Originally published on Forbes.ru by Leonid Tsukanov
Republished with permission.

The draft of the new peace plan, which sources close to the negotiating group shared with the media, first and foremost the Iranian agency Mehr, summed up the results of three months of talks in the “Islamabad format” and in many ways repeated the spirit of its predecessor — the “historical one-page memorandum,” which Washington and Tehran discussed in early May 2026, but never managed to agree on because of a new escalation of the conflict.

As in the previous version, questions of regional security are placed at the center. In particular, the U.S. and Iran are supposed to lift restrictions on vessel movement through the Strait of Hormuz within a short time frame, as well as halt fighting on all fronts, including Lebanon, which is specifically included in the memorandum. In addition, Washington is said to agree to withdraw its units from areas surrounding Iran — both on land and at sea.

Quite a lot of attention in the leaked version of the draft is also given to the economy. In particular, it envisaged the unfreezing of Iran’s foreign assets totaling at least $24 billion and the removal of sanctions from its oil and gas sector, including by lifting restrictions on top officials and businesspeople. Washington was also supposed to pay Iran $300 billion in compensation for rebuilding infrastructure destroyed during the fighting.

In exchange, Tehran would agree to continue peace talks — including working on increasing transparency in the national nuclear program — and to abandon the development of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the issue of the status of Iran’s enriched uranium is left out of the published version of the memorandum.

Conflict of versions

It is important to note one key caveat here: it still is not known for certain how close this leak is to the final version of the agreement. Officially, neither Washington nor Tehran is disclosing the document’s contents. Both sides justify this by citing national security concerns and promise to share the details only after signing. They also appear to be suggesting that the document has already been signed electronically and only needs to be formally put on paper.

At the same time, the most controversial provisions are being denied. In particular, U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance did not confirm U.S. agreement to the imminent unfreezing of frozen Iranian assets. “The truth is that Iran will have a much more prosperous future if it fulfills the obligations it is taking on under this agreement,” he said in an interview with CBS. Given these statements, the supposedly promised Iranian “compensation payments” of $300 billion and the hypothetical lifting of restrictions on the national oil sector are also automatically called into question.

It is possible that the Mehr-published “draft memorandum” is aimed at a domestic audience — in order to further legitimize the diplomatic settlement. Especially since shortly before the announcement that the deal had been finalized, Iran, as a gesture of trust, canceled its “operation of revenge” against Israel for the latest strike on the Dahieh Shiite district in the Lebanese capital, which sparked an outburst of anger among Iranian conservatives. The numerous symbolic concessions mentioned in the draft document help offset the reputational damage.

At the same time, Iranian officials, including Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei, continue to insist that the memorandum still contains an economic component. “The unfreezing of Iran’s frozen assets, along with the issue of post-damage reconstruction, are two important issues. The American side is determined to take measures in both cases,” Baghaei noted.

Moreover, the Iranian side is cautiously hinting that if the memorandum’s terms are violated — including on sanctions relief — Tehran is ready to return to its previous model of confrontation, in particular by restricting shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

The Israel factor

Another “zone of vulnerability” in the future peace agreement is the position of Israel, which does not accept the concessions laid out in the memorandum, seeing them as contrary to national interests. In particular, it does not intend to observe the “quiet regime” in Lebanon announced by Donald Trump or leave previously occupied territories, since Hezbollah strikes on Israeli border towns continue even during the ceasefire.

Interestingly, a few days before the information about the upcoming deal was made public, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu outlined four key conflict-resolution goals to the American side, compliance with which would make the Israeli side consider the deal satisfactory. Among them are the removal of stocks of highly enriched uranium from the Islamic Republic, dismantling of enrichment infrastructure, the establishment of strict “ceilings” for the missile program, and the complete dissolution of the proxy-group system (the so-called axis of resistance) in the Middle East. However, these points apparently were not included in the final text of the memorandum. Moreover, discussion of the missile program and the future of the proxy system was deliberately pushed to later stages. On some individual points — for example, preserving Iran’s right to low-level enrichment under IAEA supervision — Washington made significant concessions.

At the moment, Israel has not officially announced plans to intensify strikes on Lebanon in response to the upcoming agreement — although the country’s defense minister, Israel Katz, had earlier warned that the fighting would continue. Nevertheless, given pressure from the White House, the Israelis will most likely refrain from strikes at least until Friday — to give the U.S. the opportunity to complete the memorandum signing ceremony.

Waiting for Peace

The international community greeted the news of a possible reconciliation between Iran and the U.S. with cautious optimism — something visible, among other things, in the dynamics of global energy prices. One of the first to respond was U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres, who welcomed the achievement of a difficult compromise. Guterres also confirmed that the U.N. is ready to support the sides in achieving a sustainable and comprehensive peace.

Representatives of the so-called E3 (Britain, Germany, France) stated their readiness to lift sanctions — but only if Iran adheres to a policy of “verifiable actions” regarding the development of its national nuclear program and returns cooperation with the IAEA to prewar levels. In addition, Paris and London promised to help restore shipping through the Strait of Hormuz — including by taking part in its demining.

The Russian side also welcomed the results of months of work by Iranian and American diplomats. As Russian President Vladimir Putin noted during a phone call with Trump, it was extremely important to settle the conflict, which “threatened to set the whole region on fire.” In addition, Moscow expressed its readiness to take an active role in further settlement efforts, including in the role of guarantor of a long-term agreement.

Interestingly, even before the memorandum is officially signed in Geneva, representatives of the U.S. and Iran are planning to meet in Doha to discuss technical issues and settle “specific disagreements.” At the same time, they will also underscore their commitment to talks.

However, even if the settlement process ultimately fails, Trump has a fallback plan. As the Republican previously noted, if diplomacy fails, the U.S. will either resume a military operation against Iran or take on the role of “guardian of the Middle East” — in exchange for 20% of the region’s revenues.

And although the last initiative is unlikely to help establish long-term peace, it will definitely make it possible to preserve Washington’s influence over the regional security system, including by helping to balance Iran’s new position.

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Peruvians went to the polls twice over the course of two months to choose their next president. The first round, held in April 2025, narrowed a crowded field of more than a dozen candidates down to two finalists, neither of whom secured the outright majority required for a first-round victory. And now the runoff on June 7 the race between market-friendly conservative Keiko Fujimori (Popular Force) and left-wing congressman Roberto Sánchez (Together for Peru) is separated by only a few thousand votes, which produced the razor‑thin mmargin that has since plunged the country into a prolonged and bitter electoral dispute.

Initial rural counts gave Sánchez a small lead of roughly 50.10% to 49.90% early in the week. The thin margin separating conservative Keiko Fujimori and leftist Roberto Sánchez is a symptom of a deeper institutional rot that Washington has long exploited to maintain hegemony in its historical backyard. While early rural returns initially placed Sánchez ahead, a surge of late-stage ballots from overseas voters and urban strongholds has flipped the thin margin back in Fujimori’s favor. The ultimate outcome now rests entirely in the hands of the electoral courts, which must meticulously review up to 400,000 flagged and disputed ballots from Lima and Callao before the National Office of Electoral Processes can formally certify a winner by mid-July. This hyper-polarized standoff directly mirrors the nation’s turbulent 2021 election cycle, ensuring that whoever takes the oath of office on July 28 will inherit a deeply fractured government characterized by a newly reinstated bicameral congress where neither political faction commands a clear legislative majority.

The current electoral crisis cannot be understood without examining the previous presidential crises. Between 2016 and the present day, Peru has seen eight different presidents come and go, a staggering turnover driven primarily by a succession of impeachment votes initiated by a Congress that wields immense constitutional power yet commands little public respect.

Pedro Castillo, a rural schoolteacher who won the 2021 election, was impeached and imprisoned after attempting to dissolve Congress in December 2022. His successor, Dina Boluarte, was herself impeached in October 2025 following the “Rolexgate” corruption scandal. José Jerí lasted just 130 days as president before being censured, and interim President José María Balcázar now holds the seat only until the July 28 transfer of power. This alarming trend of rapid presidential succession is the predictable outcome of an institutional framework that Washington has deliberately weakened over decades.

The contest between Fujimori and Sánchez represents more than a simple left-right political divide. Sánchez, the political heir of the imprisoned Castillo, has promised to rewrite the constitution and redistribute wealth more equitably, a pledge that has earned him fervent support in Peru’s rural highlands. Fujimori, the daughter of the late authoritarian former president, who was convicted of crimes against humanity and died in prison, presents herself as the guardian of market-friendly stability. Both candidates, however, operate within a system whose rules are increasingly shaped by external actors and its congress. The Sánchez campaign has aggressively alleged electoral irregularities, particularly focusing on the diaspora vote in the United States where Fujimori secured 76 percent of the ballots. While the formal complaint did not directly implicate the US government, the speed with which speculation about Washington’s hidden hand spread across social media speaks to a deeper suspicion that is entirely justified by historical precedent.

The geopolitical dimension of Peru’s crisis becomes unmistakably clear when one examines the $1.3 billion megaport at Chancay, located 80 kilometers north of Lima. This Belt and Road Initiative project, majority owned by China’s Cosco Shipping, has become the primary flashpoint in the intensifying US-China rivalry over Latin America. The Trump administration has issued alarmist warnings about the port, with the State Department claiming that Peru could “lose its sovereignty” to Chinese interests. Yet the reality is far more nuanced. Chinese investment has brought tangible economic benefits, including reduced shipping times and lower logistics costs, and Peruvian officials have repeatedly affirmed that sovereignty remains firmly in Lima’s hands. The US response, which includes [designating]{.underline} Peru as a major non-NATO ally and negotiating a naval facility near Chancay, reveals Washington’s true objective: not the protection of Peruvian autonomy but the containment of Chinese influence.

As the review of contested ballots drags on, the fundamental question remains unanswered: whether Peru will be allowed to determine its own destiny or whether it will continue to serve as a pawn in Washington’s grand strategy of containment. The Trump administration has increasingly targeted the Chinese-built Chancay Multipurpose Port Terminal, identifying it as a strategic security threat in the Western Hemisphere and pressuring Peru to reclaim sovereignty over the facility, which might include disrupting the port's operations with methods similar to those used by the government of Panama. The multipolar transition is irreversible, but its path will be marked by such crises as existing power structures resist their inevitable decline. Although Keiko Fujimori has pledged to strengthen ties with the United States and attract more U.S. investment to Peru, she is unlikely to “ditch” China entirely, at least in the immediate aftermath. China [remains]{.underline} Peru’s largest investor, with deep stakes in mining, infrastructure, and energy. Fujimori may prefer a fusion approach where she would balance closer US relations while maintaining pragmatic economic ties with Beijing, not choose one over the other.

Peru’s choice, assuming it is permitted a genuine choice, will send ripples across the continent. If Sánchez prevails, the United States will undoubtedly ramp up its hybrid warfare tactics to destabilize his administration, just as it has done with every other leftist government that dared to challenge its dominance. If Fujimori wins, her administration will receive US pressure to shun China in favor of deeper alignment with Washington, sacrificing the tangible economic benefits of Beijing’s Belt and Road investments for the uncertain promise of American strategic support, even if Peru never receives adequate compensation for what it loses in trade, infrastructure financing, and diplomatic leverage.

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Today Donald Trump turns 80 years old. For his anniversary, he wished to secure a ceasefire agreement with Iran, but unfortunately that does not appear likely to happen. Pakistan, acting as a mediator, has been spreading information that an agreement had been reached, but no agreement has actually been reached. There are major protests in Tehran against Abbas Araghchi. Many points in the proposed agreement remain disputed. Iran is demanding security guarantees that go beyond the framework of the United Nations, whose resolutions neither the United States nor Israel consistently respect. Iran also wants the U.S. Congress to prohibit war against Iran—a principle that is already being violated at this very moment.

Trump is certainly the greatest destroyer of the existing world order. If his mission is to demolish humanity’s house with a bulldozer, then he has succeeded, become a hero in that role, and can celebrate his anniversary with fireworks.

This ceasefire with Iran marks the beginning of an enormous and fundamental transformation of the Middle East—a transformation long awaited and won through terrible and numerous sacrifices. Perhaps deservedly, the region is paying the price for its shortsightedness, geopolitical immaturity, and greed born from the easy wealth generated by oil—a resource that belongs to the Earth itself, not to the people who happen to live on it temporarily.

Collaboration with the West, the acceptance of the petrodollar system—which I consider a crime against humanity committed by Saudi Arabia —the neglect of Arab and Muslim rights by their own monarchs and presidents, the arrogance of Muslims, and their complacency and laziness: all of these have contributed to the blood price the Middle East is paying today. They are only now beginning to realize what it means to sell themselves. Hopefully, they have learned their lesson.

For decades, the United States has pursued a fundamentally flawed policy in the Middle East. Because of Henry Kissinger and other supposedly “brilliant“ advisers, America’s Middle Eastern strategy degenerated into nothing more than simple plunder—a behavior characteristic of primitive beings rather than an advanced civilization. Now the United States is also receiving what it deserves: a humiliating loss of power and influence, defeated and forced into retreat.

Israel, too, has received its greatest lesson. One cannot live under the illusion of being good while not being good, nor deceive the world into believing one’s actions are righteous while committing wrongdoing for eighty years. Everyone in the Middle East ultimately receives what they deserve. Iran as well, because from this point onward it will have to become a regional leader carrying enormous responsibility toward the other states and peoples of the region.

The internal upheavals within the United States are enormous. Tulsi Gabbard’s revelations concerning American biolaboratories are part of those upheavals. Those revelations were supposed to occur under Trump’s presidency. Instead, he chose to become a dependent president and failed to lead the fight against the so-called Deep State on a global scale. As a result, Gabbard’s disclosures are emerging after she left the system rather than while directing it.

She is expected to reveal even more information. Together with Thomas Massie, Tucker Carlson, Candace Owens, and other MAGA activists, Tulsi Gabbard appears to be participating in what is currently an unofficial movement that, in my opinion, will eventually become a formal public opposition to Trump and to any president unwilling to serve the people.

They have already been accused of promoting Russian interests in the United States and of being paid by Russia—an accusation that is frankly ridiculous. Republicans who themselves suffered through Russiagate are now accusing members of their own party or allied Democrats such as Gabbard of participating in a new Russiagate.

The conspiracy regarding the biolaboratories has, in my view, already been proven. Two other major conspiracies, in my opinion, remain to be proven: first, that the U.S. government maintains official contact with extraterrestrial entities (with the Pentagon gradually declassifying information concerning recorded extraterrestrial phenomena and eventually, I believe, revealing actual contact with extraterrestrial representatives); and second, that September 11 was fabricated and organized by the American state itself to justify war against Islam and establish complete control over the American people and populations elsewhere.

Specifically within the United States, all of the mechanisms of surveillance and control exercised by intelligence agencies over the population emerged after September 11, including comprehensive monitoring and recording of nearly everything. In this interpretation, September 11 served as a cover under which the state introduced totalitarian control over people’s lives.

Now, following Tulsi Gabbard’s resignation, a crisis has also emerged concerning FISA, one of the principal legal frameworks for surveillance and intelligence gathering under the pretext of combating terrorism. Some of these laws are now reportedly being discussed for repeal, which would be revolutionary. America is attempting to free itself from its own prison; whether it will succeed is another matter.

It can certainly be argued that the present war with Iran—long desired and prepared by American and Israeli hawks—marks the end of the era of the “War on Terror“ that the United States created. In my view, this included fostering or helping create organizations such as Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Hamas, and other destructive movements within Islam. Officially, they claimed to be fighting terrorism, but in reality the United States looted, subjugated, and devastated the Middle East while extracting its resources, often with the active cooperation and even encouragement of some Arabs and Muslims themselves.

Now the day of reckoning has arrived for the Middle East. The masks have long since fallen, accountability has arrived, and everyone is receiving what they deserve. The same, I believe, will eventually happen elsewhere in the world.

In honor of Donald Trump’s 80th birthday, this is my gift to him.

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Originally published on Geopolitika.ru by Leonid Savin.
Republished with permission.

On June 2, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that “we now have in this hemisphere a coalition of friendly nations — more than a dozen — that have aligned themselves to work not only on the shared security challenges we all face, but also on the economic prosperity that goes hand in hand with them.”

“It is a remarkable development that, broadly speaking — aside from Nicaragua, aside from Cuba, aside from Venezuela, which continues to face significant challenges, and of course Brazil, currently in the middle of an electoral cycle, as well as, to some extent, the current administration in Colombia — at least its president has been difficult to work with — but broadly speaking, this is now a region full of U.S. allies, of U.S.-friendly leaders, with a pro-American orientation. Now, clearly, we need to translate that into concrete action after 20 years of neglect during which China and other global powers have encroached upon our Western Hemisphere to the detriment not only of U.S. national interests, but also, in our view, of the peoples of those countries.”

This statement sparked heated debate. While Venezuela remained conspicuously silent, and Cuba and Nicaragua condemned the remarks as unacceptable, Brazilian President Lula da Silva criticized Rubio’s posture as hostile not only toward Brazil but toward Latin America as a whole — describing Rubio himself as a staunch adversary of Cuba and several other Latin American nations.

The fact is that the Washington establishment has once again decided to impose additional 25% tariffs on a range of Brazilian goods. On the eve of elections in a country whose political landscape has grown increasingly polarized in recent years, this is a clear U.S. signal that the administration no longer wishes to see Lula — or his successor — at the helm of the Brazilian state.

Furthermore, on May 28, the United States designated the Brazilian criminal organizations Comando Vermelho (CV) and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) as terrorist organizations, opening the door to deeper interference and pressure under the pretext of security concerns.

Likewise, on June 2, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum accused U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Ronald Douglas Johnson of interfering in the country’s internal affairs. Earlier, the United States had filed drug trafficking charges against Rubén Rocha Moya, governor of the Mexican state of Sinaloa — and before that, in April of this year, the CIA conducted a raid on the territory of Chihuahua without the consent of Mexico’s official authorities.

The reaction of the Mexican head of state is understandable. Over the past decade, the U.S. government has used the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to spy on left-leaning governments across Latin America and attempt to destabilize them. DEA interference operations targeted Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, former Bolivian President Evo Morales, and Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador. In the course of the resulting scandals, it emerged that the DEA had collaborated with known criminals — including drug traffickers and individuals involved in money laundering — to run covert operations against left-wing politicians.

Despite this, U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies continue to penetrate countries across the region with relentless persistence.

Rubio’s statement, taken together with Washington’s current actions across the region, reflects the systematic effort by Washington to consolidate control over the entire Western Hemisphere. This is Monroe Doctrine 2.0 in action. The toolkit ranges from blackmail and violations of international law — as applied to Cuba (recent measures include the White House calling on all foreign companies to abandon the island under threat of severe sanctions, prompting Canadian and Spanish travel companies serving dozens of major hotels across the country to cease operations) and Venezuela — to pressure under implausible pretexts (the drug cartel narrative in Mexico and Colombia).

The situation with Venezuela is the most transparent. Even within the United States, globalists at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) have acknowledged that their government has pursued total control over Venezuelan oil, though beyond official fragments, no one can say exactly how this scheme operates. Nevertheless, as the CFR itself notes, “the opacity of the system is not limited to oil. The Trump administration also controls Venezuelan exports of gold and other minerals.”

It should also be noted that Colombian President Gustavo Petro was subjected to intense U.S. pressure throughout his term — including demands that he abandon cooperation with China. So far, Colombian leadership has stood in solidarity with regional counterparts critical of U.S. foreign policy, but there is a real risk that, following the presidential runoff elections in June, the country’s current political trajectory could shift.

For compliant clients, of course, there is a sweetener — in the form of investment pledges and enhanced cooperation. For instance, in 2025, the U.S. administration signed framework trade agreements with Argentina, Guatemala, Ecuador, and El Salvador — countries whose current leaders closely follow Washington’s lead.

As for those investments, they are not offered on equal terms. As the experience of the twentieth century demonstrates, capital flows into the region from the United States or from supranational financial structures — such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (effectively controlled by the Rockefeller financial network) — come with strings attached: reduction of government social subsidies, tax relief for foreign corporations, and preferential conditions for creditors hand-picked by the lenders themselves. In corporate parlance, this is called liberalization and “creating a favorable investment climate.”

In reality, it amounts to the plunder of national resources, the transfer of the economy to external control, and the erosion of sovereignty.

Latin American countries walked this same path during the Cold War, when, at the initiative of John F. Kennedy, the Alliance for Progress was established — distributing loans and credits under the guise of development aid. Moreover, in the 1960s, the private investment corporation ADELA was founded in the United States which, with the direct support of the World Bank and the IMF, systematically dismantled nationally-owned enterprises through the 1990s.

The United States is now pursuing this agenda more openly as part of its new foreign policy posture. Rubio’s admission that Washington seeks to drive China — and, implicitly, Russia (though Russian assets in Latin America are far more limited than China’s) — out of the region suggests that Washington fears countries developing effectively outside U.S. control and pursuing independent policy frameworks. It also reflects an attempt to preserve U.S. hegemony — including dollar dominance — over the region, while slowing the advance of multipolarity as much as possible.

Even in countries governed by pro-Trump administrations, the deep political polarization signals that their populations are not prepared to accept the transformation of their nations into new U.S. client states. The fight goes on.

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Originally published on VOR - voiceofrussia.net by Leonid Savin.
Republished with permission.

Pakistan and Russia have agreed to advance a comprehensive Economic Cooperation Programme until 2030, aimed at deepening collaboration in trade, energy, investment, technology, and regional connectivity, reflecting the growing momentum in bilateral relations between the two countries.

The development was highlighted during an international webinar titled “Pakistan–Russia Bilateral Relations at the Cusp of a Shifting Global Order,” jointly organized by the University of World Civilizations, Moscow, and the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI).

The webinar brought together diplomats, policymakers, scholars, journalists, and strategic experts from both countries to discuss the future trajectory of Pakistan-Russia relations amid evolving global political and economic dynamics.

The chief guest was Sardar Awais Ahmed Khan Leghari, Federal Minister for Energy and focal person for Pakistan-Russia relations. Pakistani participants included former Ambassador Masood Khan, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister Tariq Fatemi, Ambassador Jauhar Saleem, and renowned journalist Talat Hussain.

Russian participants included Dmitri Alexander, Director of Sputnik International and Russia Today, Dr. Natalia Zamaraeva, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and Dr. Roksolana Yurievna Zhigon, Director of the Scientific Center “Diplomacy of Peoples, Partnership of Civilizations.”

Addressing the webinar, Federal Minister Sardar Awais Ahmed Khan Leghari said Pakistan-Russia relations have undergone a significant positive transformation over the past two decades, evolving from historical mistrust into a pragmatic and constructive partnership based on mutual interests.

He noted that high-level political engagement has increased considerably in recent years, pointing to several meetings between Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif and Russian President Vladimir Putin as evidence of growing strategic convergence.

Leghari emphasized that the Pakistan-Russia Intergovernmental Commission (IGC) remains the principal mechanism for expanding cooperation in energy, trade, defense, and technology. He announced that both countries have agreed to move forward with an Economic Cooperation Programme extending to 2030, which is expected to help address longstanding challenges, including banking and payment mechanisms affecting bilateral trade.

The minister also highlighted the recently signed Russia-Pakistan Readmission Agreement, saying it would facilitate visa procedures, promote business travel, and strengthen people-to-people contacts between the two countries.

On regional connectivity, Leghari stated that Pakistan is interested in joining the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and supports linking the corridor with Gwadar Port, a move that could significantly enhance regional trade and complement broader connectivity initiatives across Eurasia.

Pakistan’s Ambassador to Russia, Faisal Niaz Tirmizi, said that Pakistan and Russia today have a historic opportunity to elevate their relationship beyond traditional diplomacy. He noted that Pakistan’s role in facilitating dialogue between the United States and Iran has further underscored its importance as a key diplomatic player in regional and global affairs.

Ambassador Tirmizi stressed that cooperation in security, trade facilitation, technological innovation, education, and road, rail, and air connectivity would serve as key pillars of a stronger and more resilient bilateral relationship.

Special Assistant to the Prime Minister Tariq Fatemi highlighted the growing scope of cooperation between the two countries, particularly in the energy sector, which he described as opening a new chapter in Pakistan-Russia relations.

Former Ambassador Masood Khan emphasized the need to significantly increase bilateral trade, currently estimated at around $1.3 billion, and suggested that Pakistan could serve as an important gateway for Russian trade to the Arabian Sea and wider regional markets.

Participants from both countries underscored Pakistan’s geo-strategic importance as a bridge connecting South Asia, Central Asia, and the broader Eurasian region. They also stressed the importance of expanding cooperation in trade, energy, education, technology, counter-terrorism, and people-to-people exchanges.

Russian participants described the anticipated visit of Pakistan’s Prime Minister to Russia as a highly significant development for bilateral relations and expressed confidence that continued high-level engagement would further strengthen cooperation between the two countries.

The webinar concluded with a shared recognition that stronger Pakistan-Russia relations can contribute significantly to regional stability, economic prosperity, connectivity, and constructive international cooperation in an increasingly multipolar world.

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Originally published on Izvestia by Leonid Tsukanov. Republished with permission.

The US and Iran exchanged strikes amid mounting tensions in the Strait of Hormuz. The trigger for the conflict was the downing of an American multi-purpose helicopter, AH-64 Apache,9^th of June, in the territorial waters of Oman — which, according to President Donald Trump, was the result of an Iranian attack. In response, the United States struck Iranian air defense systems and logistics centers, while Tehran attacked military bases across the region. Trump continued issuing threats. Nevertheless, despite a series of incidents, experts interviewed by Izvestia believe the risks of renewed active hostilities between the two countries remain negligible.

The Hormuz Escalation

The escalation in the Strait of Hormuz began following the crash of the AH-64 Apache helicopter. The incident occurred near the Strait of Hormuz, and according to American sources, it was caused by “fire contact“ with Iranian air defense systems. Although the Pentagon’s investigation results have not yet been published, some American media outlets, citing sources, reported that the helicopter had been struck by a kamikaze drone Shahed. This version remains the primary working theory, as the helicopter had previously been escorting commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz and went down in the territorial waters of Oman. The crew survived.

Shortly after the incident, US Central Command (CENTCOM) launched limited operations against Iranian military targets. In a series of phases, Iranian air defense systems, ground-based command posts, and radar stations were struck — in total, more than two dozen targets were identified. The strikes were carried out near the cities of Bandar Abbas and Minab, as well as the Qeshm and Sirik areas. CENTCOM stated that “this operation was a proportionate response to unprovoked Iranian aggression.”

Washington Pulls Back

Shortly thereafter, the US announced a halt to its attacks, citing the achievement of its designated objectives. Alexei Yurkov, a senior researcher at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at IMEMO, believes the speed of Washington’s de-escalation may have been linked to a low tolerance for personnel casualties — a defining characteristic of American and Western strategic culture. He noted that while there were no fatalities in this particular incident, the risk was real, and the Trump administration has already demonstrated sensitivity to that level of losses.

Iran, for its part, characterized the US actions as naked military aggression. Official Tehran claims that one of the strikes hit civilian infrastructure, including a freshwater reservoir and a communications tower. In response, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) struck 21 targets in Persian Gulf states, including Bahrain and Kuwait. Jordan also reported intercepting several missiles aimed at one of its air bases.

Tehran’s Calculated Ambiguity

The Iranian Foreign Ministry declared that it was not seeking further escalation, framing the helicopter incident as a “fatal accident.” Yet Tehran is using the episode to project its resolve to control the situation in the Strait of Hormuz. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that foreign countries with forces stationed near Iran’s borders would be better off withdrawing from the region, warning them not to “find themselves in the crossfire.”

Political analyst Gevorgyan noted that this kind of deliberate ambiguity on Tehran’s part serves both domestic and foreign policy objectives. The publicly stated disproportionality of the response satisfies domestic audiences, while the actual retaliatory actions remain sufficiently contained — leaving the country room for diplomatic maneuvering.

Nuclear Talks Stall

Despite the escalation, the parties have recently made progress on the negotiating track. According to The New York Times, citing White House sources, Washington and Tehran have narrowed the issue of Iran’s nuclear program down to four key points. These reportedly include a long-term suspension of uranium enrichment in Iran, the dilution or mixing of already enriched material to safe levels, Tehran’s agreement to unannounced IAEA inspections, and the dismantling of those nuclear facilities that are not operational but are integrated into the Islamic Republic’s peaceful nuclear program.

If this is the case, the U.S. has significantly scaled back its demands—in particular, the condition regarding the transfer of Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium to U.S. representatives has been removed from the agenda.

Other sticking points remain within the framework of a potential deal between Washington and Tehran. Despite efforts to streamline the agenda, confidence-building has so far proven elusive. As Gevorgyan noted, the Apache helicopter incident has become one of the factors reinforcing the unacceptability of foreign military presence near Iran’s borders — and is hardening negotiating positions on the status of the Strait of Hormuz.

Balancing on the Edge

On the whole, these periodic flare-ups are not disrupting the overall balance between Iran and the US. Both countries continue to navigate between military and diplomatic action, preserving the appearance of a commitment to compromise while defending their respective “red lines.” However, this strategy is losing its effectiveness as the frequency of strike exchanges decreases, pushing both sides to seek new security formulas. Trump has already declared that Tehran will “pay” for the delay in reaching a deal — but what that will look like remains unclear, given his previous contradictory statements.

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Originally published on Brasil de Fato as part of “Columna Valdai”, a biweekly column from Brasil de Fato by Marco Fernandes, who serves as its curator. Republished with permission.

by Mohammad Reza Dehshiri, dean of the School of International Relations at the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The war between the U.S. and Israel against Iran in 2026 represents a crucial moment in the transformation of regional and global security structures. The conflict was not a conventional interstate war, but a multidimensional confrontation involving military, economic, cyber, psychological, cognitive, media, and geopolitical domains. It accelerated structural changes in the international system, challenged the paradigm of American “absolute supremacy,” and highlighted the growing importance of asymmetric deterrence and strategic resilience.

This article examines the war from four perspectives: the main lessons learned from the conflict, Iran’s strategic gains, the broader regional and international consequences, and future scenarios for Iran–U.S. relations and regional security. It argues that the war revealed the limits of traditional military dominance, demonstrated the centrality of social capital in modern conflicts, and reinforced the role of geography, energy chokepoints, and cognitive warfare in shaping strategic outcomes.

The conclusions suggest that the postwar international order is increasingly characterized by multipolarity, strategic competition, controlled instability, and hybrid forms of deterrence. The future security architecture of the Middle East is likely to be shaped by a combination of rivalry, selective cooperation, and sustained geopolitical tension.

Political inflection

The 2026 war between the U.S. and Israel against Iran represents one of the most significant geopolitical turning points of the early 21st century. The conflict emerged in a context of intensifying global competition, shifting power structures, and growing disagreement over the rules and norms of the international system.

Unlike traditional wars, defined by front lines and clear military objectives, this conflict unfolded as a complex hybrid confrontation. It combined kinetic military operations with cyber warfare, economic sanctions, energy pressure, intelligence operations, psychological campaigns, and extensive media and narrative battles. As such, it reflected the evolution of modern warfare into a multidimensional phenomenon in which the boundaries between war and peace, military and civilian domains, and domestic and international arenas have become increasingly blurred.

At its core, the conflict represented a clash between two strategic outlooks. The first was the U.S.-Israeli logic of dominance, aimed at preserving regional superiority, imposing compliance, and shaping the strategic environment through coercive power. The second was the Iranian logic of survival, centered on sovereignty, deterrence, resilience, and resistance to external pressure.

The war did not merely reshape regional balances of power. It also accelerated broader structural transformations in the global system, including the decline of unipolarity, the emergence of multipolarity, the rise of asymmetric deterrence, and the growing militarization of economic and informational instruments.

Multidimensional nature

One of the most important lessons of the 2026 war is the confirmation that contemporary conflict is inherently multidimensional. War is no longer confined to the military domain, but extends across multiple interconnected arenas, including economic systems, cyber infrastructure, media ecosystems, psychological operations, and the management of cognitive perception.

The war demonstrated that success or failure in modern conflicts depends not only on battlefield outcomes, but also on the ability to shape narratives, influence perceptions, disrupt financial systems, and manage social resilience. Military power remains important, but it is no longer sufficient to secure strategic victory.

The war highlighted the fundamental distinction between two strategic orientations: domination and survival. Dominant powers often seek rapid, decisive victories in order to restructure opposing political systems. By contrast, survival-oriented actors prioritize endurance, perseverance, and long-term attrition.

The United States and its allies adopted a strategy aimed at coercive transformation and political collapse. Iran, however, interpreted the conflict as an existential struggle. This asymmetry in strategic perception shaped the war’s trajectory and ultimately contributed to the failure of dominance-based objectives.

Another key lesson of the conflict is the centrality of social capital in modern warfare. National cohesion, collective identity, political trust, and social solidarity emerged as critical determinants of resilience.

In the Iranian case, internal unity functioned as a force multiplier that increased the country’s ability to withstand external pressure. Social cohesion reduced vulnerability to destabilization efforts and reinforced institutional continuity under crisis conditions.

This shows that modern warfare depends increasingly on the resilience of societies, not only on the finite capabilities of states.

The conflict reinforced the importance of self-reliance in defense strategy. Iran’s reliance on national capabilities, decentralized defense structures, and low-cost military technologies illustrated the effectiveness of asymmetric approaches in confronting technologically superior adversaries.

Systems such as drones, ballistic missiles, and fast-attack maritime platforms played a central role in altering the conflict’s cost structure. The war demonstrated that lower-cost systems can impose disproportionate economic and strategic burdens on more advanced adversaries.

Despite technological advances, geography remained a decisive factor in shaping military outcomes. Terrain, distance, dispersion, and environmental conditions significantly influenced operational effectiveness.

Iran’s use of mountainous terrain, underground facilities, and distributed defense infrastructure increased survivability and operational continuity. This underscores the enduring relevance of classical geopolitical principles in modern warfare.

The war also demonstrated the growing importance of cognitive warfare. Narratives, perceptions, and information flows became central components of strategic competition.

Each side sought to shape domestic and international perceptions of legitimacy, success, and justification. Failure to control narratives can undermine military gains, while successful narrative construction can amplify strategic outcomes.

Iran’s strategic gains

One of Iran’s main achievements during the conflict was the preservation of political and institutional continuity. Despite sustained external pressure, the state maintained operational coherence, internal stability, and governance functionality.

Attempts at destabilization did not achieve their strategic objectives, and institutional structures remained intact throughout the conflict.

The war strengthened Iran’s multi-layered deterrence architecture. This included military deterrence, cyber capabilities, maritime influence, missile systems, networked alliances, and cognitive deterrence mechanisms.

Deterrence evolved from a purely military concept into a multidimensional system integrating economic, informational, and geopolitical components.

The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a central strategic asset in the conflict. As a critical chokepoint for global energy flows, its geopolitical importance increased substantially during the war.

The ability to influence maritime security and energy transit gave Iran greater strategic leverage in regional and global dynamics.

Iran successfully imposed significant costs on technologically superior adversaries through asymmetric means. The conflict demonstrated that cost asymmetry is a defining feature of modern warfare, in which cheaper systems can force expensive defensive responses. This dynamic turned the war into a prolonged economic and strategic contest of endurance.

Beyond material outcomes, Iran also achieved symbolic and civilizational gains. The conflict reinforced national identity, collective resilience, and social solidarity. The war also contributed to projecting Iran as a civilizational actor with distinct cultural, historical, and normative foundations.

Regional and international effects

The war contributed to the erosion of the post-Cold War unipolar order. The inability of any single actor to achieve decisive strategic dominance reflects a broader shift in the global distribution of power.

The conflict revealed the growing influence of domestic political conditions on foreign policy behavior. Polarization, institutional fragmentation, and legitimacy challenges constrain strategic decision-making.

The war exposed tensions within alliance systems. Divergent threat perceptions and strategic interests among allies reduced cohesion and coordination.

Economic instruments such as sanctions, trade restrictions, and energy controls became central tools of geopolitical competition. Economic interdependence is increasingly becoming a domain of strategic vulnerability.

The conflict accelerated the emergence of a multipolar international system characterized by competing power centers, diversified alliances, and fragmented governance structures.

Future scenarios

• A scenario characterized by mutual deterrence and the prevention of direct large-scale conflict. Competition continues, but escalation remains limited.

• A structured rivalry in which crises are contained through communication channels and selective diplomatic engagement.

• The continuation of indirect confrontation through non-state actors, cyber operations, economic pressure, and information warfare.

• Limited agreements may emerge, but remain vulnerable to collapse due to mistrust and unstable political conditions.

• A long-term transformation toward a multipolar system in the Middle East, characterized by strategic balancing, fragmented alliances, and mixed patterns of competition and cooperation.

Conclusion

The 2026 war between the U.S. and Israel against Iran represents a decisive moment in international politics. It revealed the limits of traditional military supremacy, the growing importance of asymmetric deterrence, and the centrality of social resilience, geography, and cognitive warfare in modern conflicts.

The war accelerated the decline of unipolarity and reinforced the transition toward a multipolar international order. It also demonstrated that contemporary security environments are shaped by complex interactions among military power, economic structures, information systems, and social resilience.

The future regional order will likely be characterized by strategic competition, controlled instability, selective diplomacy, and evolving forms of deterrence. Sustainable stability, however, will depend on the development of inclusive regional security mechanisms and continued diplomatic engagement.

_{This is an opinion piece and does not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Brasil de Fato.}

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Unexpectedly, Iran did the unthinkable—it attacked Israel over Lebanon after concluding that no negotiations were capable of bringing Netanyahu under any form of restraint, rules, or justice for his actions. In effect, we witnessed the reaction of a powerful state against the constant and untouchable Western dominance over everything in the world. Only the United States, Israel, and their allies in the United Kingdom and the European Union are supposedly allowed, in the name of democracy, to attack other countries, exploit nations, kill, torture, and abuse people. And then someone appeared in our time who delivered an uppercut to the face of what is seen as a frenzied Western monster. That happened last night. Iran carried out deterrent and corrective strikes against untouchable Israel. Did it manage to frighten them? Oh yes, very much so.

Other analyses may focus on the military aspects, but I will focus on the psychological ones. Iran did the unthinkable by daring to respond to its perceived masters and even forcing them to quiet down for a moment. Israel responded to the strikes, but without U.S. involvement. We witnessed another miracle—Trump is pressuring Netanyahu NOT to retaliate against Iran. Trump’s threats, insults, and aggressive rhetoric toward Iran are nowhere to be found. The desire to erase Iranians from the face of the Earth disappeared, and instead he began pressuring Netanyahu in Iran’s favor. Why? Because a statement allegedly emerged from the Iranian government claiming that Tehran HAS nuclear weapons and will use them in the Middle East if Israel does not stop the wars in Gaza and Lebanon. That’s right—in Gaza. And where would this nuclear bomb be used in the Middle East? Against Israel, not against me; I’m not in the Middle East. Ever since we heard about this bomb, Trump’s rhetoric changed dramatically, and last night we witnessed what seemed like a miracle—Trump asking Iran to stop striking Israel while urging Israel not to retaliate. The world has turned upside down.

Other interesting news regarding Israel concerns the growing scandals in the United States about Jewish influence on American politics. My prediction and opinion, expressed two and a half years ago, that then-President Biden did not agree with supporting Israel in what I viewed as the brutal slaughter in Gaza, now seems to be gaining support. Evidence is emerging that during Biden’s presidency there was extensive monitoring of senior American institutions and figures by Israeli intelligence services, including surveillance and espionage. This is now leading to controversial reactions.

So, whatever else may be said about Biden, he opposed Netanyahu over Gaza, whereas Trump, in this interpretation, became complicit in war crimes in Gaza, while Biden became complicit in Ukraine. Another notable development in the U.S. is the unprecedented decline in support for Israel within the Democratic Party. To such an extent that the careers of many party leaders and likely future presidential candidates may be doomed because of their support for Israel.

What does this suggest? Despite the lack of international reaction or meaningful sanctions against Israel over the events in Gaza and elsewhere, life itself does not let these matters pass. Revulsion is present, and many people—including and especially Israel’s allies—are instinctively distancing themselves from it. Whatever anyone says, if you are human, you can never remain indifferent to atrocities committed against a people and their children, even within supposedly insensitive American institutions. There are inhuman people, of course, but there are also human beings in Western countries, and they react. Even more so within American political parties, where they have far more information than we do about what has happened.

Thus, humanity may be incapable of stopping Israel, but life itself is stopping it by generating revulsion in people’s minds and hearts. I predict that the State of Israel will never again receive the same level of support and approval from the peoples of the world that it enjoyed after World War II. Forever, the Jews have lost the right to be tolerated and viewed as victims. The moment it became clear—and more truth will continue to emerge—that the victims had always been executioners, the story was over.

At present, Trump has not authorized strikes against Iran. He is proposing a week-long ceasefire. This has never happened before. THE EMPIRE IS NOT STRIKING BACK.

Now, a few words about Ukraine. It has been officially confirmed by both sides (unofficially, nothing can ever truly be confirmed) that Roman Abramovich traveled to Kyiv on May 21 to deliver a message from Zelensky to Putin. Since I received comments claiming that Russia was not involved in this visit and that only Britain was, I will explain.

It is impossible for Russian intelligence not to know who goes to Kyiv, and especially who meets with Zelensky. And if that person is Russian and not on any list of traitors, there is no way he could meet Zelensky without Putin knowing. Every morning, the president of every country receives a report on all important matters concerning the state. On our president’s desk, for example, the report is probably brief because Bulgaria has little significance on the international stage and has largely marginalized itself. Russia, however, matters greatly, and Putin’s daily briefing is long and detailed.

Therefore, such a visit could not have taken place without Moscow’s knowledge. Zelensky cannot simply call someone and say, “Come here so I can tell you something to pass on to Putin,” without that communication being intercepted. In my view, Abramovich was sent precisely because he serves as a communication channel with Ukraine. I do not know what was discussed or conveyed, but this information makes Zelensky’s letter to Putin appear fabricated, because what would be the point of sending messages through intermediaries and then writing letters as well?

For the first time, the St. Petersburg Forum ended with visible dissatisfaction directed at Putin. Comments throughout the Russian-speaking world that I follow suggest that dissatisfaction with Putin inside Russia is growing rapidly. The main reason is the endless continuation of the “Special Military Operation” and accusations that Russia is not properly intimidating—or, to put it mildly, dealing with—its enemies. This does not benefit Putin at all; his previous tactics and strategy are beginning to work against him.

Nothing like this has happened before, and it will be very interesting to see what he does next. We are witnessing an unprecedented phenomenon: SUPPORT FOR PUTIN AMONG FOREIGNERS NOW EXCEEDS SUPPORT FOR HIM AMONG RUSSIANS FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HIS CAREER.

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On 22 May 2026, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev signed the law ratifying his country’s accession to the BRICS New Development Bank. Official communications framed it as a milestone in South-South cooperation. Uzbek Senate readouts spoke of expanded “opportunities to attract foreign investment and finance large infrastructure and sustainable development projects.”

The question civil-society advocates need to ask is sharper: does NDB membership actually give Uzbekistan more autonomy from Western-aligned conditionality — more policy space to build productive capabilities in cotton, mining, agriculture, and energy — or does it replicate the same de-risking architecture under a different flag?

This is the question our new advocacy brief confronts head-on. And the answer, as our research finds, is neither a clean yes nor a clean no.

Why This Moment Matters

Uzbekistan is at a genuine structural inflection point. President Mirziyoyev’s reform decade has rebuilt the country’s external creditworthiness, lifted foreign reserves to US$66 billion according to the brief, and brought multilateral lenders back into the market. For the first time in the post-Soviet era, Uzbekistan has real choices about how it finances its development trajectory — choices that simply did not exist under the previous government.

NDB membership is one of those choices. With a $5 billion announced project pipeline (though, importantly, not yet approved), the stakes are high. But so is the risk of celebrating or dismissing the accession without serious scrutiny.

"The honest reading: NDB is a partially differentiated institution, not an alternative paradigm. Whether the differentiation translates into genuine development gains depends on how Uzbekistan and the NDB structure individual projects."

That scrutiny is precisely what our research provides — and it’s why we think this briefing matters beyond Uzbekistan’s borders. As more countries join the NDB’s expanding membership, the questions we raise here apply across the Global South.

What the Research Finds

Our brief maps the NDB’s genuine differentiators against the Bretton Woods institutions — the IMF and World Bank — and finds that the differences are real, but bounded. The NDB offers equal voting rights with no IMF-style weighted voting and no single-member veto, no programme-level policy conditionality of the kind the IMF attaches to its lending, and the use of national environmental and social standards rather than imposed international templates. Under NDB President Dilma Rousseff, the bank has also committed to providing 30% of total financing in the local currencies of borrowing members and exceeded its climate finance targets, with 55.3% of 2024 lending classified as climate-aligned according to the NDB’s 2024 Annual Report.

These are non-trivial features. Civil-society organizations have spent decades demanding exactly these kinds of reforms from the Bretton Woods institutions. To dismiss them out of hand would be intellectually dishonest.

Key Finding: According to the NDB’s 2024 Annual Report, climate finance comprised 55.3% of the year’s lending — exceeding the 40% target set for the 2022–2026 strategy period. New members including Egypt, UAE, Algeria, Colombia, and Uzbekistan collectively hold under US$1 billion in approved projects despite approximately five years of NDB expansion, while founding members carry a net portfolio of $35.2 billion across 105 projects.

Uzbekistan’s announced $5 billion pipeline is pipeline — not yet approved. The Egypt precedent, where NDB membership operated alongside a US$8 billion IMF Extended Fund Facility, suggests realistic expectations are warranted.

But the differentiators have limits. The NDB’s local-currency lending is concentrated in renminbi and South African rand, not in borrowing countries’ own currencies in most cases. The bank’s project pipeline overlaps directly with World Bank, ADB, and AIIB pipelines. And crucially, the Egypt case — the clearest test of the development-finance sovereignty hypothesis among new members — shows that NDB membership did not substitute for IMF conditionality. It operated alongside it.

The Risk Question Nobody Is Asking Loudly Enough

One of the briefing’s most important contributions is its risk-distribution analysis. The key insight is this: whether NDB membership represents something genuinely different from what economists call the “Wall Street Consensus” — a framework that transfers risk from private investors to the public balance sheet — doesn’t depend on the institutional flag. It depends on how individual projects are structured.

A sovereign loan to the Uzbek government distributes risk differently than a public-private partnership (PPP) in which the Uzbek state provides demand guarantees, absorbs political risk, and underwrites climate-regulation risk so that private investors can participate. The latter structure replicates the de-risking logic regardless of whether the NDB or the World Bank is involved.

Our brief provides a project-by-project framework for civil-society organizations to track exactly these questions for each NDB Uzbekistan project as it comes up for approval.

Productive Capabilities: The Sectoral Stakes

The briefing also applies a capability-formation lens — drawing on the Reinert-Andreoni-Chang tradition in development economics — to Uzbekistan’s key sectors. The core question: does NDB finance deepen productive capabilities, or does it lock in primary-product specialization?

For Uzbekistan’s cotton-textile vertical, where the country ranks as the world’s sixth-largest cotton producer according to the brief, the test is whether NDB project finance funds ginning, spinning, weaving, and garment assembly — capability-deepening investment — or raw-cotton infrastructure and export logistics. For mining, where Uzbekistan produces approximately 105 tonnes of gold annually per the brief’s figures, the test is downstream refining and fabrication versus raw extraction. For irrigation, the question is whether projects build domestic engineering capacity or default to Chinese turnkey procurement with limited skill transfer.

These are not abstract questions. Uzbekistan’s cotton sector was the subject of an international boycott for over a decade, lifted in 2022 after sustained civil-society pressure and ILO monitoring. The labour-standard discipline those campaigns established is, our research argues, the model for oversight of NDB-financed projects.

Explore the Research on Video

The written brief is dense by design — it’s a working tool for advocates and researchers. To make the core arguments accessible to a broader audience, we’ve produced an accompanying video that walks through the main findings, explains the key concepts (including what “de-risking” and “Wall Street Consensus” actually mean in plain language), and outlines what civil-society organizations should be watching for as the first NDB Uzbekistan projects move toward approval.

Whether you’re approaching this as a development-finance specialist or as someone newer to the BRICS architecture debates, the video offers a useful entry point before — or alongside — reading the full brief.

What Civil Society Should Demand — Right Now

The brief closes with a prioritized advocacy agenda. We’re not summarizing the full list here — that’s in the document — but the top priorities according to our research are worth naming.

1. Project-level transparency before approval. Publication of environmental and social impact assessments, procurement plans, and financial structuring documents for each NDB Uzbekistan project — before, not after, Board approval.

2. An independent accountability mechanism. The NDB has no equivalent to the World Bank Inspection Panel or the IFC Compliance Advisor Ombudsman. Project-affected communities in Uzbekistan — where civil-society space remains constrained — have no independent grievance channel. This gap needs to close.

3. Local-content and skill-transfer commitments in NDB project finance for irrigation, mining-downstream processing, light manufacturing, and renewable energy. The brief proposes a 40% domestic-content threshold as a meaningful benchmark.

4. PPP risk-distribution monitoring. For any NDB PPP project, the risk-allocation matrix and the Uzbek state’s contingent liabilities should be published. The public has a right to know when its balance sheet is being used to underwrite private returns.

The brief also acknowledges — with intellectual honesty — where its critique may be too harsh. The realistic counterfactual to NDB project finance may not be a better-structured alternative; it may be Chinese policy-bank lending on tighter geopolitical terms, or no investment at all. Civil-society advocacy should push for the best achievable structure, not hold out for perfection that forecloses development entirely. There are specific signals the brief identifies that would meaningfully change its assessment — and those are worth reading in full.

Free Download (PDF · 9 Pages) - Uzbekistan and the New Development Bank: Development Finance Sovereignty or Wall Street Consensus 2.0?

_{A Note on Methodology and Framing}

_{This briefing is civil-society research, not a policy paper commissioned by any government or multilateral institution. It draws on the NDB’s 2024 Annual Report, published December 2025; Rousseff’s address at the 9th NDB Annual Meeting in Cape Town in August 2024; IMF and World Bank institutional documents; and analytical frameworks developed by Eurodad, the Bretton Woods Project, and Third World Network. Where claims are contested or uncertain, we have tried to say so clearly rather than presenting contested positions as established fact.}

_{The briefing is explicitly addressed to two audiences: development-finance specialists and researchers who want the full analytical apparatus, and civil-society advocates in Uzbekistan and across the BRICS+ membership who need practical, actionable frameworks. We’ve tried to serve both, and the accompanying video is specifically designed for the latter audience.}

_{We welcome pushback. If you see errors in the analysis, gaps in the comparators, or missing evidence, we want to know. This is the beginning of a research programme on NDB expansion and development-finance sovereignty, not the final word.}

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About the Author: Andrea Pincin is a forestry engineer who heads the Services Centre for Forestry and Mountain Farming in Friuli Venezia Giulia, Italy. He teaches at the University of Udine and contributes to Krisis.info on agriculture and geopolitics. He is the author of La città rurale (The Rural City). His contributions are professional, not institutional.

With an official press release, the Indian Minister of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare announced that this June, the city of Indore will «emerge as a global hub of agricultural diplomacy». The reference is to the upcoming meetings of the BRICS Working Group on Agriculture, scheduled from June 9 to 11, 2026, and the subsequent BRICS Ministers of Agriculture summit, scheduled from June 12 to 13, 2026.

These intergovernmental meetings are part of the programme promoted by the annual BRICS presidency, currently held by India, and are preparatory to the organization of the eighteenth BRICS summit to be held this autumn.

New Delhi’s focus on the primary sector is not accidental, but rather a political necessity and an instrument of social stability and cohesion: it means guaranteeing the food needs of a population of almost 1.5 billion people, which makes India the most populous country in the world, after India’s historic demographic overtaking of China.

The weight of a giant: surface, production, and population

Precisely for this reason, the figures for India’s agricultural sector reveal the scale of this giant: the area alone that can be allocated to arable land (wheat, rice, etc.) extends for over 150 million hectares, and is roughly equal to the entire utilized agricultural area of Europe or, for a similar comparison, to that of the United States. India has about 10% of the world’s total arable land and a total primary production corresponding to about 7.5% of global agricultural output.

However, it is not solely a matter of cultivable land. From an economic standpoint, the primary sector accounts for only a minimal share of GDP in Western countries: less than 2% in the EU and less than 1% in the USA. In India, the primary sector is still highly significant, accounting for slightly more than 16% of the GDP, albeit declining. The political weight of Indian agriculture does not depend solely on its contribution to the GDP, but on employment data: while in the EU only 2% of the population is employed in the primary sector, in India the percentage rises to between 42% and 45% of total employment, although this is also declining.

Yet, despite these impressive figures, it is often pointed out that «the Indian agricultural system is often described as a giant with feet of clay».

The Structure of Rural India

The structure of India’s rural economy and society is complex, as one would legitimately expect in a large nation where over 170 languages are spoken. First, it should be noted that in India between 65% and 68% of the population lives in rural areas, which contribute to 55% of national consumption. Furthermore, inland and rural areas account for 46% of the Indian GDP: they are therefore a factor of central domestic political relevance.

From a quantitative perspective, agricultural holdings are predominantly very small in size: roughly between 86% and 89% of farms have an area of less than two hectares, representing almost 90% of the agricultural workforce and managing 47% of the cultivable land. The remaining area is divided among larger family properties, some historic large plantations, and state-owned land.

MSP, APMC, and PDS: The Indian agricultural market organization

Generally, a portion of agricultural trade in India has historically taken place within the framework of agricultural produce market committees (APMC), which are physical wholesale markets where farmers can sell their products to authorized traders and processors. These markets were «originally established in the 1960s and 1970s to ensure that farmers are not discriminated against by traders. As such, they played an important intermediary role in agricultural marketing during and after the Green Revolution. This intermediary role is founded on trust and networks built up over many decades between the farmers, the [APMCs] Boards and the government. […] Rules exist to ensure that if a trader does not pay the farmers within a specified time period, the trader can be suspended from trading».

Moreover, through specific technical bodies, the government sets minimum support prices (MSP) for 22 crops of strategic interest. These prices are a non-binding recommendation for market agents within the APMCs, but they are mandatory for government agencies, primarily the Food Corporation of India, which purchase large quantities of food commodities at the minimum guaranteed prices.

Through state procurement, New Delhi simultaneously pursues three national security objectives: it protects hundreds of millions of smallholder farmers from price collapses; it secures the physical volume of grain necessary to feed the poorest half of the population through state welfare – the public distribution system for food commodities – and it maintains immense strategic reserves, the so-called buffer stocks, to protect the national population from famines, climate shocks, or global inflation. This represents «the world’s biggest food welfare programme that entitles 800 million Indians to free rice and wheat. This costs the government $24.7 billion annually – its largest outgoing subsidy».

The State also guarantees specific subsidies for the purchase of fertilizers—essential for ensuring modern agricultural yields—and the use of water, which is indispensable for certain crops such as rice, of which India is the leading global producer, but which currently faces a situation of water scarcity.

Agricultural reforms and internal tensions

The regulations governing the management of the primary sector are dated, and an agrarian reform was partially promoted by the government headed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2020, sparking strong protests in the Indian agricultural world before being repealed. The reform essentially envisioned a liberalization of the primary sector towards the free market, reducing the role of agricultural market committees in order to promote agricultural competition and private investments.

In 2024, farmers’ protests once again inflamed India. This time the demands were more maximalist: price guarantees or making the purchase of agricultural commodities at the government-established minimum support prices (MSP) mandatory, the establishment of specific pensions, and debt cancellation. A section of the agricultural movement also demanded a radical redefinition of India’s stance towards the WTO and free trade agreements, denouncing the risk that international trade rules could squeeze public agricultural support mechanisms.

International recommendations

The structure of India’s heavily state-regulated primary sector has long been the subject of strong criticism from many international organizations and think tanks. As early as 1991, the World Bank (WB) published a document entitled «liberalizing Indian agriculture. An agenda for reform» proposing a series of steps to achieve a deregulation of the sector. In 2008, the WB also published the report «India – taking agriculture to the market» which «promoted the complete deregulation of the agricultural marketing system» and highlights the strong legal restrictions on foreign direct investment.

According to the IMF’s 2018 consultations minimum support prices «could skew farmers’ production decisions, add to inflation, and enlarge the fiscal burden» and points out how «more needs to be done to revamp government procurement processes and the public distribution system (PDS) for food, including to restructure the role of the Food Corporation of India via outsourcing of cereal procurement and stocking operations as well as checking leakages in the PDS».

According to the Bretton Woods Project, the 2020 agrarian reform is «advocated by international financial institutions, particularly the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF)», but «farmer organisations have slammed the bill for its neoliberal orientation».

The historic US think tank Carnegie Endowment indicated that the repeal of the agrarian reforms represents a defeat for innovation and the country’s structural transition towards the free market. The Economist indicated that the system of APMC agricultural markets and minimum support prices is an obsolete legacy that drives away private investment.

Therefore, many international financial organizations and Western think tanks converge, albeit with different nuances, towards the same basic approach: opening Indian agriculture more to markets, private investment, and international competition, in order to improve supply chain efficiency, foster environmental protection, promote foreign investment, guarantee corporate profitability, and reduce consumer prices.

The crossroads of Indian agriculture

India therefore faces a crucial choice over the future of its agrarian economy, which can also produce strong impacts on the demographic structure and social resilience of the country system: comply with the demands of the farmers, who are also the main electoral base, or support the demands of the major international financial institutions? India is not the first large country to tackle this issue: before it, Europe, Russia, China, and other States intervened in primary sector policies, with very different forms, directions, and results.

In 1957, Europe included agriculture among the four founding pillars of the then EEC. The founding Treaty does not speak «of technology, armaments, rare earths, energy, or green policies, but of agriculture as the primary guarantee for security of supply» and the Common agricultural policy (CAP) was established.

However, starting from the 1990s, the CAP underwent a major restructuring, which «progressively introduced […] the principle of decoupling: economic support for the primary sector no longer depends on what or how much is produced, […] leaving the producer greater freedom to become market-oriented. […] The EU has consciously dismantled the previous approach based on dirigisme and public coordination of the primary sector […] in favor of an almost total liberalization of the sector».

The overall results of these policies can be read through two figures: the lack of generational renewal, so much so that today less than 12% of agricultural entrepreneurs are under forty years old. On the other hand, the strong protests that still inflame the European primary sector: only in the last ten years, those of 2015-2016, 2019-2022, 2023-2024, and 2025-2026 stand out. Both figures speak of a primary sector that is becoming increasingly marginal and whose future is in some ways uncertain.

The primary sector of the newborn Russian Federation in the 1990s was also subject to strong deregulation and liberalization, the so-called shock therapy, which caused a severe economic contraction and an increase in poverty, hunger, and mortality rates in the country system. The agrarian and land reforms and the privatizations of the Yeltsin presidency further contracted agricultural production.

The turning point that produced the transformation whereby Russia has today become one of the world’s leading exporters of agricultural commodities, particularly grains, «occurred with the recognition of the strategic role of agriculture as an asset of primary national importance» and the reforms introduced under the presidency of Vladimir Putin. These include the establishment of Rosselkhozbank, the state bank for agriculture, land reforms, state programs for agricultural development, agricultural research institutions, and above all the food security doctrines (2010 and 2020), which have become part of the national security strategy.

Despite the difficulties, particularly regarding generational renewal which is also present in Russia, wheat production has increased to the point of making the Federation the world’s leading exporter, and food sovereignty has reached, for certain products, remarkable levels of self-sufficiency. Furthermore, in the last ten years, large-scale agricultural protests appear to have been comparatively limited, with the 2016 mobilization standing out as one of the most visible cases.

Agriculture as strategic infrastructure

The key question is not whether Indian agriculture needs reform, but what form that reform should take. New Delhi needs investments in infrastructure, the cold chain, storage, food processing, digitalization, mechanization, robotics, and waste reduction. It needs to strengthen research, domestic seed production, the development of eco-friendly phytosanitary products, and the capacity to strategically negotiate fertilizer procurement. It also requires policies capable of making the use of natural resources more sustainable, starting with water, which is increasingly decisive today for the production stability of the primary sector.

However, modernization does not necessarily mean deregulation. The historical examples recalled show that the liberalization of the primary sector can produce efficiency, investments, and greater commercial integration, but it can also generate economic, social, and political marginalization. This risk, for India, takes on incomparable dimensions compared to those of many Western economies: we are talking about a country of almost 1.5 billion inhabitants, where agriculture still contributes a significant share of the GDP, absorbs a huge portion of the workforce, and supports the poorest half of the population through the public food distribution system.

The issue is therefore not solely economic. It is political, demographic, and strategic. If wheat and rice are treated exclusively as international commodities, on a par with a steel or IT product, as so desired by international financial organizations, agriculture loses its special character. It becomes a sector like any other, governed by the profitability of capital, the volatility of global prices, and the ability of large traders to direct flows and exchanges. But food is not just any good: it is the primary material basis for the stability of a State.

For New Delhi, the challenge is therefore to forge its own path to agricultural modernization. Not a nostalgic return to autarky, nor a complete handover of the primary sector to international markets, but a form of public dirigisme capable of combining efficiency, social and environmental protection, safeguarding private investments, and food sovereignty. In a global context marked by trade wars, energy crises, logistical instability, and the fragmentation of supply chains, the capacity to produce, store, distribute, and protect national food supply chains returns to being an essential function of the State.

From this perspective, the BRICS agricultural summit in Indore does not represent merely a diplomatic event. It can become a platform for comparison among different agricultural models: the Russian grain powerhouse, Brazilian agribusiness, Chinese planning, African food needs, and the Indian agricultural context. For India, it is an opportunity to study and propose its own path in the realm of agricultural policies within an increasingly multipolar world: open to technology and investments but not subordinated solely to the logic of the global market.

India’s future will not be decided solely in the digital metropolises of Bangalore, Mumbai, or Hyderabad. It will also be played out in rural villages, agricultural markets, silos, rice paddies, wheat fields, irrigation systems, infrastructure serving inland areas, and public food distribution networks. The India of the 21st century will also be defined by its ability to keep its rural nature alive, productive, and strategic. Because whoever controls food does not merely control a supply chain: they control one of the fundamental conditions of national sovereignty.

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ST. PETERSBURG — Against the backdrop of a shifting global order, the 2026 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) has positioned itself as the definitive staging ground for a world economy no longer anchored solely to Western institutions. At the heart of this year’s agenda was the “New Drivers of Business Partnership within BRICS“ panel, a session that sought to move the bloc’s narrative from political aspirations to the mechanical realities of trade.

The data remains the bloc’s strongest selling point: BRICS now accounts for approximately 40% to 50% of global GDP and represents roughly half of the world’s population. Intra-bloc trade has surpassed the $1 trillion milestone. Yet, as the panel made clear, these “macro” wins mask a more difficult “micro” reality. To sustain this momentum, the bloc is attempting to re-engineer the very “drivers and mechanisms” of international commerce. The central question for observers is whether the new institutional frameworks discussed today—such as Russia’s recently minted National Committee for Business Cooperation—represent the birth of a viable parallel economic system or merely another layer of sophisticated bureaucracy.

The Geopolitical Impetus: Decentralization as Defense

The primary driver of the current BRICS expansion is a shared diagnosis of systemic failure. Russian officials argued today that the standards of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have effectively collapsed, leaving a void that necessitates new “rules of the game“. In this environment, the Kremlin is betting on business to lead where diplomacy has hit a ceiling.

Denis Agafonov, head of the Expert Department of the President of the Russian Federation, noted that business is “decentralized“ and “more flexible“ than state actors, making it the ideal vehicle for bypassing political bottlenecks. The establishment of the National Committee for Business Cooperation in February 2026 was presented as a strategic pivot to “coordinate the activity of bilateral committees” and provide an institutional home for private-sector initiatives. However, the investigative question remains: can a state-directed committee truly foster “decentralized” business growth, or is this simply a mechanism for aligning private capital with state geopolitical goals?

The Payment Problem: The Gap Between Ambition and Action

Nowhere is the friction between rhetoric and reality more visible than in the realm of payment settlements. For years, the “BRICS currency“ has been a staple of summit communiqués. Yet, the panel revealed a striking admission of delay. Elias Monage, a representative from South Africa, candidly observed that while a common payment platform was a priority during South Africa’s 2023 chairmanship and Russia’s 2024 presidency, the goal of concluding a common platform remains unfulfilled.

“Trade without a payment system cannot take off,” Managago warned, noting that it is “unacceptable” for BRICS members like Russia and South Africa to continue using the U.S. dollar as an intermediary for their respective national currencies. He called for central banks to be more “courageous” in accepting national currency settlements, a sentiment that highlights the persistent caution of the bloc’s financial regulators despite political pressure.

While a single BRICS currency remains a distant, perhaps even discarded, dream, the focus has shifted to technological workarounds. Petr Zaselskiy, Chairman of the Board of EXIMBANK of Russia, pointed toward the use of digital currencies and stablecoins linked to the yuan as a “fast” way to maintain liquidity and bypass traditional compliance barriers. There was talk of “interoperability” between Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs), specifically looking toward China’s 2027 chairmanship to scale these experiments. This is a concrete area of activity, but it remains in the “experimental” phase, with Zaselskiy himself warning businesses to “tread carefully” and avoid unknown platforms masquerading as BRICS partners.

The African Corridor and the Risk of Perception

The inclusion of the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) in the discussion added a layer of pragmatic regionalism. Haytham Elmaayergi, Executive Vice President of Afreximbank, argued that the biggest barrier to South-South trade is not a lack of capital, but a “perception of risk“ that doesn’t match reality.

Afreximbank is currently attempting to link its Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS) with China’s CIPS. This is a tangible mechanism—an effort to create a “BRICS-Africa corridor“ that includes guarantee systems and insurance to promote trade. By helping African nations move from exporting raw cotton to manufacturing garments with “BRICS technology,” the bank is attempting to build the value-added supply chains that the bloc has long promised.

Logistics: Measuring the “Connectivity Index”

If finance is the blood system of the bloc, as the ICBC representative suggested, then transport is its skeletal structure. Sergey Pavlov, First Deputy Managing Director of Russian Railways (RZD), highlighted a significant concrete development: the creation of a “Logistics Connectivity Index“. Set to be presented in July, this index is designed to assess BRICS transport routes against traditional corridors like the Suez Canal, providing a data-driven approach to identifying and removing “transport barriers“.

Pavlov’s report of a 2.5-fold increase in haulage with BRICS partners over the past year is a rare piece of hard evidence that supply chains are indeed realigning. Agreements to build a second track at the Zabaykalsk-Manzhouli section of the railroad between Russia and China further indicate that physical infrastructure is being prioritized over mere diplomatic statements.

The “One-Stop Shop” and Regulatory Hurdles

To attract the investment needed for these projects, Murat Kerefov of VEB.RF discussed the “Invest Russia“ portal, a “one-stop-shop“ principle designed to synchronize investment support across the bloc. The proposal is to harmonize regulations so that an investor in India or Brazil faces the same rules and support mechanisms when entering the Russian market.

However, the panel also underscored a critical structural gap: the lack of a “code of new rules“. Without a formalized harmonization of relations and a stable regulatory framework, the “trust” that speakers repeatedly cited remains a fragile substitute for law. The proposal for a “BRICS insurance and reinsurance“ mechanism was mentioned, but notably, it is “not yet in force“.

The Global Realignment

What does this mean for the global economic architecture? The SPIEF 2026 discussions signal a move from “G2G“ (government-to-government) declarations to “B2B“ (business-to-business) implementation. The rhetoric of “civilizational response“ and “rejection of old obsolete mechanisms“ is high, but the builders are clearly struggling with the plumbing.

For non-BRICS nations, the risk is not necessarily a sudden “de-dollarization“ event, but a gradual “slow-drip” of trade into these new, separate channels. If the “Logistics Connectivity Index“ and the digital currency experiments succeed, a significant portion of global trade could move into a closed-loop system where Western sanctions and financial standards no longer apply.

Forward-Looking Perspective: September in New Delhi

The true test of today’s rhetoric will come in September 2026, when India assumes the BRICS chairmanship and hosts the next summit. Ambassador Vinay Kumar emphasized that India’s theme—”Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability“—will focus on “practical and clear“ outcomes in critical technologies and startup ecosystems.

However, the parting shot from the panel came from the South African delegation, which demanded “clear timelines“ for the implementation of a common currency platform. Without these timelines, today’s talk of “new drivers“ risks being remembered as just another well-polished piece of rhetoric. The foundations are being laid—through rail tracks and digital ledgers—but the “parallel economy“ is still very much a work in progress, hampered by the very diversity and lack of unified standards that the bloc often celebrates as its greatest strength.

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In recent years, security issues have come to dominate the Nordic discussion on global affairs. The focus is on rearmament, defence budgets, deterrence, and scenarios of potential conflict. This is an understandable development following the war in Ukraine, which has fundamentally altered Europe’s strategic landscape.

Yet while Europe deepens its military planning, another transformation is unfolding with far less attention. A new global balance of power is emerging, slowly but clearly, outside the Western sphere.

The Rise of a Multipolar World beyond the West.

BRICS has expanded in recent years and now brings together a growing share of the world’s population, resources, and economic weight. Regardless of political values, it is difficult to ignore the group’s increasing global significance.

Despite this, the development receives surprisingly little attention in the Nordic countries. The dominant perspective remains transatlantic, where the United States, the European Union, and NATO form the unquestioned framework for foreign and security policy analysis. As a result, changes in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are often pushed into the background, despite these regions being where much of the world’s economic growth and political self-confidence is now emerging.

For many countries in the Global South, BRICS is not primarily about geopolitical confrontation, but about economic room for manoeuvre. It is about investment, trade, and reducing dependence on traditional Western institutions. Where the West often sees a strategic challenge, other countries see an opportunity for diversification.

At the same time, BRICS is far from a homogeneous actor. The differences between its member states are significant, both politically and economically. However, they are united by the view that the global order established after the Cold War no longer reflects today’s distribution of power. This raises a question that is rarely formulated in Nordic debate: how are small, export-dependent economies affected by a world in which multiple centres of power and trade are emerging?

Security thinking versus diplomatic reality.

As the world becomes more multipolar, the European discourse appears to become more polarised. Foreign policy is increasingly described in terms of choosing sides between blocs, rather than as a network of relations in which different interests coexist and overlap.

Historically, small states have been most successful when they have combined security with dialogue, and pragmatism with independent diplomacy. The Nordic countries have long enjoyed an international reputation built precisely on this balance: military restraint, economic openness, and active diplomatic engagement.

Today, this dimension has partly been overshadowed by a more unilateral focus on military capability and deterrence. However, while military power can influence balances of power, it cannot replace diplomatic processes. Conflicts are generally resolved at the negotiating table, not on the battlefield.

This does not mean that security policy is unimportant, or that threats should be underestimated. But a strategy built almost exclusively on military logic risks overlooking the long-term economic and political transformations reshaping the international system.

The central question for the Nordic region is therefore not whether to choose between the West and BRICS. The question is rather whether it is able to understand and navigate a world in which such binary choices are becoming increasingly irrelevant.

Much suggests that future historians will describe our era as a period in which the global balance of power shifted away from a Western-centred order towards a more multipolar system, in which Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East gained increasing weight.

In this perspective, the Nordic debate’s strong focus on military rearmament appears to be only one part of a much larger picture. While politics often revolves around the next potential conflict, a deeper structural transformation is simultaneously taking place in the global economy and international system.

The question, therefore, is not whether the Nordic countries approve of this development. The question is whether they will understand it in time.

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Despite all the background noise in global affairs, yet another new and interesting development has emerged. It is already becoming difficult for me to choose adjectives—I do not like repeating myself.

The United States cannot wage a war against Iran. At any cost, it wants to avoid one.

Let me remind you that after Trump declared that he would wipe Iranian civilization off the face of the Earth—and I genuinely thought he was prepared to use nuclear weapons—after Iranians took to the streets waiting for death, after Trump announced that he would block the Strait of Hormuz, and yet achieved nothing, it became clear that he had no winning move in Iran. Painful negotiations then began.

In those negotiations, Iran has not backed down from its demands, which I have explained many times before. The main intermediary between Iran and Trump is Pakistan, while Pakistan is advised by China. Trump’s visit to China was a complete debacle for the United States. We know that he pleaded for help not only with Iran but also with Ukraine—to stop these wars and find a way out of a dead end.

One of Iran’s demands is a total halt to Israel’s massive wave of attacks against Lebanon. Netanyahu is attempting, quite unequivocally, to turn Lebanon into another Gaza. Iran has made it a non-negotiable condition for Trump that Israel completely cease its strikes on Lebanon. In fact, Iran’s nuclear program is currently not even the most important issue in these negotiations—Lebanon is.

Yesterday, Iran announced that it was suspending negotiations with the United States and declared that if Netanyahu does not stop in Lebanon, Iran will attack Israel.

Iran also stated that it would completely close the Strait of Hormuz to the West.

To put it simply and briefly: the world is witnessing an unprecedented situation in which SOMEONE (Iran) IS SETTING CONDITIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL.

In response to Israel’s constant aggression in Lebanon, where entire large families are reportedly being annihilated on a daily basis, Hezbollah resumed shelling Israel. This, in turn, prompted Israel to escalate once again, including at the UN Security Council, where its representative stated that Israel would continue firing at Lebanese targets because of Hezbollah, regardless of anyone else’s opinion.

Imagine Russia’s representative to the Security Council, Nebenzya, saying that Russia would reduce Kyiv, Lviv, and Odesa to ashes and kill Ukrainians along with their entire families.

Iran, through Ghalibaf, announced that it was halting negotiations with the United States. This was reportedly followed by the phone call between Trump and Netanyahu, the contents of which are now public knowledge after being published by Axios. a media outlet close to Trump and likely acting at his direction.

Iran’s threats thus become much easier to understand. From this conversation between Washington and Tel Aviv, it becomes clear that the United States is cornered and dangerously close to a critical point at which it could suffer both military and geopolitical defeat.

If Iran attacks Israel and if Russia accelerates the fall of Kyiv, I will tell you what will happen.

Trump will fall immediately. The United States will enter a political crisis accompanied by unrest, and a split within the government unlike anything in its history will emerge.

Because it is becoming increasingly obvious that the United States cannot sustain a war against Iran, especially while simultaneously supporting Israel in such a conflict. The same applies to Ukraine.

In a certain sense, Trump’s political career—and perhaps even his fate—currently lies in Putin’s hands.

Since Iran is acting regardless, and Hezbollah continues striking Israel, the military-strategic decision of Putin—whether to finish off Kyiv and Zelenskyy—will determine what happens to Trump.

I would also add that a civil war already exists within the Republican Party, that the congressional elections this autumn are effectively decided, and that the turbulent processes within American domestic politics are colossal. Trump is hanging by a thread, and Netanyahu is doing everything in his power to snap it, because he is a mindless thug.

This is why we have reached the point of: “Damn it, if it weren’t for me, you would be in prison.”

On this point, Trump was not lying. Without him, Netanyahu would not have survived politically after October 7.

Trump bears responsibility for the deaths in Gaza and Lebanon, as well as in Iran and across the Gulf region.

I had long predicted a split between the two of them. Here is yet another prediction of mine that has come true.

I repeatedly said that Israel is a millstone around America’s neck. And now Trump is hanging over the abyss.

I also predicted a possible conflict between Israel and the United States. It cannot be ruled out at all. Never mind that a new congressional law merges the military systems of the two countries—if anything, that would only make Israel’s destruction easier.

Whether Trump destroys Netanyahu or Netanyahu destroys Trump remains to be seen. More importantly, both scenarios depend on what Putin decides to do.

In Israel, the Knesset is being dissolved and early elections will be held. Benjamin Netanyahu will not be allowed back into power under any circumstances. The likelihood of Likud winning the elections is zero.

Meanwhile, the economic forum begins tomorrow in St. Petersburg. People from all over the world are gathering there, and I would like to attend as well. Putin’s upcoming statement is awaited with enormous interest, especially by Russians themselves, whose patience regarding Ukraine has been completely exhausted and who want a rapid and irreversible conclusion to the conflict.

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The halls of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) have always been a barometer for the shifting winds of global power, but in June 2026, the atmosphere felt different. It wasn’t just the presence of new tech giants or the usual talk of trade deals; it was the unveiling of a landmark report titled Beyond the Pattern: The World of Real Multipolarity. Presented by a new generation of scholars, including our team member Professor , this wasn’t just an academic exercise—it was a declaration that the old Western-led hegemony has transitioned into something far more complex, fluid, and urgent.

For decades, we’ve operated under the “pattern“ of a global order defined by Western standards of democracy and market capitalism. But as the report makes clear, we are now living in a world that has moved past those rigid lines. We are witnessing a fundamental reordering of power where multipolarity isn’t a distant destination or a fixed end-state, but an active, messy process that is reshaping everything from the smartphone in your pocket to the security of the Arctic.

Multipolarity: A Process, Not a Destination

The first thing to understand about the “new normal“ is that multipolarity doesn’t look like the Cold War. There are no iron curtains or rigid blocks where you are forced to pick a side. Instead, the world is characterized by what the report calls “situational alignments“.

Think of India. It is simultaneously deepening technological cooperation with the United States while maintaining strategic ties with Russia and pragmatic engagement with Iran. This isn’t confusion; it’s the new strategy. Multipolarity today is a “dynamic balancing process“ where states move beyond rhetorical declarations and start building practical, functional frameworks for cooperation. It is less about who you are “against” and more about who you can coordinate with on specific issues like alternative payment systems or supply chain security.

The Weaponization of Everything

Perhaps the most startling insight from the Valdai report is how the very foundations of our prosperity—trade, technology, and finance—have been transformed into “weaponized interdependence”. In the old world, the goal of trade was efficiency. In the new world, trade is a tool of statecraft used for pressure, punishment, and exclusion.

The report maps this out through a fascinating “three-tier“ system of states:

1. Major Powers (The System-Shapers): These are the actors like the US, China, Russia, and the EU who have the “structural reach“ to build and enforce global chokepoints. They use everything from “technology-stack controls” to financial sanctions to maintain their advantage.

2. Middle Powers (The Swing Enforcers): Countries like Japan, India, and Brazil hold the cards here. They are the “pivotal nodes“ that can either enforce a major power’s sanctions or act as “insulators“ that prevent a truly bipolar system from emerging. They are constantly “multi-vector balancing,” trying to maximize their own sovereignty by playing the major powers off one another.

3. Small States (The Exposure Managers): For everyone else, the world has become a constant exercise in risk management. These states focus on building redundancies and “fall-back mechanisms“ so that a single chokepoint doesn’t collapse their entire economy.

BRICS: Coordination Over Confrontation

A common Western narrative portrays BRICS as an “anti-Western“ alliance, but the scholars in St. Petersburg argued for a more nuanced view. BRICS isn’t interested in a “systemic rupture“ or a direct military confrontation with the United States. After all, no BRICS member wants to sever ties with the global economic system they are still deeply embedded in.

Instead, BRICS acts as a “projection“ of the multipolar world. Its strength lies in “functional interaction“. By developing common financial mechanisms and unifying technology standards, BRICS members are gradually increasing their autonomy “around“ Western dominance rather than just fighting against it. It’s a slow-motion transformation that focuses on practical sovereignty rather than symbolic shouting matches.

The Multipolarity of Meaning

Perhaps the most profound shift is happening in the realm of ideas. For decades, the “End of History” narrative suggested that Western liberal democracy was the final, universal goal for all of humanity. The Valdai report argues we are entering a “multipolarity of meaning“.

This isn’t just about different political systems; it’s about “epistemological decolonization”. Countries in the Global South are reclaiming their right to define their own values and development paths. Professor Pacini and his colleagues emphasize that for these nations, sovereignty isn’t just a legal status—it’s the freedom to validate their own indigenous knowledge and social organizations without seeking external Western validation. We are seeing a global demand for “authentic pluralism“ where diverse civilizations coexist rather than being homogenized into a single Western standard.

Regional Grounding: Where the Map is Changing

This isn’t just theory; it’s visible on the map in three critical regions:

• Europe: The old “transatlantic consensus“ is fracturing. The report notes a “gradual American disengagement“ from European affairs as the US shifts its focus to smaller, more flexible alliances like AUKUS. Europe is at a strategic crossroads: it will either become a series of competing “micro-zones“ or attempt to build a new, stable security architecture that finally addresses its relationship with the rest of Eurasia.

• Central Asia: Once viewed as a mere resource prize for great powers, Central Asian states are now asserting their own “fluid architecture“. They are recalibrating their strategies, signing multi-billion dollar deals with the US while simultaneously strengthening institutions like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and participating in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. They have even begun resolving century-old border crises on their own, without the mediation of “great powers“.

• The Arctic: Once a model of “exceptional cooperation,” the Arctic is being pulled into “unmanaged rivalry“. The exclusion of Russia from circumpolar cooperation and threats of Greenlandic annexation have turned the region into a “militarized frontier“. The “Arctic exceptionalism” of the post-Cold War era is effectively dead, replaced by a “managed fragmentation“ where NATO and Russia operate in separate, increasingly armed realities.

Historians of the Present

The scholars who presented this research at the SPIEF 2026 view themselves as “historians of the present“. They aren’t trying to sell a specific solution or a new utopia. Instead, they are documenting a world that is “surfing through issues“ without a single set of universal rules.

The take-away for the rest of us is that the “pattern“ of the last thirty years has been broken. Power is redistributing, trade is being weaponized, and the very meaning of “progress“ is being contested by civilizations that refuse to be ignored. We are entering a future of “managed fragmentation,” where success will be measured by a state’s ability to build resilience and navigate a world that is no longer waiting for Western permission to change. This isn’t just a shift in geopolitics; it’s a shift in the way the world understands itself—and it’s happening right now.

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Originally published on Brasil de Fato by Marco Fernandes
Republished with permission.

Brazil’s Special Presidential Adviser Celso Amorim attended the 2026 International Security Forum in Moscow this week. In addition to meeting with senior officials of the Russian government, Amorim granted an exclusive interview to Brasil de Fato in which he commented on current conflicts and issues of Brazilian sovereignty.

The topic gained particular urgency in recent days after the United States government classified the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and Comando Vermelho (CV)—Brazil’s two largest criminal organizations—as terrorist organizations. Amorim was among the first officials to respond publicly on behalf of the Brazilian government.

In a formal address, the adviser stated that “another serious threat to [Brazilian] security is the growth of organized crime. The Brazilian government is acting decisively to dismantle criminal networks, including by increasing legal penalties and working in close collaboration with local authorities to strengthen their capacities. Organized crime must be fought with the utmost energy and determination. Equating organized crime with terrorism, however, is not helpful. Understanding motivations is essential for effectively combating all forms of crime.”

In his interview with Brasil de Fato, regarding the current state of Brazil–Russia relations, he acknowledged a degree of convergence, while noting: “I also spoke frankly with the Russians. Brazil’s largest trade deficit is with Russia. That has to change.” On the political front, however, “there has been a significant rapprochement. For eleven years—since the Dilma administration—there had been no high-level meeting of the Brazil–Russia High-Level Commission.”

Regarding Washington’s various interventions around the world, Amorim articulated the Brazilian government’s condemnation of the invasion of Venezuela and the war against Iran, and expressed deep concern over the situation in Cuba: “I believe a solution by force will not work and will result in a great many deaths and much suffering.”

Amorim also recalled, in detail, Brazil and Turkey’s joint attempt to broker a nuclear agreement with Iran in 2010—at the request of then-U.S. President Barack Obama—and expressed regret that no deal was ultimately reached: “They could have set up a commission to monitor compliance with the agreement if any doubts arose. Everything that was asked of us regarding Iran was delivered.”

Finally, the man who served as Foreign Minister throughout President Lula’s first two terms and as Defence Minister under President Dilma Rousseff raised a fundamental debate for Brazil—amid Washington’s interventionist offensive and the remilitarization of countries such as Germany and Japan—about what is required to defend national sovereignty: “You must have deterrence capability. I believe that is the bare minimum for any actor in international relations. It is all well and good to be a pacifist, it is all well and good to seek dialogue—but you need a little something to fall back on when push comes to shove.”

Full Interview

Brasil de Fato: Last June, shortly after the first U.S. airstrikes against Iran in the Twelve-Day War, you gave a live television interview in which you said: “The international order is over.” Since then, we have seen the extrajudicial killings of people aboard fishing vessels in the Caribbean, the invasion of Venezuela, another war against Iran, and Cuba may be next. How is Brazil responding?

Celso Amorim: President Lula’s starting point is the idea of dialogue. You just saw that, despite everything that happened before, he received an invitation to visit the United States. He went, he had conversations—we are talking about trade and can address other dimensions as well.

I believe President Trump was very respectful in his dealings with us. That is a positive thing. But there is no question: we have condemned what happened in Venezuela, and we are deeply concerned about Cuba—very much so. I made a comment, I think it was to Lavrov: “We are here in Moscow. Communist Cuba has now existed for nearly as long as the Soviet Union did. And the Soviet Union was the defining landmark of the twentieth century.” So it is an enormously dramatic situation.

Everything has been tried—boycotts, embargoes. I do not know what more they can attempt. I believe it will be very difficult to achieve there what was achieved in Venezuela. I did not expect what happened in Venezuela either, but I think Cuba will be even harder.

I believe that, although there may be discontent with the economic situation and other aspects—I am not defending the system—Cuba could evolve. But a solution by force will not work and will result in a great many deaths and much suffering. And Cuba carries a symbolic weight in Latin America, even for countries that disagree with its political system.

There is also no sense that the United States is overextending itself—not in military terms, which everyone knows are enormous, but in its political capacity for mobilization. There is a film I saw as a child, an American film called Skyjacked. There was a plane under threat. The point is: when there is a thread of hope, we have to work it, pursue it. I used to talk about “openings,” but today even those have narrowed to almost nothing—so you have to find a thread of hope.

Q: And did President Lula raise the issue of Cuba with Trump on that last visit?

He did raise his concerns. I was not in the meeting, so I cannot say for certain. I did not ask for details. But from what he mentioned, I believe he expressed that concern.

Q: How do you assess Brazil’s current position regarding the war the U.S. and Israel provoked against Iran? Brazil once attempted to mediate that conflict between the West and Iran many years ago—as you recount in your book “Tehran, Ramallah, Doha”—correct?

These questions depend greatly on circumstances. Today, for instance, it is Pakistan that is actively engaged—a country that typically focused only on its own interests. I find that very positive and even praised it in my address. Of course, Pakistan participates in the United Nations and the G77—I am not diminishing that. But it had never positioned itself as a mediator in these conflicts before. It has its own problems, as everyone knows, particularly with India.

Now a moment has arisen in which there are conversations under way. I believe Qatar is also re-engaging, which is also very significant. I do not know the details, but I think this gives some grounds for hope. Let us hope it leads somewhere. It does not have to be Brazil doing the mediating—we are interested in peace.

In fact, regarding what President Lula always references in connection with the Tehran Declaration—Brazil and Turkey’s joint mediation attempt in 2010—it was Obama who asked for it. What I cannot understand is why the Brazilian media said “Why is Brazil getting involved?” Brazil did not insert itself. Obama asked, in three clear points: 1) the greatest challenge in the world today is the Iranian nuclear program; 2) I extended my hand and received no response; and 3) I need friends who can speak to those I cannot speak to myself.

Those three sentences were more than enough, weren’t they? And to leave no room for doubt, he sent Bill Burns—who would later become Deputy Secretary of State under Obama and subsequently CIA Director under Biden—to meet with me. I was Foreign Minister at the time. Then President Ahmadinejad visited Brazil. We kept the conversation going, gradually building trust. In the end, there was a moment of uncertainty.

There was a point at which I myself said: “Mr. President, I don’t think this is going to work—we had a meeting in Washington with the Turks that was very negative.” Then, on returning to Brazil, we had a BRICS meeting scheduled. The following day, I opened a copy of a letter from Obama to Lula reiterating exactly the same three points. So I said: “Now we have to try.”

There was still a small technical discrepancy—the quantity of enriched uranium—but it was discussed and resolved. The French also appealed to us, because there was a French woman being held. We spoke with President Sarkozy—perhaps in Manaus, because the French also consider themselves part of the Amazon region (French Guiana is a French overseas department, a kind of French colony)—and he said: “I cannot speak to Iran while they are holding her.” So I asked: “But if they release her, will you engage immediately on the substance?” He said yes. It then took them more than three months to do so.

By then there were already sanctions in place. In any case, this is all history now. But it demonstrates that with genuine political will, it is possible to reach an agreement on something that is not easy—because countries are internally divided. Sometimes one faction wants to move forward, another does not.

Q: But why did it ultimately fall apart? Was it sabotaged by the U.S.?

I believe there was a division within the United States. I have written about this at length, though it was some time ago. There were the midterm elections. The Secretary of State herself—Hillary Clinton—was a presidential contender. I noticed at least a certain nuance, a difference in emphasis, between the Secretary of State and the President. And Iran was not easy either. We would bring proposals, they would take time to respond, things would go back and forth. But in the end, we reached an agreement.

What surprised me most, though, was something else entirely. Obviously, what was decisive—in terms of the failure—was the American position. They had asked us to act, they had wanted this. But what surprised me was that all the permanent members of the UN Security Council voted in favor of the resolution imposing sanctions. And that planted in my mind the idea that certain problems, only they can resolve. Particularly in the nuclear domain, because the P5—the five permanent members of the Security Council—are also the N5: the five countries recognized as nuclear-weapon states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. There are others that have nuclear weapons, but they are not recognized as such: India, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel.

Q: Israel doesn’t officially acknowledge it, does it?

It’s ambiguous. But everyone knows. When pressed, they don’t deny it.

I believe they consider the nuclear question to be, in a sense, their exclusive domain. That is the only explanation I have. Because they gave Russia a small concession, gave China a small concession—they allowed Iran to keep exporting oil to China and Russia—and they permitted Russia to complete a nuclear power plant in Bushehr (not an enrichment facility, but still). Only Brazil and Turkey voted against. It was the only time Brazil voted against a resolution that passed in the Security Council. Lebanon abstained.

Q: What year was that?

2010. A month and a half after the declaration.

The first thing I did after leaving the chamber was speak briefly with Lavrov, then I telephoned Tehran. But the first long conversation I had was with Hillary. She had been the one making the request. “It’s no use,” she said—”we’re going to proceed with our push for sanctions.”

I believe that was a disaster. I am not saying Brazil could have made everything work on its own, or that someone else might not have come in to complement the effort—there are always uncertainties. You sign an agreement, but you can never be entirely certain how it will be implemented. They could have created a commission to monitor compliance, to handle any doubts that might arise. But everything that was asked of us regarding Iran was delivered.

Q: And what about the current conflict?

I do not know what will happen. But I believe the objectives initially announced by the United States—at least rhetorically, of sending Iran back to the Stone Age—will not be achieved. Iran is one of the world’s oldest civilizations. I always mention that the oldest surviving Greek play opens with a line about Persia.

No one is going to bomb a country into becoming a democracy. It doesn’t work that way. It happens through conversation, through dialogue, through an appreciation of cultural differences. Of course, we can be critical of certain things—we would be. But we must respect the self-determination of peoples. Every society follows its own trajectory. Look at Brazil fifty years ago—how indigenous peoples and Black Brazilians were treated. Would that have justified bombing Brazil? No. We have to evolve on our own terms.

Q: You mentioned the UN Security Council, and Russia’s support for Brazil’s accession as a permanent member. Do you believe there is a deepening of the multilateral agenda between Russia and Brazil in the context of Donald Trump?

I hope so. I met with a number of people—essentially everyone I had set out to see, with the exception of President Putin, whom I did not request a meeting with. But I did leave him a letter from President Lula regarding the Bachelet matter.

I think there is a genuine rapprochement. That said, I also spoke frankly with the Russians. Brazil’s largest trade deficit is with Russia—and that has to change. I understand that the war has driven Russia toward greater self-sufficiency; they used to import beef and no longer do. We import diesel and fertilizers—and at increasingly high prices, not through any fault of theirs, but costly nonetheless. And our exports to Russia remain very limited.

On the political level, the rapprochement is significant. For eleven years—since the Dilma government—there had been no high-level meeting of the Brazil–Russia High-Level Commission, at the level of Prime Minister and Vice-President. Our Vice-President has now stepped back from the Ministry of Industry and Trade, which is a major portfolio. And President Lula himself attended the lunch to lend the meeting his personal prestige. Shortly afterward, there was already a technical-political follow-up meeting—their Minister of Development came to Brazil and met with our acting Foreign Minister.

So I believe this is a very propitious moment for dialogue. Lavrov himself recalled that when Venezuela was invaded—when President Maduro was effectively taken hostage—it was President Lula who called for an emergency BRICS meeting.

I think this is a good moment in the bilateral relationship. We are advocates of multipolarity, but we are equally advocates of peace. We recognize that, historically, NATO’s expansion unsettled Russia—perhaps with justification, or at least understandably. But we also do not want a solution that comes at the cost of massive civilian casualties.

That is precisely why Brazil and China proposed a dialogue-based solution. Before Trump took an interest in the matter, we had already proposed and established the Group of Friends for Peace. Perhaps now is the moment to draw on that. Clearly, with attention currently concentrated on Iran—and, should it come to that, which I hope it does not, on Cuba—everything becomes more difficult. We are already living through a world war of sorts. Not a world war in the traditional sense, with all conventional forces fully engaged, but there is no region that remains untouched.

Not even Latin America, which is normally so tranquil. There was an invasion of Venezuela. And no one knows what will happen in Cuba. This is extremely concerning. Brazil must defend its sovereignty. We cannot simply look on and say: “Oh, nothing like that will ever happen to us, because Brazil is a peaceful country.” That is no guarantee. I served as Defence Minister. When the day comes—and one never wishes to single out any particular country—we must have deterrence capability. The legacy of the military dictatorship created a deep resistance to this idea among the public—but those in the know are well aware of the necessity.

Q: This is a theme that is returning with great force in Brazil. We are watching the Iranian case**. Many analysts agree that the United States is losing that war—but Iran spent nearly forty years preparing for it, developing its defence capabilities, its deterrence arsenal, its missiles and drones. Is it time for Brazil to revisit, for example, the discussion on nuclear weapons or other deterrence capabilities?**

Brazil enshrined the prohibition of nuclear weapons in its Constitution. And I believe that today—while no one denies the importance of nuclear deterrence—there are significant non-nuclear means of deterrence that Brazil can and should develop. People sometimes hold a mistaken view: “Oh, you’re not going to go to war with Country A or B because you’d lose.” That is not the point. The point is your capacity to inflict sufficient pain—to raise the cost high enough—to deter an aggressor.

In earlier eras, when a German ship and a British ship were both sunk, Churchill would count how many British had died versus how many Germans. Today it is entirely different. When body bags start arriving home, it no longer matters whether you are winning the war.

Compare the Vietnamese and American casualty figures—there is no comparison. But who won the war?

So here is my view: we must have deterrence capability. We must be in a position to say: “I do not want conflict, and you are not going to impose it on me by force. Let us talk. Let us engage in dialogue.”

This can apply to critical minerals; it can apply to any number of issues. We need to have this capability—not targeted at any specific country. People have grown accustomed to thinking in terms of U.S. dominance, but tomorrow it could be anyone. It can happen. You must have deterrence capability. I believe that is the bare minimum for any actor in international relations. It is all well and good to be a pacifist, it is all well and good to seek dialogue—but you need a little something to fall back on when push comes to shove.

Q: China stopped Trump with rare earths: “We are no longer selling to you.” Trump backed down immediately.

And now Iran has stopped the United States—a massive disproportion of forces. That is exactly the point: raising the cost of an interventionist adventure.

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The main threat to Europe remains the EU. The organization continues to pursue an extremely harmful and dangerous policy for the Union and is doing everything possible to impose lies as the main form of communication and governance.

According to the head of Russian intelligence, Naryshkin, Brussels has made the decision to remain silent about all types and forms of crimes committed by Zelensky and the ruling Nazi власти in Ukraine.

This is not simply a lie, but an extreme injustice into which the peoples of Europe are being drawn, some of them by force.

There has never been and there never will be a time when lies grow and bear good fruit.

In other words, with this policy the EU condemns Europe to a permanent political and economic crisis without any possibility of improvement.

And this means that the main culprit for the fall of morality and the system of civilizational constructive evolution is precisely the EU.

This is the main reason why the peoples of Europe must leave the EU if they want to survive, or make efforts to destroy this supranational organism, which has turned into a grotesque totalitarian monster.

The same tendency is present in the governance of the USA and England, which means that the West is effectively at the lowest point of its development precisely because it chooses lies and injustice as a way of existence.

And this leads to collapse, decline, and desolation, and the signs of all three categories can be observed with the naked eye in the lives of people and in nature in the West.

The UN carried out yet another act of heroism by placing Netanyahu’s Israel on a blacklist for war crimes because of sexual torture and the use of sexual violence against Palestinians, against both women and men, and there is no need even to speak about the children.

This is the opinion of the UN, because of which Israel’s foreign minister demanded sanctions against Guterres, as well as insulting the UN and its members.

The arrogance has crossed every boundary! It is not about money and not about pleasures at all.

If the world fails to deal with this growing cretinism of the West, expressed in boundless deceitfulness and aggression toward people, there will be no possibility to continue into the future, because in this way civilization itself and the human species as a whole are being discredited.

Can those who kill children, men, and women, plunder entire states, kill their leaders, and ignite struggles and wars everywhere be called human?

Can those who use economic and financial mechanisms to destroy entire states be called human?

In my opinion these people are a disgrace and shame for human civilization, and if humanity wants to survive, it must condemn and limit these manifestations as a dangerous and deadly disease.

The opposite should be supported — mercy in politics, in economics, care for Nature, but not the care of the globalists, rather true empathetic care.

But also deep care for people, for humanity, the imposition of goodness as a norm of behavior, of prudence and justice as a norm and condition for success, sharing and free cooperation that is not based on egoism and violence.

There are many deeply benevolent things, and there are politicians who wish this to become a value.

But all attempts to impose goodness in governance are sabotaged and suppressed.

And despite this, it is clear that the majority on Earth does not approve of what the West is doing.

A pleasant impression, and it is becoming constant, is made by the liberal Hungarian prime minister who, contrary to expectations, continues to conduct anti-Ukrainian rhetoric in the EU.

Unlike the Bulgarian prime minister, Magyar openly stated to Rutte that Hungary will not provide weapons to Ukraine.

And Radev said that we are moving toward 5% for NATO and that Bulgaria will benefit from SAFE, which automatically means that Radev is including Bulgaria in the main anti-Russian financial bloc in the EU and in the policy of building European armed forces, including nuclear ones, directed against Russia.

Ursula’s SAFE program aims to drain the budgets of the member states for the military-industrial complex.

Yet another instrument for robbing the peoples of Europe after the use of the health institutions.

It is very important to mention that there are certain statements in Russia at the level of the foreign ministry that Bulgaria has not submitted or shown in any way an impulse for changing its relations with Russia under the new government.

Moreover, yesterday Rumen Radev stated in Brussels that NATO must seriously invest in its own capabilities.

Against the background of Magyar’s statements and against the background of Professor Jeffrey Sachs’s letter to the German Chancellor Merz, this turns Radev into a convinced Atlanticist hawk.

Russia demands a rejection of Russophobia and an end to its denial as the main condition for improving its relations with Europe.

If you have a friend and that friend has caused you many troubles and hurt you in many ways, there is no way to allow him back again without a deep change in his behavior and attitude toward you.

As long as Bulgaria follows NATO, no improvements with Russia can happen, and we are obliged to have good relations with Russia and therefore it is mandatory for us to separate from NATO.

By the way, Rumen Radev has personally been informed about our fundamental tasks regarding Russia, so he will never be able to justify himself.

American policy under Trump became transparent. The informational dynamics regarding negotiations with Iran are being used to regulate the oil market.

Behind this, no negotiations are succeeding. Trump continues trying to appropriate the Strait of Hormuz.

He creates provocations there, the Iranians repel them, then the USA strikes Iran, and Iran strikes the allied countries of the USA in the Gulf.

Nothing will come of this. Trump is a leader among rulers through lies!

But the truth does not change — the war with Iran hit a dead end, triggered an escalation of the American internal financial crisis, drained the military reserves of the USA (which makes Trump a criminal in relation to the national security and sovereignty of the USA), and returned things to the starting position.

At the moment the USA at the negotiating table is in the same position it was before February 28, 2026, but Iran is not.

Iran has now placed on the table the lifting of sanctions, the unfreezing of its assets, and many other things.

Honestly speaking, no one dares to say that Iran is in a position to destroy the USA, to wipe it off the face of the earth, and not the USA Iran.....and that`s the truth.

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Originally published on Fondsk.ru by Alisa Savina
Republished with permission.

On May 14, CIA Director John Ratcliffe visited Cuba, with the island’s government emphasizing that the meeting took place at the initiative of their northern neighbor. According to official information from Cuba’s Foreign Ministry, the meeting produced clear evidence that “Cuba does not pose a threat to US national security, and there are no legitimate grounds for its inclusion on the list of countries allegedly sponsoring terrorism.” Apparently, however, the evidence wasn’t quite clear enough — or, to be more precise, it is obvious that the CIA was attempting to pressure the revolutionary government, which refused to take the bait and did not cave. As a result, on May 20, charges were filed in the United States against Raúl Castro and several Cuban military officials for “conspiracy to murder US citizens“ — which theoretically, following the logic of past events, opens Washington’s next move: intervention on the island.

Just days after the talks with Ratcliffe, the US imposed new sanctions against Cuba, and the press began circulating reports about Havana’s purchase of 300 strike drones from Russia over the past three years. The outlet that first broke the story claims that Cuba is studying the lessons of modern warfare (as if other countries — and the US above all — weren’t doing the same), and that the island has concluded it needs this type of armament (also hardly a secret revelation). The conclusion drawn from this, however, is a surprising one: that Cuba supposedly intends to deploy the drones against North American targets, including Guantanamo, military vessels, and facilities in Florida.

We cannot, of course, predict the future, but the simplest analysis must begin with the question: “Why would Havana want this right now?“ Guantanamo, if the
will existed, could be attacked without UAVs — it is, after all, Cuban territory. Moreover, as Leonid Savin notes in his work “From Sheriff to Terrorist: Essays on US Geopolitics,” declassified archives reveal that US plans as far back as the 1960s included simulating an attack on Guantanamo (along with several other provocations). That option remains on the table to this day and is officially referred to by the Pentagon as a “complex operation.”

Second point — launching drones at Florida immediately after the announcement of what are, in the fullest sense of the word, revolutionary decrees on a new framework for relations with “citizens of the Republic of Cuba living abroad,” decrees that had been awaited for decades and that open up broad avenues of engagement with the Cuban diaspora in Florida itself (despite the fact that the current head of the well-known Cuban American National Foundation, Jorge Más, claims that in the event of a change of power in Cuba, it is the diaspora that will handle economic recovery — but only if social changes occur; in reality, diaspora members had approached the Cuban government decades ago with requests to participate economically, including offering assistance to their hometowns free of charge, and many have not abandoned that desire)... That scenario also doesn’t hold up. And at the present moment, escalation is the last thing the island needs. It turns out that drones, if they exist in the republic at all, are there purely as a defensive measure. As Cuba’s Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla stated previously: “Cuba is a peaceful country, but if it is attacked militarily, it will exercise its right to self-defense to the fullest
extent, with the mass support of its people.”

Nevertheless, this particular piece of planted information appears to have struck a nerve with Cuba’s leadership: many of its representatives responded to the report, and the media observatory Cubadebate quickly conducted and published an analysis of the American social media audience’s reaction to the drone story.

The Cuban analytical organization concluded that a more dangerous phase of the
psychological warfare confrontation is underway — one in which the narrative is shifting from political to military. On the one hand, this sows suspicion against Cuba; on the other, such narratives are meeting serious pushback even from a North American audience. And not just from the public. Former National Security Advisor in the Obama administration Ben Rhodes stated that the blockade of Cuba is illegal and that the scenarios of attack being discussed are absurd. A circle of a fairly significant number of US journalists, intellectuals, and politicians is forming around that position.

For his part, Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez again emphasized on his social media page that Cuba “poses no threat, has no aggressive plans or intentions against any country. It has none against the United States, and never
has. The government of that country, especially its defense agencies and national security organs, knows this well.“ He added that threats, on the contrary, are coming from the north, and that if they are carried out, “it will trigger a bloodbath with unpredictable consequences, to say nothing of the devastating impact on global peace and regional stability.“ It is worth noting that such rhetoric is not particularly characteristic of the typically composed president. And within literally minutes, Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla fired off two separate posts in which he, first, underscored Cuba’s right to self-defense and, second, addressed US threats and the role of the media in these crimes: “Those who unlawfully intend to attack Cuba will use any pretext, however false and absurd, to justify an attack against the will of public opinion in the US and throughout the world.

It is regrettable that certain media outlets continue to be complicit in such a crime.” “Certain media outlets play right into their hands, spreading slander and amplifying the insinuations of the American government itself. Cuba does not threaten anyone and does not want war.“ But war is apparently what the northern neighbor’s Secretary of State is after.

The North American press continues its pressure campaign. The NYT, which previously “leaked” information about “a CIA operation in Venezuela,” reports on a possible plan to do something similar involving none other than the 94-year-old Raúl Castro. It is difficult to comment seriously on this “plan”; suffice it to say that Cuba’s power structure is more complex than Venezuela’s, and that eliminating one individual — even a symbolically significant one (and now perhaps only symbolically significant) — makes it impossible to engineer the kind of power transfer that occurred in Venezuela, even accounting for the fact that, according to statements from North American diplomats, there are people in Cuba who would like to cooperate with the US government. And let us be clear — one must never underestimate one’s adversaries, but statements of this type look more like informational, psychological, and diplomatic terrorism: actions aimed precisely at sowing panic and uncertainty.

What is interesting, however, is the backstory behind this plan. The thing is, Washington has pressed charges against Raúl in connection with events thirty years in the past — specifically when Cuban forces shot down over their own territory two aircraft belonging to the terrorist organization Hermanos al Rescate, killing those aboard. The third plane, piloted by the organization’s leader José Basulto León, “by a strange coincidence” never entered Cuban airspace and quietly turned back to Florida. What is remarkable here is not so much the reopening of this thirty-year-old legal “time capsule,” but the context
in which it is being done today.

Whether because of the decades that have passed, or the general worldwide decline in education, or through criminal negligence or outright betrayal — many
media outlets, including domestic ones, parrot their North American “colleagues”
(from whom they draw their information, lacking the fact-checking skills to do otherwise) and refer to Hermanos al Rescate as an exclusively humanitarian organization. Its cover story, after all, was rescuing migrants crossing to the US by sea, or dropping propaganda leaflets. The reality, however, as is so often the case, is somewhat different. The organization’s founder, José Basulto León, was recruited by the CIA in the 1960s, and his training took place at the time at the legendary JMWAVE base, which operated in Miami from 1961 to 1968 and was the primary hub for planning operations against the Cuban government. The Bay of Pigs invasion was prepared from that very base; assassination plots against Fidel Castro were also devised there. At the time, the base constituted “the third-largest fleet in the Caribbean,” staffed by up to 400 officers and 15,000 Cuban emigres — among them José Basulto León, who specialized in demolition,
covert communications, sabotage, and urban terrorism tactics.

In 1962, José Basulto León personally participated in a speedboat attack on civilian targets in Havana — a theater and a hotel. In the decade that followed, he maintained operational ties with Miami terrorist groups responsible for bombings, the assassination of Cuban diplomats, and attacks on civilian targets;
he coordinated the financing of subversive and terrorist activities against Cuba through the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF). And while Hermanos al Rescate initially kept up the pretense of a “humanitarian organization,” as today’s media describe it, by 1994 it had transformed into a “provocation unit.”

Its primary activities were clearly aerial provocations, reconnaissance (the aircraft repeatedly flew over strategic military, economic, and energy facilities), interference with Cuba’s air defense radio frequencies, and — according to Cuban intelligence reporting from the early 2000s — there were plans to destroy high-voltage power transmission lines in the territory of what is now Mayabeque Province and to attack thermal power stations using explosives dropped from the air. The goal was to trigger a nationwide collapse of the electrical grid, which would lead to social chaos and destabilization — precisely what Cuba is experiencing now, as the result of economic terrorism rather than the conventional kind the Yankees were banking on thirty years ago. And even then, Havana acted with exceptional restraint: each violation was reported in writing to both the US government and the International Civil Aviation Organization, and after a particularly large-scale attack on July 13, 1995, Cuba issued a public official warning about the neutralization of aircraft entering the republic’s airspace without authorization. Even that attack might not have prompted Havana to take tough measures, had Cuban intelligence agents embedded in the terrorist emigre networks not passed along information about a major provocation being prepared by José Basulto León. The pilot of this “humanitarian organization,” Juan Pablo Roque, returned to Cuba and made a public statement that Basulto was planning an action intended to force Cuba into
a military response and thereby justify US intervention. Meanwhile, intelligence
officers Gerardo Hernández, Ramón Labañino, Antonio Guerrero, Fernando González, and René González — who subsequently received lengthy prison sentences in the United States and were awarded the title of Heroes of the Republic of Cuba in their homeland — proved that the Hermanos al Rescate flights were a cover for espionage and terrorism.

The indictment of Raúl was turned into a full-blown spectacle. The first information to come out was announced at a special gathering held in Florida “in
honor of the fallen” terrorists. The media, as is customary in the US, provided detailed coverage of Basulto’s “emotional reaction” as he spoke, practically in tears, about “justice.” Commenting on the matter, acting US Attorney General Todd Blanche declared that “we expect him [Raúl Castro] to appear here voluntarily or by other means.” The date chosen was no accident: May 20 is the
so-called independence day — it is the day Cuba obtained independence from Spain, only to fall under the control of the United States through the Platt Amendment. “This day deserves thanks for one thing only: for planting the seeds
of anti-imperialist sentiment in Cubans,” Cuba’s president Miguel Díaz-Canel wrote on social media. It is not observed as a holiday in Cuba, but is naturally beloved in Florida — Marco Rubio himself addressed Cubans on the occasion. The show went on.

As things stand now, the pretext the US is using for the possible intervention that Trump and Rubio have been talking about amounts to nothing more than the defense of terrorists. Moreover, the evidence the US is putting forward is fairly shaky: the foundation is an audio recording made during negotiations before the planes were shot down. On it, Raúl Castro — who was Cuba’s defense minister at the time — can be heard ordering that the aircraft be pushed out of Cuban airspace, not shot down outright. That doesn’t work; the terrorists refuse to comply and press on. One hears “they’re headed for Havana,” and only when there is a genuine risk to peaceful Havana does the order to act come.

Respect for the rule of law, of course, has never been Washington’s strong suit. It is worth noting, however, that the CIA still manages to pull off its psychological information operations — and at present, these are directed not merely against the Axis of Good, but against our very connections to one another. Organizations like Hermanos al Rescate are labeled humanitarian by domestic media in exactly the same way that many Cubans — including some who are quite respected in intellectual circles — draw their knowledge about Russia’s Special Military Operation from North American sources, which are, of course, hardly inclined toward a fair and honest account of the events and causes behind Russia’s military operation. And that is a danger no less serious than the prospect of CIA operations in Cuba or anywhere else.

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Originally published on Fondsk.ru by Leonid Savin
Republished with permission.

In less than six months, the leadership of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has made a swift journey from positioning the country as one of the driving forces of a multipolar world and Bolivarian socialism to becoming a compliant client of the United States — reverting to the pre-Hugo Chávez era. The logic of geopolitical capitulation is clear: rather than choosing to fight and attempting to preserve autonomy and sovereignty (the paradox being that no such attempts were even meaningfully made), Venezuela opted for dependency, driven by the sheer fear gripping its current political leadership following the abduction of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores by US special forces.

The extradition of former Minister of Industry Alex Saab — who for many years served as the financial brain of the Chavistas and helped circumvent US sanctions — puts a definitive period at the end of this shameful string of actions by the Delcy Rodríguez government. Though the troubles for Venezuela and its people are, in all likelihood, only just beginning.

Before this came the Washington-imposed licensing scheme for oil sales (without lifting the sanctions), under which only the US gets to decide who can buy Venezuelan oil and on what terms (a de-sovereignization of the oil sector, one of the main pillars of the Venezuelan economy, as well as a blow to Venezuela’s closest partner — Cuba, which Venezuela regularly supplied with oil); the transfer of the country’s gold reserves to the United States (de-sovereignization of the financial sector); and the removal of enriched uranium that had been designated as fuel for a nuclear reactor (de-sovereignization of the energy sector) — a move the State Department framed as “the removal of uranium that could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons.”

As for Saab, following his extradition on May 16, the US Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida charged him with international conspiracy to launder money and corruption related to Venezuela’s state food distribution program CLAP. Meanwhile, Venezuela’s own leadership announced Saab’s “deportation” on the grounds of “committing various crimes in the United States,” claiming the decision was based on Venezuela’s “national interests.”

Alex Saab had already been held in US custody before. He was arrested in Cape Verde in 2020 and extradited to the United States in October 2021, where he faced money laundering charges. That process was riddled with violations: the notification was issued 24 hours after the arrest, there was no extradition treaty with the US, ECOWAS and the UN Human Rights Committee demanded his release — to no avail. It is also known that he was subjected to torture while in US custody.

Saab was released in 2023 as part of a prisoner exchange involving ten US citizens, twenty Venezuelan political prisoners, and the consolidation of Chevron‘s position in Venezuela’s oil sector. Such a lopsided deal underscored how valuable Saab was to the Venezuelan government.

So what exactly did he do? It is known that even under Chávez, he helped establish ties between the country’s oil industry and Iran. Saab holds multiple citizenships (Colombia, Venezuela, Antigua and Barbuda) and operates a network of companies in Turkey, Hong Kong, Switzerland, and Panama, through which he built the logistics infrastructure that allowed Venezuela to work around US sanctions.

From 2011 onward, he oversaw two major state programs: the construction of social housing (Gran Misión Vivienda Venezuela) and the distribution of food subsidies through CLAP, which fed the poorest segments of the population during the worst years of sanctions.

According to the US indictment, starting in October 2015, the businessman conspired with accomplices to bribe Venezuelan officials and gain control over CLAP contracts for food imports. But rather than fulfilling the contracts, the participants used shell companies, falsified invoices, and other documents to redirect hundreds of millions of dollars intended for food purchases.

If Nicolás Maduro is accused by the White House of creating and running a drug cartel that doesn’t exist, pinning charges of corruption and money laundering on Alex Saab will be considerably easier — especially given that he genuinely did help circumvent US sanctions.

Saab operated effectively across multiple jurisdictions and also developed a scheme to exchange Venezuelan gold through Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran in return for other assets. On top of that, he served as a channel for negotiations with Western companies — including Chevron and JP Morgan — that were, in practice, continuing to operate in Venezuela.

That is precisely why, after his release and return to the country, Nicolás Maduro appointed him Minister of Industry in October 2024. He was removed from the post just two weeks after the US operation on January 3, 2026, and Saab had already predicted at that point that he would be betrayed and deported. In February, reports emerged of his arrest by Venezuelan security services, though the authorities tried to suppress this information.

Diego Herchoren and Ayse Goriyak argue that Saab’s extradition carries at least six political consequences for Venezuela.

First, the fact that “new authorities” were able to make the decision to hand over such a prominent figure from Maduro’s government means that Maduro is no longer running the country. As a result, all of Venezuela’s leadership rhetoric about protecting Maduro is nothing but an information smokescreen.

Second, the extradition marks the beginning of a systematic purge of the old guard. Those who helped circumvent sanctions and were once considered heroes will now be treated as criminals.

Third, a climate of terror has been established within Venezuela’s leadership. The extradition functions as a disciplinary mechanism: no senior Chavista official can feel safe, since the new puppet rulers can hand them over to US justice at any time.

Fourth, the rules of the geopolitical game have changed. Venezuela has ceased to be a player and has become an object of manipulation by its northern neighbor.

Fifth, subordination to specific US financial interests. The extradition decision does not respond to domestic judicial criteria but rather to the rivalry between investment funds such as Amber Energy and JP Morgan. Venezuelan policy has thus been subordinated to factions of American financial capital. (These same authors note that Venezuela is currently the battleground between two US interest groups: on one side, JP Morgan operating through Dalinar Energy; on the other, Paul Singer — a close donor to Donald Trump — operating through Amber Energy.)

Sixth, the weakening of ties with Russia and Iran, in line with the new US foreign policy direction.

As we can see, Venezuela’s own leadership plays no role in decision-making. Delcy Rodríguez is currently acting as a “controlled interim leader” — a role designated for her by Harry Sargeant III, whose company has operated in Venezuela since the 1980s and has the blessing of Donald Trump. And once the United States gets everything it needs and builds a new functioning structure serving its interests, Rodríguez may very well end up in the dock herself — as might Diosdado Cabello, who still faces unresolved drug trafficking charges and is accused by the domestic opposition of ordering unlawful arrests and torture that led to the deaths of political prisoners. For now, they are left playing the role of go-betweens — caught between the hammer of US foreign policy and the anvil of their own population’s growing discontent.

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All processes in which the West and the East clash, meet, and are forced either to fight or to negotiate, show that there is a lack of correspondence in the development of mental and cognitive qualities between the two halves. As well as moral categories --- honesty, truthfulness, responsibility, loyalty. All negotiations that the East conducts with the West are inapplicable, untrue, lifeless as a result. This is due to the difference in the character of the two systems. In the mismatch between the two systems in the understanding and application of life. The notorious American “word of honor,” which was the main point of the American Dream, has long ceased to exist, and at the moment under Trump it is its complete burial. For example, the negotiations between Russia and the USA over Ukraine led to absolutely no result. The same will be with negotiations over Iran, and also with negotiations between Russia and the EU. The reason lies in the moral and mental, and also spiritual, divergence between these two currents, between these two civilizational shores. All the efforts that Russia has thrown so far into Ukraine on the diplomatic field are fruitless, because the West cannot and does not want to live in understanding and honesty. This exhausted Russia and Putin personally, beyond any doubt. From here on begin the reactions that he should retire, that he has failed, and so on. I pointed out the reason for this result. The reason is not Putin’s inability, but the West’s inability to accept and understand. The reason is cognitive!

One more proof of my thesis is the fact that even after a military loss the West refuses to accept it and continues to fight. The world had never seen such a thing --- to have lost a war and to continue waging it! This means that the West has developed a lack of sensitivity. Absolutely no conversations and negotiations in this way make any sense! Everything spoken, agreed upon, and experienced on the battlefield or on the economic battlefield cannot enter life, nor happen, because the West sabotages life itself. And proof of this is what is being carried out by Israel and the inability of the whole world community to stop it! There neither talks help, nor negotiations, nor fighting. I do not know whether we live in times of change, but I am sure that we live in times of total absurdities.

One more example. The couple Mrs. and Mr. Smith, Witkoff and Kushner, who negotiate for the USA on all topics in the world, have not achieved a single positive application, except the thickening of their bank accounts. There is no meaning at all so far from their work! This means that the world is experiencing a crisis of the civilizational way of life and understanding of the world above all. How will two systems live that speak different languages and understand life in a fundamentally opposite way? Impossible.

I found all these conclusions while studying the finished meeting Putin–Xi. In which there was not a single new thing, only a deepening of things developing until now. There is no military agreement. If this is what Xi Jinping had in mind at New Year, the declaration for the announcement of a multipolar world, then this is the only news from Beijing. Because Russia and China, Putin and Xi, can do nothing more in their dialogue with the West! I think that those who will replace them will not have different results either. And I immediately cut off the version that war between East and West will change the civilizational abyss. The West is fighting now and does not admit that it has lost! Neither in Ukraine, nor in Iran. More than that, the West fights without any disturbance and sense of sin. Neither the killings, nor the violence, nor the plundering provoke a state of disturbance in the West. Not only reason is lacking, but feelings as well. I paraphrase Jane Austen: “the West is Without Reason and Feelings”. Even war will not fix things. Even nuclear war, because with such there will be no life at all. The solution is not simply a change of the elites in the West, no. Here there lies ahead a very long and profound rational process of how the world can continue under this truth. A multipolar world is the first form that appears for distinction from the rotting corpse of the West. This will be an attempt for the East to isolate itself from the West and I think that in China and Russia they understand this excellently. They understand it in Iran as well. And that is all. All other parts of the world still have not reached this understanding, and in Europe it is almost impossible for this thought to be advanced.

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