Permutation 1

The 240 BJP MPs are supported by

• 28 MPs of JDU+TDP

• The other 25 MPs of the NDA from smaller parties

• YSRCP+SAD come forward with their 5 MPs

• NCPI’s 20 MPs are definitely coming on board

• 22 MPs of the DMK (issue-based support, since they are getting the proportional increase they always wanted)

• 4 Independents

• 1 from ZPM (Zoram People’s Movement (can be trusted for issue-based support)

• 6 MPs from SS(UBT)

This takes the final number to 351. Even if we add 3 from JMM, it still leaves 7 short, but we are also assuming a full house with zero abstentions. A few abstentions, and this will take the BJP to its target. The most pragmatic option.

Permutation 2:

The 240 BJP MPs are supported by

• 28 MPs of JDU+TDP

• The other 25 MPs of the NDA from smaller parties

• YSRCP+SAD come forward with their 5 MPs

• NCPI’s 20 MPs are definitely coming on board

• 4 Independents

• 1 from ZPM (Zoram People’s Movement (can be trusted for issue-based support)

• 6 MPs from SS(UBT)

BUT, DMK abstains, and this brings down the required number to 346. Even then, the NDA is 17 short. Add the 3 MPs of JMM, and it’s still not good enough. A lot many will have to abstain for this permutation to work.

Permutation 3

What if the Samajwadi Party decides to abstain, and DMK comes on board?

• 28 MPs of JDU+TDP

• The other 25 MPs of the NDA from smaller parties

• YSRCP+SAD come forward with their 5 MPs

• NCPI’s 20 MPs are definitely coming on board

• 22 MPs of the DMK (issue-based support, since they are getting the proportional increase they always wanted)

• 4 Independents

• 1 from ZPM (Zoram People’s Movement (can be trusted for issue-based support)

• 6 MPs from SS(UBT)

351 is the final number here. 336 was the required number. Easy win for the NDA. But will the Samajwadi Party abstain?

Permutation 4: The Most Likely Scenario

What if any 4 MPs choose to abstain? We know two Independents who might not be present in the Lok Sabha, but if the number rises to 4?

• 28 MPs of JDU+TDP

• The other 25 MPs of the NDA from smaller parties

• YSRCP+SAD come forward with their 5 MPs

• NCPI’s 20 MPs are definitely coming on board

• 22 MPs of the DMK (issue-based support, since they are getting the proportional increase they always wanted)

• 4 Independents

• 1 from ZPM (Zoram People’s Movement (can be trusted for issue-based support)

• 6 MPs from SS(UBT)

• 8 MPs from Sharad Pawar’s camp. Purely issue-based support, hoping to revive the party in old pockets, and eventually, the state.

Takes the total to 359, and four abstentions is a conservative figure to assume. It’ll be touch and go, but it will be enough.

Further Reading

The instinct across the regional bloc was that this was a defeat for the NDA. It was not. Delimitation does not disappear because one bill failed; the 84th Amendment froze the exercise only until the first census after 2026, and the freeze is now nearly spent.

The question was never whether the map gets redrawn. It is on what terms, and who is at the table when it happens. It was never a question of 'if but when.

That is the calculation regional parties have been getting wrong. The reflexive opposition treats delimitation as a gift to the BJP.

Read the seat arithmetic carefully, and the opposite is closer to the truth: the parties with the most to lose from a frozen 543-seat house are not national at all. They are the regional outfits now staring at an existential squeeze.

My analysis makes the case that the DMK, the newly minted NCPI with 20 of the MPs from TMC, the Samajwadi Party, the two NCPs, the RJD, the Akali Dal and even the AIMIM have a self-interested reason to want the 131st passed — and that the timing has never been better for them than now. Six of the Shiv Sena (UBT) MPs have already committed themselves to the NDA.

What has changed since April? Well, a lot.

Two of the largest regional players have just been wounded at home. Together, they had 42 MPs in the Lok Sabha. One party has been duped by its junior alliance partner, and one party witnessed its juniors dumping the leadership.

42 potential lame ducks, to begin with. Add Maharashtra’s MPs, and the count goes to 59. 26 of the 59 MPs have already aligned with the NDA.

The DMK and TMC went into the last delimitation debate believing they could hold out. They cannot any longer. A bloc negotiating from weakness behaves very differently from one negotiating from a position of comfort — and that is precisely why the politics of the 131st is alive again.

More seats, mechanically, means more MPs

On the floor of the House, the Home Minister committed to a proportional increase — roughly 1.5 times the existing strength of every state — rather than a population-based reapportionment. That distinction is the entire ballgame. The first-order consequence is straightforward: every state gets more seats.

West Bengal moves from 42 to 63. Gujarat from 26 to 39. Kerala from 20 to 30. The national house expands from 543 to roughly 820.

For a party with a committed, geographically concentrated vote base, more constituencies are not a neutral development — they are an opportunity, because the average number of electors per constituency falls.

Smaller constituencies reward parties whose support is dense and local rather than thin and national. The regional party’s core asset — a loyal vote that turns out within a defined territory — becomes more decisive, not less, as the unit shrinks.

The arithmetic that scares regional parties is, on inspection, arithmetic that favours them.

The South’s penalty fear dissolves

The sharpest historical objection to delimitation came from the South, and it was not unreasonable.

The southern states industrialised, controlled their population growth, and — through the devolution formula — effectively subsidised the poorer, faster-growing states of the North.

A population-based delimitation would have punished them for exactly that success, transferring seats from Chennai and Bengaluru to Lucknow and Patna. The fear of being penalised for good governance was the bedrock of southern resistance.

That is exactly why Home Minister Amit Shah was willing to go as far as bringing an amended version of the draft bill within an hour, with a clause for proportional increase. Bluff or bridge, the opposition missed the trick that evening.

Every state rises by the same multiple; no state’s relative weight collapses. The South does not lose power — it retains its share and gains absolute seats. This is the argument a regional party can actually sell to its voters: not ‘we surrendered to Delhi,’ but ‘we secured more MPs for our state without ceding ground to the North.’ This narrative will be critical for the DMK in 2029, assuming they come onboard.

The vote-value comparison makes the point visceral.

An average southern voter today already carries more weight per ballot than a northern one because of the freeze.

Proportional delimitation preserves that structural advantage rather than erasing it. Framed this way, the South is not defending itself against delimitation — it is protecting a position it already holds.

For family-led parties, more seats are a survival mechanism

More MPs mean more representation. They also mean more relevance, and relevance is the scarcer commodity for India’s regional parties, almost all of which are organised around a single family.

The DMK, the RJD, Sharad Pawar’s NCP, Badal’s SAD, and Akhilesh Yadav’s Samajwadi. Party — each is vulnerable to the generational cycle in a way a cadre-based national party is not.

One or two bad elections can threaten not just a term in office but the survival of the organisation itself. The recent local body elections would have reminded Sharad Pawar’s NCP of that vulnerability. Mamata Banerjee, however, learned her lesson by losing the party altogether.

A larger Lok Sabha footprint is a buffer against that fragility.

More seats give these parties a platform to stay nationally visible between state cycles, to keep building cadre, and to keep returning to voters with a record. And because they are regional, they benefit disproportionately from the first-past-the-post mechanics that smaller constituencies produce.

As constituency size falls and a regional party remains a serious player, contests tend to fracture into three- and four-cornered fights, as they did in pockets of Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal, and repeatedly in Jharkhand.

In a fragmented field, the party whose voters know it best and trust it most on the ground wins on lower vote shares. That is structurally the regional party, not the national one. That is one reason why the tribal vote in Jharkhand doesn’t go to the BJP even today.

Lok Sabha seats convert into state-level political capital

This is where the longevity argument hardens into something more durable than survival.

A larger national presence is not just visibility; it is political capital — cadre, resources, bargaining weight — that a regional party can redeploy in its state elections.

A party that is irreplaceable in the Lok Sabha math of a state becomes irreplaceable in that state’s coalition math too. It stops being the junior partner a national ally can sideline and becomes the partner without whom government cannot be formed.

Crucially, this capital outlives the founder. The family builds the party; the seats institutionalise it.

This is where the regional parties must think long-term. Not 2029, but 2039, and beyond. If you are Arvind Kejriwal, why would you object to more seats in Punjab in the Lok Sabha?

Cadre energised and funded through an expanded Lok Sabha presence is what allows a regional outfit to keep contesting and winning after the founding leader is gone.

Delimitation, in other words, does not merely extend the life of these parties — it changes the incentive structure of party-building itself, giving them a path to exist beyond the family.

The state-by-state ledger

The DMK, with 22 MPs, is the single most consequential vote on the 131st — and the most exposed. After the TVK’s breakthrough and Stalin’s personal defeat, the DMK in 2029 is staring at a genuine rout. More seats are precisely what a party facing a rising dominant force needs to avoid eradication.

The NCP (Sharad Pawar) faction, squeezed in a Maharashtra dominated by the BJP and the rival NCP, gets a route back into the Lok Sabha game in and around its western Maharashtra base, assuming they can make something of it.

The RJD in Bihar and the Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh both sit on a near-guaranteed Muslim-Yadav base; for them, more seats mechanically lock in relevance. If UP rises to 120 seats, Akhilesh Yadav starts as favourite in at least a third of them , roughly 40, before a vote is counted.

The Shiromani Akali Dal, down to a single MP, has nothing to lose and a base to rebuild.

And the AIMIM is the most interesting case: a larger, more granular map of Muslim-dominated constituencies is exactly the terrain on which Asaduddin Owaisi can attempt to become the dominant Muslim force nationally.

That is the politics the party already runs; delimitation hands it more board to play on. Fun Fact; Owaisi has never won more than 2 seats, and never contested more than 15 (2024). Delimitation could make him a frontrunner in at least a dozen seats, and I am being conservative here.

The communists have their reasons to be optimistic too. There are constituencies where these relics still are of some value, and delimitation might just open up a new market for them to find people who are willing to squander their lives. Put together, the Communist parties have 8 MPs.

The regional parties are scared for the wrong reasons

The honest objection from these regional parties is that the BJP gains too, and that a larger house entrenches a dominant national party. That fear is legitimate. It is also beside the point.

The BJP is in an advantageous position at 543 seats; its winning prospects do not depend on the house expanding to 820. The saffron party is starting at least 30 seats from West Bengal in 2029, and even if they score 60 out of 120 seats in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, they’ll still be in play.

The regional parties’ existential crisis, by contrast, depends very much on the seats staying frozen.

The choice in front of the DMK or SAD or NCP(SP) or SP is not ‘delimitation that helps us versus a status quo that helps us.’ It is a slow decline at 543 versus a fighting chance at 820. The BJP wins either way; the regional bloc only wins under one of them.

Turns out, this is where the 20 MPs of NCPI may have made their choice. This is where the 6 MPs of SS(UBT) have made the jump. If the party leadership prioritises its ego, the parliamentarians will pick their long-term interests. To each their own.

There is a second actor quietly hoping the regional parties vote no: the Congress.

The Congress has long cast itself as the national pole that lets regional parties leap from the assembly to the Lok Sabha, a ladder the regionals are supposed to need.

A larger Lok Sabha breaks that dependence. With more seats of their own, regional parties can bargain against the Congress rather than shelter behind it, and they can force the Congress to actually perform in the states where it faces the BJP one-on-one: Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Haryana, Uttarakhand, Himachal, and Karnataka.

The Congress would much rather the regionals stay small and dependent. That, more than any principled objection, is what its opposition to the 131st is really about.

Delimitation is coming regardless. It’s a constitutional inevitability.

The regional parties can arrive at that table wounded after the next census, when the NDA is calling every shot, or they can shape the terms now, while a proportional formula is on offer and their votes still carry weight.

The 131st was never the BJP’s lifeline. It was for the regional parties, I’d argue, but only if the regional parties are willing to look beyond that one family, towards the next generation.

Also Read;

The numbers tell a story of nerve, not invincibility.

When the Strait of Hormuz closed in March, India’s trade flinched — exports fell 4.6%, imports 5.7%. Had the analysis stopped there, the doomsayers would have won. It didn’t. April and May staged a sharp recovery, and the quarter closed with exports up 7.9% and imports up 6.9% on last year. The deficit barely moved.

A caveat keeps this honest: part of May’s 20.6% import jump is costlier oil, not booming demand, and that same oil bill widened the May gap. '

But strip out the noise and the signal is clear — services exports held firm, merchandise rebounded, and an economy supposedly rattled by war kept selling to the world.

The right sentiment won. The ‘dhandho’ sentiment.

Whatever is left of the TMC, with Mamata Banerjee, can merge with the Congress easily. The celebrity MPs cherrypicked by the TMC, some in the Rajya Sabha, are anyway Congress-minded in their head. Plus, she needs funds to fight future elections. It's not ego; money will dictate this move.

The Constitution (131st Amendment) Bill — which sought to fast-track the 33% women’s reservation by ordering an immediate delimitation on the 2011 Census and expanding the Lok Sabha to 850 seats — fell well short of the two-thirds special majority it required, managing just 298 votes. It looked, that day, like a settled defeat.

I wrote about it here.

Then Bengal happened. The BJP’s capture of the West Bengal assembly broke the Trinamool’s spine, and 20 of its 28 Lok Sabha MPs are now reported to be offering the NDA outside support; almost in the same breath, the DMK walked out of the INDIA bloc — though, crucially, over a feud with the Congress rather than any new warmth for the BJP.

Suddenly, the Opposition’s two-thirds ‘veto’ looks brittle, and a question that seemed closed in April is open again: can the BJP climb from 293 to 361?

Why 361?

On paper, the House seats 543. But three of those seats — Basirhat, Shillong and Nagaon — lie vacant, leaving 540 members who can actually vote. For the sake of argument, we’ll assume all 540 are available to vote, with none choosing to abstain for whatever reason.

A constitutional amendment under Article 368 requires two-thirds of those present and voting, which, at near-full strength, comes to roughly 361. (The April bill needed only 352 because just 528 members showed up — a reminder that the bar itself moves with attendance.)

That gap — 68 seats — is the BJP’s mountain. These six charts map the climb.

The 240 saffron dots of the BJP dominate the left; the Congress's 98 anchor the green centre; and a sprawling tail of 41 parties — many holding a single seat — fills out the rest. The three vacant seats sit in grey. For the 131st Amendment, this is the board on which the entire game is played: a two-thirds majority is handed to no one. It has to be assembled, dot by dot, from precisely this fractured arrangement.

Constitutional amendments are won or lost at the margins, which is why the smallest parties carry outsized weight. The verdict is uncomfortable for the BJP: 30 of those seats currently lean to the INDI bloc, just 13 to the NDA, and 8 sit unaligned.

Individually, these are minnows, easy to overlook; in aggregate, they are exactly the kind of swing the 131st needs. If the BJP is to find 68 extra votes, a meaningful chunk must come from coaxing these small players, one by one, across the floor.

The NDA musters 293, the INDI bloc 182, and a pink wedge of 50 — the DMK and Trinamool together — sits deliberately apart, because this is precisely the bloc whose loyalties have come into question.

Measured against the special-majority line of 361, the picture is stark: even at full strength, with every ally present and voting, the governing alliance is 68 seats short of the two-thirds it needs to amend the Constitution. This is the gap the 131st died in this April, and the gap every subsequent chart tries to close. The only question that matters is: from where?

Here is the first genuine crack in that wall — and the reason the 131st is suddenly worth re-counting. Of Trinamool's 28 sitting MPs, 20 are now reported to be backing the NDA from outside, a defection that runs clean across Bengal, from Cooch Behar to Birbhum.

Nineteen names appeared on the letter to the Speaker, per ANI; Sudip Bandyopadhyay has since taken the tally to 20, leaving Mamata Banerjee just eight loyalists. The number nineteen is no accident — it is the exact two-thirds the anti-defection law demands for a split to be legal. For a government chasing a super-majority, a 20-strong bloc shaken loose from the Opposition is a serious down payment.

So where might the remaining 68 actually come from?

This chart maps the universe realistically in play — 112 MPs — ranked not by alliance but by the probability of their backing the NDA on a bill like the 131st: high (48), medium (24), low (40). The arithmetic is tantalising.

The high-probability bloc alone falls short of 68, but high and medium together clear it — implying the BJP could, in theory, reach the line without ever needing the deeply unlikely Samajwadi Party or AAP. The catch is in those colours: every step down the probability ladder is a step further from anything the BJP can actually bank on.

Finally, the whole House reconciled in a single view, every seat accounted for. The 543 split into five blocs — the NDA's 293, the DMK-and-Trinamool defector pool of 42, the wider "fray" of 70 still up for grabs, the immovable Opposition of 37, and the Congress's 98 — with the three vacancies in grey.

Only the contested slices are itemised: exactly who the 37 hard-core holdouts are, and who makes up the bloc the BJP is trying to flip. At the centre sits the target, 361. Laid out this way, the path is visible but painfully narrow: the BJP must hold all of its 293 and then win, cleanly, almost everything coloured gettable.

The verdict: it all rests on three uncertain turnstiles

Add it up and the BJP’s road to the 131st runs through three gates, none of them bolted open.

The Trinamool rebels (20) are the firmest — but ‘reportedly in talks’ is not a vote, and a letter to the Speaker can be unsigned as quickly as it was signed.

The DMK’s 22 are the great mirage. Yes, the party has quit the INDIA bloc — but it left to build a front against both the BJP and the Congress, not to hand Narendra Modi a super-majority. Counting those seats for the NDA is the single most heroic assumption in this entire exercise.

More plausibly, the DMK helps the government only by abstaining — and that points to the real mechanism. That will bring down the required target to 346 from 361.

Because a special majority is measured against those present and voting, the BJP doesn’t always need a ‘yes’; sometimes an empty seat will do.

The April bill fell needing just 352 on a thin house of 528. So the last stretch depends on the mercy of the smaller parties — a Jagan here, an Akali there, an independent or two — and on who quietly chooses to stay home on the day.

The BJP, in other words, doesn’t merely have to win these MPs. It has to win them into the chamber at the right moment.

On today’s numbers, 361 is reachable only if nearly everything breaks its way — and in a Parliament this volatile, every possibility is on the cards.

What is noteworthy is the fiscal prudence demonstrated amid these challenges. The fiscal deficit has been brought down to 4.4 per cent, and the current account deficit has been managed effectively. This resilience sets the current period apart from the vulnerabilities exposed in 2013. The economic foundation today is solid, thanks to a steady policy approach. The government merits credit for handling these successive shocks while staying focused on long-term national interests rather than short-term optics.

I pointed out that while the opposition claims welfare schemes like Ujjwala are being hollowed out, it is not studio panellists but the average Indian beneficiary who is the best judge. They have given their clear mandate to the BJP in the last three Lok Sabha elections. The first-time delivery of toilets, bank accounts and tap water speaks for itself.

For the BJP leadership, the stunning defeat of the TMC in the recent assembly elections is clearly not enough. They want to go for the full monty; complete decimation of Mamata Banerjee’s political fortress, or whatever is left of it post-May 4.

The TMC has 28 Lok Sabha MPs and 12 Rajya Sabha MPs. As of this moment, 20 Lok Sabha MPs are forming a splinter group, as reported by the mainstream media.

Even the Rajya Sabha MPs are reportedly considering their options. While Mamata Banerjee has found shelter in the INDI bloc meeting, gravitating towards them after two years of disdain, the party ministers are on a different tangent altogether.

Given their brand of politics, not many would miss the TMC, even if it sinks completely. However, for the BJP, this is not about an ego trip or avenging their slain workers and the dastardly violence of 2021 alone, but something far more pragmatic.

1. The NDA Cushion Against Regional Blackmail

The most immediate and tangible benefit of the TMC realignment is the insulation it provides against coalition partners who have historically used their parliamentary criticality as leverage.

Chandrababu Naidu’s Telugu Desam Party (TDP) and Nitish Kumar’s Janata Dal United (JDU) can both demonstrate a willingness to extract disproportionate concessions from the NDA in exchange for support. It has not happened yet, but the BJP won’t risk it.

With twenty additional MPs in the kitty, even as a splinter group, the BJP gains meaningful negotiating room. This cushion does not eliminate coalition management—it reduces its cost and limits the blackmail potential of partners who see themselves as indispensable.

2. Constitutional Manoeuvrability

The second strategic gain concerns India’s constitutional architecture. Certain amendments require supermajorities that the NDA previously lacked comfortably.

With additional allied MPs, previously inaccessible constitutional reforms become operationally feasible. The 131st Constitutional Amendment and other dormant proposals now have a more plausible legislative pathway.

When the opposition parties met earlier this week, they would have privately discussed their options if it came to blocking the passage of the 131st amendment in the Parliament, assuming the BJP went for it again in the upcoming sessions.

3. Diversification for Lok Sabha 2029 Elections

The BJP’s 2024 performance exposed a structural vulnerability: its mandate remains heavily concentrated in Hindi-speaking states.

Over-dependence on Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan creates fragility. A significant electoral swing in these states could prove catastrophic.

The TMC fracture is one piece of a larger strategic puzzle aimed at building a geographically diversified mandate. Thirty-odd seats from West Bengal, significant gains in Telangana ahead of those state elections, and consolidation in Assam and Jharkhand—these targets represent a deliberate effort to construct an electoral coalition resilient against regional swings in the Hindi heartland.

The BJP is not just winning seats; it is stress-testing its national footprint. Come 2029, and the BJP would want to pick up at least 32 seats from West Bengal, 15 from Odisha, 10 from Telangana, and 5 from Punjab. This negates any upsets from Uttar Pradesh or Bihar.

4. Forcing Congress Into the Frontline

As regional parties fracture or align with the BJP, the INDI bloc’s residual strength increasingly rests with the Congress. This creates a strategic trap: Congress becomes nominally stronger within the opposition, but politically weaker because it must now front-line electoral contests it cannot consistently win alone.

Congress lacks the granular regional machinery, caste networks, and demographic advantages that parties like the TMC, RJD, or DMK possess.

By engineering regional fragmentation, the BJP pushes Congress toward repeated defeats in states where it has no organisational depth. For the 2029 elections, it creates the same old problem for Congress.

A majority of the contests would be between Rahul Gandhi and Narendra Modi. Even the staunchest supporters of the silver-spoon scion are not bullish on that contest.

For Narendra Modi, that is the preferred binary. Modi versus Rahul in 2029 is an electoral contest the BJP enters with considerable confidence.

5. National Security and the Northeast Corridor

There is a dimension to this strategy that rarely features in mainstream political analysis: national security of the northeastern region.

West Bengal, Assam, Jharkhand, and Bihar are not merely electoral battlegrounds. They sit along India’s most sensitive demographic and geographic frontiers.

Strengthening the BJP’s organisational and political presence in these states serves a dual purpose—electoral consolidation and administrative control over regions that face cross-border pressures, infiltration concerns, and long-standing demographic anxieties.

The SIR exercise in Bihar and West Bengal was a signal of this intent. For the BJP, building political dominance in the northeast corridor is simultaneously a security posture and an electoral strategy.

In the coming years, expect generous investment and focus on Assam, Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand, and Odisha. This is where the stability of the mandate is directly linked to the weakness of the TMC in West Bengal.

6. Potential Delimitation and the Regional Stalwart Equation

If delimitation proceeds before the 2029 general elections—and the political pressure to do so is building—the electoral map will shift significantly in favour of northern and eastern states.

New constituencies will emerge in states where the BJP is already strong, but regional parties will become critical intermediaries in pockets where the BJP lacks direct organisational reach.

By fracturing larger regional formations like the TMC and DMK while simultaneously absorbing smaller outfits—the RLD in Uttar Pradesh, factions of the NCP in Maharashtra, potential allies in Punjab—the BJP is pre-positioning itself for this redrawn map.

The goal is to ensure that wherever delimitation creates new competitive constituencies, the BJP either wins directly or has a reliable regional partner to deliver the seat.

That is one reason I remain bullish on the possibility of an alliance between the BJP and the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) ahead of the assembly elections in Punjab in 2027.

7. Demographic Consolidation in West Bengal

The final dimension is Bengal-specific but nationally significant.

West Bengal’s demographic composition—with Muslims constituting approximately 27 to 30 per cent (on paper) of the population—makes Hindu vote consolidation arithmetically essential for any BJP victory in the state.

As long as the TMC exists as a credible secular alternative, the Hindu vote remains fragmented between the BJP and the TMC. A fractured TMC removes this splitting mechanism.

If the primary opposition to the BJP in Bengal eventually becomes a Muslim-backed political formation, the BJP gains the demographic binary it needs to consolidate the Hindu electorate behind a single party.

This is not accidental. It is a deliberate long-game designed to reshape Bengal’s political identity over two election cycles. Polarisation can work both ways.

Meanwhile, A Gift From Destiny

Taken together, these seven imperatives reveal a BJP that is not being reckless or ruthless without purpose.

Every move against the TMC and the broader INDI bloc serves multiple strategic functions simultaneously.

I, personally, do not buy this argument of certain TMC MPs having a sudden change of heart or waking up to realise the strength of their conscience. Like shattered pieces of a planet, they are gravitating towards the strongest body around them. It’s human nature combined with political power play.

Parliamentary cushion, constitutional space, geographic diversification, opposition fragmentation, security architecture, delimitation preparation, and demographic consolidation—these are not separate goals. They are interlocking pieces of a single coherent strategy for 2029.

And yet, for all the BJP’s calculated manoeuvring, there is an element of sheer fortune here that deserves acknowledgement.

The DMK’s heartbroken exit from the INDI bloc, bringing with it twenty-odd MPs in the Lok Sabha, is a gift, should the BJP choose to unwrap it.

Whether it is a gift born of Congress’s characteristic inability to manage its allies, or simply a gift from destiny, the BJP finds itself holding an unexpected dividend.

How it deploys these MPs, what arrangements it works out, and what it extracts in return will determine whether this windfall is merely useful or genuinely transformative.

But if the 131st comes back into play, the disgruntled MPs of TMC and DMK will have a role to play, and here I’d beg you to allow me an indulgence. With Annamalai out of the equation and TVK getting close to 10 Janpath, what if DMK goes back to its old mothership before 2029?

There is a method to this madness. And it has everything to do with the BJP’s long-term interests.

By June 2026, the landscape had transformed dramatically. JDU had returned to the NDA fold. Prime Minister Narendra Modi secured a decisive Lok Sabha victory. AAP, RJD, Shiv Sena (UBT), NCP (SP), TMC, and DMK all lost power in their key states.

Congress suffered further setbacks, losing Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan, and Haryana. The once-confident opposition alliance lay fragmented.

Today, if the Modi Government were to bring back the 131st Amendment, can this broken alliance still offer the same resistance it did a few weeks ago?

The recent arrival of the Cockroach Janta Party, an offshoot of the Aam Aadmi Party, brought this idea roaring back. If AAP can spawn such creatures to advance its politics, the BJP too needs its own CJP, or Capitalist Janta Party — one built for long-term narrative warfare rather than just elections.

Some facts may appear outdated, hence the disclaimer about the date was necessary.

Originally published on 14 December 2021

I

Only last week, the Haryana Pollution Control Board issued a voluntary closure notice to 228 factories across the state for violating the pollution norms.

One of these factories was the Hindustan Syringes and Medical Devices Ltd (HMD), responsible for the production of two-thirds of the syringes in the country.

While the Union Ministry immediately swung into action, seeking exemption for the HMD plant, questions must be asked of the state pollution control board and the procedures governing it, for what else explains the sanity behind shutting HMD in the middle of the pandemic and 227 other factories just as the economy is beginning to recover?

Not long ago, it was reported that as many as 438 infrastructure projects, each worth at least Rs 150 crore, were facing significant delays, resulting in cost overruns to the tune of Rs 4.3 lakh crore.

Of the 1,670 projects monitored, 438 had cost overruns, 563 were plagued by delays, thus pushing the cost of completion to around Rs 26 lakh crore from around Rs 22.5 lakh crore.

Of the 563 delayed projects, 127 projects had a delay time of 5 years or more. The major reasons cited for the delay were the delay in land acquisition, obtaining forest and environmental clearances, and a lack of infrastructure support.

Earlier this year, during Diwali, the government in the national capital put curbs on gatherings and the sale of firecrackers in the name of tackling pollution and Covid-19.

The curb had a domino effect on the sale of other goods in the markets, and even the hospitality sector, beginning to recover from Covid-19.

The desperation to sound politically correct on the issue of climate change came close to wiping out the entire firecracker industry in India.

Similar curbs were extended to the construction sector as well, further adding to the uncertainty.

As was the case with the Sterlite plant in Tamil Nadu, the judiciary backed the ban on firecrackers and went as far as suggesting that a lockdown was needed in the region of NCR!

II

Now, a few stories from the other side.

In the last 10 years, China has created more than 26,000 kilometres (km) of dedicated high-speed railway (HSR) lines. China’s HSR lines alone constitute 66 per cent of the HSR lines across the globe.

As per a report from 2018, China then had 26,869 km HSR lines in operation with another 10,738 km under construction. In comparison, the next best was France with 3,220 km HSR lines in operation, with 125 km under construction.

In 2016, as it was reported recently, Apple’s Tim Cook signed a five-year agreement with the Chinese government promising investments, business deals, retail stores, manufacturing plants, and other skill development programmes in the country worth $275 billion.

For Apple, the motivation was to get rid of the disruptions that came from the CCP, especially with respect to the regulatory framework.

Post-2016, Apple made some changes to Apple Maps for some islands in the East China Sea, and during the Hong Kong protests, it even took down an app that helped protesters. However, Apple is just one of the scores of companies lobbying in the White House on behalf of Beijing.

Post-COVID-19, China, anticipating the vulnerability of both the supply chains and sanctions from the governments in the West, increased its investment heavily in the semiconductor industry, to the tune of $1.4 trillion across the next five years.

China has not restricted itself to semiconductors alone, but made massive investments in Africa and South America, ensuring an undisputed supply of rare-earth metals for its other industries, especially electric vehicles (EVs).

III

In India, a common mistake made in evaluating China is to view its development and evolution as an economy through a Western lens. That ‘China is not a democracy, and hence it is bound to implode sooner or later’, is a common notion.

Interestingly, this was the notion the West held after the 1991 Tiananmen Square fiasco, and the integration of China in the early 2000s to the World Trade Organisation, and very recently, after the outbreak of Covid-19.

The other problem when it comes to China is that the focus is more on its political system than on the reforms undertaken for wealth creation. Not to say that China is without its set of problems, but then that is unique to every country, including India, the European states, or the United States.

Before the pandemic struck, the Prime Minister spoke about India being a $5 trillion economy. Even though ambiguous, the goal showcased intent, rightfully so, to give China a run for its money.

However, in a post-pandemic world, this pursuit will require some hard decisions, and the capacity to compete with China cannot be built by reckless state support for everything under the sun.

To visualise how India and China will look 10 years from now, the author indulged in some back-of-the-envelope calculations. For the sake of argument, assume the exchange rates to be more or less the same for the next ten years.

Assuming India is a 3 trillion dollar economy in 2022, and grows at 8 per cent until 2031, it would be a $6 trillion economy. An achievable goal, yes, but if India were to unleash some of its untapped potential, mainly through infrastructure, privatisation, and other reforms, and grow at 10 per cent for the same period, it would be a $7 trillion economy by 2031.

Let’s assume the worst for China within the same parameters. If China, being a $15 trillion economy in 2022, were to grow at merely 2 per cent for the same period, it would be an $18 trillion economy by 2031.

At 3 per cent, 4 per cent, and 5 per cent, it would be a $19.5 trillion, $21.3 trillion, and $23.2 trillion economy, respectively. Even with all its faults, China is expected to grow anywhere between 3 and 4 per cent for the next ten years, pushing its economy closer to the US.

For India, to get anywhere remotely closer to China, growing at 2 per cent, it would need to grow at 20 per cent for 10 years. Clearly not happening.

Thus, India’s best bet is to grow at 10-12 per cent, aim to become a $7-$9 trillion economy by 2031, and, as China enters an age of new leadership and weakening demography, use the window to up the ante, and the BJP government in the Centre is best suited to undertake this herculean pursuit.

However, for reasons good or bad, there is a limit to what the party can do, as the recent repeal of farm laws showcased.

IV

The three farm laws were a universe more than merely MSP and Ambani. From a policy perspective, they were about getting the private sector involved, through a set of uniform laws across the country, into various levels of agriculture, from procuring seeds to retail.

From a farmer's perspective, it was about giving them a shot at doubling, or perhaps quadrupling, their income while inviting greater investments, technology, and infrastructure for their lands.

From a growth perspective, it was about unleashing the potential of a sector that contributes almost 20 per cent to the GDP.

Yet, the Prime Minister admitted that they could not convince the farmers. Perhaps, the BJP, within its leadership, had access to a separate set of readings from the ground that confirmed the eroding support amongst the farmers, almost 50 per cent of the population, if the family labour and other unaccounted help are to be factored.

The repeal, irrespective of the politics behind it, has stunted the pursuit of privatisation. Today, it was agriculture. Tomorrow, the same resistance will likely be met for banks, then BSNL, and then for the National Monetisation Pipeline. Put simply, the repeal has done to privatisation what the Church did to Science in the 1600s.

The irony is that amongst all the parties in India, it is the BJP, under Narendra Modi, that has done the most for rural welfare through an array of programmes and schemes.

With its foundation in the JAM Trinity, the Modi-led government has ensured food security during the pandemic and beyond, clean water, houses for the rural population, electricity, vaccines, health insurances, and much more, and yet, it is proclaimed as anti-socialist or overtly pro-capitalist by all other parties, from AAP to TMC to Congress, who have done nothing but protest against all such moves for the last seven years.

More than the BJP, the downward socialist spiral this country is on the edge of must be attributed to the likes of AAP and Congress, who have ushered in the freebie culture.

For instance, Punjab, ahead of its elections, is not debating or deliberating on serious policies or economic reforms to pull the state back on the path of prosperity, but is instead fixated on which party can promise more cash transfers in the garb of welfare, and this is when it stares at an imminent ecological disaster.

V

The wealth creation narrative is nowhere on the cards, for such is the politics of the land. Come 2024, Congress will again float a newer version of NYAY, promising a few thousand rupees to every household without any fiscal explanation.

The socialist romanticisation and contempt for capitalism are not restricted to the rural population alone, but are now beginning to plague the minds of the younger generations, even those working in the corporate sector.

Ideally, one must get rich before they get philosophical, but in India, it works the other way, not just with all political parties, barring the BJP, but also the people, the judiciary, and other stakeholders. Perhaps, it is something we have inherited from Mahatma Gandhi as a cultural trait, that is to quote philosophy while piously looking for silver linings in poverty.

For the BJP, it is imperative to invest in a narrative that solely focuses on wealth creation. However, there are limits to what the party can do, and even the Prime Minister himself, and therefore, it is time for the mothership to invest in a political offspring.

A political offspring of the BJP should not be focused on vote-cutting or winning elections, as is the case with AAP when it comes to Congress, but on taking back the narrative from the anti-capitalist forces, eager to reduce India to a begging bowl of the West and export market of China.

This offspring must bring together the best minds from the private sector, be it technocrats, CXOs, market experts, people working on senior levels within the corporates, or anyone with the experience of running a real business, anywhere in the world. This party must be given an identity and branding, independent of the BJP, and have a set number of priorities.

One, to educate people on the importance of wealth creation and privatisation.

Be it television, digital channels, or any other medium on the internet, say the metaverse in the future, the political offspring, comprising CXOs and tycoons, must usher in literature that helps people understand the difference between a person who is given a fish as a charity and the person who learns to fish as a practice.

This political network will also be critical in addressing the freebie culture, beginning to plague the Indian political scene.

Two, the political offspring, while coordinating with the Ministry of Finance or Commerce, must act as the representatives of the government across the world, inviting the biggest of the companies to come make in India. This is where it doubles up as an advocacy group.

Of course, the finishing touches from the government will be imperative, but you need business leaders from India to impart some confidence to their global counterparts.

Similarly, at the state level, this political offspring can inculcate entrepreneurs at a district and village level to make people understand the importance of wealth creation and even push for faster completion of infrastructure projects.

Three, and most importantly, the existence of this political offspring must not be reduced to an election cycle, as is the case with other parties.

Irrespective of how they perform during the elections, lose all seats, or even forfeiting the deposit, or even not contesting, the objective of this party must be to complement the ideas of the mothership with information and awareness on the ground.

The nation, in the long run, will require the intellect and wisdom of people with skin in the business, and not those politicians who bless the rowdy mob bringing down telecom towers.

The ideal window for the BJP to launch this offspring is post the UP elections, one they are favourites to win.

Assuming they do make the cut, the BJP must focus on a seven-year agenda, until 2029, focusing on reforms, infrastructure, and the government exiting businesses it is not meant to be in, and getting the economy on a track where it grows at least 10 per cent every year.

Looking back, we missed the industrialisation bus, and therefore, we were always trailing the West. Then, in the 1980s, we missed the manufacturing bus, and hence, we are trailing China even today. However, if we miss the bus of demography in a multipolar world because we were too busy obsessing over free electricity and water, the consequences in the 2030s would be dire for us as an economy.

Modi has set the ideal foundations for growth with welfare socialism, enabling 800 million people, but a decade from now, people migrating from villages to cities would need employment and better living standards, and that warrants a spree of wealth creation and private sector-fueled development, beginning today.

Thus, the BJP, the party, needs a small upgrade to its operating system, and this is precisely where having an offspring can help. Yes, the same job can be done by an advocacy group, but branding it as a political entity gives it better visibility, reach, scale, and acceptance.

We need more capitalists, not cockroaches or termites.

Originally published on 14 December 2021

He has the perfect credentials for an Indian student. Studied engineering, pursued an MBA from an IIM, and then cracked the UPSC exam, serving as an IPS officer.

From whatever I have observed of him, he comes across as a man who doesn’t like to beat around the bush, understands the system well, both its strengths and weaknesses. His conduct, confidence, and conviction are rare in this day and age.

And yet, he doesn’t have an electoral victory to show for, after almost six years in active politics. This includes two state assembly elections and a Lok Sabha election. Yes, it’s a difficult state for the BJP to breach, but the expectation of a win from him was not unfair or unreasonable.

Political talent is only vindicated by electoral victories. It’s a free country, so anyone can design their moral compass to evaluate a politician, but the constitutional consensus settles on elections. That is where Annamalai is yet to deliver.

And now, following the stunning victory of Joseph Vijay’s TVK, uncertainty plagues the political career of Annamalai. AIADMK has disappointed and almost disappeared from the alliance equation. The BJP is not finding its ground, despite the sustained efforts of the Prime Minister.

Therefore, Annamalai’s political future now remains suspended. In hindsight, he was right about the AIADMK, some would say, but dropping them from the alliance did not win the BJP even a single seat in 2024, including in Coimbatore.

In both 2024 and 2026, the disdain for a North Indian connection is visible in the state’s politics. This may reverse in the future, but at this point, the assumption holds.

Clearly, the voters want the state’s political outfits to remain independent of any national party in Delhi, and this is where Annamalai has to go back to his science class to get a better understanding of his future.

In 1935, physicist Erwin Schrodinger proposed a thought experiment to illustrate the strange concept of superposition in quantum mechanics.

He imagined a cat placed in a sealed box containing a radioactive atom, a Geiger counter, a hammer, and a vial of poison.

If the atom decays, the counter detects it, the hammer breaks the vial, and the poison kills the cat. If it does not decay, the cat remains alive. Until someone opens the box to check, the atom exists in both decayed and undecayed states at the same time.

This means the cat is simultaneously both alive and dead. The experiment shows that in quantum physics, reality stays uncertain until it is observed closely (or until there is a tangible end to the process in the real world).

Annamalai is that cat. The box is Tamil Nadu state politics.

Inside that box is one big uncertainty: whether he stays tightly linked with the BJP or steps away to build his own independent path.

As long as this question remains unanswered and voters haven’t clearly made up their minds, his political future exists in two states at once: it is both alive and dead.

If he is seen as Delhi’s man, the next election becomes the trigger that releases strong anti-BJP anger against him, and that anger ends his career in the state.

But if he walks away cleanly and creates a new identity, that anger never gets released, and his political life survives. Right now, both futures are still possible because the box remains closed.

Annamalai now has to fix the Geiger counter here, which is the perception of the voters.

It is upon him to determine whether that perception is in favour of or against the BJP, because that perception will trigger the hammer (the election result), and the hammer will or will not unleash the poison against Annamalai.

If he wants to do the heavy lifting himself, he will have to break away from the BJP. Start afresh. Can a people’s movement germinate into a political entity that captures at least one-third of the vote share in the Lok Sabha elections of 2029, or emerges as the primary opposition party in 2031?

I also do not buy this argument about him leaving the BJP because of a tiff over a Rajya Sabha seat.

If Annamalai's primary goal is to become the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, why would he care for a Rajya Sabha seat? Also, he did not contest in the recently held assembly elections. Why should a future CM shy away from being an MLA first?

We won’t get the answers today. The earliest tangible results will be visible in 2029. If Annamalai makes a mark for himself, the cat will become a tiger, and if he doesn’t, don’t blame the vial of poison, but the cat itself. Perhaps, it was never meant to survive the political grill.

These deals never make it to the books, are never invoiced, and quietly sustain an entire parallel trade that runs almost exclusively on cash margins.

Demonetisation in 2016 dealt the system a lasting blow. The withdrawal of the ₹1,000 note made large cash transactions far more difficult. Although the ₹2,000 note provided some temporary relief, traders always knew they were living on borrowed time. Greater formalisation of the sector was inevitable.

While claiming 100 per cent formalisation would be an exaggeration, the cost and risk of operating in cash have risen dramatically. A single example makes the point: you can slip a one-kilogram gold bar into your back pocket, yet the cash required to buy it would fill at least five 15-inch laptop bags.

The risk attached to cash operations is tremendous. Traders rarely deal in one or five kilograms — they move far larger volumes. That is why the sharp reduction in import duty to 6 per cent after the 2024 Lok Sabha elections felt like a genuine turning point.

It was the steepest cut in more than a decade — the last time duty was in single digits was in late 2013, under the UPA government, when gold imports were being blamed for a widening current-account deficit.

A lower import duty disincentivises cash transactions. At least that was how it was playing out — until the government hiked the duty back to a record 15 per cent earlier this month.

Higher duties have the opposite effect on smuggled gold. While they immediately raise the landed cost of legally imported gold by the full hike, smuggled gold bypasses the duty entirely.

Smugglers incur only modest costs for transport, hawala commissions and risk. This allows them to sell in the grey (cash) market at a steep discount to the new official price — cheaper for buyers, yet far more profitable for them.

As of now, cash gold is trading at a discount of roughly ₹5 lakh per kilogram to the official price, with some traders off the record claiming the gap is already closing in on ₹10 lakh. You might see headlines about gold demand falling by 50 to 80 per cent, but that only refers to formal demand. Demand via cash is skyrocketing again.

This is already creating several problems on the ground.

First, it is reducing the flow of cash in the formal market. Many bullion traders are locked into high-cost inventory bought during the recent bull run. They are in no hurry to exit. The government might view this as a temporary win, but these stocks will eventually be liquidated through the old cash channels.

Second, it is reversing the hard-won push towards formalisation. When the duty was low, the price difference between formal and informal routes was negligible, nudging most buyers toward RTGS and invoices. That nudge has now vanished. Consider a middle-class couple buying ₹10 lakh worth of gold: by going the informal route, they can effectively acquire an extra ₹1 lakh worth of gold. The incentive now works on both the demand and supply sides.

In the short term, this will dent official market volumes, hurt government revenues (GST and import duty), and push cash back into circulation. The loser, amongst many, is also the government itself — it loses on steady GST revenue and on its long-term goal of formalising the sector.

Contrary to popular belief, many traders were genuinely happy to move to the formal route when the economics made sense. The high duty is now forcing even reluctant players back to the old ways. Those who never left the cash market were already on borrowed time.

What are the real options before the government?

Lowering the import duty is the most realistic path. If bringing it all the way back to 6 per cent is politically difficult, a return to higher single digits would at least close the arbitrage window. The idea of discouraging gold purchases may be working on the retail side, but in the wholesale business, it has opened a new Pandora’s box.

The Finance Ministry also needs to start talking urgently to traders’ associations across the country. Prime Minister Modi’s appeal may have found its audience, but the unintended consequences require immediate attention.

The government is rightly worried about the current-account deficit, the weakening rupee, and dollar outflows — yet the same logic that once pushed for lower fuel consumption and work-from-home policies must now be applied here.

India’s finished gold jewellery exports alone are worth roughly $11–12 billion annually; the illicit market is already hurting smaller traders and artisans, who earn a few thousand rupees a month.

The most realistic option for the government is to lower the import duty. One can understand the GOI’s desperation to increase it to 15 per cent, but that costs sacrificing an entire industry moving towards formalisation. Another tough test on the cards for the Modi Government.

The other side of the story.

Core long-term investors remain firmly committed.
The United States, which holds 44% of all FPI assets, has reduced holdings by only about 2% on an actual basis after adjusting for the Nifty’s 8% price correction. Pension funds actually increased their positions by 1.9%, while Norway’s sovereign wealth fund saw just a 4.2% decline, mostly valuation-driven. Stable institutional capital is staying put.

The outflows stem from temporary macro factors, not structural rejection.
FPIs are rotating capital toward AI-linked stocks in Taiwan and South Korea, reacting to India’s valuation premium and rupee depreciation. These pressures are cyclical. As the BusinessLine analysis reports, once these conditions ease, the speculative money that left can return rapidly, allowing the tide to turn soon. There is a reality beyond the speculative headlines too.

Electoral polarisation has become clearly visible in successive elections across West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and the 2024 Lok Sabha polls. In Dhule (Maharashtra), for example, the BJP won five out of six assembly segments yet lost the seat because Muslims voted en bloc for Congress at a ratio of 42 to 1.

I stressed that India cannot function as a dharamshala for illegal infiltrators; they must be deported firmly. Organised religious conversion rackets, widely reported by News18, also require resolute action.

However, tackling infiltration and conversions is not enough.

The more fundamental issue is the declining fertility rate among Hindu families, especially first-generation middle-class households, trapped by soaring real estate and private education costs.

Drawing from China’s 2021 experience, policymakers must address these economic pressures to make larger families viable. Only a comprehensive approach can resolve India’s demographic challenges.

Here's another story from July 2021 you may find interesting. From yours truly.

CCP’s Latest Idea: Let’s Make Education Cheaper So People Have More Kids

Precisely why we can’t tell our farmers to forego the power or fertiliser subsidy, or tell the farmers of Punjab and Haryana to move away from the MSP model, or ask slum dwellers anywhere in India to vacate illegally occupied land, or send an eviction notice to a club that was always running on a huge land subsidy from the Government of India.

Reservations were supposed to be there for ten years. Ten became twenty. Twenty became thirty, and now, they are an indispensable part of our political (not policy) structure.

For political parties and vested interest groups, sustaining this temporary arrangement is a top priority. Our policy draws inspiration from the pursuit of converting temporary solutions into permanent problems.

The Delhi Gymkhana Club episode is as entertaining as it gets. The members, protesting the eviction notice from the Government of India (through the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs), presented outlandish reasons to save the club premises.

To some members, the club represents the best of India. To some, its institutional, cultural, and sporting heritage is second to none in the country. One even claimed that the club has given the country some of its best tennis players. As I write this, I expect a couple of Olympic gold medals to be attributed to this club's existence.

However, some people are barking up the wrong tree. Exclusivity is not a crime. That it takes 30 years or Rs. 30 Lakh to secure the club’s membership can’t be a reason to go after the club.

Through mismanagement, the club may burn itself down to the last shred, and even then, it’s not the government’s business. From food to wine, people are citing every frivolous reason to celebrate the eviction notice. That’s rather immature and unnecessary. Unexplained hate for the club is no grounds to celebrate the eviction notice.

It’s about the land—the relationship between the landlord and the tenant. A tenant can be there for twenty, thirty, forty, or even fifty years, but at the end of the day, they are a tenant.

They do not own the land. Yes, the rented premises will harbour a thousand memories, countless sentiments, and heritage that cannot be quantified, and yet, it is a rented premise.

The Government says they need the land back for security reasons, and are therefore citing Clause 4 of the lease (not a 99-year one, but one based on perpetuity).

The stakeholders have demanded that the government must explain the security concerns before the eviction notice can be considered. This is where the entitlement gets problematic.

The government owes no explanation to a club, irrespective of how old it is, who its members are, how exclusive it is, and if it has actually churned out an Olympian (rhetorical; it hasn’t).

Tomorrow, slum dwellers will question the government before vacating the land they have occupied illegally. If the rich can keep their club, the poor should be allowed to retain their shanties is the rhetoric that will cloud the political discourse. If Delhi Gymkhana Club can stay, why not Dharavi?

Legal technicalities will be discarded (as they always are in such debates).

Some stakeholders claiming to represent the club have demanded an alternative parcel of land for the club to run. That’s also outlandish. The landlord doesn’t owe the tenant a search for the latter’s new home.

The relationship between the landlord and the tenant is restricted to the former’s property alone. The reasoning, when deployed in the real world, makes one realise the scale of entitlement. It could be India’s best club, for all one could care, but even then, it’s on land that it does not own.

A question is also being raised about what will happen to the 600 workers employed at the Gymkhana Club. Given their connections, why can't the members arrange employment prospects for the workers there? Time to give back to the club that gave them so much.

The Delhi Gymkhana Club episode is about a generous landlord and a blissfully forgetful tenant.

I believe the club doesn’t owe anyone an explanation on how it functions, but then, the government also doesn’t owe the club an explanation of what it intends to do with the 27.3-acre land parcel that it owns. It’s that simple.

However, I don’t see the club shutting down on June 5. I am a firm believer in the capacity of the Indian state to turn a simple case into something far more intricate, and to delay the obvious.

In all probability, the Delhi Gymkhana Club will get more time, courtesy of the courts. Article 14 doesn’t factor in the most important variable in India-connections.

But one thing is clear, everyone in India loves a subsidised product as long as they are not directly paying for it. In this case, it’s a rent of ~Rs. 80 per month for a parcel valued at Rs. 50,000 Crore (as per media reports).

In that fashion, we aren’t exclusive, and our collective hypocrisy transcends social and economic barriers. As Anil Kapoor rightly said in Nayak, ‘everybody, sab ke sab…”.

While they frequently discuss literacy, rights, and political distractions on social media, I’ve noted that their approach often lacks clear structure or specific demands. It tends to focus on broad protests while overlooking India’s real progress in areas such as the semiconductor mission and other key policy achievements. I’ve also pointed out instances where the founder has shown limited awareness of basic facts. Since the outfit isn’t properly based in India, questions arise regarding Article 19 protections, even as it raises concerns about censorship and bans.

In my view, significant online numbers don’t always translate into meaningful ground impact. Our political discourse benefits from more facts, substance, and constructive dialogue rather than broad rhetoric alone.

It is a well-oiled supply-and-demand machine, choreographed to perfection. The nuisance supplies novelty and demands validation. The newsroom supplies validation and demands amplification. Viewers, emotionally invested, root for a David they never signed up to fight.

In the grander calculus, they are the unknown beneficiaries of a political opera. The nuisance and the newsroom play along, hoping to secure more fuel. The goal is not sustainability but ignition — and a bridge between consumers and the spectacle.

The greater the volume of nuisance, the greater the value of the newsroom. The promoters on both sides pocket the profits, and if the gods are generous, an election. Because it happened in Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, the operatic professionals (the usual suspects) are now consumed by wet dreams of a Gen Z revolution in India.

A similar opera had an average opening in 2012-13, and a bumper run in one Union Territory for a decade. It is now being prepared for a sequel. Borrowing the Bollywood formula of repackaging old wine in a new bottle, they have outsourced the nuisance to a social media outlet this time.

However, India is not Bangladesh. India is not Nepal. India is not Sri Lanka, and India is not even the India that was ten years ago. Beyond the opera, in the real world — misunderstood by Noida elites and Western think tanks — an India exists, rooted in reality.

Here’s why a Gen Z revolution is impossible in India.

1. We are a Big Economy: The simplest answer. The countries quoted by the usual suspects are much smaller economies. While India still has a long way to go before it matches China or America, the sheer size of its economy insulates it against any Nepal-like upheaval. A large economy supports a large institutional hierarchy and a robust administrative machinery.
   

2. Our Social Structure: The most undermined factor. Even when living away from home, Gen Z remains deeply attached to parents, siblings, and extended family. For a revolution to succeed, parents would need to be on the same page. Beyond metros, community structures exist to protect and guide the young. This is why the Naxal movement never became a pan-India phenomenon.
   

3. Their Economic Priorities: Earning money guides the majority of the younger generation. They want to build strong careers in their 20s, start family life in their 30s, and largely follow their parents’ life script — albeit with greater personal freedom. They are socially more liberal than their parents, but economically far more conservative.
   

4. They Have Their Hands Full: They may scroll Instagram endlessly, but they are also racing to crack state entrance exams, prepare for UPSC, or land a decent job. You will find far more youngsters spending years in Rajendra Nagar chasing bureaucratic jobs than joining any digital revolution. They’ll give ten years to coaching institutes but not one to the usual agitators.
   

5. The Success Stories Around Them Are Too Many: The long grind for government jobs or personal wealth consumes critical years, but families and communities are filled with enough real success stories to keep aspiration alive — the cousin who went abroad, the one running a startup, or the one who took an unconventional path and succeeded.
   

6. They Are Not Exhausted: A revolution requires a society exhausted from within. India is the opposite. A large section of Gen Z are first-generation graduates, first to move to a city, first to own a car. From small towns and villages, they have climbed into vibrant cities and continue to aspire for more.
   

7. The Contrarian Streak: Gen Z has a mind of its own. Youthful exuberance lets them reject parental advice, but they also hate being told what to think. Feed them a ready-made political ideology, and they will research it and form their own view. They may have grievances with the current government, but they are not easy fodder for professional troublemakers.
   

8. They Are Nationalists: Gen Z criticises urban infrastructure and governance daily — often rightly so — but they are not anti-India. They may dislike leaders and governments, but they love the country. If there is even a one-per-cent overlap between toppling a government and harming the nation, most will see through the charade.
   

9. Spectators and Stakeholders: Gen Z will stop to watch a JCB digging, make a hero out of a roadside tea vendor, turn eateries viral, and even enjoy a street quarrel — but they remain spectators, not stakeholders. They voice loud support for causes, yet asking them to abandon jobs and exams to join the fray is misplaced optimism.
   

10. They Want To Get Married: Metro Gen Z may relate less to this, but for those from Tier-2 cities, towns, and villages, marriage remains a serious life goal. Along with professional success, they carry strong personal goals. Often, their personal lives shape their professional choices. In preparation for married life, they instinctively choose stability, certainty, and a future free of drama.

In Norway, a professional heckler made news, while in Italy, it was an innocent, playful moment between the leaders of the two nations.

Yes, they were playing to the gallery, but hey, why not? Some indulgences make for good literature on social media, and contrary to popular belief, the leaders here were aiming to ‘break the internet’. Mission accomplished.

However, what concerns me is the lack of awareness among our media stakeholders about the news from the Netherlands.

ASML is the giant. Perhaps the biggest name in the business of making machines is critical to the semiconductor industry. Their lithography machine, made of over 400,000 unique parts, is what makes them one of the most sought-after companies in the world.

Five years ago, when the world was grappling with the semiconductor supply chain crisis, India was a headless chicken. Five years later, we have made some progress. In the coming weeks, we may probably increase our capital outlay from $10 billion to $20 billion for chip manufacturing.

When a professional heckler, a ‘sweet’ exchange, and a frivolous comment from one of the MPs garners more attention than ASML, and the MoU they have signed with the Tata Group, and what it could amount to in the next ten years, you are reminded that the discourse is trapped in a black hole.

I wrote about India’s chip manufacturing aspirations more than five years ago, and you can read that analysis here.

More about ASML here.

Also, here’s how far we have come in the last five years.

Earlier this year, a young man was killed in New Delhi’s Uttam Nagar after a mob descended on his house. Turns out, his eleven-year-old cousin had thrown a water balloon at a woman walking by. An innocent act, worthy of forgiveness. An act some of us may have committed in our years of adolescence. For Tarun, this act resulted in his death.

Coexistence and the rhetoric around it sounds fashionable on television, but secularism is a two-way street. However, for decades now, one side of the traffic has been plagued with several checkpoints, and the other side remains blocked. It’s time to liberate both.

This is no age for religious exceptionalism.

For the ones who ask about the secular Hindu, the ideal response must be ‘show me the secular Muslim, and I’ll show you the secular Hindu’.

The Dhule Lok Sabha constituency, referenced in the debate above, is explained in the tweet below.

What happened in Malegaon Central?

A 95 per cent Muslim-majority assembly flipped the Lok Sabha seat in favour of the Congress, a party known for mocking the BJP on the floor of Parliament, after the saffron party lost Faizabad (which also includes Ayodhya).