Restore Britain’s Energy Policy

Foreword and Philosophy

The foreword and philosophy of the policy paper were clearly written in Rupert Lowe’s style. It reads as overtly political in tone, particularly through its references to Ed Miliband and Net Zero (Foreword and introductory sections, pp. 1–5). While some degree of political framing is to be expected in a foreword, in my view, it comes across as more partisan than positive, and therefore less consistent with the more measured and ostensibly apolitical tone usually associated with well-constructed policy papers.

A useful way to frame policy papers is to present them as beyond conventional politics and focused on apolitical solutions to problems. A policy paper is not the place to argue against other policies. Rather, it should aim to demonstrate persuasively that the proposed policy is both workable and beneficial.

In the philosophy section, the argument for lower regulation is introduced; that is, large parts of the energy sector remain characterised by ineffective and excessive regulation (see “A Note On Planning: The Fourth Fundamental”, pp. 13–15; also “Nuclear”, pp. 24–31). This point feels somewhat underdeveloped and ideologically driven rather than evidence-based. More broadly, the tone of the piece comes across as distinctly Thatcherite and somewhat dated in its framing of economic and regulatory issues.

Remit

The general remit of this paper is quite broad. It focuses on repealing Net Zero and increasing energy production and abundance (see “Net Zero Self-Harm”, pp. 6–12; “Abundance”, pp. 13–15). While it addresses these topics in broad terms, it does not go into significant detail on the specifics of removing subsidies or other important measures, and it makes clear that such details will not be discussed in the paper itself (pp. 10–12).

This is a weakness. It is all well and good to state that the Net Zero policy will be reversed and that domestic energy resources will be exploited, but achieving these goals is highly complex and requires substantial legal, engineering, and policy expertise.

A more productive approach to developing energy policy, in my view, would have been to focus on specific areas, such as repealing Net Zero legislation or improving government policy towards nuclear energy. Each of the topics briefly addressed in this paper is extremely complex. As such, I do not believe the paper offers anything particularly unique or especially useful for a Restore government, if and when it were to enter power.

Net-Zero Self-Harm

Simple Changes

The Net-Zero section of the report states that the 2008 Climate Change Act should be repealed, along with the Climate Change Levy — a levy imposed on commercial energy (“Net Zero Self-Harm”, pp. 6–9). This increase in energy costs leads to higher prices for goods and services. The paper also proposes cancelling Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs) by Act of Parliament (pp. 9–10).

These appear to be the most actionable proposals in this section of the policy paper. In principle, these are positive measures and would be welcome changes to both economic and energy policy.

However, a more detailed analysis should have been conducted to determine which legislation would need to be repealed to achieve the state policy goals. A more detailed breakdown of the likely effects of cancelling ROCs would also have been welcome. There has been no mention of other legislation with built-in Net Zero provisions affecting areas such as planning, energy, construction, manufacturing, and more.

Ignoring other primary legislation, such as the 2023 Energy Act and the Planning and Energy Act 2008, would mean Net Zero would remain embedded in primary legislation. As a result, any attempt by a Restore Britain government to move away from Net Zero policy would likely be subject to successful judicial review, leading to years of litigation over energy policy.

More Complex Changes

Importantly, this policy paper recognises that divestment and the removal of subsidies for renewable energy are complex processes, as many renewable providers receive some form of subsidy or price guarantee under their contracts with the British government for the development of renewable energy projects (“Net Zero Self-Harm”, pp. 9–12; “Offshore Wind”, pp. 31–33).

One of the suggested means of dealing with this issue is to introduce windfall taxes on wind and solar providers, require operators to restore land to its original pre-installation state, and make greater use of existing laws protecting birds and other wildlife (pp. 10–11; also “Offshore Wind”, pp. 32–33).

The implication here is that the aforementioned legislation and taxes would be used to encourage divestment from wind and solar energy, which, depending on how they are implemented, could negatively affect Britain’s ability to attract large private investors. This is because using the above-mentioned legislative and tax strategy would increase investors’ perception of regulatory risk and may also place Britain in breach of existing trade, investment agreements and commercial contracts.

This section of the policy paper has been insufficiently thought through. In most wind and solar developments, there is already an obligation to restore the land to its original condition once operations cease as part of the decommissioning obligations. As for imposing windfall taxes on wind and solar farms, while this may not be unworkable, the broader set of proposals reflects a recurring issue throughout the policy paper: it lacks careful consideration and demonstrates an insufficient understanding of how such policy changes would affect the energy market more broadly.

Another suggestion, which is more welcome, is the proposal to renegotiate existing trade agreements that contain Net Zero commitments (pp. 11–12). The report correctly identifies that many clauses in trade and investment agreements are often vague and nonspecific. On this basis, renegotiation — or potentially disregarding such provisions altogether — would be easy, provided there is sufficient parliamentary support for doing so.

The reasoning in this aspect of the policy paper is sound, but, as is a recurring problem throughout the paper, this suggestion lacks detail on which treaties and articles would be renegotiated and how that would be done.

A Note On Planning: The Fourth Fundamental

The “Abundance” section of the report begins by explaining in detail the importance of achieving energy abundance and describes the problems currently faced by households and businesses due to the limited availability of cheap energy (“Abundance”, pp. 13–15). It then reiterates points about excessive regulation and planning barriers that hinder the development of energy projects, but provides limited detail.

It is important to note that the UK planning system, particularly in terms of land use for energy infrastructure projects, is widely regarded as cumbersome and inefficient. However, the report provides very few practical solutions or meaningful proposals for reforming the planning system (pp. 13–15; also references throughout “Nuclear”, pp. 24–31).

This is not something that is too disappointing, because developing practical and well-designed solutions to the cumbersome planning system, even when focused specifically on energy-related planning, is extremely difficult and is something with which many experienced academics and legal practitioners would struggle, let alone the small policy team at Restore Britain.

The issue with this section of the report is that, by this stage, it would be reasonable to expect either some genuinely detailed policy proposals or, at the very least, a set of clearly defined outlines suggesting that a more comprehensive policy framework would follow. Instead, the “Abundance” section largely meanders over three pages, with only a small number of paragraphs offering substantive value.

This reflects a broader and disappointing theme within Restore Britain’s policy papers: they are often short on practical detail and concrete planning, yet lengthy in argumentation and rhetoric.

Oil & Gas

The oil and gas section argues that British government policy towards oil and natural gas production has been deeply flawed. It correctly claims that these policies have contributed to a sustained increase in energy bills and argues that Britain would benefit from a greater domestic natural gas supply (pp. 16–21).

The principal policy proposal advanced in this section is to reduce the tax imposed on oil and natural gas production to a standard 25% corporate tax rate (p. 20). At present, oil and natural gas producers are subject to a more burdensome range of taxes and charges than many other industries. So if oil and natural gas taxation is more fair, it will become profitable, likely reducing energy prices in the United Kingdom.

In addition, the paper includes a discussion suggesting that revenues from oil and natural gas could potentially be used in a manner similar to Norway’s sovereign wealth fund (p. 20), which contributes towards funding its welfare and pension systems.

Importantly, while this may be a worthwhile policy ambition, it is necessary to recognise that a model which functions effectively in Norway may not be transferable to the United Kingdom. Norway’s oil and gas revenues are channelled through a state-owned energy company, whereas no comparable entity exists in the UK. Moreover, the creation of such a structure would likely sit uneasily alongside Rupert Lowe’s small-government, Thatcherite political outlook.

Nuclear (“Nuclear”, pp. 21–31).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, by this point, the nuclear energy section of the policy paper contains few clear policy objectives beyond the broad deregulation agenda and the greater inclusion of small modular reactors (SMRs) through planning reform and encouragement of private investment. (SMRs, pp.25-28)

SMRs are not commercially viable at present. In terms of operation, there are only two experimental SMRs in the world today: one in Russia and one in China. Both were development projects that took over a decade to complete. The reasons for this are complex and, according to SMR companies themselves, operational viability is not expected until the mid-2030s. Commercial viability is likely to come much later than that because, for SMRs to be commercially viable for both developers and users, they would need to be sufficiently standardised and widely adopted so that manufacturers can generate profits from them.

Furthermore, as with large nuclear power plants, similar siting considerations apply.

It is not clear that the technology is commercially unviable and should therefore be written off completely. However, the regulatory system and planning process should not be altered solely to encourage SMRs, nor should the government introduce investment incentives, as SMRs remain an untested technology outside naval submarines and surface vessels at present.

Therefore, the idea that local authorities and investors will be able to establish their own SMR facilities to provide cheap energy in the foreseeable future is unrealistic.

This section of the policy paper attempts to address policy in a highly complex and potentially dangerous industry, yet it does so without demonstrating that the author or authors possess any detailed knowledge of how nuclear regulation operates, or which specific regulations are genuinely in need of reform or repeal.

Offshore Wind

The principal policy proposals in the wind energy section are to stop approving new wind farms unless developers can demonstrate that the projects can cover all associated costs themselves, and to end subsidies for new developments (“Offshore Wind”, pp. 31–33).

In terms of policy, these proposals are workable and, in my view, worth pursuing. However, very little in this section of the report has not already been discussed in the Net Zero section (compare pp. 31–33 with pp. 6–12). As a result, the section feels somewhat repetitive and adds little in the way of new analysis or policy detail.

Fracking

The fracking section of the report is interesting and well-researched on the specifics of the current fracking policy and its problems (“Fracking”, pp. 33–36). However, as with other sections of the policy paper, it does not address policy or regulatory change in any meaningful detail.

The only specific policy proposal is to change the current allowable seismic disturbance to align with that for geothermal energy projects and reverse the current ban on fracking (pp. 35–36).

Beyond the fracking element, the paper only vaguely suggests the need to review and repeal regulations (pp. 35–36). If Restore Britain had produced a policy paper of similar length focused solely on fracking, it would likely have been considered sufficiently detailed to constitute a serious policy proposal or to demonstrate that Restore Britain is a government-in-waiting.

Conclusion

Although this policy paper makes some potentially beneficial proposals, it does not adequately set out clear policy. Admittedly, the paper’s remit acknowledged that certain specific areas of energy policy — such as addressing offshore wind farm contracts — would not be covered in detail, as doing so would be beyond the scope of a single paper (see “Net Zero Self-Harm”, pp. 10–12; “Offshore Wind”, pp. 31–33).

Overall, however, the policy paper is of poor quality because the writing style is casual and argumentative rather than neutral, and evaluative.

The overwhelming majority of the paper focuses on criticising previous government policy (throughout pp. 1–39). While there is certainly a place for criticism within a policy document, it should not dominate to the extent that it does here. Furthermore, where criticism is made, it ought to be supported by a high degree of detail and analysis, which this paper largely lacks.

The term “regulations” is repeatedly used without identifying any specific regulations, regulatory frameworks, or governing bodies (especially “Nuclear”, pp. 24–31; “Fracking”, pp. 35–36).

Perhaps the most striking example appears in the fracking section on page 36, where the paper states that “one geologist within the fracking industry expressed frustration to us that ‘so many pointless roadblocks have been put in the way of good-faith efforts to recover our own onshore reserves’” (p. 36).

The fact that no specific regulations were identified, and that this individual does not appear to have contributed substantively to the policy proposals themselves, suggests that Restore Britain’s promise — made during its launch campaign — to bring experts from business, science, and other professional backgrounds into government to help formulate policy and support MPs is unlikely to be meaningfully delivered upon.

Had I been asked to review this paper prior to publication, I would have focused on one area of energy policy, such as fracking or legislation, and used the additional space to provide more detailed explanations of how the proposed solutions could realistically be implemented.

Unfortunately, this document should not be regarded as a serious policy paper. Rather, it is better understood as a mediocre research paper which requires considerably more detail, technical understanding, and policy development.

The great historical philosopher Oswald Spengler has a quote often misunderstood: “optimism is cowardice.” This statement is frequently interpreted as a pessimistic attempt to discourage hope, but this is not entirely accurate. In its original context, in Man and Technics: A Contribution to a Philosophy of Life, Spengler suggests that ideas such as hope, optimism, and other positive expectations of the future may be considered a form of cowardice when they are not grounded in a clear recognition of reality. The first idea—that hope or optimism alone is sufficient—becomes problematic because it can serve as a way to avoid the harder truths about limitation, struggle, and decline. The takeaway from this is that it is cowardly to rely on optimism as a substitute for confronting reality and acting within it.[1]

A slightly different interpretation of this idea can be found in Dune by Frank Herbert, particularly in the Bene Gesserit order, which displays a similar attitude: that optimism is foolish and that planning must take its place. In the modern adaptation, Dune: Part Two, this idea is clearly summarised by Reverend Mother Gaius Helen Mohiam in the final scene; in response to Jessica saying, “You should have believed”, she replies, “We do not believe. We plan.”[2] The point being that the Bene Gesserit, by the time of the first Dune novel, are a multi-millennia-old order that has continually striven to further humanity by producing better leaders, ultimately seeking to create the Kwisatz Haderach—a superbeing—through long-term breeding and the careful manipulation of power.

The Bene Gesserit are an elite order that does not rely on hope but instead treats it as a tool, planning over centuries and millennia to achieve their goals, fully recognising the difficulty involved. This type of long-term planning towards a political objective is often the only viable approach for a counter-elite or a group of political outsiders.

Historically, this kind of beyond-lifetime planning has enabled many political goals to be realised by groups initially outside formal power, whether in the case of the Zionist movement, which led to the creation of Israel, or the Irish nationalist movement, which achieved independence in Ireland. These types of ambitious political goals necessarily take time and may extend beyond any individual lifetime.

It is important to consider that both Oswald Spengler and the Bene Gesserit are not completely opposed to optimism and hope. Rather, they are sceptical of it outside its proper place, and recognise that optimism and hope, more broadly, can be as dangerous as they are useful.

Importantly, Hope is a complex concept, and different cultures have held more or less sophisticated understandings of it than those held by modern Britons (Restore Britain Supporters). The more sophisticated the understanding, the more nuanced its placement within the broader structure of thought and action is.

Ancient Greeks

One of the oldest understandings of hope in ancient Greek literature can be found in the story of Pandora’s box, as told by Hesiod, where Pandora, having been gifted by the gods a jar containing all the evils of the world, opens it, despite her better judgement and out of curiosity, releasing plague, Madness, vice, violence Sickness and disease, into the world, leaving only hope within the jar. It is disputed what the role of hope is in this story, as to whether it is a good in itself or a bad; however, given the context, hope appears neither wholly a virtue nor wholly an evil, but something in between.

Moving into the classical period, it should be noted that there is a diversity of opinion among thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates. Socrates, for example, understood hope to be a virtue in a way not entirely dissimilar to later Christian thought, in that, in the context in which he was writing prior to his execution, as depicted in Plato’s Apology, he presents hope in the possibility of an afterlife as something good, or at least as part of an acceptance of the inevitable.

Whereas more elitist thinkers, such as Democritus, viewed hope as a good only insofar as it is limited by rationality and possessed by right-thinking men, such that hope, in this sense, is only a virtue when governed by reason.

On the other hand, Aristotle has similarly nuanced views on hope, suggesting that hope, as an emotion, may lead man astray and prompt poor or ill-advised decisions based on belief in the virtuousness of an act.

Thucydides offers perhaps the most pessimistic view, in that he presents hope as something that arises only in moments of disaster, rather than as a virtue. Much like in the story of Pandora’s box, Thucydides’ view of hope is that it functions as a form of comfort when nothing else remains. Broadly, the ancient Greek view of hope is to see it as a limited virtue, dependent on an individual’s ability to think rationally and in a disciplined manner, or as something properly directed towards particular ends, such as hope for an afterlife.[3]

Roman

A distinct Roman attitude towards hope does not really exist, due to the diversity of Roman thought and the long duration of both the Republic and the Empire. Notable approaches include those of Stoicism and Epicureanism. These were developments from early Greek understandings that would have been taught to and agreed upon by early Romans. The Stoic approach to hope is somewhat negative, seeing it as an emotion to be controlled and moderated rather than indulged. By contrast, from an Epicurean perspective, hope was viewed more favourably, provided it was neither empty nor shallow, but instead a mental disposition worth cultivating insofar as it improves one’s experience of the present.

Within Roman public life, there was also a form of hope grounded in the individual, namely the practice of referring to a person as a “hope”. This can be seen, for example, in references to Augustus as the hope of Rome, as well as similar language applied to military leaders. This type of individual-based hope contributed to the construction of an imperial image and functioned as a form of political propaganda.[4]

Taken together, these examples suggest that Roman attitudes towards hope were, for the most part, relatively stable and pragmatic: hope was considered acceptable, and even valuable, but only when properly grounded and kept within its appropriate bounds. Its status depended on the specific context, and it was regarded as a virtue only when it occupied its proper place.

The Christian View of Hope

Moreover, the Christian view is broadly more positive; hope is seen as a virtue, particularly in relation to the hope of an afterlife and the hope of the resurrection, and is also understood alongside faith. It is also seen as a virtue because one hopes in the belief that God is good and that God will do right by you within a Christian framework. Hope, because it requires submission and vulnerability, is understood as an act of obedience and faith. The virtue of hope is best symbolised by the theme of “daring to hope”, as seen in observances such as Lent. Christian hope acts as an anchor for the soul, helping the individual to endure hardship by focusing on God’s promises rather than the present circumstances. Even positive Christian understandings of hope are grounded in the idea that hope, as a virtue, is directed towards God—who is good—rather than placed in particular individuals or specific political outcomes. Where hope is a virtue, it is only so when it has the necessary limitations and in its proper place. Outside of hope in God, hope is not really understood as a virtue by Christian thinkers.[5]

Hope in Restore Britain

As mentioned in my previous article, there is an extreme level of optimism and hope in and around Restore Britain that, to some, makes it seem cultish and, in my opinion, leaves it vulnerable to foolish mistakes due to a lack of critical thinking among party members. This level of optimism, applied to anything, seems misplaced.

From my perspective, I would expand on how optimism is applied here: in my experience, most Restore members and supporters fail to accept the present’s difficult nature, either through incompetence or cowardice. As Oswald Spengler suggested in his analysis of civilisational decline, there is often a tendency to cling to comforting illusions rather than confront harsh realities. This refusal to accept the present means that, instead of doing the limited but productive things that our time requires. People prefer to watch, like, and share podcasts and memes, or walk around places like Great Yarmouth putting leaflets through people’s doors, believing that they are saving the country.

The Clown Show

Engagement in traditional party politics reduces it to a spectator sport, in which supporters and members of political parties behave much like football fans. They effectively do the same thing: they interact on social media and go out to support their side, whether that is through leafleting or attending events.

Proper politics is often boring and expensive. It requires an understanding of how administrative and political power structures operate at multiple levels, as well as the development and testing of plans to achieve specific political objectives.

The hope that Restore Britain will succeed allows them to engage in the more enjoyable yet mostly ineffective aspects of politics, while sincerely believing that they are saving Britain.

A proper understanding of hope in politics

The ancient Greeks were reluctant to accept hope as a virtue because it requires giving up. From there understanding hope is something clung to when everything else has already been lost. It is not merely that hope exists alongside despair, but that it can represent resignation itself.

In a Christian context, having hope in God, through Jesus, for the salvation of the soul is considered virtuous. Hope in the abstract is not necessarily a virtue. It can only be a virtue when it is specifically grounded; for example, hope in God is a virtue.

However, placing hope in individuals such as Rupert Lowe and movements like Restore Britain to save the country is something quite different. It suggests that, for the most part, the right-wing desire for hope reflects a surrender of the country and on its capacity to do anything meaningful to preserve or restore it, whether at the level of local community or the nation as a whole.

For the masses, having hope and, in effect, giving up on politics is not necessarily an issue. The masses should not be overly concerned with politics beyond what directly affects their lives.

However, for those called to leadership for the betterment of others hope should not be a guiding principle. Thucydides criticism of hope that it can only be present as a response to failure should be accepted by Leadership.

Arguably hope can function as a virtue if it is sufficiently ordered and restrained, at least in a worldly context, which may seem counterintuitive. If hope, in a worldly sense, is treated as a virtue for an elite, it will abandon competence. Hope that is tightly constrained ceases to be hope and instead becomes confidence and self-belief, which are virtues when exercised proportionately.

If Restore Britain were genuinely confident and self-assured, this would not be an issue. However, from what I have observed, that is not the case. Restore Britain is hopeful that they will be elected in 2029 and save Britain. But this hoped-for outcome is not commensurate with what Restore Britain has shown it can do thus far.

Restore Britain has shown that it can win local elections and mobilise large numbers of supporters to distribute leaflets. It has also shown that it is capable of conducting a probing inquiry, although the quality of this inquiry remains unclear. In addition, it has demonstrated the ability to raise significant amounts of money, both from high-net-worth individuals and through crowdfunding. However, it has not shown that it can draft and implement well-thought-out, productive policies to achieve political goals, nor has it demonstrated an ability to organise large numbers of people with diverse skills over a long period of time.

The energy around Restore Britain can be channelled into worthwhile causes. However, allowing that energy to become centred on hope and optimism risks encouraging the leadership to neglect the more mundane but productive aspects of political work.

[1] Oswald Spengler, Man and Technics: A Contribution to a Philosophy of Life (Routledge rev edn, 2016) 56.

[2] 2 Dune: Part Two (directed by Denis Villeneuve, Legendary Pictures, 2024).

[3] G Scott Gravlee, ‘Hope in Ancient Greece and Rome’ in The Oxford Compendium of Hope (OUP 2025) 43 https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197618240.003.0003 accessed 9 May 2026.

[4] Paul Johnston, ‘Worshipping Hope: Versions of Spes in the Roman Empire’ (Stanford Humanities Center, 2024) https://shc.stanford.edu/arcade/interventions/worshipping-hope-versions-spes-roman-empire accessed 9 May 2026.

[5] John MacArthur, ‘Fundamental Christian Attitudes: Hope, Part 1’ (Grace to You, 5 January 1997) https://www.gty.org/sermons/90-136/fundamental-christian-attitudes-hope-part-1 accessed 9 May 2026.

My Restore Britain Experience

On or around the 13th of February 2026, just after Rupert Lowe launched Restore Britain as a political party—marking the transition from a movement or pressure group into a national political party—I received a phone call from a friend of mine, an independent journalist. He was gloating about what he saw as the good news of Restore Britain. He argued that my “riding the tiger” plans—namely, trying to build anti-fragile communities and mutual aid organisations, and so on—were no longer necessary. He insisted I had been wrong to pursue them and should instead put everything behind Rupert Lowe and support Restore Britain, so that at the next election we could have a Restore Britain government that could save the country.

I have been a member of Restore Britain since roughly 30 June 2025, when it launched. Initially, I was cautiously optimistic. While it was still a movement, it drafted a policy paper explaining how mass deportations could be carried out. I made my own criticisms at the time. At that stage, I hoped that, with experience, these early shortcomings would improve over time and that any teething issues would be addressed promptly.

Since the announcement of its intention to become a national political party, I have made the following criticisms:

Premature announcement: Announcing before Restore Britain had been formally registered as a political party gave the impression of disorganisation.

In its defence,

I was told by people in the inner circle that this was done to maximise the reach of Rupert Lowe’s video.

Leadership dominance: Restore Britain appears to be overly influenced, if not dominated, by a small central group of influencers and alternative media figures.

Lack of detailed policy. There is a need for more serious, developed policy work rather than relying on messaging or personality.

Assurances of improvement: My local branch leader, Henry Bolton (former leader of the UK Independence Party, UKIP), told me in a Q&A that these issues are recognised and that changes are already in progress.

Communications concerns: Following activity on Restore Britain’s Twitter account associated with Rupert Lowe, the quality of posts appeared to decline, with content noticeably lower.

Framing of the next election: Rupert Lowe, along with other senior party officials, have framed the 2029 election as Britain’s “last chance”. This makes me concerned that all genuinely right-wing energy will be drawn into Restore Britain, only for the party to collapse in a manner similar to UKIP’s post-Brexit collapse.

My Experience of a Party Meeting

Overall, my first Restore Britain party meeting was an enjoyable experience, during which I had the opportunity to briefly meet several people who were sympathetic to or broadly aligned with my political views. The meeting consisted of a short speech about Restore Britain, followed by a Q&A session which, despite lasting for several hours, was neither dull nor boring.

The branch organiser, Henry Bolton, introduced himself and briefly outlined his background, which is largely in the military and the Foreign Office, as well as his role as former leader of the UKIP. Overall, he came across as an interesting and qualified individual, as did most of those present at the meeting.

During the Q&A, others and I had the opportunity to ask important questions. Most of my questions focused on planning policy and aspects of Restore Britain’s organisational structure that interested me. The branch organiser seemed to share my desire for proper planning, though he was somewhat reluctant to go into detail. This reluctance was attributed to concerns about potential infiltration by individuals from other parties, which is not unreasonable.

My Concerns

On a number of occasions during the meeting, Henry Bolton made two significant claims but declined to provide any supporting details.

Following my own questions on policy, and similar questions from others, he stated that Restore Britain has policies in development that are so strong that they surpass anything any other party has proposed or implemented. However, he also said that neither the content nor any details of these policies could be disclosed to us at the meeting, citing concerns about potential infiltration by spies.

This explanation made me uncomfortable. He had not been asked to share full policy documents with party members, nor to provide highly specific details. Even if a hostile actor had been present, there would have been little of substance to report beyond the general fact that Restore Britain is working on more detailed policies in areas such as energy or defence. With many basic details absent from the policy reports and policy papers.

Secondly, in response to questions about the perceived media blackout, it was claimed that once these policies are released, they will attract global attention, including from serious figures in the United States and other Commonwealth countries. This was presented as a near certainty, implying that there may already be some level of engagement or alignment between Restore Britain’s policy team and international policy institutes, politicians, or high-net-worth individuals.

A related point was that Restore Britain expects to attract the support of “serious people” who, at the appropriate time, would publicly and financially back the party. My concern here is not the lack of detail, but rather that experience in Westminster suggests that expressions of interest or informal assurances of funding do not necessarily translate into actual financial support. Furthermore, such claims can sometimes be used by high-net-worth individuals—or, in some cases, less credible actors—to advance their own interests.

It has been stated that Rupert Lowe is not accepting donations in exchange for influence; however, the practical reality of this remains to be seen.

Part of my concern relates to these claims. On the one hand, they could be true—which, as a Restore Britain member and supporter, I hope is the case—but it seems more likely that they are a mixture of bluster and overexcitement.

Restore Britain’s online presence, along with the reaction and behaviour of its supporters (or perceived supporters), has been described by some—specifically Pete North—as somewhat cultish. I think this is an exaggeration; however, there is clearly a strong degree of enthusiasm and loyalty towards Rupert Lowe and Restore Britain among both members and supporters.

This often appears to come at the expense of critical engagement. Many seem unwilling or unable to question the party, instead presenting everything it does as inherently good. While maintaining a positive public line can be advantageous, my experience at the party meeting was that I was effectively the only person in the room willing to engage critically with Restore Britain.

This is a concern for obvious reasons. Leadership—no matter how good its instincts may be—can be undermined if surrounded by yes-men and sycophants, making it more susceptible to poor judgment or avoidable mistakes.

Conclusion

I remain cautiously optimistic about Restore Britain. I hope my concerns prove unfounded and that the issues outlined above are addressed in due course.

Restore Britain could serve as an important organising point for the British people. Even if it is not successful in forming a government in 2029, a well-organised and broadly supported party could still act as a vehicle for promoting the interests of the British people. In such a scenario, even if no single party secures a decisive outcome, and the existing two-party system fragments into unstable left-wing and centrist coalitions, there would still be a coherent organising force through which people can represent their interests.

In that sense, Restore Britain could provide a platform through which the British people can better defend their rights and way of life against those who may seek to undermine them.

Introduction

For the most part, Retaking the English Castle (pp. 3–30) is a well-intentioned policy document. The report is authored by Rupert Lowe and Harrison Pitt; their credentials are included in the report itself (p. 2).

The sections on ordered freedom (pp. 4–6), the onslaught of anarcho-tyranny (pp. 6–8), and the disarming of the law-abiding Englishman (pp. 9–12) are, in general, well written. However, there does appear to be a slight overemphasis on political argumentation and an underemphasis on practical implementation.

The sections of the report that I find most interesting from a critical perspective are those concerning the right to a jury of one’s peers (pp. 24–27) and the treatment of self-defence towards the end (pp. 28–30).

Anarcho-Tyranny (pp. 6–8)

The report devotes approximately two pages (pp. 6–8) to the concept of anarcho-tyranny. Within these pages, there is no mention of the intellectual originator of the term, namely Sam Francis. This, alongside their vague description of the concept, suggests to me that they may not, in fact, be familiar with his work. It gives the impression that their understanding of the concept derives almost exclusively from YouTube videos and well-informed tweets.

This section of the policy paper reads more like a Substack essay than a thoroughly researched policy document.

Legalising Pepper Spray (pp. 13–16)

By page 13, when the policy paper begins to address specific policy proposals, it discusses important pieces of legislation that it argues should be repealed — points with which I would agree — such as the repeal of Section 5B of the Firearms Act 1968 and Section 6 of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 (pp. 13–14). Both are strong, well-made points in the report.

However, the three pages devoted to the legalisation of pepper spray (pp. 13–16) do not properly address how it would be implemented, nor do they set out any meaningful limits on civilian ownership and use. Much of those three pages instead drifts into broader political commentary that is not directly relevant to the specific question of legalising pepper spray. While issues such as migrant crime and sexual violence may be indirectly related, the section lacks sustained focus on the practical and legal mechanics of the proposal itself.

Furthermore, across those three pages, there is no serious discussion of safeguards governing the carrying and widespread use of pepper spray. There is no exploration of how a legal right to carry pepper spray would interact with private venues’ existing ability to prohibit certain items on their premises, such as pubs, nightclubs, train stations, airports, and similar locations. Nor is there any consideration of enforcement mechanisms, liability, misuse, or proportionality standards.

In general, this part of the report is vague and does not properly engage with the complex legal and practical questions that would inevitably arise from legalising pepper spray.

Amending the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984 (pp. 19–21)

Pages 19 to 21 of the report discuss amendments to the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984, which the paper states are intended to protect homeowners from civil claims arising from injuries to trespassers. The policy proposals in this section are, in my view, sensible. I am inclined to agree with the suggestion that the Lord Stanley amendment be adopted into the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984 (p. 20), namely:

“No duty is owed by virtue of this section by an occupier of premises to any person who is on those premises having committed, or with the intention of committing, a criminal offence of which that person is capable of being convicted.”

Unlike the pepper spray section, this part of the report requires less extensive discussion of safeguards surrounding the proposed legal change. However, the section cites two legal principles, one case, and several examples in which the Act is said to be unfit for purpose and to have led to unjust outcomes (pp. 19–21). In my opinion, these cases are not analysed in sufficient depth for what Restore Britain claims to be a serious, government-ready policy.

By this stage, the paper reads more like a well-informed layperson’s article on the current state of self- and home-defence law, rather than a policy document that rigorously engages with legislation, public policy, and the practical interaction between legal reform and institutional realities.

The impression given by this section is that the cases cited were not examined in any meaningful detail by the authors, nor were relevant secondary sources engaging with those cases critically considered.

To produce a well-constructed policy that stands a realistic chance of successful implementation by the civil service, the judiciary, and other stakeholders, greater attention must be paid to practical application and legal nuance.

While this depth of engagement is arguably less critical for the proposed amendment to the Occupiers’ Liability Act than for other sections of the report, it should nevertheless have been addressed.

The Right to a Jury of One’s Peers (pp. 24–27)

The previously mentioned shortcomings in earlier parts of the policy paper continue into pages 24–27, which discuss the right to trial by jury. The section suggests that proposed changes to jury trial, referred to by David Lammy in the latter part of last year — namely, as the report characterises it, the removal of juries for most criminal trials, particularly complex or relatively routine cases — represent a serious threat.

Although I am, in principle, supportive of the concept of trial by jury, it does present genuine difficulties, and there are longstanding problems with the British approach to jury trials. Juries are expensive, time-consuming to assemble, and — at least from a practical and anecdotal perspective — are not always well equipped to assess complex, or even relatively straightforward, evidential issues over extended periods of time.

Throughout much of this three-page section, the report adopts a romanticised view of juries and their role in English legal history, emphasising their importance to justice and the protection of individuals acting in self-defence. However, at no point does the report meaningfully engage with the specific reforms reportedly under consideration, nor with the recommendations of the Leveson Review, from which David Lammy’s proposed jury reforms originated. Instead, criticisms of jury trial and proposals for reform are presented largely as mechanisms for the state to impose tyranny upon the individual, and nothing else.

Like earlier sections, this part of the paper is not really a serious policy proposal and more closely resembles a think piece one might expect to find in a magazine such as The Spectator or The Tablet, rather than a deeply researched document that grapples with the legislative, procedural and institutional realities of reform.

Conclusion

In conclusion, although I agree with many of the proposals set out in this report, I cannot help but feel disappointed by it. As noted above, it reads more like an article that raises topics for further discussion and research, rather than a thoroughly developed policy document drafted on behalf of a government in waiting.

The impression I am left with is that this shortcoming may stem from the composition of Restore Britain’s team. Except for Rupert Lowe himself, many of those associated with the project appear to be influencers, commentators, or media figures. While undoubtedly capable in certain respects, such individuals are not necessarily well equipped to undertake the detailed research and technical drafting required for government-ready policy.

If a political movement is to succeed in government — particularly if it aspires to “drain the swamp”, to borrow a phrase popularised by Donald Trump — it must cultivate a breadth of expertise within its senior ranks. Effective governance requires a diversity of skills and perspectives, especially when drafting policy that must ultimately be implemented by institutions that may not be instinctively sympathetic, including elements of the civil service.

A potential obstacle to this may be a concern about infiltration by bad actors. However, this is not an insurmountable problem. Over the past several years, networks of individuals broadly aligned with Restore Britain’s aims have emerged, willing and able to contribute constructively. That resource ought to be utilised. As it stands, this policy paper reads like slop, and that is a missed opportunity.

Introduction

In the previous article, “Structural Decline or Personal Crisis?”, it was argued that while there may be some overdiagnosis of mental health conditions, there is also a very real mental health crisis preventing large numbers of people from working full-time in a typical capacity. The data has indicated that significant minorities of the working-age population receive benefits for mental health-related disabilities, as well as regularly taking time off work or not working at all.

The prevailing policy consensus for treating mental illness has generally been to move away from institutional care and towards community-based mental health provision. This started in the 1960s with Enoch Powell’s Water Tower speech and has continued to the present day with Keir Starmer’s 2025 Mental Health Act. This applies both to severe mental health conditions, such as schizophrenia and psychosis, and substance misuse.[1]

For individuals with less severe mental health conditions, who present less risk to themselves and others, the approach has increasingly shifted towards diagnosis- and medication-based care. This shift has occurred partly because pressures on community mental health services have grown significantly over recent decades.

Across most, if not all, age groups, mental health appears to be declining, suggesting that the current outpatient-based, medicalised approach may not be achieving the desired outcomes. Depending on the nature and severity of particular conditions, a more differentiated approach to care may therefore be required. Such an approach could improve overall mental and physical health in Britain and increase the number of people who are effectively supported.

The Difficulty of National-Level Solutions

Different mental health conditions require different approaches. Conditions such as severe schizophrenia and acute psychosis may be better addressed through assisted and more secluded living arrangements and, in certain circumstances, full-time institutional care.

By contrast, more common conditions such as depression and bipolar disorder may be better managed through forms of social prescribing, alongside appropriate medical treatment where necessary.

Policy should primarily focus on those who are not a significant danger to themselves or others, but whose mental health difficulties are nevertheless severe enough to result in benefit dependency or repeated absence from work. This group is likely to be more receptive to structural reforms and policy changes designed either to prevent the onset of serious mental health difficulties or to provide timely support when such difficulties arise.

While it remains important to consider how conditions such as schizophrenia and psychosis can be better managed, from the standpoint of improving workplace participation, these cases present less of a broad policy challenge and more of an issue of individual clinical circumstances. Such conditions are often more appropriately addressed through specialist medical intervention and personalised care rather than generalised public policy.

Overview of Potential Solutions

Many mental health conditions are diagnosed and treated following a questionnaire-based assessment when an individual seeks a formal diagnosis. In cases such as bipolar disorder, personality disorders and depression, this often occurs during a period of personal crisis. Similarly, individuals may present for assessment when experiencing substance misuse or other harmful habitual behaviours, such as gambling or pornography addiction.[2]

The difficulty with this diagnostic model is that a person who presents as having bipolar disorder, a personality disorder or depression during a crisis may not previously have shown sustained symptoms, or may not have the condition as it would typically be clinically understood. Acute situational distress can be interpreted as a chronic psychiatric disorder, especially when there are incentives for medical staff to diagnose people with conditions and give them medication, due to time and other pressures.[3]

Furthermore, many medications prescribed for conditions such as depression and bipolar disorder carry significant side effects. These medications may worsen overall well-being, create dependency, or produce secondary psychological and physical difficulties that complicate recovery.[4]

From a policy perspective, this suggests that if individuals were provided with structured, non-medicalised support designed either to prevent personal crises or to help them cope with them more effectively when they occur, mental health diagnoses might decline. In turn, the number of people able to participate more fully in the labour market and in society could increase.

Addressing the Causes of a Mentally Unwell Society

Despite what is often presented as a medical consensus — that mental health conditions and learning disabilities are largely heritable or primarily the result of chemical imbalances or other factors outside an individual’s control — there is substantial evidence that this view is incomplete. Environmental factors such as diet, overstimulation, loneliness and overall physical health have been shown to play significant causal roles in many mental health conditions.

Diagnoses of conditions such as ADHD, Depression and Personality Disorders have increased rapidly in recent years. While this rise is often attributed to overdiagnosis and increased screening — an explanation supported by observable trends — it does not fully account for the scale of the increase.

Research published in The Lancet found that when children in the Netherlands who had been previously diagnosed with ADHD followed a controlled dietary intervention and were subsequently reassessed for ADHD, 64 per cent no longer met the diagnostic criteria.[5] It is suggested that highly processed foods, including genetically modified products, may contribute to ADHD-like symptoms in a large number of individuals.

Evidence also suggests that excessive engagement in activities associated with overstimulation, such as video gaming, social media and gambling, can worsen existing mental health conditions. These activities can lead to dysregulation of serotonin and dopamine. Leading individuals who would not previously have met diagnostic thresholds to exhibit symptoms associated with conditions such as depression or personality disorders and getting diagnosed.[6]

Loneliness is another well-established risk factor with serious consequences for mental health. Numerous studies across different countries have demonstrated the harmful effects of prolonged social isolation, making this a largely uncontested issue within public health research.[7]

Large proportions of the population in Western countries experience obesity or poor physical health, both of which are closely linked to mental health outcomes. Although these factors do not account for the entirety of the mental health crisis in Britain and other Western societies, they represent significant contributors that could, at least in part, be addressed through public policy.

From a policy perspective, if individuals were provided with structured, non-medicalised support designed either to prevent personal crises or to help them cope more effectively when they occur, the number of formal mental health diagnoses might decline. In turn, more people could participate fully in the labour market and in society more broadly.

What Policies Could Look Like

Diet

A significant number of young people are unable to cook, either because they lack basic culinary skills or because they lack access to adequate cooking facilities — a problem that is becoming increasingly common in large cities. The inability to prepare meals without relying on ready meals and takeaways is a long-term issue that can and should be addressed through policy.

Food Education

Parents could be encouraged to teach their children how to cook, and subsidised or free cookery education should be made available to those who wish to learn but lack the confidence or resources to begin. Strengthening practical food education would help reduce reliance on highly processed ready meals. Similar policies have been tried in the UK and other nations, and cooking classes have been shown to help. These are normally delivered by local authorities and charities.[8] The evidence for cooking-based interventions in obesity suggests that they are successful for those who engage in them. However, it is difficult to determine whether cooking classes are inherently effective or whether their apparent success stems from the fact that participants are already motivated to lose weight and change their habits.[9]

From a policy perspective, this type of facilitation-based approach may not be successful at the macro level on its own, because those most likely to engage are already interested in losing weight.

Research from the United States (2017) suggests that cooking interventions are only successful about one-third of the time. However, the same body of research notes that cooking interventions and cooking lessons within schools for young children have a positive impact in reducing childhood obesity.

The way food education is taught, delivered, and, in some cases, enforced appears to be the most significant factor in determining its success in schools. Japan, in particular, implements this effectively through its food education programme, shokuiku.[10]

What appears paramount in schools is that students cook and serve food to one another while being educated about appropriate portion sizes and developing a more detailed understanding of nutrition. Crucially, this is done regularly in order to instil lasting habits. Food education is valuable; however, unless healthy eating becomes habitual, individuals are unlikely to maintain it.

From a policy perspective, adopting a system of directed food education would be relatively straightforward for a government to implement, particularly within state-funded schools. In the Japanese case, such an approach should, even in isolation, achieve a relatively high success rate because it not only facilitates healthy behaviour but also embeds it through structured practice. By instilling good habits early, children are more likely to carry them into adulthood.

Planning Reform Law

Planning regulations could also be amended to prohibit the construction of houses, flats and other forms of residential accommodation that lack adequate cooking facilities. Proper kitchens should be regarded as a basic requirement of habitable housing.

Policies are due to be introduced later this year, and it will be interesting to observe their impact on obesity and mental health.[11]

Policy changes should also address how highly processed foods are marketed and presented to consumers. Although some measures have already been introduced, research conducted by the Behavioural Insights Team in the UK and similar organisations internationally has demonstrated that accessibility and convenience significantly influence purchasing behaviour. Limiting online promotion and prominent placement of highly processed food has been shown to reduce purchase rates substantially. Similarly, restrictions on the packaging and display of such foods could further discourage excessive consumption.

This could mean that government guidelines require healthier food options to be placed in prominent areas of supermarkets and online retailers, while imposing direct limits on the visibility and placement of ultra-processed food products. For example, supermarkets might be required to prioritise healthier foods in promotions and reduce the promotion or visibility of ultra-processed items, alongside supporting pricing strategies that make nutritious products more affordable while removing price incentives for ultra-processed foods. This could include increasing taxes on ultra-processed foods and reducing taxes on non-ultra-processed foods. Common areas within supermarkets, such as eye-level shelving and brightly coloured displays, could be reserved for healthier options.[12]

Overstimulation

There is a broad consensus that online pornography, excessive smartphone use and video gaming require policy attention. Current legislative efforts, such as the Online Harms Bill, were not originally designed to address overstimulation as such, but rather to protect children from harmful online content, representing the far end of the problem.

It is too early to determine how effective these measures will be. There have been criticisms of such policies, that they are ineffective and only restrict the free speech of adults

The issue is not limited to specific websites and applications; smartphones themselves are a central part of the problem. The constant availability of stimulation alters patterns of attention and behaviour.

From a policy standpoint, although prohibiting smartphone use for under-16s would be challenging to enforce, such a measure could, over time, contribute to improved mental health outcomes for children and young people by reducing chronic overstimulation and its associated behavioural and psychological effects.

Loneliness

Designing and implementing policy to address loneliness, particularly among young people, is extremely challenging. Young people are often more reluctant to seek help, and initiatives aimed at this group are more complex than those targeting older populations, as their social needs differ significantly.

Among older people, loneliness is often a matter of proximity: individuals may be geographically isolated, lack transport, or have limited opportunities to meet others. In such cases, the primary issue is access and opportunity.[13]

By contrast, loneliness among young people appears increasingly linked to social anxiety and difficulties with both verbal and non-verbal communication. These challenges are often attributed to prolonged screen-based socialisation rather than face-to-face interaction. As a result, even when young people are physically present in social settings, they may struggle to form meaningful connections. The difficulty lies not in access to others but in the ability to bond and develop friendships.[14]

From a policy perspective, addressing or mitigating loneliness among young people is extremely challenging. Generally, initiatives designed to counteract loneliness — whether social, charity-based, led by local authorities or, in some cases, government-led — have historically been targeted at vulnerable groups such as the severely disabled or other at-risk groups.

The difficulty in 2026, however, is that a large proportion of young adults experience loneliness. The problem, from a policy perspective, is that there has been relatively little discussion about how to address loneliness among young people. Even within charities focused on young people, the majority of available resources tend to focus either on the individual rather than the wider structural issue, or on accessing one form of therapy or another.

From my perspective, loneliness among young people has multiple causes, some of which may be addressed through government policy. However, like the declining birth rate, loneliness is not something that the government can simply legislate away. There are policy measures that could contribute to improvement, for example, banning the use of smartphones and other smart devices for children to encourage them to develop social skills. However, such measures would not produce immediate results and would likely take years before any meaningful benefit became apparent.

As mentioned earlier in the section on diet, the responsibility of parents to teach children social skills and help them form friendships is one that many modern parents appear either unable or unwilling to fulfil. This has contributed to a society in which a significant minority of young people are so poorly equipped to function socially that they are diagnosed with mental health conditions and struggle to work or form meaningful relationships.

Historically, social and romantic relationships were highly structured and governed by clearly defined and enforced codes of etiquette. These norms evolved over time to ensure that people were more likely to get along and, even where personal differences existed, to prevent behaviour that might cause serious offence or lead to significant conflict. There were, of course, exceptions — otherwise no duels would ever have been fought. Nevertheless, the existence and observance of etiquette in its various forms enabled people to socialise and form bonds within a clear and predictable framework.

Given that modern social and romantic relationships lack such a strict structural etiquette, any future policy solutions may involve a re-emergence of shared social norms and behavioural expectations in personal relationships and public life.

[1] Scull, A. (2021). UK deinstitutionalisation: neoliberal values and mental health, in Mind, State and Society: Social History of Psychiatry and Mental Health in Britain 1960–2010, edited by G. Ikkos and N. Bouras, Cambridge University Press, pp. 306–314. DOI: 10.1017/9781911623793.033.

National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990.

Mental Health Act 2025

Mental Health Act 2010

[2] Lawrence Robinson, Melinda Smith and Jeanne Segal, Dual Diagnosis: Substance Abuse and Mental Health (HelpGuide.org, 3 February 2026) https://www.helpguide.org/mental-health/addiction/substance-abuse-and-mental-health accessed 19 February 2026.

[3] Janet Eastham, ‘GPs admit they are under pressure to overdiagnose mental health issues’ Yahoo News (6 December 2025) https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/gps-admit-under-pressure-overdiagnose-131450732.html accessed 19 February 2026.

[4] Peter C Gøtzsche, ‘Long-term use of antipsychotics and antidepressants is not evidence-based’ (2020) 31 International Journal of Risk & Safety in Medicine 37.

Peter C Gøtzsche, Allan H Young and John Crace, ‘Does long term use of psychiatric drugs cause more harm than good?’ (2015) 350 BMJ h2435.

Evangelos Dragioti and others, ‘Association of Antidepressant Use With Adverse Health Outcomes: A Systematic Umbrella Review’ (2019) 76 JAMA Psychiatry 124.

Narinder Bansal and others, ‘Antidepressant use and risk of adverse outcomes: population-based cohort study’ (2022) 8 BJPsych Open e563.

Tarang Sharma, Louise Schow Guski, Nanna Freund and Peter C Gøtzsche, ‘Suicidality and aggression during antidepressant treatment: systematic review and meta-analyses based on clinical study reports’ (2016) 352 BMJ i65.

[5] Pelsser LM, Frankena K, Toorman J, Savelkoul HF, Dubois AE, Pereira RR, Haagen TA, Rommelse NN and Buitelaar JK, ‘Effects of a restricted elimination diet on the behaviour of children with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (INCA study): a randomised controlled trial’ (2011) 377 Lancet 494–503 https://library.fabresearch.org/viewItem.php?id=7710 accessed [20^th of February 2026].

[6] Akaki Tsilosani, KinHo Chan, Adriana Steffens, Thomas B Bolton and William J Kowalczyk, ‘Problematic social media use is associated with depression and similar to behavioral addictions: Physiological and behavioral evidence’ (2023) 145 Addictive Behaviors 107781 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0306460323001764 accessed 20th of February 2026

Hannah Devlin, ‘Teenagers who report addictive use of screens at greater risk of suicidal behaviour, study shows’ The Guardian (18 June 2025) https://www.theguardian.com/society/2025/jun/18/teenagers-social-media-mobile-phones-video-games-mental-health accessed. 20th of February 2026

[7] Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, Mental health and loneliness: the relationship across life stages (Report, 12 June 2022) https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/mental-health-and-loneliness-the-relationship-across-life-stages/mental-health-and-loneliness-the-relationship-across-life-stages accessed 20th of February 2026

[8] 1. Andy Corbley, Taking a Cooking Course Has Magic Pill Like Effects on Mental and Physical Well-Being (Good News Network, 21 March 2022) https://www.goodnewsnetwork.org/mental-health-and-well-being-improves-after-taking-a-cooking-class/ accessed 20 February 2026.

2. Southern Health & Social Care Trust, Cook it! and Healthy Eating (Southern Trust HSCNI) https://southerntrust.hscni.net/your-health/health-improvement/healthy-eating/ accessed 20 February 2026.

[9] Andy Corbley, Taking a Cooking Course Has Magic Pill Like Effects on Mental and Physical Well-Being (Good News Network, 21 March 2022) https://www.goodnewsnetwork.org/mental-health-and-well-being-improves-after-taking-a-cooking-class/ accessed 20 February 2026.

[10] Ordo, Why Japan’s School Nutrition Program Sets a Global Example (Ordo, 8 April 2025) https://www.ordo.com/articles/why-japans-school-nutrition-program-sets-a-global-example accessed 20 February 2026.

[11] Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, ‘The New Decent Homes Standard: Policy Statement’ (GOV.UK, January 2026) https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/consultation-on-a-reformed-decent-homes-standard-for-social-and-privately-rented-homes/outcome/the-new-decent-homes-standard-policy-statement accessed 20 February 2026.

J D Mackenbach et al, ‘The Effects of Nudging and Pricing Strategies on the Availability and Purchases of Ultra-Processed Foods: A Secondary Analysis of the Supreme Nudge Trial’ (2024) Appetite 201 (107599) https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0195666324004021 doi:10.1016/j.appet.2024.107599 accessed 20 February 2026.

[12] J D Mackenbach et al, ‘The Effects of Nudging and Pricing Strategies on the Availability and Purchases of Ultra-Processed Foods: A Secondary Analysis of the Supreme Nudge Trial’ (2024) Appetite 201 (107599) https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0195666324004021 doi:10.1016/j.appet.2024.107599 accessed 20 February 2026.

[13] Mental Health Foundation, Loneliness in young people: policy recommendations (Mental Health Foundation) https://www.mentalhealth.org.uk/our-work/public-engagement/unlock-loneliness/policy-recommendations accessed 20 February 2026.

[14] Mental Health Foundation, Loneliness in Young People: Young People’s Experiences of Loneliness and Ideas for Policy Solutions (Mental Health Foundation February 2021) https://www.mentalhealth.org.uk/sites/default/files/2022-06/mhf-Loneliness-policy-recommendations-young-people.pdf accessed 20 February 2026.