy has worked effectively in the past, and is currently being used in Zaporizhzhia.

Pokrovsk

This area has seen reduced movement in the past 2 weeks, but Russia has managed some advances within Hryshyne and entered the settlement of Bilytske from the east.

Huliaipole

The Russian control line north of Huliaipole has been moved back after forward Ukrainian units were spotted some 4km south of Verbove. Ukrainian forces also attacked Russian positions in Berezove from the east.

The attacks in this area are possibly to resecure the line of fortifications in the area, which had fallen into the greyzone with Russian infiltrations in several settlements behind the line.

If they intended to prevent Russian progress in the area, that appears to have failed. The Russian focus here has not been a northerly push, but westerly along the Ukrainian fortification lines. These advances have resumed despite the Ukrainian attacks.

Russian forces have now been spotted in Rizdvianka and Hirke. This Russian push follows two lines of Ukrainian fortifications, limiting their defensive effectiveness and putting the key city of Orikhiv at risk.

Ukraine’s first defensive line on the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk front ran either side of Orkhiv. If these Russian advances continue, not only will that first line fully fail, but the secondary line that has already been bypassed with the Rizdvianka advance will likely fall shortly after.

That being said, the rate of advances is slow, and if the current rate continues, the Zaporizhzhia city’s defensive ring will have more than a year before being tested.

Joint US and Israeli strikes

On the morning of Saturday, 28th February 2026, after the sun had risen in Iran, the US and Israel commenced their long-expected air campaign against the Iranian regime.

A wave of hundreds of airstrikes hit the capital Tehran, and major military installations across the country in the first few hours. Key members of the regime’s leadership were killed on the first day, including: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, the Commander in Chief of the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), the Minister of Defence, the Head of the Military Bureau, and the Chief of Military Intelligence.

The US has been building up its presence within range of Iran for weeks with waves of air-to-air tanker aircraft dragging hundreds of combat, heavy lift, and intelligence aircraft across the Atlantic to bases across Europe and the Middle East. In addition, two aircraft carrier strike groups were deployed to the region, one in the eastern Mediterranean and one off the southern Iranian coast.

With the scale of the deployment, it quickly became clear that this was not simply a show of force, and a withdrawal of deployed aircraft was no longer on the cards. Kinetic action was a matter of when, not if. It appears the strikes began when Israeli intelligence received information about a gathering of Iranian leadership.

Iran’s response

Iran quickly carried out retaliatory strikes and has so far targeted Israel, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.

The targeting for the retaliatory strikes has been mixed. US bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, Iraq, the UAE, and Jordan have been struck, but a wide set of civilian infrastructure also appears to have been intentionally targeted. These include the international airports of Kuwait, Bahrain, Abu Dhabi (UAE), and Dubai (UAE). Hotels, shopping centres, and oil infrastructure have also been directly targeted, as well as residential areas inside Israel.

The Iranian strikes also targeted a French naval base in Abu Dhabi, and the UK RAF Akrotiri base in Cyprus was hit by drones from the Iranian proxy Hezbollah, based in Lebanon. Hezbollah also carried out some strikes into northern Israel, though the total number was relatively low after Israel effectively wiped out not just Hezbollah leadership but also fighters and equipment over the past few years.

Why does it feel one-sided?

In pure numbers, on the first day, Israel and the US claimed to have carried out just over 2,000 strikes on Iran, while the claimed drone and missile strikes fired by Iran in retaliation over the same period were reportedly just over 1,200.

When the US and Israel carried out strikes last year, one of the primary targets was Iranian air defence emplacements and infrastructure. While those attacks didn’t completely cripple Iran’s defences, it has made it easier for attacks to be carried out this time around.

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An overview map of the control situation in Ukraine as of 09 February 2026. This week showed continued Russian advances on their key focal areas, primarily around Kostiantynivka and Huliaipole.

Slov’iansk / Siversk

On the approach to Slov’iansk, Russia has continued recent advances. Russian forces previously advanced along the south bank of the Siverskyi Donets river and took up positions in the settlement of Zakitne. This week, they continued the advance along the banks, expanding their area operations south towards Kryva Luka.

Northwest of Bakhmut, Russian forces have pushed further along the E40 road between Bakhmut and Slov’iansk. Their presence is now confirmed on the northern boundary of the settlement of Pryvillia, following their positions being spotted south of the settlement last week.

Slightly further northeast of these new positions, Russian troops engaged Ukrainian forces in Bondarne.

While the map shows what may be the forming of a small pocket, there are few defensive positions located in the ‘pocket’, and there have been few geolocations from within it in recent weeks, so the continued presence of Ukrainian forces there is not certain.

Kostiantynivka

Russian forces have reached Illinivka and Stepanivka to the southwest of Kostiantynivka.

The area southeast of Berestok, between Ivanopillia and the reservoir, remains marked only as a Russian forward operating area, as Ukrainian forces have been spotted in several locations across the area in the past couple of weeks.

Ukrainian forces have also been seen this week in positions on the northern edge of Yablunivka despite Russian advances beyond the settlement.

Slightly further west, Russian forces are now confirmed to have entered Sofiivka and crossed the narrow Kazenyi Torets river, taking positions in neighbouring Toretske.

Huliaipole

On the edge of the city of Huliaipole, Russian forces have pushed further west and taken new positions inthe settlements of Tsvitkove, Staroukrainka, and Zaliznychne.

Further north, Russian forward units had also pushed out from Ternuvate and clashed with Ukrainian forces in neighbouring Prydorozhnje.

A Ukrainian counterattack over the weekend has pushed back through to eastern Ternuvate from Boikove.

Last week, the ISSP (Islamic State Sahel Province) carried out an attack on the International Airport in Niamey.

The airport is home to both the Diori Hamani International Airport and the 101 military airbase.

The 101 airbase is home to around 300 Italian troops in the country as part of a military cooperation agreement. There are also Russian Africa Corps forces located at the base.

The base is fairly large, and it appears that the attack was confined to the hangars and aprons, close to the runway. The main military infrastructure and residences are located on the northern side of the base.

It is worth noting that the 101 airbase is where the recent Uranium convoy through Niger was, and is suspected to still be stored. The convoy was parked near the entrance to the base, just 700 metres from one of the damaged hangars. Recently, the trucks carrying the convoy have moved, and the yellowcake is suspected to be stored elsewhere in the base. For those unfamiliar with the convoy, I wrote about it previously here and here.

On the night of the attack, local residents posted video footage where heavy gunfire is audible, and anti-aircraft rounds can be seen being fired into the air. reports that, according to local sources, the IS militants made use of drones in the attack. These were likely used in a battle coordination role rather than for direct offensive capability.

Footage released by the Amaq News agency, the IS-aligned news organisation, shows damage to military aircraft housed at the base.

The footage and imagery show the following aircraft losses1:

• 1x Diamond DA42 MPP Guardian. A twin-engine, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) light aircraft.

• 2x Cessna 208 Caravan. Single-engine light aircraft, also used for ISR.

• 1x TAI Hürkuş. A 2-seat turboprop ground attack aircraft.

• 1x Mil Mi-171 (Hip) transport helicopter.

Despite the damage inflicted, the available evidence suggests the attackers faced limited resistance, particularly in the early stages. Russian mercenaries stationed in Niamey even claimed that local Nigerien forces “slept through the attack”.

Nigerien authorities reported that just four military personnel were injured in the attack, and some 20 jihadists were killed and several others captured. However, these numbers are dubious as they also only reported minor damage to 3 civilian aircraft, which, while true, omits the total loss of at least 2 military airframes.

Small arms fire impacted and damaged 3 civilian aircraft parked next to the civil aviation terminal. The aircraft belonged to Air Côte d’Ivoire and Asky, a Togolese carrier.

While the attack was orchestrated and primarily carried out by ISSP, there is evidence to suggest that members of ISWAP (Islamic State West Africa Province) were also involved in the attack.

Analyst BrantPhilip notes that in the video footage below (shared by Brant on Twitter) of the militants in the civil side of the airport, the fighter filming speaks in Kanuri. The Kanuri people are from the Lake Chad region, located in the far east of Niger, northeastern Nigeria, and western Chad. That region falls under the administration of ISWAP rather than ISSP.

If correct, this would suggest a higher level of inter-provincial cooperation than is usually observed.

The attack is reminiscent of the JNIM attack carried out on Bamako International Airport in neighbouring Mali in late 2024.

The day after the attack, the leader of Niger’s junta, Abdourahamane Tiani, announced that some 20 attackers had been killed and repeated claims, also made by Burkina Faso’s leader, that Benin and France provide support to the jihadists.

What this means

An attack on the capital and on a base hosting both Russian and Italian forces demonstrates the Islamic State’s growing operational confidence in Niger.

Security measures around the city proved insufficient to prevent infiltration or provide early warning for a quicker response.

While this is a blow to the junta, this likely doesn’t spell the end of the regime. Of the AES states, Niger is generally faring better when it comes to the jihadist insurgencies of the region. The vast majority of attacks impact Mali or Burkina Faso.

Given the success of the attack and the apparently limited casualties, it is likely we will see similar attacks repeated in the future.

Ukraine control maps are coming back to the WarMapper social media pages this week, and I will also start to publish summary updates here on Substack.

As there has been a break, I have taken the opportunity to make some changes to the map styling. The war in Ukraine has evolved several times since the outbreak, and the most effective way to map it has had to evolve alongside it.

When the war expanded beyond the Donbas in 2022, advances were rapid and fluid. There was no clear frontline, and maps reflected this reality. Many analysts showed broad operational areas, with only a handful of locations marked as firmly controlled. In some cases, such as Nathan Ruser’s (@Nrg8000) maps, advances were illustrated simply with arrows showing the routes taken by Russian forces.

Early WarMapper maps followed a similar logic. Large areas were marked as forward Russian operating areas to indicate intermittent presence rather than firm control.

As the war progressed, frontlines solidified. Trench warfare became dominant, advances slowed, and it became possible to map the frontline with high precision, in some areas down to individual treelines or streets.

By the end of my Ukraine mapping last year, that level of precision was already becoming less accurate. The growing impact of drones was already making static positions increasingly vulnerable, and the concept of a clearly defined, continuous frontline was starting to break down again.

Nearly a year on, that trend has accelerated. Drones dominate the battlefield to an even greater degree, which makes firm, unbroken frontlines unrealistic. Areas between positions are increasingly fluid, with presence defined more by activity than permanent occupation.

As a result, bringing back the Ukraine maps has required a change in how control and presence are represented.

So what changes are coming to the Ukraine maps?

Ukrainian control

From now on, maps will show only the presence of opposing forces rather than reaffirming default territorial ownership. For example, inside Ukraine, Ukrainian control will no longer be explicitly marked. Ukrainian territory is treated as the default unless there is a confirmed Russian presence. Ukrainian troops do not need to be physically present for an area to be Ukrainian, only an enduring absence of Russian forces.

The same logic applies in reverse inside Russia, where only Ukrainian presence will be marked.

Forward Operating Areas

The previous “grey zone / contested” designation has been replaced with “Forward Operating Areas”.

This terminology more accurately reflects battlefield reality as there are varying types of greyzone that can expand tens of kilometres from the ‘front’. In this case, a forward operating area indicates any location where hostile forces are actively present or conducting operations, regardless of how secure or permanent that presence may be.

In Ukraine, areas marked as Forward Russian Operating Areas indicate confirmed Russian military activity, including reconnaissance and probing attacks. These markings may persist even if Ukrainian forces also operate in the same area, as the designation reflects ongoing Russian presence rather than exclusive control. If Russian activity ceases and Ukrainian operations continue, the marking will be removed.

This approach avoids automatically marking the entire space between more firm positions as contested, now only marking up until the furthest known Russian advance. Under the old system, all areas between Ukrainian and Russian secure control would have been marked grey, exaggerating the depth of contested territory.

The impact of this change varies across the front. In quieter sectors, forward Russian operating areas may be less than 500 metres deep, while in more active sectors they can extend to several kilometres.

In effect, this should be a relatively minor change, but it will hopefully provide a more realistic picture where there are differences.

Occupied territory

The final major change relates to how occupied territory is confirmed.

Currently, forces may operate in an area regularly without maintaining a permanent presence. Units rotate in and out, while opposing forces may also move through the same space for resupply or rotations of their own. As a result, confirmation of firm control often takes longer than it did earlier in the war.

This means occupied territory markings will update more slowly than in previous versions. However, the use of forward operating areas ensures that active Russian reach is still accurately represented, even where the degree of control remains uncertain.

Project Owl geolocations

Updates for Ukraine will now rely primarily on the open-source geolocations completed by volunteers and collated by Project Owl. This data will be supplemented by additional information I source independently, but Project Owl’s dataset will form the core of the update process.

This avoids unnecessary duplication of effort and allows for regular Ukraine updates while leaving time for continuation of other mapping projects.

Other changes

Some other minor changes have been made to the visuals and data sources. This includes rail lines, roads, and waterways. Which should now all be more clearly and precisely marked than previously.

There aren’t too many changes to the colour palette, and I have made an effort to ensure that the map is still accessible for those with colourblindness. That being said, the tools are not always perfect, so if you spot any issues in that regard, please don’t hesitate to let me know, and I will make the fixes.

As always, I am open to suggestions, feedback, or corrections on all the maps.

End-of-month data sets.

While the Ukraine map itself has been brought up to date, the timings of advances to the current positions are still being reviewed and recorded. While the end-of-month charts and summaries will return to the page, the historical data is not yet ready to share.

The charts will be posted for all for free here on Substack, the website, and across the social media pages. Paid subscribers will also get access to the underlying raw datasets.

The Kurds are a minority ethnic group in Syria, making up approximately 10% of the total population and are located primarily along the northern border with Türkiye.

Kurdish majority areas are spread across Türkiye, Syria, Armenia, Iraq, and Iran. They have long been an oppressed group suffering notably under the regimes of the Assads in Syria and Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Both regimes followed Arabisation doctrines across the Kurdish-majority regions. These actions, rather than homogenising the respective countries, further drove divisions and fuelled the desire by the Kurdish people to have autonomy.

When the Syrian civil war began in 2011, local Kurdish militias rose to fill the security gap when the Syrian army redeployed to counter the Syrian opposition forces. The Kurdish people then created administrative committees to manage the areas under their control. These evolved into the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), more commonly known as Rojava. The official military wing of Rojava is the SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces), a collection of Kurdish militia groups.

The SDF rose to prominence due to its fight against ISIL / ISIS, which had captured large swathes of Syria by 2014. The US campaign against ISIS led to American support for the SDF through equipment and airstrike coordination. By the time ISIS was effectively defeated in Syria, the SDF had vastly expanded its control of Northern Syria, controlling almost all areas North of the Euphrates.

In 2019, Türkiye carried out an offensive in SDF-controlled areas of Northern Syria, establishing a buffer zone. Türkiye strongly opposes the establishment of a Kurdish state due to its internal conflict against its own significant Kurdish minority in the East of the country.

Recent situation

After the fall of Assad in late 2024, Kurdish forces initially took control of areas on the southern bank of the river. They soon lost territories west of the Teshren Dam to the Syrian National Army (SNA). The SNA was the armed wing of the Turkish-backed Syrian Interim Government (SIG), which merged with Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) into the Syrian Transitional Government (STG).

Due to the expansion out of the Kurdish majority regions into formerly ISIS-controlled areas, the majority of the cities, towns, and villages that the Kurds controlled are populated by Arabs. While the SDF has presented itself as a multi ethnic democratic force under DAANES, many Arab communities view it as primarily serving Kurdish political ambitions. This has led to animosity among some of the Arab population living under their rule, including local allied Arab militias.

Since the STG was formed, Syria has largely been split into two: the new Syrian government and the SDF. Negotiations were ongoing for integrating Kurdish-controlled areas into the new government. Negotiations over integration stalled, and tensions over control, representation, and security soon escalated into open conflict.

Fighting restarts

Earlier this month, after clashes in Aleppo, the STG advanced into and took full control of the Sheikh Maqsood neighbourhood. The SDF then also withdrew from territories on the southern bank of the Euphrates. The neighbourhood of Sheikh Maqsood had long been held by Kurdish forces, with the rest of the city controlled initially by the Assad regime, and then the STG since the end of 2024.

On the 13th, the STG began to advance into SDF territory. Arab armed groups and former SDF allies within the DAANES took advantage of the advance and rose up, seizing towns and cities ahead of the Syrian Army’s advance.

The advancing STG met with forces in the former Northern Syria Buffer Zone. In less than a week, the SDF had largely been forced back to controlling only the Kurdish majority areas of their former territory.

On the evening of Monday, the 19th, the SDF media spokesman stated:

“Everything [is] for our people: either a life with dignity or a martyrdom with honor.”

This declaration implies that the SDF intend to fight back and not simply have the Kurdish population absorbed into the Syrian State by force.

A large prison camp is located in Al-Hawl, 30 kilometres east of the city of Al-Hasakah. The prison is home to a significant number of former ISIS (Daesh) fighters and their families. The SDF has been responsible for guarding the camp until now. After the rapid advances of the STG, SDF elements abandoned the town and camp, withdrawing further north to protect the core areas of the Kurds.

When STG forces arrived in the town on Tuesday, 20th, they accused the SDF of allowing ISIS prisoners to go free by abandoning their security duties.

ISIS continue to operate in Syria, albeit in a significantly reduced capacity compared to its height. Any escaped fighters could return to their positions with ISIS, who will no doubt be looking to take advantage of the return to war in the region after the relative calm since the fall of the Assad regime.

On the 20th, a ceasefire was announced. Despite this, both forces have committed major breaches of the agreement, including human rights violations.

What does this mean for the Kurds?

The Kurdish people have little recognition on the international stage and are still marginalised in government representation across each of the countries they inhabit. Their presence in northern Syria and their fight against ISIS drew in support from across the world for their cause for an independent state. Western nations, opposed to both the Assad regime and part of the coalition against ISIS, backed the SDF in the war on ISIS.

The SDF provided the Kurdish people with an opportunity for an independent, or at least highly autonomous, region for the Kurds. This rapid loss of territory and struggle in combating the government have put that aspiration at risk. If Kurdish forces lose control and the STG secures Syria’s full internationally recognised territory, the Kurds’ limited international representation may vanish, and their cause could quickly be forgotten.

Fighting does not appear to be a viable option, and it is possible that demands in negotiations with the STG were too high for a diplomatic resolution. The ceasefire provides the SDF an opportunity to negotiate and end the conflict diplomatically. Unless the SDF are prepared to come back to the table with revised goals for the level of autonomy, this may be the end of a possible Kurdish state, for now.

Background

Last week, it looked as though a new country was to be created after a declared secession in South Yemen. First, a quick background on the situation in Yemen and the key factions involved.

A unified Yemeni state is a relatively recent reality, one that did not exist before 1990. As with the UAE and others in the region, the area was initially comprised of more than 20 separate, much smaller ‘sultanates’ and ‘sheikhdoms’.

Until the 1960s, the area was divided into two: the former Ottoman-controlled northwest, which had become the ‘Kingdom of Yemen’ and the British ‘Aden Protectorate’ in the south.

Although the British protectorate was briefly divided into two: ‘South Arabia’ and the ‘Federation of the Emirates of the South’, they reunified into the ‘People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen’, also known as South Yemen, after breaking from British influence in 1967.

The Kingdom of Yemen became the ‘Yemen Arab Republic’ in the 1960s after a coup d’état and civil war overthrew the monarchy there. The two Yemeni states clashed in the 1970s, with wars in 1972 and 1979. Finally, in 1990, after two years of negotiation, they unified into the ‘Republic of Yemen’.

Yemen was one of the many countries that changed leadership during the Arab Spring of the early 2010s. The President, Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had been in power since the unification in 1990, stepped down in 2012. A transitional government was established, but to vastly oversimplify things, when it stayed in power beyond the original 2-year mandate, the country descended into civil war, which has been ongoing since 2014.

The Southern Transitional Council (STC) have been fighting for an independent state in southern Yemen since the group was formed in 2017 by dismissed members of the Yemeni government.

Until very recently, control of the country has been largely divided into three primary forces. The STC (backed by the UAE), Ansar Allah (known widely as the Houthis, and backed by Iran), and the internationally recognised Government of Yemen. The primary backer of the government is Saudi Arabia.

Recent changes

As shown in the map below, territorial control was fairly evenly split between the three groups. However, large areas of Yemen are sparsely populated and areas under Houthi control account for an estimated 65%+ of the population, with ≈20% in STC areas, and ≈15% living in government-controlled areas.

Changes to territorial control had been largely stagnant since an agreement by the government to recognise STC legitimacy, and each side shifted focus towards the Houthis. However, in December 2025, the STC began an offensive against the government, rapidly advancing and seizing huge swathes of territory. It’s worth remembering that the rapid advances can be largely explained by the fact that the areas being fought over are so sparse and are built along only a handful of key roadways.

Now controlling much of the land they claimed as a separate state, last week they declared the initiation of a formal secession process from Yemen. The new country was declared to be the State of “South Arabia”, a clear nod to the former British Protectorate.

Current situation

Shortly after taking control of these new territories and issuing its intention to secede, the Yemeni government, with support from its Saudi allies and pro-government forces, started a counterattack.

Saudi Arabia carried out airstrikes against STC forces directly, as well as ports being used to deliver equipment from the UAE to the STC.

The counterattack quickly retook all the areas lost in December and then continued its advance into core STC territory. Government-aligned forces had reached and taken control of the major city of Aden by the middle of the week. Aden, the capital of the new ‘South Arabia’, had been under the control of the STC for nearly a decade.

The STC suffered a complete collapse in under a week, and their President, Aidarus al-Zubaidi, has fled to the UAE via Somalia. Even the island of Socotra, 350km (220 miles) off the south coast of Yemen, appears to have been abandoned by the UAE-aligned forces. On Friday, the leaders of the STC dissolved the organisation, exactly one week after they proudly declared independence.

The Saudi armed forces have struggled to make much progress against the Houthis in previous campaigns. It will be interesting to see over the coming months whether the STC were particularly ill-prepared for a serious armed engagement, or if the successes will be possible to repeat in retaking the Houthi-controlled areas of the country.

It is also worth remembering that this is not the end of southern separatism. Although the size of the movement may have been overstated due to UAE backing, there are distinct differences between the Southern and Northern Yemeni populations, historically, religiously, and in terms of political identity.

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Images appeared this week on the Chinese social media platform Weibo of a Chinese cargo vessel docked in Shanghai, loaded with containers that are fitted with launchers.

The ship shown in the pictures is the Zhong Da 79, a 320ft cargo ship which appears, until now, to have operated primarily on domestic shipping routes.

The containers visible on deck carry large text markings reading:

中华民族海洋复兴与
人类海洋命运共同体计划

This translates as:

“The Plan for the Maritime Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation and the Maritime Community with a Shared Future for Mankind.”

The wording appears to be a naval-themed adaptation of common Chinese government slogans, including:

“Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” and “building a community with a shared future for mankind”

Due to the somewhat humorous nature of using these modified slogans, there has been some online speculation that these images were fabricated. However, Planet Labs satellite imagery shared by Decker Eveleth on Twitter shows the vessel docked in Shanghai with container-mounted silos and radar systems clearly visible.

What is on the ship?

Images show five rows of containers along the length of the ship, and five along the width. The central three rows all appear to contain missile launchers. Each launcher consists of four launch tubes, suggesting a total of approximately sixty launch tubes installed on the vessel.

While the central three rows are all just one container high, the aft container row is stacked up to three high and appears to be fitted with radar systems mounted atop the containers.

The forward container row is stacked up to two containers high and appears to include a CIWS (Close-in Weapon System), as well as multiple naval decoy launchers. These two systems are defensive in nature, with decoys to confuse or divert incoming threats and the CIWS designed to intercept and destroy incoming munitions.

Why is this concerning to see?

It has been theorised that this vessel is intended to be a concealed or improvised warship. In practice, the systems seen to be installed would make the ship easy to identify and distinguish from civilian cargo vessels.

Configured as seen, such ships could provide a lower-cost method to bring overwhelming naval mass, avoiding the cost and production timelines associated with conventional military naval warships. While more vulnerable and easier to target, their relative simplicity would allow for faster production and replacement in the event of losses.

Containerised weapons systems are not a new concept. Similar approaches have been explored or employed by multiple countries, including Ukraine (with Operation Spiderweb), Russia (with Club-K launchers), and the United States.

Thousands of containers enter the US from China every single day. Shipping routes pass close to US naval bases and Air Force Bases. In the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the threat of even a limited number of containerised weapons positioned near critical US infrastructure could complicate early US military responses. Any delay in US action responding to Chinese aggression could be decisive in determining the outcome of the war.

The US has repeatedly stated that, while it does not formally recognise Taiwanese independence, it would come to Taiwan’s defence if it were to be invaded by China. These statements may be effective as a deterrent to Chinese ambition. However, the military and economic costs of a direct conflict with China would be substantial and could ultimately constrain the scope and speed of any US response.

More broadly, the blurring of distinctions between civilian and military platforms increases risks to civilians. Whether it be placing military equipment in civilian areas or concealing military equipment as civilian, these practices raise the likelihood of misidentification and collateral damage, particularly in high-intensity conflict environments.

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