While young people across the world are 'Chinamaxxing,' some have really made the bold move to go to China. Is China really safe and friendly to people like Muslims or of African descent? In this episode, I speak to Q. Ali, a political commentator and former journalist for Western media outlets. He moved to China a year ago; his experience living in China as a Black Muslim might give you a different angle to look at China.

Share

Subscribe now

Leave a comment

Europe has performed the rather remarkable feat of losing the US-Iran War despite not formally participating. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has said that the war will place a burden on the European economy “as heavy as we recently experienced during the Covid pandemic or at the start of the Ukraine war.” EU energy chief Dan Jørgensen has advised Europeans to curb transportation use to save fuel. Christine Lagarde, the president of the European Central Bank, warned the effects are “probably beyond what we can imagine at the moment.” The very real possibility of stagflation hangs across the economy as projected growth figures plunge and fuel protests spread.

Europe once more sleepwalks into an economic and political crisis, and this time it may not be able to find an exit.

At first glance, Europe appears to be in a better position than most to weather the economic storm caused by American and Israeli actions in the Middle East: while a substantial quantity of Europe’s fertilizer comes from the region, just 6 percent of its crude oil and under 10 percent of its natural gas pass through the Strait of Hormuz. However, Asian markets, which receive up to 80% of their supply from the Gulf, simply outbid Europe for the remaining supply. The emerging economic crisis, then, is symbolic of Europe’s dwindling clout in the global economy.

Yet, more than just another economic shock, this moment has come as an existential crisis for Europe’s image of itself and its place in the world. The latest war has punctured two of the most persistent myths of post-WW2 Europe: that the US will keep Europeans safe, and that this safety was offered for purely altruistic reasons.

First, let us deal with the faltering American security apparatus.

Future historians may look back on the 2026 US-Iran War as the beginning of the end of the American Empire. Already in our own time, some are likening the conflict to the Suez Crisis - the 1956 British invasion of Egypt (aided, as the US is today, by Israel). When the British were forced into a humiliating withdrawal, it destroyed what was left of British military prestige - and along with it British hopes of maintaining Great Power status.

The Iranians are hardly the first people to sap the American Empire’s will to fight. From Korea and Vietnam to Afghanistan and Iraq, the histories of the Cold War and Global War on Terror are littered with battlefields which the Americans were forced to abandon in the face of fierce opposition. Yet, despite winning precious few wars, the myth of American military invincibility has endured. Americans across the political spectrum will tell you that their army could have won these wars if only they had “taken the gloves off”. In this telling, it was the US commitment to liberal (read civilized) values that prevented total victory. The Americans could have defeated the Taliban at any point during the 20-year occupation of Afghanistan, it is just that the Pentagon is such nice guys, they didn’t want to. Obviously absurd and transparently racist, the myth gave comfort to a certain type of American: we might not have healthcare, they tell themselves, but at least our boys can whip your boys in a fight.

The Trump administration came into power believing the liberal propaganda, and so, supposing that abandoning all “woke” military doctrines would allow for easy victory, very publicly took the gloves off. On social media and in a press conference, Trump and his officials announced Iran would be sent back to the Stone Age, that this was a war in which no quarter would be given, and that American military force would bring an end to Iranian civilization. Donald Trump threw the entire might of the American war machine at Iran, assassinating their leadership, destroying infrastructure, and massacring civilians. Iran remains standing. The myth of US military dominance does not.

Why a historic humiliation for American hard power is so disastrous for Europe may be difficult to comprehend if you are not European, but it comes down to something called the American Security Umbrella. During the Cold War, much of Europe outsourced security to the US military-industrial complex. To simplify somewhat, the US took over much of the security of the continent, and this gave Europe the time and resources to focus on building our much vaunted social democratic welfare states (or at least that is what we told ourselves). What the Americans got out of the arrangement was never very clearly stated because what they got was control of the European continent in every area that mattered.

Learning, as we did recently, that the US security infrastructure is not fit to fight a 21^st-century war would be bad enough, but watching the US abandon the Gulf States (an area that exists under the same security umbrella) to their fate as soon as the going got tough must have given European leaders heart palpitations.

Worse was to come, for, unable to bring an adequate resolution to the conflict with Iran, Trump is turning once more to an easier and more pliant target: Europe.

He has already implied that he holds Europe responsible for American humiliation in the Strait of Hormuz. He has claimed, in a rambling press conference, that “they [Europe] must grab it [the Strait of Hormuz] and cherish it. They could do it so easily. We will be helpful, but they should take the lead in protecting the oil that they so depend on.” Later, Trump said in an interview “they haven’t been friends when we needed them...we’ve never asked them for much… it’s a one-way street.” Throughout the war Trump has also done nothing to hide his vitriolic displeasure at European leaders, and has threatened to withdraw American security guarantees from the continent completely.

Now, as it becomes increasingly clear the easy wins Trump loves will not be found in the Middle East, Washington’s sights return to Greenland, with Trump declaring on Truth Social “NATO WASN’T THERE WHEN WE NEEDED THEM, AND THEY WON’T BE THERE IF WE NEED THEM AGAIN...REMEMBER GREENLAND, THAT BIG, POORLY RUN, PIECE OF ICE!!!” Mark Rutte, NATO Secretary-General, rather laconically, has called these developments a “disappointment.”

Plans are afoot to build European independence - the EU’s “ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030“ plan aims to mobilize €800 billion by the end of the decade. However, the continent is starting with severely degraded military capacity (the British Army, for example, currently has more horses than tanks), and a truly independent rearmament policy would require an industrial base that decades of off-shoring means Europe just doesn’t have. Despite the changing mood at the grassroots (a recent poll found that everyday people view the US as one of the greatest threats to Europe), there is a deep ideological reluctance among the current crop of European leaders to take the steps required to chart a truly independent path forward. When, for example, Belgium’s prime minister, Bart De Wever, called for the normalization of relations with Russia to regain access to cheap energy, he was roundly rebuked from figures across the EU and within his own government. For the Europeans to become a pole in the emerging multipolar world (or even just to secure their independence from an increasingly predatory United States) they would require both the means and the will to do it - and currently they lack both.

For those for eyes to see the US military and security presence on the continent was always about an insidious need to control rather than a benevolent desire to protect European social democracy (read, as just one historic example, about the Cold War Operation Gladio). But, by making a show of consulting with their supposed allies, and occasionally allowing symbolic dissent, previous American presidents gave European elites what they needed to legitimize the process to their own people - that is to say they gave Europe plausible deniability. Trump, in making the nature of US Empire explicit and turning its gaze upon Greenland, has ensured that even the most committed European Atlanticist can no longer plausibly maintain the myth of American benevolence. And yet, despite all that, European elites seem psychologically incapable of contemplating a serious break with the United States.

The war in Iran has weakened Europe economically, but, and perhaps more importantly, it has wounded America politically. And a wounded predator, sensing death, is much more dangerous. Europe, so close and so weak, presents an increasingly tempting target for American predation.

Long used to viewing themselves as the cockpit of human civilization, the nations of Europe have, in subordinating themselves to American power, moved from the subjects of history to its objects. They cannot act, only be acted upon. After centuries of colonialism and decades of aiding and abetting US imperialism there is unlikely to be much sympathy in the emerging power centers of the Global South as Europeans slowly awaken to their new reality.

About the Author

Douglas Rooney: Writer and educator working in Beijing. Writing about China and politics mostly.

Doug’s X page: @doug_rooney

Page Editor: Jin Yulin

Call for Contributors!

I’ve added an “ Op-Ed” section to China Up Close. It’s an open platform I specifically designed to let everyone share their own perspectives with the world. Articles can be related to any topic as long as you’re highly passionate about it! Article length is recommended to be within 700 - 900 words.

If you have an idea for an Op-Ed, contact jjnewsletter@hotmail.com with a brief description of the article's focus.

Share

Subscribe now

Leave a comment

Jingjing’s Social Media Links

X: @Jingjing_Li YouTube: @Jingjing_Li Facebook: Talk it Out with Li Jingjing

TikTok: @iamlijingjing Reddit: r/NewsWithJingjing Instagram: @jj_ontheroad

US-Iran talks in Islamabad broke down with no agreement reached. Professor Seyed M.Marandi joined me from Tehran to share why the US conditions were unacceptable to Iran, why attacks on Lebanon got less attention, and China's role in the region.

Share

Subscribe now

Leave a comment

The US is strangling the Cuban people with an energy blockade, which leads to daily blackouts, severe gas shortages, and deteriorating medical care, but Cuba is not alone.
Countries like China, Russia and international activists from around the world are sending aid into the country.

Manolo De Los Santos was among the activists who went to Cuba on a humanitarian aid program. He shares with us how the Cuban people are resisting the bully.

Share

Subscribe now

Leave a comment

Dr.David Qualaalou ‪@geopoliticaltrends‬ is a geopolitical analyst, writer and consultant who worked for the U.S. Government in both the military and executive branches. His main academic research focuses on International Relations, US Foreign Policy, and the Middle East.

In this episode, he analyzes the reasons and the timing of the U.S. - Israel attack on Iran, and how the escalating tensions will change the Middle East region.

Share

Subscribe now

Leave a comment

In the shadow of renewed conflict in Iran, the global energy landscape is fracturing under the weight of unprecedented risks. US-Israeli strikes have prompted Tehran to restrict navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, halting tanker traffic and disrupting up to 20 percent of the world’s seaborne oil trade. This is equivalent to 12 million barrels per day of crude oil. Prices have surged by 12 percent by morning trading on 2 March, embedding an $8 per barrel risk premium, while LNG shipments from Qatar face similar perils. Compounding this, Houthi re-activation in the Red Sea has forced rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope, adding weeks to voyages and billions in costs. These aren’t isolated incidents; they signal a new era of “oil risk” where geopolitical flashpoints can choke supply lines overnight, threatening economic stability for oil-dependent nations.

This volatility underscores a stark reality: Long-term electrification of transportation and industry isn’t just an environmental imperative; it’s a non-negotiable strategy for national sovereignty.

By shifting from imported fossil fuels to domestically generated electricity, countries can insulate themselves from maritime chokepoints and foreign supply disruptions. Even oil-rich Arab states have recognized this, pouring tens of billions into renewables despite their vast reserves. Saudi Arabia aims for 50 percent renewable energy by 2030, investing over $40 billion annually from its Public Investment Fund into solar, wind and hydrogen. The United Arab Emirates has exceeded 7.7 GW of installed renewable capacity, with projects set to reach 23 GW by 2031, backed by 190 billion AED in investments. These “electro-petrostates” are decarbonizing grids to free up oil for export, reducing domestic emissions while bolstering energy independence.

For nations without such reserves, the stakes are higher. Electrification enhances Energy Return on Energy Invested (EROEI) by leveraging efficient renewable sources, yielding more usable energy per input and fostering sustainable growth amid finite fossil resources.

China’s ascent in the electric vehicle (EV) sector exemplifies this foresight. Facing perennial threats to its oil lifelines - 80 percent of imports pass through the Strait of Malacca, a chokepoint historically vulnerable to US naval interdiction - China has invested strategically for decades to mitigate these risks. The result? A world-leading EV ecosystem born from anticipated energy insecurity, now delivering unparalleled scale and affordability. By addressing its own vulnerabilities, China has at the same time solved EROEI challenges for itself and for the globe: Cheaper batteries and efficient supply chains make electrification viable for emerging markets, enabling energy sovereignty where high-cost Western systems once priced them out.

This transition extends far beyond passenger cars. In 2025, China’s new energy heavy-duty truck sales exploded. Electric trucks now dominate over 20 percent of heavy-duty sales, displacing diesel and slashing emissions in logistics. Rail electrification is equally transformative. China’s high-speed network, already 70 percent electrified, integrates hydrogen fuel cells for long-haul efficiency, with prototypes like a 2,400-kW hydrogen train entering trials. Shipping follows suit, with electric and hydrogen vessels emerging; witness the methanol-fueled Guoneng Yangtze 01 in commercial operation and ammonia tugs completing bunkering tests. These advancements are shields against oil shocks, proven by China’s diesel demand peaking in 2024 amid electrification embedment.

Global conditions have never been more conducive to accelerated electrification. Electricity demand is forecasted to surge 3.6 percent annually through 2030, driven by EVs and industry, while renewables will meet 90 percent of the growth, surpassing coal by 2026. EVs are 3 to 4 times more efficient than internal combustion engines, converting 75 to 90 percent of energy to motion versus 20 to 30 percent. By 2050, road transport could slash energy use by 70 percent while supporting 70 percent more travel, with electrification driving most savings. Yet, this momentum hinges on leadership in supply chains and breakthroughs, areas where China reigns supreme. Dominating 70 percent of global clean tech manufacturing, including EVs, batteries and solar energy, China is leveraging economies of scale to halve battery costs and standardize innovations like LFP chemistry. Its “three verticals and three horizontals” roadmap integrates upstream mining to downstream infrastructure, fostering systemic synergies.

This dominance is evolving beyond exports into a profound globalization of production footprints, transforming electrification into a shared capacity-building endeavor. Chinese EV powerhouses like BYD, Geely and Chery are establishing factories worldwide, localizing assembly to bypass trade barriers, create jobs and transfer technology to host economies. BYD’s facilities in Thailand, Brazil, Uzbekistan, and a new plant in Hungary ramping up in 2026 exemplify this shift, enabling region-specific models while integrating local suppliers. Chery’s $800 million investment in Vietnam’s largest Southeast Asian factory, targeting 200,000 units annually by mid-2026, further illustrates how these ventures build resilient supply chains, from component sourcing to final assembly.

Battery giant CATL is extending this model upstream, with a $6 billion integrated hub in Indonesia spanning nickel mining to battery recycling, and plants in Spain and Hungary. Overall, Chinese OEMs’ overseas manufacturing capacity is set to nearly double to 4.3 million vehicles per year by 2026, concentrated in Europe and Southeast Asia. This localization not only mitigates “oil risk” for partner nations by embedding electrification capabilities but also boosts global EROEI through optimized, proximate supply networks, reducing logistical vulnerabilities and empowering emerging markets to leapfrog into sustainable mobility.

Some 15 years ago, a number of western commentators argued that China’s then commitments to developing EVs was a sign of wasted investment. The passage of time suggests that these pronouncements were premature and ill-judged. For nations pursuing energy sovereignty, engagement with Chinese capabilities is inevitable. Tariffs and barriers may slow imports, but they can’t erase the affordability and efficiency China offers. In a world of mounting oil risks, those who board this electrification “train” will fast-track resilience; those who resist risk being left at the station, vulnerable to the next shock. The path forward is clear: Electrify now, or pay later.

*The article was first published on CGTN

About the Author

Warwick Powell is an Adjunct Professor at Queensland University of Technology. He’s also working at the intersection of China, digital technologies, supply chains, financial flows and global political economy & governance.

Page Editor: Jin Yulin

Call for Contributors!

I’ve added an “ Op-Ed” section to China Up Close. It’s an open platform I specifically designed to let everyone share their own perspectives with the world. Articles can be related to any topic as long as you’re highly passionate about it! Article length is recommended to be within 700 - 900 words.

If you have an idea for an Op-Ed, contact jjnewsletter@hotmail.com with a brief description of the article's focus.

Share

Subscribe now

Leave a comment

Jingjing’s Social Media Links

X: @Jingjing_Li YouTube: @Jingjing_Li Facebook: Talk it Out with Li Jingjing

TikTok: @iamlijingjing Reddit: r/NewsWithJingjing Instagram: @jj_ontheroad

Track records of Western interventions tell us we need to be skeptical and cautious whenever some Western politicians and pundits claim they want to liberate people in another country and bring them democracy.

Seyed Mohammad Marandi is a professor at the University of Tehran in Iran. In this episode, he told us what happened during the protests in Iran and how Western sanctions hurt the lives of ordinary Iranians.

Share

Subscribe now

Leave a comment

Editor's note: Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian, editor and journalist. He is a writing fellow and chief correspondent at Globetrotter, the chief editor of LeftWord Books, and the director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of China Up Close.

Iran is in turmoil. Across the country, there have been protests of different magnitudes, with violence on the increase with both protesters and police finding themselves in the morgue. What began as work stoppages and inflation protests drew together a range of discontent, with women and young people frustrated with a system unable to secure their livelihood. Iran has been under prolonged economic siege and has been attacked directly by Israel and the United States not only within its borders, but across West Asia (including in its diplomatic enclaves in Syria). This economic war waged by the United States has created the situation for this turmoil, but the turmoil itself is not directed at Washington but at the government in Tehran.

There are reports – such as in the mainstream Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz in October 2025 about Israeli “influence operations aiming to install Reza Pahlavi as Shah of Iran” – that Israeli intelligence has a role in the protests, and the United States has openly told the protestors that it would bomb Tehran if the violence by the government increase. Last year, protests took place in twelve South Pars oil refineries, where 5,000 contract workers in the Bushehr Gas Refinery Workers Union marched with their families on December 9 in Asaluyeh to demand higher wages and better working-conditions. When the workers took their struggle to the National Parliament in Tehran, where they called for an end to the contract work system, the Israelis and the United States took advantage of these sincere protests to attempt to transform a legitimate struggle into a potential regime change operation.

To understand what is happening, here are six points of historical importance that are offered in the spirit of discussion. Since 1979, Iran has played a very important role in the movement beyond monarchies in the Arab and Muslim world, and it has been an important defender of the Palestinian struggle. Iran is no stranger to foreign interference, going back to the British control of Iran’s oil from 1901, the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention that divided Iran into spheres of influence, the 1921 coup that put Reza Khan on the throne, the 1953 coup that installed his son, Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi to the throne, and then the hybrid war against the Iranian Revolution from 1979 to the present. Here are the six points:

1. The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 overthrew the rule of the Shah of Iran Reza Pahlavi, and due to the strength of the religious clergy and its political formations resulted in the creation of the Islamic Republic in April 1979 with the Constitution of the Islamic Republic coming into effect in December 1979. The other currents in the revolution (from the communist left to the liberals) found themselves largely sidelined and even – in some cases – repressed. The March 1979 protests on International Women’s Day in Tehran followed the restrictions on women’s rights (particularly against the compulsory hijab policy), which forced the government to accept the demands of the protests – but this was a short-term win, since in 1983 a mandatory hijab law was passed.

2. The Revolution followed the military coup of Zia ul-Haq in Pakistan in 1977, the Saur Revolution in Afghanistan (August 1978), the establishment of the Yemeni Socialist Party (October 1978) that took the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen into the Soviet sphere and that led to the North-South war in Yemen (February-March 1979), and the capture of power by Saddam Hussein Iraq in July 1979. The entire region of south-western and central Asia was catapulting in political somersaults. Some of these developments (Pakistan, Iraq) offered advantages to the United States, and the others (Afghanistan, Iran, Yemen) being counter to US objectives in the region. Very quickly, the United States attempted to press its advantages by trying to overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

3. The pressure by the United States on these processes led to a war-like situation in all three countries: the US and its Gulf allies urged Iraq to invade Iran unprovoked in September 1980, starting a war that lasted till 1988; the Gulf Arab states urged North Yemen to invade South Yemen after the assassination of Salim Rubaya Ali (a Maoist who was negotiating the merger of the two Yemens); finally, in Afghanistan, the US began to fund the mujahideen to start an assassination campaign against cadre of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan. Iran, Afghanistan, and Yemen saw their social projects narrowed by the attacks they faced from outside. Afghanistan crashed into over forty years of terrible violence and war, even though the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan remained in place for 18 years; the Marxist government in South Yemen remained until 1990, but it was a pale shadow of its own expectations; Iran, meanwhile, saw its Islamic Republic survive a harsh sanctions policy that followed the end of the war by Iraq (in 1988).

4. The Islamic Republic faced several important, consecutive challenges: The most important came from US imperialism, which not only fully spurred Iraq’s war, but supported initiatives by the former Iranian elites to restore their rule and supported Israeli attempts to undermine the Islamic Republic (including direct attacks on Iran, sabotage operations, and assassinations of key figures from the science professions and military). It is the United States and Israel that have been systematically trying to erode Iran’s power in the region, with the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani in 2020, the harsh attack on Hezbollah during the Israeli genocide and the assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah in 2024, and the overthrow of the government in Syria in December 2024 with the installation of the former al-Qaeda chief as President in Damascus.

The old Iranian elites, led by the Shah at first till his death in 1980 and then his son, so-called Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, joined with the Europeans and the US to restore their rule. It is important to know that while the Shah had sat on the Peacock Throne from 1941, he was forced to accept a democratic government from 1951 to 1953 – which was overthrown by Western intelligence services and then the Shah was encouraged to exercise absolute rule from 1953 to the revolution of 1978-79. The Shah’s bloc has consistently wanted to return to power in Iran. While the Green Movement of 2009 had a very small monarchical element, it represented the dominant classes who wanted political reforms against the more plebeian presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. It is telling that the United States has ‘chosen’ the Shah’s son, who lives in Los Angeles, as the figure of this uprising.

Limitations to the republic’s transformative social agenda were present as it tolerated sections of the old elite, allowing them to hold their property, and therefore allowing the formation of a stratified class system that benefited sections of these property owners and an emergent middle class. After the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in June 1989 and the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the government adopted large parts of the International Monetary Fund’s structural adjustment policies, which – one way or the other – remained in place for decades (the policy was driven by Mohsen Nourbaksh, who was the Minister of Economic Affairs from 1989 to 1994 and then head of the Central Bank from 1994 to 2003). The economy was not organized along socialist lines in 1979, but it had built a strong role for the state and for public planning due to the needs of the war economy and due to the commitment to Islamic social welfare. Nourbaksh could not totally dismantle the state, but he conducted currency and banking reform as well as he did cautiously integrate Iran into the global economy. The class divergence and the difficulties of life for the majority of Iranians increased due to the combined impact of the US-European sanctions regime, the military threats by the US-Israelis (that has led to high military spending in Iran – still at around 2.5% of GDP it is much lower than the 12% of GDP during the reign of the Shah), and to the neoliberal policies pursued by the increasingly neoliberal finance ministers of the government (such as Ali Tayebnia from 2013 to 2017 and Ali Madanizadeh from 2025). It was this limitation of the Islamic Republic that has led to cycles of economic protest: 2017-2018 (around inflation and subsidy cuts), 2019 (around fuel price hike), 2025 (by bakers), and 2025-26 (soaring inflation and the collapse of the Iranian rial).

5. While the current protests are largely driven by a record-high Rial to USD exchange and a 60% food inflation rate, the transition from labor strikes in South Pars to coordinated urban violence points towards a deeper level of intervention. The administration has favored sections of the import-export sector, which has worked in the context of the sanctions, to assist the commodity-exporters at the expense of the importers – a situation that is not easy to correct. Yet the abrupt 30-40% currency drop is a classic hallmark of external financial manipulation. Therefore, what began as business owners protesting the Central Bank without interference, soon morphed into a violent, top-down assault on the state fabric. The “protests” shifted overnight from peaceful assemblies to high-intensity urban sabotage resulting in the deaths of roughly 100 law enforcement officers, with claims that some officers were burned alive, a security member was beheaded, and a medical clinic was torched, claiming the life of a nurse, for instance. The use of close-range small arms fire against civilians further suggests an attempt to maximize domestic tension and provide a pretext for foreign intervention. The geopolitical orchestration behind the chaos became undeniable as the US State Department and Mossad openly cheered the violence in real-time. Once authorities disabled Internet access, the protests significantly lost strength, which places into question the spontaneity of the movement and lends truth to the thesis that there is a destabilization strategy at play, seeking to benefit from the current international conjuncture.

6. The opposition has taken to the streets but recognizes that it does not have the strength to seize power. There are reports of US and Israeli interference, and it does not help the opposition that the Shah’s son has been both claiming credit for the protests and seeing himself as its beneficiary. With Trump at the helm of hyper-imperialism, and with Israel amid a period of what it feels are endless victories, it is impossible to know what these dangerous cliques will do. As the mobilizations lose steam, which will take place, the US-Israel might take advantage of the situation to strike Tehran and other cities with more force than it did in June 2025. This should be a worry not only for the people in Iran, the vast mass of whom do not wish an attack on their country, but also the people of the Global South – who will find themselves as the next target after Venezuela and Iran.

Real problems bedevil the population, but these problems are not going to be solved through a hyper-imperialist aerial bombardment by the United States and Israel. The Iranians will need to sort out their own problems. The sanctions regime and the threats of violence do nothing to allow that to happen. It is easy to say “solidarity to the Iranians” in the West, where protesters are being beaten and even killed for their support of the Palestinians and their anger at the anti-immigration policies. And somehow, it seems to be much harder to say “end the sanctions,” and therefore allow the Iranian people to breathe into their own future.

Source: Globetrotter

About the Author

This article was produced by Globetrotter. Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian, editor, and journalist. He is a writing fellow and chief correspondent at Globetrotter. He is an editor of LeftWord Books and the director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research. He has written more than 20 books, including The Darker Nations and The Poorer Nations. His latest books are On Cuba: Reflections on 70 Years of Revolution and Struggle (with Noam Chomsky), Struggle Makes Us Human: Learning from Movements for Socialism, and (also with Noam Chomsky) The Withdrawal: Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and the Fragility of US Power. Chelwa and Prashad will publish How the International Monetary Fund is Suffocating Africa later this year with Inkani Books.

Page Editor: Jin Yulin

Call for Contributors!

I’ve added an “ Op-Ed” section to China Up Close. It’s an open platform I specifically designed to let everyone share their own perspectives with the world. Articles can be related to any topic as long as you’re highly passionate about it! Article length is recommended to be within 700 - 900 words.

If you have an idea for an Op-Ed, contact jjnewsletter@hotmail.com with a brief description of the article's focus.

Share

Subscribe now

Leave a comment

Jingjing’s Social Media Links

X: @Jingjing_Li YouTube: @Jingjing_Li Facebook: Talk it Out with Li Jingjing

TikTok: @iamlijingjing Reddit: r/NewsWithJingjing Instagram: @jj_ontheroad

The dawn of January 3, 2026 marked a dramatic escalation in US foreign policy when American special forces, backed by airstrikes involving over 150 aircraft, raided Caracas and seized Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores. The US pledges to "run" Venezuela until a "safe, proper and judicious transition" has been achieved. This operation, dubbed "Operation Absolute Resolve," echoes centuries of US imperial interventions in Latin America, reviving the Monroe Doctrine in a modern guise dubbed the "Donroe Doctrine." Yet, as history demonstrates, such actions often become a "rod for America's own back" - a self-inflicted burden of instability, resentment and strategic overreach that undermines US interests far more than it secures them.

The Monroe Doctrine, proclaimed in 1823 by the then president James Monroe, warned European powers against meddling in the Western Hemisphere, ostensibly to protect nascent republics but effectively asserting US primacy. Theodore Roosevelt's 1904 Corollary expanded this into "gunboat diplomacy," justifying interventions to enforce stability and debt repayments, as seen in the 1902-03 naval blockade of Venezuela by the UK, Germany and Italy - with tacit US approval - to collect debts. This episode, which bombarded Venezuelan ports, foreshadowed a pattern: foreign powers using economic pretexts to exert control, often over resources like oil, which would later define US-Venezuela relations.

Cold War-era echoes are even more pronounced. The US backed dictators like Venezuela's Marcos Pérez Jiménez in the 1950s, providing CIA assistance amid torture and repression, to safeguard oil interests against perceived communist threats. Interventions in Guatemala (1954), the Dominican Republic (1965), Chile (1973) and Grenada (1983) followed similar scripts: Ousting leftist leaders under anti-communist banners, only to install regimes that bred long-term chaos and anti-US sentiment. The 1989 invasion of Panama, which captured Manuel Noriega on drug charges, offers the closest parallel to Maduro's fate - yet it left Panama economically dependent with migration issues unresolved, much like the Venezuelan refugee crisis today. These actions, justified as defending democracy or combating narcotics, often masked hegemonic control, entrenching cycles of intervention and backlash.

The 2025 US National Security Strategy (NSS) formalizes this revival through the "Donroe Doctrine." Venezuela, with the world's largest oil reserves, serves as the doctrine's first test case. The NSS prioritizes the region for direct US military intervention over Asia, deploying naval forces to curb migration and trafficking. Furthermore, it views instability like Venezuela's as a direct threat to US security.

The January 3 intervention embodies these echoes. Months of planning, including CIA tracking and troop rehearsals on a mock Maduro compound, culminated in strikes disabling air defenses, jamming the grid and extracting the couple via the USS Iwo Jima.

Casualties reached at least 80, mostly Venezuelan security forces, no US forces were killed and there were "few" injuries. Venezuelan acting president Delcy Rodríguez's changing attitude toward the US from defiance to seeking collaboration suggest internal fractures, as well as the risk of guerrilla resistance from Chavista militias.

Herein lies the "rod for America's own back." Historical interventions have consistently boomeranged: Panama's capture of Noriega didn't end drug flows; Iraq's 2003 invasion, justified by dubious WMD claims, cost trillions, thousands of lives and US credibility, fostering ISIS and regional instability. Venezuela risks similar quagmires - prolonged occupation amid armed opposition, exacerbated migration (already straining neighbors), and humanitarian crises from strikes causing blackouts and deaths. Global backlash is swift. Domestically, there are Americans fearing endless wars and taxpayer burdens. Threats of further strikes to pressure post-Maduro leaders only heighten escalation risks.

Some critiques frame it as resource imperialism, punishing Venezuela's socialist experiment while ignoring internal causes like corruption. Conservatives defend it as pragmatic against threats, yet acknowledge parallels to failed nation-building. With reasonable assurance, destabilizing consequences loom: entrenched resistance, allied pushback and multipolar shifts accelerating US decline. US' moves, while tactically bold, repeat historic follies, turning hemispheric dominance into a costly entanglement that weakens America more than its adversaries. In reviving the Monroe Doctrine, the US risks forging its own chains in a world no longer tolerant of a unilateral empire.

*The article was first published on Global Times

About the Author

Warwick Powell is an Adjunct Professor at Queensland University of Technology. He’s also working at the intersection of China, digital technologies, supply chains, financial flows and global political economy & governance.

Page Editor: Jin Yulin

Call for Contributors!

I’ve added an “ Op-Ed” section to China Up Close. It’s an open platform I specifically designed to let everyone share their own perspectives with the world. Articles can be related to any topic as long as you’re highly passionate about it! Article length is recommended to be within 700 - 900 words.

If you have an idea for an Op-Ed, contact jjnewsletter@hotmail.com with a brief description of the article's focus.

Share

Subscribe now

Leave a comment

Jingjing’s Social Media Links

X: @Jingjing_Li YouTube: @Jingjing_Li Facebook: Talk it Out with Li Jingjing

TikTok: @iamlijingjing Reddit: r/NewsWithJingjing Instagram: @jj_ontheroad

Welcome to the first-ever Jingjing's Choice Awards! In recent years, China has been in the spotlight for a lot of things. Some were heartwarming, some were ridiculous.

We can't just let these moments sink into the bottomless ocean called the Internet. They need to be honored, or publicly ridiculed, again.

Share

Subscribe now

Leave a comment

At the end of September, a new Chinese infrastructure project reached completion and immediately went viral on both Chinese and Western social media. This was the Huajiang Grand Canyon Bridge in southwest China’s Guizhou Province - otherwise known as the tallest bridge in the world.

The bridge is over 9 times higher than San Francisco’s Golden Gate Bridge, floating 625m above the Beipan River. At a staggering 2,890 meters long, the bridge connects two sides of the Huajiang Grand Canyon, shortening the time locals take to navigate the canyon from over two hours to under two minutes.

However, the new bridge is important to the economic development of the region, not just because it facilitates trade and provides easier access to otherwise fairly remote mountainous communities. The regional government has realized the potential tourist draw of the world’s tallest bridge, and has drawn up a detailed tourism plan for the area with a focus on extreme sports, science education, and sightseeing. The plan appears to be working since during China’s recent national day holidays, around 220,000 people made a trip to the area.

The viral potential of the world’s tallest bridge is pretty obvious (for one thing, the views are stunning), but reactions to videos and pictures of the Huajiang Grand Canyon Bridge were a little different on Chinese and Western social media. While Chinese netizens marveled at the engineering feat of building such a long bridge in a remote location, one question dominated Western social media discussions: why can’t we build something like this?

Why Can’t the West Build Anything?

The West wasn’t always like this. In the 18^th century, the United Kingdom built a network of canals, viaducts, roads, and bridges so well constructed that they are still used today. In the 19^th century, Britain then established the world’s first rail network, and, while there are no geographical barriers in Great Britain to rival those of China, British engineers had no problems building infrastructure in all the different climates and geographies of their vast empire (at least when it suited the interests of British financiers to do so). In the U.S., too, the 19^th and early 20^th centuries saw the construction of such epic infrastructure projects as the transcontinental railway and the Hoover Dam. Yet, today, these great engineering marvels are being left to crumble, and very little is being done to replace them. So, what has changed?

I think we can get a pretty clear idea of what is going wrong by zooming in on one of the most egregious examples of infrastructure mismanagement: Britain’s High Speed 2 (HS2) rail service (so-called because Britain’s first - and only - high speed rail service connects London to Paris).

By the first decade of the 21^st century, British transport officials were becoming embarrassed. High-speed rail had come to Asia in the 1960s, and it had arrived in mainland Europe by the 1980s. Yet, in Britain, the nation that had given the world the railway, the trains had become infamous for being slow, outdated, expensive, and plagued with delays and staff shortages. As a matter of national pride, then, it was decided in 2010 to link all of England’s major urban areas with high-speed rail. So, one of the last acts of Gordon Brown’s Labour government before leaving office in 2010 was to set up HS2 Limited - a private company which would spend the public funds set aside to build HS2 from London to the north of England.

Problems developed with the project very quickly. In 2011, HS2 Limited estimated the cost of the project at $32 billion. Only two years later, that had been revised upward to $50 billion. Today, the cost of the whole project is estimated to be somewhere in the region of $100 billion. What is worse, in 2023, the then-Prime Minister Rishi Sunak announced that he would cancel the northern part of the service. This means that only two cities - London and Birmingham - will be connected by high-speed rail. In other words, British taxpayers are now likely to pay more than double the initial estimate for less than half of the originally proposed line. And it still isn’t done: even the truncated HS2 line connecting London with Birmingham, the UK’s second largest city, will not be fully operational until sometime in the 2030s. Even then, the terminal station will not actually be in central London. Instead, HS2 will terminate in the suburbs, meaning that, if we factor in transfer times from suburban to central London, journeying between Birmingham and the capital by high-speed train will take about the same time as taking the slower (but direct) regular train. So much for the promise of high speed.

How did the largest infrastructure project in a generation become a national embarrassment so great that it is now used as evidence by conservatives in the U.S. to argue against plans to bring high-speed rail to the U.S.? Well, as China has shown, infrastructure on this scale requires national guidance, expertise, and, most crucially, long-term planning - and, unfortunately for rail commuters in the United Kingdom, the British government is lacking in all three.

The last decade has been rather tumultuous for the island kingdom, and this has allowed the chaotic management and ballooning costs to pass under the radar. For example, a key 2017 parliamentary vote to expand funding took place in the middle of Brexit. The transport secretary at the time would later admit to the BBC that the largest constitutional debate in generations meant that parliament had neither the time nor inclination to give proper scrutiny to Britain’s largest infrastructure project. Neither parliament nor government ministers had a clear idea what they were signing off on. This has been an issue throughout the project: HS2 Limited has outlasted seven Prime Ministers and ten Transport Ministers. When turnover at the top of government is this high, oversight becomes much more difficult and, since no minister is likely to be in their job for long, encourages short-term thinking while discouraging the development of any kind of expertise.

Yet, the chaos of the British political system ultimately proved a liability for HS2, for, without proper government buy-in, its continued funding became entirely dependent on a couple of key backers - principally Boris Johnson as both Mayor of London (2008-2016) and Prime Minister (2019-2022). Importantly, however, by 2023, Johnson had left both government and parliament in disgrace. This gave an opportunity to a government aide called Andrew Gilligan (called “rabidly anti-HS2” by the Financial Times) to push the new prime minister, Rishi Sunak, into axing half the project. The southern half would have also probably come on the chopping block if it had not been for Sunak’s defeat in the 2024 election.

To put all this in perspective, China has added about 40,000 km to its high-speed rail network while Britain waits for the opening of a single line over some of the flattest land in the country. But the reason Britain can’t build (and China can) is not due to geography or the economy. Instead, the fundamental reason Britain (and much of the rest of the West) has lost the ability to build reliable infrastructure is due to the political system.

The Governance Lessons of British Misadventures

HS2 has been such an embarrassing disaster because British politics in the last few decades has just not been capable of producing the type of long-term planning that is required for large-scale infrastructure projects. HS2 did not - and does not - have broad institutional support, but instead was driven through by charismatic individuals who saw the project as beneficial for their own political advancement. However, once the individuals left office, the project was left defenseless. In short, large infrastructure projects often take decades, but British politics can only think in terms of the next election cycle.

Of course, these are not governance problems found in the UK alone: Britain’s closest international partner, the United States, is also bedeviled by an inability to plan ahead. Indeed, the top frustration of many nations in dealing with both the Trump and Biden administrations has been that the Americans often cannot clearly articulate what they want. This is because, much as with Britain’s HS2, the structure of the American political system makes it very difficult for the government to commit to one policy long term since the opposite party (or even just a rival wing of the same party) will renege on any promise once it gains control of either the White House or Congress.

China has become the gold standard for global infrastructure construction, but projects like the Huajiang Grand Canyon Bridge or the national high-speed rail network require a huge amount of resources and, most crucially, the iron guarantee from the government that these projects will be completed and form part of a greater strategy for development. For example, local businesses are now able to develop tourism around the Huajiang Grand Canyon Bridge precisely because they can depend on the government to see the project to completion, and know that there is a long-term plan to integrate their efforts into the wider regional development plan. In the United Kingdom, by contrast, businesses were left reeling by Sunak’s surprise 2023 announcement canceling parts of HS2 since many had made long-term plans on the premise that the government had already committed to linking them to London by high-speed rail. And over in the U.S., similar economic chaos has been caused by the flip-flopping over things like internet regulation and trade deals.

The contrasting tales of the Huajiang Grand Canyon Bridge and HS2 are not merely about concrete and steel, but about governance and political will. The Anglo-American infrastructure crisis is not an economic or technological failure; it is a governance failure. The crumbling and mismanaged infrastructure is merely another symptom of a political structure that hasn’t worked for decades, and is now trapped in the kind of short-term thinking that makes large infrastructure projects nearly impossible. So, the question should not be why the West can’t build anything, but how the West makes governance work again.

About the Author

Douglas Rooney: Writer and educator working in Beijing. Writing about China and politics mostly.

Doug’s X page: @doug_rooney

Page Editor: Jin Yulin

Call for Contributors!

I’ve added an “ Op-Ed” section to China Up Close. It’s an open platform I specifically designed to let everyone share their own perspectives with the world. Articles can be related to any topic as long as you’re highly passionate about it! Article length is recommended to be within 700 - 900 words.

If you have an idea for an Op-Ed, contact jjnewsletter@hotmail.com with a brief description of the article's focus.

Share

Subscribe now

Leave a comment

Jingjing’s Social Media Links

X: @Jingjing_Li YouTube: @Jingjing_Li Facebook: Talk it Out with Li Jingjing

TikTok: @iamlijingjing Reddit: r/NewsWithJingjing Instagram: @jj_ontheroad

China’s basic infrastructure has somehow become the jealousy of the whole world.

So we are digging into this in this episode ... why other countries are not building these basic infrastructures for their people, but China can?!

Share

Subscribe now

Leave a comment

The new Japanese Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, provoked a diplomatic firestorm when she suggested that Japan may become militarily involved in stopping the process of Chinese reunification. This is a doubly sensitive issue given Japan’s role in the 1930s and 1940s in propping up puppet separatist regimes as part of their attempt to add China to the Japanese Empire.

Every few years, a Japanese politician will say or do something that will provoke a furious response from China or the Republic of Korea (ROK). China and the ROK’s reaction to the return of Japanese militarism and a more bellicose foreign policy is often met with bafflement in the West, where Japan’s actions are inevitably framed as a response to living in an “unstable region” by our media.

The West is baffled only because the history of Japanese fascism is a subject on which it is ignorant. This ignorance is inexcusable since it downplays the role of Asians in the fight against fascism in the 20^th century. More than that, however, it obscures the crimes committed against our own citizens by the Japanese Empire.

I want to share here just one of those war crimes. This is a British story of heroism and perseverance, but it is also a story I knew nothing about until a Chinese director decided to shed light on the incident. Remembering it now might help Westerners understand a bit better why rising fascism in Japan is just as worrying as anywhere else.

The Sinking of the Lisbon Maru

The Lisbon Maru was a cargo liner pressed into service by Imperial Japan to transport British Prisoners of War (POW) to internment camps after the Battle of Hong Kong. 1,816 Allied prisoners were crammed into the holds of this decrepit ship, and, in late September 1942, it set sail towards Japan. Three days out from Hong Kong, the Lisbon Maru was hit by an American torpedo. Over the next 25 hours, the ship slowly sank to the bottom of the sea.

The Japanese were now left with a quandary. The Lisbon Maru would have to be abandoned, but what should they do with the 1,816 prisoners? A few options were available: they could transfer the POWs to other ships that made up the convoy of which the Lisbon Maru was a part. Or, if there wasn’t enough room for all the servicemen aboard the other ships, the nearby Dongji Island (within sight of the sinking cargo liner) offered a convenient place to temporarily hold the POWs until more Japanese ships arrived.

The commanders of the convoy and the army attachment did neither of these things. Instead, they ordered the British soldiers sealed in the holds. The Japanese soldiers and sailors then evacuated the ship. A small detachment of soldiers was left on board. Their only job was to shoot any POWs who managed to escape the hold. Their duty, they were told, was to go down with the ship. The Japanese convoy, despite knowing that American submarines were active in the area, then circled the sinking ship to make doubly sure that no British soldiers escaped.

The POWs did eventually escape the hold and overpower their death guards. When they jumped into the sea in hopes of swimming to safety, the Japanese ships opened fire. The Japanese would continue to fire until disturbed by local Chinese fishermen from Dongji Island. Horrified by the carnage they could see from the shoreline, the fishermen sailed out to do what they could to help the British soldiers. The guns stopped not because the Japanese had been made to feel guilty by the bravery of the Chinese or persistence of the British, but because they worried the fishermen might report what Japan had done, and that this would make Imperial Japan look bad in the eyes of the world. In all, 828 POWs died in this massacre at sea.

The ordeal of the Allied POWs did not end with the sinking of the Lisbon Maru. The survivors would spend the rest of the war in brutal conditions in Japanese POW camps - death rates in Japanese camps ran at about 20% (seven times higher than for British soldiers interned in Germany). Those who did manage to return home were often left with debilitating mental and physical wounds that never fully healed.

I remain shocked by these events not only because of the sheer pointless cruelty of the Japanese actions, but because, despite being British, I only learned about this event after watching the 2023 Chinese documentary The Sinking of the Lisbon Maru. I have a Master's degree in history and (briefly) served in the British army, yet I had never heard of this horrific war crime perpetrated against British soldiers. And I don’t think I am alone: in the documentary itself, again and again, the survivors and their families recount a feeling of being forgotten by the country they served so gallantly. In the reporting that followed the release of the documentary, the adjectives “untold”, “little-known”, and “forgotten” appear regularly.

The heroes of the Lisbon Maru are not alone in being forgotten. Britain is a country obsessed with World War Two, yet the average Brit has a greater working knowledge of the Soviet war against Nazi Germany than our own fight against fascism in Asia. The Royal British Legion (the UK’s largest armed forces charity) calls the soldiers who fought the Japanese in South and South East Asia the “Forgotten Army,” while a recent history of the British Far East campaign calls it the “Forgotten War.”

Regardless of your opinion about the British Empire, I think most of us would consider this a tragedy. These men were, for the most part, in their late teens and early twenties. They crossed half the world to do what they thought was their duty. They fought, suffered, and died in large numbers for their country in one of the most brutal wars in history. And, after all that, when they returned home, their sacrifice was largely forgotten.

What made Britain forget the men and women who died in Asia when we hold the veterans of every other theatre of World War Two in such high regard?

This has to do with Japan’s role after the war. Very quickly after 1945, Japan became an important node in East Asia in America’s fight against communism. From bases in Japan, America supported the Nationalists in the Chinese Civil War, supplied its troops during the Korean War, and kept watch on the Soviets in the Pacific. In order to keep Japan in the American camp, prosecution for war crimes was kept to a minimum (to use just one example, Hirohito, in whose name these atrocities were committed, was allowed to remain as Emperor). In order to keep the Western public on board, it was important not to dwell too long on or delve too deeply into what exactly our new allies had been up to during the war.

China and the ROK have not forgotten the atrocities committed by fascist Japan. Chinese and South Koreans understand that when Japanese politicians embrace militarism, or visit the graves of war criminals and downplay their atrocities, this is not ancient history. There is a direct link connecting the leaders of Japan today with the fascists who shot British soldiers swimming from a sinking ship. Whitewashing the crimes of fascist Japan is an attempt to return to fascism. We in the West owe it not just to the Asians who suffered under Japanese Imperialism but to our own countrymen to remember that.

About the Author

Douglas Rooney: Writer and educator working in Beijing. Writing about China and politics mostly.

Doug’s X page: @doug_rooney

Page Editor: Jin Yulin

Call for Contributors!

I’ve added an “ Op-Ed” section to China Up Close. It’s an open platform I specifically designed to let everyone share their own perspectives with the world. Articles can be related to any topic as long as you’re highly passionate about it! Article length is recommended to be within 700 - 900 words.

If you have an idea for an Op-Ed, contact jjnewsletter@hotmail.com with a brief description of the article's focus.

Share

Subscribe now

Leave a comment

Jingjing’s Social Media Links

X: @Jingjing_Li YouTube: @Jingjing_Li Facebook: Talk it Out with Li Jingjing

TikTok: @iamlijingjing Reddit: r/NewsWithJingjing Instagram: @jj_ontheroad

U.S. mega influencer Hasan Piker, who has a combined 4.5 million followers across Twitch and YouTube, visited China for the first time and sat down with Li Jingjing in Beijing to talk about his long-awaited China trip.

Hasan Piker, also known as HasanAbi, is one of the most influential political streamers and commentators in the U.S., with a massive reach among young Americans. His daily livestreams combine political commentary, media analysis and cultural discussion, offering a direct and unfiltered perspective that mainstream media struggles to deliver. This style has earned him deep trust from millions who rely on him to make sense of politics and global events.

Why China? Piker says he wanted to cut through Western misinformation by seeing the country with his own eyes. “There are so many rumors and outright lies about China,” he said. “I needed to see it for myself.”

He discusses China’s rapid growth, its achievements in poverty alleviation and why Western media often misrepresents the country. Piker also reflects on the challenges facing young Americans today and explains why a clearer understanding of China is essential for the future of China-U.S. relations.

Share

Subscribe now

Leave a comment

Is China a socialist or capitalist country? Will China become the next hegemon as its global influence continues to grow?

Renowned leftist historian and writer, director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, shared his analysis in this talk.

Share

Subscribe now

Leave a comment

I will focus on the importance and role that the development of productive forces plays in the process of achieving the building of a socialist state in China.

We are witnessing a defining moment in human history, debatably as transformative as the shift from feudalism to capitalism 500 years ago. Some suggest parallels with the crises of the last century, such as World War I, which ended the Age of Empires.

Yet, today’s global transformations appear more profound, driven by countries like China, which seeks to reshape global economic and social paradigms through socialism. This claim may seem overstated, but it is necessary to make sense of what China is currently undertaking.

In its 20th Congress, the Communist Party of China (CPC) outlined its second centennial goal: building a modern socialist state by 2049.

This raises a critical question: Is this just a slogan, or is China really and seriously working toward this goal? What if it succeeds? Specifically, what if production relations in the world’s second-largest economy become socialist?

Historically, the CPC has demonstrated an ability to convert slogans into actionable programs. These programs translate into daily struggles for hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens, and most of these goals have been achieved. The latest example is the elimination of extreme poverty. Thus, I can confidently state that slogans in China are made to be implemented.

So, how will China build a modern socialist state by 2049?

For five decades, the Communist Party of China has led the nation toward one central goal: socialism. At every stage, there has been boldness—boldness in presenting new ideas, adapting Marxist theory to align with Chinese realities and characteristics, confronting imperialism, liberating China politically and economically, and carving out an independent development path free from colonial dictates.

Later, in 1978, China entered a new phase marked by “reform and opening up.” This phase saw the liberation and development of China’s productive forces, with the aim of “building socialism in China,” as repeatedly emphasized by Deng Xiaoping: “According to our experience, in order to build socialism, we must first of all develop the productive forces, which is our main task. This is the only way to demonstrate the superiority of socialism. Whether the socialist economic policies we are pursuing are correct or not depends, in the final analysis, on whether the productive forces develop and people’s incomes increase. This is the most important criterion. We cannot build socialism with just empty talk. The people will not believe it”.

Then, the “reform and opening-up” policy launched by the CPC aimed to develop productive forces, not to abandon socialism, but to strengthen it. These policies achieved the rapid development of China’s productive forces.

Since the CPC’s 18th Congress, socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a new era, emphasizing technology and innovation as pillars of development. This approach is encapsulated in the concept of “New Quality Productive Forces,” introduced by President Xi Jinping.

According to Marxist political economy, science and technology play a crucial role in advancing productive forces. Marx famously noted the transformative impact of productive forces on societal production modes, stating: “The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill society with the industrial capitalist.”

Thus, the long journey toward building a modern socialist state necessitates a new wave of liberating and advancing the productive forces. Therefore, the concept of “New Quality Productive Forces” is a key term for understanding China’s modernization model and will serve as a driving force for socialist modernization.

Over the past decade, China’s efforts in this regard have been remarkable. Two years ago, I visited Qingdao and its automated port, where I was surprised to witness the unloading of one of the world’s largest cargo ships. The operation involved no workers on the dock—only dozens of highly efficient and complex robots.

For instance, a friend once asked me, “What will happen to the workers replaced by robots at Qingdao Port?” This is indeed a legitimate question, given that we are observing a novel experiment unprecedented in human history.

Until now, our understanding has been shaped by the Western capitalist model. In Qingdao’s case, the replacement of workers by robots would, in a capitalist system, aim to maximize surplus value, generating immense profits for a small group of capitalists while leaving the workers unemployed and impoverished. However, this transformation must also be viewed through the lens of the Chinese socialist model.

Before I continue, let me note that, of course, I’m not speaking about today’s cases, but just as an expectation for the future when China consolidates its socialist transformation. Today, China is still on this path and, according to the CPC, has already entered the primary stage of socialism—a phase expected to last over a century. The goal by 2049 is not to begin socialism, but to deepen and modernize it. Until then, there will still be many issues to address, including class disparities. Therefore, now I have no idea what happened to those workers in Qingdao.

So, this transformation must be reexamined through the lens of the Chinese socialist model. Unlike the Western capitalist model, China’s means of production are under state control, led by the CPC, which prioritizes public welfare. Consequently, surplus value is redistributed across society rather than concentrated in the hands of a select few capitalists. This is how China eradicated extreme poverty—a feat impossible in capitalist systems like the United States.

Through centralized control over surplus value and its redistribution to enhance societal welfare, China can ensure universal access to basic needs such as education, healthcare, housing, and transportation. Meanwhile, workers displaced by automation, like those in Qingdao Port, can engage in other meaningful pursuits without worrying about basic necessities.

In the Chinese context, if productive forces continue to develop and the path toward socialism progresses, workers will benefit in two key ways: first, by having more free time; and second, by moving away from hard labor toward jobs aligned with their talents and aspirations. This vision is not utopian but rather grounded in theoretical principles increasingly achievable through China’s ongoing experience.

As long as the CPC maintains control over the means of production and fulfills its role as the vanguard of the working class, implementing strategic plans guiding the country step by step toward socialism, these goals will be realized sooner than expected. Looking back 70 years, we see the extreme hardships endured by the Chinese people, working tirelessly for a single daily meal. Comparing that to today’s reality shows that nothing is impossible and that China is on the right path.

Following and learning from this experience will be immensely enriching—not only for researchers like us but also for all people worldwide seeking a way out of the crisis imposed by imperialist capitalism.

About the Author

Adham Sayed is a senior research fellow at the Institute of East Asian Studies, Zhejiang Gongshang University.

Page Editor: Jin Yulin

Call for Contributors!

I’ve added an “ Op-Ed” section to China Up Close. It’s an open platform I specifically designed to let everyone share their own perspectives with the world. Articles can be related to any topic as long as you’re highly passionate about it! Article length is recommended to be within 700 - 900 words.

If you have an idea for an Op-Ed, contact jjnewsletter@hotmail.com with a brief description of the article's focus.

Share

Subscribe now

Leave a comment

Jingjing’s Social Media Links

X: @Jingjing_Li YouTube: @Jingjing_Li Facebook: Talk it Out with Li Jingjing

TikTok: @iamlijingjing Reddit: r/NewsWithJingjing Instagram: @jj_ontheroad

In the shadow of ancient Korean temples in Gyeongju, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum convenes its 2025 summit this October/November, a gathering that once symbolized the triumph of open markets and cross-Pacific unity. Founded in 1989 amid the euphoria of the Cold War’s end, APEC was envisioned as a pragmatic antidote to rigid trade blocs, promoting voluntary cooperation among 21 diverse economies - from the emerging powerhouse China to island nations like Papua New Guinea. Champions like Australia’s Bob Hawke and Paul Keating subsequently, and Japan’s Noboru Takeshita, saw it as a vehicle for mutual economic benefit, fostering trade liberalization without the binding constraints of institutions like the European Union. Over the decades, APEC delivered solid results. These included tariff reductions accelerated by the 1994 Bogor Goals tripled intra-regional trade to $8.7 trillion by 2019, while initiatives like the APEC Business Travel Card eased cross-border commerce since 2001.

Yet, as leaders assemble under South Korea’s theme of “Building a Sustainable Tomorrow,” the forum’s aspirations feel increasingly fraught, if not hollow. Geopolitical rifts, protectionist surges, and the persistence of bloc political alignments have transformed APEC from a bridge across the Pacific into a fractured arena, where consensus is elusive and irrelevance looms. In this moment of conjuncture - to borrow from historian Fernand Braudel - short-term crises collide, testing whether APEC can endure the longue durée of shifting global power.

The United States’ waning commitment to multilateralism stands as the most glaring fracture. Once APEC’s de facto steward, Washington now views such forums through the lens of “America First” skepticism, amplified under President Donald Trump’s second term. Since January 2025, the administration has reimposed sweeping tariffs and prioritized attempts to strike bilateral deals, echoing Trump’s first-term withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). At the IMF’s April 2025 meetings, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent conditioned U.S. support for global institutions on “reciprocal benefits,” a thinly veiled demand for concessions favoring American industries. This retreat is quantifiable. The 2025 Multilateralism Index from the International Peace Institute shows a decline in U.S. engagement across trade forums, even as others ramp up participation. For APEC, this means diluted influence; Trump’s in-person attendance in Gyeongju - his first as president - comes amid domestic pressures to revive U.S. manufacturing, sidelining regional pledges. His August 2025 summit with South Korean President Lee Jae-myung focused on bilateral tech transfers and attempts to impose investment commitments from South Korea to the U.S. rather than any substantial discussions around APEC-wide integration. The forum’s 2025 priorities - AI governance, demographic resilience, and green transitions - risk becoming peripheral, vetoed by a U.S. more inclined to unilateral action than collective strategy, with limited interest to green transitions (after all, Trump has described climate change as a “hoax”) and little signs of a willingness to abandon AI unilateralism.

At the heart of this disarray lies the U.S.-China trade war, a conflict that has metastasized into a regional malaise. Reignited in February 2025 via the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, U.S. tariffs now exceed 10% on over half of APEC members, with China facing 50-100% duties on sectors like electric vehicles and semiconductors. Beijing’s countermeasures have disrupted supply chains as businesses rerouted product channels, fast-tracked imports to avoid impending tariffs, or abandoned trade altogether. APEC’s May 2025 trade ministers’ meeting in Jeju forecasted regional export growth plummeting to 0.4% for the year, down from 5.7% in 2024, blaming “fundamental challenges” from protectionism. In Gyeongju, expect debates on WTO reforms, where the U.S. calls for “market reciprocity” to clash with China’s advocacy for developing-nation exemptions, mirroring the forum’s 2023 failures in San Francisco.

Compounding these tensions are bilateral rivalries that erode APEC’s cohesion. The forum’s inclusive membership now amplifies disputes into multilateral static. South China Sea clashes pit the Philippines against China, with Manila’s enhanced U.S. alliances raising regional tensions. The Diaoyu Dao is another focal point of regional bilateral tensions, straining Tokyo’s role as a U.S. partner. Even semi-neutral players like Singapore are confronting real challenges. ASEAN’s 2025 growth forecast dropped 0.5% due to disrupted trade routes and tourism. North American frictions add to the mix, with Canada and Mexico navigating USMCA renegotiations amid Trump’s assorted tariffs. Collectively, these spats have spawned 345 new trade restrictions across APEC by October 2025, the highest in a decade, per the Jeju statement. Such fragmentation undermines APEC’s role as a strategic canvass for economic alignment, turning it into a venue for grievance airing rather than resolution.

Washington’s pivot to “minilaterals” - smaller coalitions - further fragments the landscape, positioning them as bulwarks against China. Groups like the Quad (U.S., Japan, India, Australia), AUKUS (U.S., UK, Australia), and the U.S.-Japan-Philippines trilateral form a “security latticework,” with exercises like Balikatan expanding; all of which raises the heat in the region. These minilaterals drain APEC’s vitality. The Quad’s August 2025 supply-chain accord bypassed forum-wide digital trade discussions, leaving APEC’s innovation agenda underfunded. For host South Korea, this splinters the summit’s “connect, innovate, prosper” ethos, reducing it to parallel dialogues rather than unified action.

External shadows deepen the gloom. The Russia-Ukraine conflict’s ripples - global food inflation at 8% above pre-2022 levels - batter APEC’s vulnerable economies, with rice prices surging 12% in Indonesia and Peru during Q3 2025. Meanwhile, BRICS - expanded to include Indonesia, Egypt, and others - emerges as a parallel forum - if not a functional alternative or rival to APEC, commanding 40% of global GDP (PPP) and advancing currency multipolarity through national currency settlements and the expanded role of the New Development Bank. At its October 2025 summit, BRICS lambasted U.S. tariffs, highlighting a parallel order that overlaps with APEC members like China, Indonesia, Vietnam and Russia, who leverage it to influence forum dynamics.

This conjuncture - a Braudelian tangle of immediate crises - portends struggle for common ground in Gyeongju, much like 2023’s rifts over Ukraine and Gaza. Yet, the longue durée offers hope amid peril. APEC survived the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis by adapting to peer reviews and capacity-building. Today, evolving power balances - China’s ascent, India’s rise, Russia’s re-emergence - could force reinvention. If BRICS eclipses the G7 by 2030, APEC might pivot to multipolarity. Host Lee Jae-myung’s “pragmatic flexibility” - balancing U.S. ties with China outreach - could yield breakthroughs, like a Xi-Trump dialogue easing rare-earth tensions or frameworks for AI ethics and green finance.

Ultimately, APEC’s fate hinges on rediscovering its flexible origins. In a world of zero-sum mentalités, where trust erodes amid 345 restrictions, the forum must evolve beyond ceremony. Gyeongju could plant seeds for revival - modest pacts on sustainability or digital standards - or confirm decline, outshone by minilaterals and blocs. As Braudel reminds us, conjunctures pass, but longue durée endures through adaptation. For APEC, the choice is to reinvent itself as a high-stakes barometer of Pacific cooperation, or fade into irrelevance in a multipolar storm.

About the Author

Warwick Powell is an Adjunct Professor at Queensland University of Technology. He’s also working at the intersection of China, digital technologies, supply chains, financial flows and global political economy & governance.

Page Editor: Jin Yulin

Call for Contributors!

I’ve added an “ Op-Ed” section to China Up Close. It’s an open platform I specifically designed to let everyone share their own perspectives with the world. Articles can be related to any topic as long as you’re highly passionate about it! Article length is recommended to be within 700 - 900 words.

If you have an idea for an Op-Ed, contact jjnewsletter@hotmail.com with a brief description of the article's focus.

Share

Subscribe now

Leave a comment

Jingjing’s Social Media Links

X: @Jingjing_Li YouTube: @Jingjing_Li Facebook: Talk it Out with Li Jingjing

TikTok: @iamlijingjing Reddit: r/NewsWithJingjing Instagram: @jj_ontheroad

Twenty-Three Minutes on the Missouri

On the morning of September 2, 1945, in Tokyo Bay, the Second World War officially ended. The setting was theatrical yet austere. A teak-decked American battleship, the USS Missouri, was anchored amidst an armada of Allied vessels. The ceremony lasted barely twenty-three minutes. Japan’s foreign minister, Mamoru Shigemitsu, hobbled up the gangway on his wooden leg to sign the Instrument of Surrender. Behind him stood General Douglas MacArthur, tall and imperious, flanked by American, British, Soviet, Chinese, French, Dutch, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand representatives. Cameras clicked, pens scratched, and the world’s most destructive war was brought to a close.

Yet, the tableau was misleading in its simplicity. At the time, it implied a story of great-power confrontation and victory, a war won largely by the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. Absent from the teak decks that morning were the representatives of the millions of men from China, India, Africa, and the Arab world who had fought in lands far from home, often for empires that denied them sovereignty, citizenship, and dignity. Their sacrifice was immense. Their presence, however, was erased.

From Missouri to Tianjin: Memory and Multipolarity

It is precisely these absences that make the 80th anniversary of the end of the war today so charged with meaning. Commemoration is no longer confined to the American-led tableau in Tokyo Bay. In Tianjin, at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit over the last few days, leaders of China, Russia, India and other Eurasian states gathered under banners of multipolarity and “true multilateralism.” Their summit deliberately reframed history, not through the narrow lens of the “Big Three,” but by evoking the reality that victory in 1945 was global.

The symbolism is striking. Where Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin once sat in judgment of the world, today Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin and Narendra Modi appear together on a different stage, presenting themselves as heirs to a broader coalition than the Atlantic order ever admitted. Linking the end of the Second World War with the current momentum of the Global South is not contrived. It reflects the very truth that victory was achieved by armies drawn from Asia, Africa and the Arab world. The SCO’s language of sovereignty and equality thus resonates as a modern echo of the forgotten millions who fought without a voice in shaping the peace.

China’s Overlooked War

One of the most overlooked contributions to the Allied victory was that of China itself. For fourteen long years before Japan’s surrender, stretching back to 1931, China fought a grinding, total war against the Imperial Japanese Army. China suffered more than 35 million military and civilian casualties during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (1931–1945). China also suffered more than $100 billion in direct property damage and war expenses, along with an estimated $500 billion in indirect economic losses at 1937 prices. Due to the great sacrifices of the Chinese people, at its peak, over 1.86 million Japanese soldiers were pinned down in China, unable to be redeployed elsewhere. This not only drained Japan’s strength but also prevented Tokyo from striking north against the Soviet Union or south in even greater force against Southeast Asia.

In Western memory, China’s role is often relegated to a footnote. School textbooks dwell on Normandy, the Battle of the Bulge and Pearl Harbor, while the epic scale of the Sino-Japanese War, including the pivotal battles of Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhan and Changsha, is blurred out. Yet, without China’s resistance, the strategic geometry of the Second World War would have looked entirely different.

This is precisely the point Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized in his recent interview with the Xinhua News Agency ahead of the SCO summit. He argued that China’s prolonged resistance helped prevent Japan from striking the Soviet Far East, freeing Joseph Stalin to concentrate his forces on the existential fight against Nazi Germany. Had Japan subdued China, Putin noted, Berlin and Tokyo could have presented a united front against the USSR, a scenario that would have radically altered the balance of the war.¹

Putin’s framing is not just political spin. It echoes long-standing assessments in Russian and Chinese historiography. For both Moscow and Beijing, the war was not won by the Atlantic powers alone but by the combined weight of Eurasia, including the millions of Chinese soldiers and civilians who absorbed Japan’s fury. As such, for China, this history is not simply about remembrance, it is about asserting a legitimate place at the center of global order, a claim underscored by its planned Victory Day parade on September 3, 2025, in Beijing.

The Global Army That Defeated Fascism

India’s Immense Contribution

By 1945, the British Indian Army had become the largest volunteer force in human history with over 2.5 million serving men and women. They fought in nearly every theater, from the deserts of North Africa to the mountains of Italy, from the jungles of Burma to the beaches of Malaya. According to official British and Commonwealth sources, between 87,000²-110,000 Indians died and tens of thousands more were wounded or captured. Their victories at the Battles of Imphal and Kohima, hailed as the “Stalingrad of the East”, stopped the Japanese advance into the subcontinent. At Monte Cassino, Sikh regiments climbed shattered abbey walls under German fire. In North Africa, Indian divisions helped Montgomery push Rommel back across the desert.

This was not an imperial force coerced by conscription. Most of these soldiers volunteered. They sought livelihoods, adventure or a sense of duty to king and country. Yet, when they returned home, they were met with famine, poverty and colonial contempt. The Bengal Famine of 1943, exacerbated by wartime policies, estimated to have killed up to four million civilians even as Indian troops fought abroad. The paradox was stark. Indians bled for freedom overseas but were denied it at home.

Africa’s Unheralded Role

More than one million Africans served the Allied cause. They came from Britain’s colonies of Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Uganda and from French and Belgian territories. Some carried rifles while many more carried supplies. They were the porters, engineers, stretcher-bearers and scouts without whom campaigns could not have been sustained. In the jungles of Burma, the 81st and 82nd (West African) Divisions fought alongside Indian and British troops, hauling artillery through leech-infested swamps, crossing rivers under fire and pushing back Japanese forces along the Kaladan River.

Yet, in European memory, their role has been nearly obliterated. School textbooks and commemorations seldom mention the African divisions. Where they appear in photographs, they are often nameless figures, anonymous bearers of burdens, not acknowledged as soldiers of equal stature.

North Africa and the Arab World

France’s liberation was in no small part owed to the Army of Africa comprising hundreds of thousands of Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians. The Moroccan Goumiers, famed for their mountain warfare skills, broke German positions in the Italian Apennines, helping open the road to Rome. Algerian tirailleurs were among the first to enter southern France during Operation Dragoon in 1944. In total, over 400,000 North African troops fought for France.

Yet, when Paris was liberated in August 1944, French authorities carried out the infamous policy of “blanchiment” - the whitening of forces. African and Arab soldiers were removed from frontline units so that photographs of victory parades would show only white faces. Those who had died on Italian slopes or Provençal beaches were erased from the image of triumph.

Arab troops also served in smaller but significant formations. The Arab Legion, under British command, fought in Iraq and Syria, ensuring Middle Eastern oil remained under Allied control. Syrian and Lebanese volunteers joined Free French forces. Their war, too, was fought not for their own liberation, but to secure the empires that occupied them.

The Grand Alliance that Wasn’t Just a Troika

When historians recall the “Grand Alliance” of the Second World War, the image that dominates is of the Big Three - the Troika of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin - who met at Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam. In popular imagination, these three leaders, representing the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union, are credited with forging the coalition that defeated Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan.

This picture, however, is profoundly incomplete. In reality, the Grand Alliance was the largest coalition ever assembled in human history, comprising over fifty nations. At its height, the Allies mobilized an astonishing over seventy million men and women under arms across every continent.

The war effort stretched far beyond the Big Three. Canada, Australia and New Zealand sent divisions to Europe, Africa and the Pacific. China absorbed the bulk of Japan’s military might for ten long years before Pearl Harbor. Indian soldiers fought under the British flag in multiple theaters. African and Arab troops marched in French and British formations. The Caribbean contributed sailors, airmen and merchant mariners. Even small nations like Nepal, whose Gurkhas became legendary, or Ethiopia, which resisted Italian occupation, were part of this coalition.

This reality is important. The Grand Alliance was not just three leaders in a room, but a tapestry of peoples from colonies, dominions, republics and kingdoms, most of whom lacked sovereignty. The world’s largest war effort was fought not only by great powers but by millions from societies denied a voice in shaping the peace.

A War Fought Far from Home

The common thread for these soldiers was displacement. They fought in lands whose languages they did not speak, under commanders who often held them in contempt and for causes that were defined elsewhere. An Indian sepoy who fell at Monte Cassino was buried in Italian soil, a Nigerian rifleman who died in the Arakan rests in a Burmese cemetery and a Moroccan goumier who perished in Tuscany was interred beneath olive trees.

Their deaths were noble but their war was not truly theirs. It was Europe’s war, fought to preserve European states. And yet, it was precisely this contradiction of dying for freedom while being denied it that sowed the seeds of decolonization.

After the Victory: Erasure and Revolt

Victory in 1945 did not bring emancipation to colonial peoples. Instead, it exposed the hypocrisies of empire. On Victory in Europe (VE) Day, May 8, 1945, as Europe celebrated, Algerians in Sétif, Guelma and Kherrata marched to demand independence. The French response was brutal. Over 45,000 Algerians were massacred. The message was clear. Colonial blood was welcome on the battlefield but not in the body politic.

Across Asia and Africa, demobilized soldiers returned with new expectations. They had fought the Germans and Japanese as equals. Why should they be treated as inferiors at home? The Indian National Army trials, the Royal Indian Navy mutiny of 1946 and the spread of nationalist movements in North and West Africa all drew upon the experience and anger of returning veterans. The war had militarized societies and delegitimized empire. Independence movements surged and within two decades much of Asia and Africa was free.

Yet, memory lagged behind history. In European capitals, victory monuments enshrined Churchill, De Gaulle and Eisenhower, but seldom the nameless sepoys, tirailleurs and askaris. Their absence from public memory was deliberate, a final act of imperial censorship.

Why the 80th Anniversary Matters Now

Decolonizing Memory

Eighty years on, commemorating the end of the war is not just about wreaths and bugles, but about narrative. Who gets remembered shapes who has legitimacy today. For decades, the story of the Second World War was Western-centric - Normandy, Dunkirk, Midway and Pearl Harbor. Only recently have institutions like the Imperial War Museum or the National Army Museum begun to spotlight the global armies that made Allied victory possible. Exhibitions such as Beyond Burma: Forgotten Armies are attempts to correct the record even though much remains to be done.

The 80th anniversary is a moment to insist on a decolonization of memory. It is to say that the war that ended on the USS Missouri was not only America’s victory or Europe’s salvation but rather a global struggle, won with Soviet resolve, Chinese resistance, Indian bayonets, African scouts and Arab cavalry. Their descendants deserve not silence, but recognition.

Memory as Geopolitics

The politics of remembrance is not neutral. Japan commemorates August 15, the day of Emperor Hirohito’s surrender broadcast. China celebrates September 3, the day after the USS Missouri ceremony. Russia commemorates the Great Patriotic War, anchored in the battles of Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, Kursk and Berlin, among others. Each nation shapes memory to reinforce present identity.

For the Global South, reclaiming their role in 1945 is more than nostalgia. It is a moral claim to a voice in the world order of 2025. If the Chinese, Indians, Africans and Arabs died to defend freedom then, their nations have earned the right to define freedom now. Recognition of sacrifice becomes a form of diplomatic capital, reinforcing the legitimacy of a multipolar world.

Lessons for Today’s Shifts

We live in an era of tectonic geopolitical shifts entailing the decline of Western primacy, the rise of Asia, the assertion of Africa and the return of civilizational states. The 80th anniversary arrives at a time when blocs like BRICS and the SCO reflect the agency of the very regions once treated as expendable manpower.

Remembering the forgotten armies connects past injustice to present demands. It underlines that the current quest for sovereignty, dignity and multipolarity is not new. It is the unfinished business of 1945.

The Oath We Owe

On the decks of the USS Missouri, Allied leaders promised that the new world would be different in that aggression would be punished and freedom would prevail. For Europe and America, those promises had meaning. For India, Africa and the Arab world, they rang hollow. They had given their lives for liberty and received continued subjugation in return.

Eighty years later, the popular imagination still conjures images of the “Big Three” - Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin - guiding the Grand Alliance to victory. However, this is a partial truth, and therefore a distortion. The Grand Alliance was not a Troika. It was over fifty nations and more than seventy million men and women, many of them from colonies and dominions who had no seat at Yalta or Potsdam, no pen on the surrender documents, no say in shaping the peace.

To remember only the Troika is to perpetuate the injustice of erasure. To recall the sepoy at Monte Cassino, the West African rifleman in Burma, the Moroccan goumier in the Apennines and the Arab Legionnaire in the Levant is to restore historical balance. It is to acknowledge that the Allied victory was truly global, and that freedom for some was purchased with the lives of many who did not yet know freedom themselves.

The 80th anniversary of September 2, 1945, should therefore not be a simple celebration of victory. It should be a solemn reminder of debts still unpaid. The world order being born in 2025 is more multipolar, more civilizational, more insistent on dignity and echoes the voices silenced in 1945.

The key message is simple in that without China, India, Africa, the Arab world and dozens of other nations, there would have been no Allied victory. To forget this is not only amnesia, it is betrayal. To remember it is to honor the past honestly and to build a future where no sacrifice is erased and no people are denied their rightful place in the story of freedom.

About the Author

Kautilya The Contemplator decodes power, empire and strategy through the lens of ancient statecraft and modern realism. Unmasking collapse, mapping multipolarity—this is where the Arthashastra meets the 21st century.

Page Editor: Jin Yulin

Call for Contributors!

I’ve added an “ Op-Ed” section to China Up Close. It’s an open platform I specifically designed to let everyone share their own perspectives with the world. Articles can be related to any topic as long as you’re highly passionate about it! Article length is recommended to be within 700 - 900 words.

If you have an idea for an Op-Ed, contact jjnewsletter@hotmail.com with a brief description of the article's focus.

Share

Subscribe now

Leave a comment

Jingjing’s Social Media Links

X: @Jingjing_Li YouTube: @Jingjing_Li Facebook: Talk it Out with Li Jingjing

TikTok: @iamlijingjing Reddit: r/NewsWithJingjing Instagram: @jj_ontheroad

Most people in the West have learned words like “Xinjiang” and “Uygur” in the past few years, due to the bombardment of reports from the media and activist groups describing how terrible Uygurs’ lives are in China. People in the West quickly became concerned, even though many had little knowledge about the culture, history, and customs of the Uygurs or the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region.

It’s understandable that such interest has been generated – that’s what the campaigns are designed to do. So, how about continuing to read this article and learning the real stories of Xinjiang, the stories that Western media and governments never tell you?

The neglected facts

Before explaining the historical background, here are some basic facts that may surprise you.

The population of the Uygurs in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region grew from 3.6 million in 1953 to 11.6 million in 2020, according to China’s seventh and also the latest national census in 2020.

Between 2000 and 2020 alone, the population of the Uygurs grew by over 3 million. The 1.67-percent growth rate is a lot higher than the average growth rate of all ethnic minority groups in China, which stands at 0.83 percent.

Does that sound like “genocide”?

Xinjiang’s regional GDP rose from 1.23 billion yuan ($184 million) in 1955 to 1.4 trillion yuan in 2020, according to the White Paper on Ethnic groups’ equal rights in Xinjiang in 2021. By the end of 2020, 2.7 million rural people were lifted out of extreme poverty. The per capita disposable income of rural people was 13,052 yuan in 2020, 10.8 percent higher than in 2012.

Does that sound like “forced labor”?

If you went to Xinjiang, you would see the Uygur language written and spoken everywhere, from public signs, books, radios, TV programs and songs to conversations among pedestrians. In fact, there are 52 newspapers and 120 magazines in different languages since there are over 50 ethnic minority groups in Xinjiang, and Uygur, Mongolian, Kazakh, Kirghiz and Xibe are the most commonly used languages.

Several Uygur cultural heritages and customs are not only on the national heritage list, but also the UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage list, with the support of the Chinese government.

Does that sound like “cultural genocide”?

In order to help members of ethnic minority groups have better access to education, kids in Xinjiang can enjoy 15 years of free education from kindergarten to high school, much more than the average nine years for kids in the rest of the country. For the college entrance exam, the most competitive exam in China, kids of minority descent are granted extra points to make sure they can attain higher education. The extra points vary depending on the population of the ethnic group. One of my Uygur friends from Hotan said she gained 30 extra points, which made a great difference in her exam results.

Does that sound like “oppression”?

In Xinjiang, there are five main religions: Islam, Buddhism, Christianity, Catholicism, and Eastern Orthodox. But if you want to understand the situation for Muslims, visiting any mosque and talking to the people going to their daily prayers will allow the real picture.

Currently, there are over 24,000 mosques across Xinjiang, more than in many Muslim-majority countries. Islam-related institutions have been renovated in the past few years. Several mosques have been updated, expanded, and equipped with better facilities for ablution, heating, and fire control, including Masjid Yanghang in Urumqi and Id Kah Mosque in Kashgar. The China Islamic Institute, which provides education for anyone interested in becoming faculty or staff for Islamic institutes in China, built eight new compounds across Xinjiang in 2017, with 200 million yuan from the government.

“There are mosques; they’ve been teaching the Quran. The only Quran we’ve all been learning, some of the students can read it better than I. What other evidence do you want to be presented to prove there is actually freedom to worship, and Islam is not ended there?” said Mubarak Mugabo, a Muslim from Uganda who visited Islamic institutions in Xinjiang during his trip, in an interview with CGTN.

Does that sound like the “oppression of Muslims”?

So why have these facts, these voices never been picked up by the media, political figures and activist groups in the West, who claimed they are extremely “concerned” about people in Xinjiang?

If your counterargument is “data from China’s government and government-funded organizations or individuals are not trustworthy,” may I kindly remind you that almost all the West’s accusations, reports and investigations about Xinjiang were conducted by “scholars” or “researchers” from a self-proclaimed independent think tank called the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). It is funded by multiple governments and weapon manufacturers, including the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Department of Defense, the UK Embassy in China and the government of Canada, or “East Turkistan” related activist groups, whose headquarters are in Washington, D.C. and receive funding from government organizations like the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).

Yet, Western mainstream media organizations have no problem believing and amplifying their words or data, even though most of their “proof” of horrendous atrocities in Xinjiang are just satellite images, self-made cartoons, photoshopped images and witnesses with apparent gaps in their stories. All have been debunked by multiple users on social networks.

Eliminating extremism, terrorism and separatism

But of course, we have to ask, where do those lies come from, and why do certain groups keep pushing them? First, we need to understand what’s happened in Xinjiang.

It’s hard not to notice the heavy security in Xinjiang at airports, gas stations and public venues when one travels there, especially several years ago. That’s because terrorist attacks occurred frequently across Xinjiang starting in the 1920s, after pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism spread to the region. Extremists advocated violence, separation and even ethnic cleansing in Xinjiang, even though the region has been home to multiple ethnic groups for hundreds of years, with some groups even inhabiting here long before the Uygurs.

Thousands of terrorist attacks took place in Xinjiang and even spread to the rest of China until 2017, causing not just financial damage but also the loss of countless lives of innocent civilians and security forces.

“I was told that I shouldn’t interact with other men or anyone that is non-Muslim. Women can’t work because the money we earn is dirty. I couldn’t wear colorful clothes,” recalled Zaynura Namatqari, a Uygur woman who studied at a vocational training center in Shufu County and is now the head of women’s affairs on her village committee, in an interview with CGTN.

Many Uygurs like her were approached by religious staff with extreme ideologies and were forced to abandon their traditional Uygur culture.

Memetjan Metqasim, a Uygur musician who is now competing on a national music show, remembers being asked by imams to abandon music and dancing, which are key cultural elements for many Uygurs like him. Crying at funerals and singing at weddings were forbidden, too.

In fact, the groups of extremists were not just targeting people of the Han people; they were targeting the Uygurs, who were not Muslims, or Muslims who didn’t agree with their extreme ideologies. Several renowned imams of major mosques in Xinjiang were among the victims, such as the former imam of Id Kah Mosque, Jume Tayir, who was strongly against radicalism and was brutally murdered at the age of 74 in 2014 by a group of terrorists in front of the mosque after he finished morning prayers.

This tragedy has been barely mentioned by those in the West who claim they care about the people in Xinjiang.

So, China adopted de-radicalization methods, similar to the de-radicalization methods being used by many countries, including France, providing education at vocational training centers. Besides de-radicalization, providing those people with proper education, and teaching them to gain a better understanding of vocational skills, laws and Mandarin skills have helped many stand on their own feet.

Most graduates were able to run businesses, improve the yield of their farmland, or work in offices with the computer skills they learned, earning a much more stable income after graduation.

Have those methods been effective? Just look at the reality.

Not one terrorist attack has happened in Xinjiang since 2017.

Villages were lifted out of extreme poverty. Ethnic minority women are working in every industry, often as the breadwinners of the family. More minority kids are going to high schools and colleges. Average household incomes have increased. More tourists are traveling to Xinjiang every year. People of all religions are able to celebrate their religious festivals. The Uygurs are shining in their professions, as movie stars, singers, professors and government officials.

Are those realities enough to debunk the West’s false Xinjiang narrative?

Page Editor: Jin Yulin

Call for Contributors!

I’ve added an “ Op-Ed” section to China Up Close. It’s an open platform I specifically designed to let everyone share their own perspectives with the world. Articles can be related to any topic as long as you’re highly passionate about it! Article length is recommended to be within 700 - 900 words.

If you have an idea for an Op-Ed, contact jjnewsletter@hotmail.com with a brief description of the article's focus.

Share

Subscribe now

Leave a comment

Jingjing’s Social Media Links

X: @Jingjing_Li YouTube: @Jingjing_Li Facebook: Talk it Out with Li Jingjing

TikTok: @iamlijingjing Reddit: r/NewsWithJingjing Instagram: @jj_ontheroad

India-China relations are entering a historic shift. This video on India-China news explores the India-China rapprochement, India-China relations, BRICS India-China diplomacy, Modi-China relations, and the future of India-China cooperation. Featuring Li Jingjing and Janvi Sonaiya on Think BRICS, the discussion analyzes how Narendra Modi’s visit to China, Xi Jinping’s strategy, and India-China border talks are reshaping Asia.

Share

Subscribe now

Leave a comment