Putin’s response to Zelensky’s invitation to talks

What attracted a lot of attention was Putin’s response—in the plenary session—to Volodymyr Zelensky’s open letter. That letter was published the day before, on June 4, and argued that Russia would never win the war, that Putin was getting old, that the Russian people were growing tired, and that there might ultimately be consequences for Putin personally. Therefore, why not meet and talk—not in Moscow, not in Kyiv, but in some third country?

Putin’s response to this invitation was sharply negative. In contrast to his solicitous references to “Donald” (when he briefly mentioned the American president), Putin refused even to call Volodymyr Zelensky by name, referring to him instead as the “author of the letter.” The letter itself he called “a piece of paper.” He added that he “did not see any sense” in a meeting—“for now.”

Then he recounted an interesting story about a “businessman” (reportedly Roman Abramovich) who, some weeks earlier, undertook a trip to Kyiv to meet with Zelensky. Abramovich had played an intriguing role in this conflict. He was, for instance, heavily involved in mediation immediately after the Russian invasion, in parallel with the so-called Istanbul negotiations, and was even allegedly poisoned with an unknown substance. This time—if Putin is to be believed, which is never a safe proposition—Abramovich travelled to Kyiv at Zelensky’s personal invitation and with Putin’s approval.

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Russia, with its ongoing slog of a war in Ukraine, appears a weak disrupter by comparison. Its imperialistic, murderous regime shows, for once, a degree of predictability—something that can hardly be said of the United States. And China—the clear underperformer—has not even managed to invade anyone at all.

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There is actually a lot in the book about Iran, but the bits I thought are worth extracting deal with the 1979 Iranian revolution and its aftermath, when the Soviet leaders sought to ingratiate themselves with the Khomeini regime at the U.S. expense. These efforts failed, but only because the Kremlin invaded Afghanistan. Otherwise, Khomeini was willing to deal.

For the entirety of Khomeini-Brezhnev correspondence (in English!), go here:

Otherwise, read on:

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The Russians are stuck in a grueling war of attrition in Ukraine and have neither the capability nor the intention to help Iran materially. Moreover, the need to keep the United States profitably engaged in the trilateral Russia-Ukraine-U.S. peace talks—if only to erode U.S. support for Ukraine—mitigates against an overly sharp Russian reaction to this new American war. Russia’s (non)reaction to Operation Midnight Hammer last summer—apart from thoughts and prayers—already demonstrated the limits of the Kremlin’s influence in the Middle East.

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“No,” I said. “Haven’t been in years.”

“But you have a Russian passport,” she pressed.

“No,” I said. “I’ve renounced it.”

“Oh,” she said. “I am sorry.”

“Why should you be,” I asked.

“Well, you are still culturally Russian.”

This is from a discussion I had yesterday with a European filmmaker…

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ht…

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The piece makes a number of important claims, for example this here:

We’ve heard this…

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The main problem is that we don’t have access to classified government documents. True, on occasion documents are leaked. Among the most interesting leaks related to the war in Ukraine were the documents that Sam Charap and I used for our much-talked-about article in Foreign Affairs (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/talks-could-have-ended-war-ukraine) and Airman Teixeira leaks (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jack_Teixeira)—the latter quite illegal (Teixeira is serving a 15 year prison sentence for his indiscretion).

So, as I mentioned in my talk, the only real sources early historians of the war (including me) will have to rely on are public sources (newspapers and such) and, crucially, interviews with key policy makers. The latter in particular are of great significance. These interviews can and do provide important tidbits of information that, when properly triangulated and checked, can actually yield a lot of interesting material about the war.

There is, however, one more method of seeking documentation—freedom of information requests. I have dozens of these requests outstanding at any particular moment. They take months and years to process, and the results are rarely guaranteed. It’s actually quite common to be denied, at which point you then have to litigate with the government, hoping to convince the powers that be that selective release is actually in the public interest. Still, it’s very unlikely that we’ll see anything of much use in the near future (materials that are 20-25 years old have a better chance of being released; the standard declassification age is 30 years, though this is not always adhered to, and, once again, you have to litigate).

I wanted to share my recent experience of attempting to have the records of Boris Johnson’s trips to Kyiv declassified. The process yielded some useful results but you can also see the limitations. The two trips I got were his April 9, 2022 and his August 24, 2022 visits to Kyiv. The release included some useful internal Foreign Office documentation, including correspondence signed by Liz Truss and the U.K. Ambassador in Kyiv Melinda Simmons. As an example, consider the following cable from FCDO, dated April 9, 2022.

You can sort of see how historians can actually extract useful bits and pieces of information from these kinds of selective releases. Let’s hope that more of these, in coming months and years, will inform our understanding of the war, helping easier to understand what happened and why, and what mistakes were made, and by whom.

The two documents are reproduced below in their entirety:

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I have been thinking quite a bit about this problem. My instinctive take is to join in the chorus of disapproval, arguing, as I have, that the Trump Administration really has no clue what it’s doing, and that by undermining U.S. allies, it is, in effect, undermining America’s position in the world, which rests in part on U.S. alliances. But in this note, I’d like to test the logical limits of the NSS position, to see whether there might be something to it.

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Ok, helpful. The usual formulation is independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The rest of the proposed agreement makes it clear that Ukraine’s territorial integrity will not be respected. I don’t see the lack of reference to "independence” as particularly meaningful here: probably just an oversigh…

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The full text of the report can be found below. The original is in TNA PREM 19/4969/4.

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Warren Christopher was in Vladivostok just briefly as part of a longer Asia tour that took him to Australia, Japan, and China. The meeting with Kozyrev was very brief. He didn’t even leave the airport. And it began, unpromisingly, with Kozyrev telling Christopher that he had a long statement to make, and asking whether Christopher wanted to hear it all at once or in parts. Christopher told him to do as he liked.

The Russian Foreign Minister then made a lengthy, somewhat rambling presentation, which was evidently accompanied by a draft document (we don’t yet have the document). The essence of the charge was that the United States was not treating Russia as an equal, and if continued in this fashion, things would not turn out well. Let’s highlight a few passages.

“We believe,” Kozyrev said, that “the relationship [between Moscow and Washington] can and must be only one of equality and total dialogue.” He followed with this eye-popper:

Just to clarify, he was proposing to develop a joint Russian-American “strategy” that would then be presented to the G7 “as a guide for reference to use in conducting our activities.” He talked about “coordination,” which presumably referred to Russia and the U.S. deferring to each other and acting jointly to manage certain international problems.

The underlying idea here by the way was exactly one that Leonid Brezhnev presented to Richard Nixon in the early 1970s, a form of a “condominium.” Now, the earlier condominium failed in part because the relationship between the two superpowers was, fundamentally, one of strategic competition. What Kozyrev was implying here is that now that the Cold War was over, Russia and the United States were no longer in competition. Therefore, they could work together if only each respected the other’s legitimate interests. And this is where it gets really interesting.

Kozyrev argued that the U.S. was not respecting Russia’s interests in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), regarding Moscow’s activities there with “suspicion.” And when certain CIS countries complained to the Americans about Russia’s behavior, the United States, would you believe it…

…failed to convince these countries that Russia was acting in their own best interest.

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The way in which the process of Ukraine’s sovereignty or secession unfolds will largely determine not only the future of Russia and the USSR, but also the future of the world. Arguably, the processes that may be triggered by Ukraine’s separation now represent the number one challenge to European security.

Where does the danger lie? Ukraine and Russia are, in fact, parts of a single national and cultural whole. Russia arose out of Kievan Rus’. The two peoples are bound together in the closest way. A hostile rupture will create enormous national tensions. Economically, the two republics are inextricably linked, their economies closely intertwined.

Without Ukraine, sooner or later Belarus as well, the cultural and economic balance of the remaining Union will shift sharply. It loses its meaning. Russia would find itself left with the Asian republics, which are in general far more backward economically. Russia’s geographical isolation from Europe, with its economic and cultural power, would worsen.

Then check out this bit (very patronizing towards Ukraine, to say the least), but note some of the terms used:

In Ukraine, the overall level of democratic processes and democratic consciousness is relatively low. Secession, in the midst of an economic crisis and with the absence of legitimacy of the slogan of statehood, will almost inevitably lead to the creation of a right-wing (from the traditional European point of view) nationalist, or even national-socialist, regime. This would entail grave problems both in the field of human rights (including the rights of Russians) and for international political and strategic stability.

Here Karaganov picks up on the importance of nuclear weapons to Ukraine’s future:

Ukraine has potentially disputed borders (from both sides!) with virtually all its western neighbors. All its other borders remain unconfirmed. This could easily give rise to conflicts with Moldova, Belarus, not to mention with Russia itself.

In nationalist circles, militarist sentiments are relatively strong. The rapid creation of large armed forces is viewed as a guarantee of internal and external territorial integrity. Nuclear weapons are at present denied by all but the ultra-nationalists. But a change in this stance is possible and, in my view, even likely. The reason is the need to secure Western interest in cooperation and recognition. Nuclear weapons could begin to be regarded both as a symbol of statehood and national power, and as a means of deterring Russia.

The document goes on to explain what Russia should do to retain its influence, which includes items like positioning itself as the protector of Russian people in Ukraine, and implicitly threatening to partition the country. Ummm, does this count as a blueprint?

Anyway, the document is a jaw-dropper. I am using it for my class, but if anyone wants to reach it in full, please subscribe.

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Angela Merkel's door-stopper of a biography, Freedom: Memoirs, 1954-2001 (Macmillan, 2024), is reassuring in this sort of way. The book, spanning almost 700 pages, recounts Merkel’s amazing life story—from her obscure childhood in East Germany to the glory and drama of international politics. But it certainly won’t leave you thirsting for more.

The first few chapters tell the story of Merkel’s early years, her experience of living in the GDR, her Marxist education, and her sometimes-troubled relationship with the Communist authorities. Perhaps the most exciting moment in this part of the book is when Merkel writes about the Stasi’s attempt to recruit her as an informer. Apparently, the attempt failed, because she wisely offered to consult her husband, and the Stasi evidently concluded that she could not be trusted with secrets. It’s a brilliant idea we all must learn from.

My biggest takeaway from this part of the book was that as a child, Merkel ate unwashed carrots from the gardens, even as she listened to Bach. Why, I think those two aspects go well together.

Merkel then turns to 1989, and what that meant for her. The 1990s–early 2000s were a blur, to be honest. There was something there about organizing some big climate conference in Germany. Oh, yes, and I got the distinct impression that at one point Merkel knifed Helmut Kohl.

Eventually, halfway through the book Merkel becomes Chancellor, a moment of pride and joy, which the author celebrates by presenting—I kid you not—an alphabetical list of things she had to do while in office. This includes things like B: background conversations, and C: cabinet meetings but also M: Make-up appointments (“because the chancellor represents the country both internally and externally”) and of course V: Vacations. The list continues for a mind-numbing 10 pages. I demand that Merkel’s editors take a voluntary pay cut.

On page 332 we learn that “on jet-lagged days following trips abroad, or after late-night meetings, a chicken, potato, or lentil soup was a wonderful thing. But nor will I forget the mixed salads.”

On page 382 we find the following important piece of information: “The Chancellery kitchen suggested menus to me, and I loved smoked pork with kale so much that I had unwittingly forced the dish on everyone else over and over again.”

Anyway, you get the idea.

But I should say, there are also useful bits and pieces, especially for historians scrutinizing German foreign policy in the 2000s–2010s. I thought the most interesting (by far—but that’s obviously my occupational bias) were Merkel’s accounts of her many meetings with Vladimir Putin. For example, she recalls the June 6–7, 2007 G8 summit in Germany, where Putin turned up 45 minutes late to a social gathering, claiming that he was busy drinking beer. “He seemed to enjoy being the center of attention by behaving like that,” Merkel writes (p. 355).

She also recounts her experience in Sochi, where Putin—knowing of her fear of dogs—brought in his Labrador to terrify her. “I could tell from Putin’s facial expressions that he was enjoying the situation” (p. 360).

Here’s how she describes Putin on p. 427: “as someone constantly on the lookout for signs of disparaging behavior toward him, and yet always ready to disrespect others, for instance by engaging in canine power-play and making everyone wait. You could find all of this childish and reprehensible, you could shake your head, but there Russia was, still on the map.”

Highlights in this part of the book include her description of the NATO summit in Bucharest, where Merkel opposed giving a membership action plan to Ukraine and Georgia, resisting pressure from the US to this effect. “I found it illusory to think,” she writes, “that Ukraine and Georgia’s MAP status would have protected them from Putin’s aggression, that this status would have acted as a deterrent, or that Putin would take these developments lying down” (p. 428).

She continues by arguing that the vague promise of the Bucharest summit didn’t do enough to reassure Ukraine and Georgia and yet did do enough to worry Putin. “At a later date, although I can no longer recall the precise details, he told me: ‘You won’t be chancellor forever, and then they’ll become NATO members. And I’m going to prevent that’” (p. 435).

For historians, these kinds of revelations add up to important pieces of evidence, which is why I think the book is very valuable.

Merkel describes some of the dilemmas and tough choices faced by the East Europeans as they eyed a resurgent Russia. Not all her comments are favorable. For example, she argues that Georgia’s Mikheil Saakashvili “was overplaying his hand toward Russia” (p. 437)—that’s in relation to the 2008 war. She seems fairly empathetic with regard to Viktor Yanukovych in relation to his choices in 2013–14. “Give me a little more time,” she recalls him saying in response to her question as to why he was pulling out of the Association Agreement with the EU. “It isn’t possible now. You mustn’t force the issue now. One day, I’ll sign.”

She continues. “How was I meant to respond to that? Fear oozed from his every pore. He must have known that he was caught between a rock and a hard place.” (p. 444).

The hard place is Russia, but where was the rock—the EU? Sometimes, I wonder whether this whole geopolitical us-vs-them approach was a massive miscalculation on the part of the European Union.

Meanwhile, she has this to say about the East Europeans: “Many countries in Central and Eastern Europe had very little appetite for investing in any relationship with Russia. They seemed to wish that their gigantic neighbor would just disappear from the map, simply cease to exist. It was hard to blame them…” I guess it is hard to blame them. Let’s leave it at this.

There is some discussion of Nord Stream. I’ll spare you the details, as this is the subject of my forthcoming book, where I will cite Merkel and other German politicians.

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Before exploring Moscow’s reasons, let’s rule out Russia’s claim that it was an accident. The likelihood of this is about zero. The idea that nineteen drones could simply lose their way because of GPS jamming stretches credulity. And if you had any doubts, these should have been dispelled b…

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In this context, Gazprom’s Aleksei Miller’s recent announcement in Beijing that Gazprom and its Chinese partners have agreed on a “legally binding” MoU on the construction of Power of Siberia 2 was hailed as a “breakthrough.” One reason that was flagged up (not by Miller) as contributing to Beijing’s alleged change of heart was the situation in the Middle East, and China’s supply fears. But that’s just a speculation.

Miller offered no details, however. Or, rather, the details that he *did* offer would make you wonder whether the breakthrough was really much of a breakthrough at all. He said that the two sides would still have to negotiate the price, adding that the gas supplied to China would be *cheaper* than that supplied to Europe because the distance from Eastern Siberia to China was shorter than the distance to Europe.

Here’s the RBK article discussing these comments: https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/68b6af069a794765c6ec69a3 [in Russian].

So, at this point, if you have followed the PoS-2 saga, then you should be smelling a rat. For a start, what the hell is Miller actually talking about? PoS-2 is meant to supply gas from Yamal in Western Siberia not from Eastern Siberia. The projected length is 6.7 thousand kilometers, which is considerably longer than pipelines that run from Yamal to Europe. I can’t tell where the mistake is: in RBK’s reporting (surely not?) or in Miller’s claims. But surely Miller knows the difference between East Siberia and West Siberia?

But I guess one take-away from the above, is that the price is going to be cheaper than what the European customers have been paying for Russian gas even though the pipeline is longer. So far so good.

This is where the story gets really foggy. Gazprom does not normally publish its contracts. It only announces that a deal has been made. So even if they signed an actual contract (not a “legally-binding MoU” whatever the hell this means), we may not even find out for a while what the conditions are.

But the two items that will remain crucial are:

1. The price. It would look something like this:

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In this reflection, I would like to go over some of the points in greater depth. Let’s begin here:

It is worth recalling what the SCO was formerly known for. It was little more than a platform for managing Sino-Russian differences in Central Asia. I guess it worked for this purpose. I don’t recall any global media interest at all in what the SCO did or did not do. I think most people would have struggled to decipher the acronym. So, the current interest is indeed unprecedented, a reflection of the troubling uncertainty of our times.

I go on to argue that it’s too early to bury the West. The SCO, I argue, was always less than the sum of its parts. I draw attention in particular to the difficult Sino-Indian relationship. China and India are geopolitical and economic rivals, and that’s not going away. And they have an unresolvable border dispute that goes back to the 1950s and that only recently flared up in border skirmishes.

The optics were striking—true. But it certainly wasn’t Modi’s first SCO summit, so I struggle to understand why seeing Xi, Putin, and Modi chitchatting is something we are supposed to have a heart attack over. I don’t mention Pakistan in the piece. But it’s worth observing that India and Pakistan were just recently on the brink of a nuclear war (forgive the pathos—and they probably weren’t to be fair). But in any case, it’s hard to imagine how these two countries can plausibly work together to build a post-Western world order. None of this makes any sense.

And then I pivot to this important observation:

Again, why are we making something out of the SCO that it clearly is *not*? It is not an alliance. It is not a camp. It is not an axis. And I encourage you to read the 6,000-word Tianjin Declaration, which is going to be the biggest waste of time in your life, since there is nothing there that suggests anything like a blueprint for a post-Western world. But you’ll find out about stuff like the retreating glaciers—an important topic tbf.

I then poke fun at Xi Jinping’s SCO Plus speech, where, by the way, he also unveiled his Global Governance Initiative. I’ve heard several commentators point out how it shows his global ambitions etc, but I just encourage people to read it. It literally adds up to nothing. Just banalities and platitudes. I am sure it will assume its place of honor alongside Xi Jinping’s Global Security Initiative and Global Civilization Initiative as Xi’s great contributions to the history of Marxist-Leninist Thought. I’d rank these Three Initiatives at least on par with Three Represents. (Look it up. Actually—don’t).

By the way, he had a great line in his speech where he quoted from Lao Tzu’s Dao De Jing (chapter 35). “Uphold the Great Principle, and the World Will Follow.” (执大象，天下往). Those of you who are fans of Dao De Jing (I certainly am), will appreciate the reference. I kind of enjoy thinking of Xi Jinping as a “Daoist” (like hell he is).

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