The Top Six Stories:

1. While visiting the United Nations in New York in part for a Meeting of the Group of Friends of Global Governance, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with a number of Latin American and Caribbean officials. Wang mostly discussed global governance and political cooperation issues with these leaders, though he notably raised the Taiwan issue with Cuba, Costa Rica, and Panama. Meetings include:

   1. Seeking to smooth over recent tensions, Wang met the Panamanian foreign minister. FM Wang argued that “China-Panama ties ‌should not be subject to third-party interference” and highlighted the Taiwan issue.

   2. Wang Yi discussed with Manuel Tovar the Chinese-Costa Rican Free Trade Agreement, the One China Principle, and broader political and economic ties (FMPRC).

      1. The wording of the Taiwan references in the Costa Rica and Panama meetings suggests that the Chinese government remains most concerned about Taiwan finding a diplomatic opening for unofficial ties with its recent former diplomatic partners in Central America.

   3. Colombian foreign minister Rosa Yolanda Villavicencio chatted about the Belt and Road Initiative, the One China Principle, trade, and broader political cooperation. (Xinhua)

   4. In a face-to-face with the Cuban foreign minister, Wang expressed support for Cuba in the face of increased U.S. pressure. (FMPRC)

   5. In a meeting with the Trinidad and Tobago foreign minister, Wang reviewed people-to-people ties, trade, and the One China Principle. (Xinhua)

   6. Wang and Argentine Foreign Minister Quirno discussed global governance and the UN system, as well as trade and agriculture ties. (FMPRC)

   7. The Uruguayan foreign minister was told by Wang Yi that “Uruguay is an engine of peace and a stabilizing factor in Latin America.” The two also discussed broader UN issues.

2. Partially in response to U.S. concerns, the Argentine central bank announced that it has significantly reduced its liabilities under its currency swap agreement with China. Activated funds are down to $675 million, a reduction from $5 billion in 2023. However, the country’s central bank officials claimed that they were in talks to extend the swap line for another three years beyond its August 2026 expiration.

   1. Still, broader commercial ties remain close: President Milei approved in mid-May a series of investment incentives for a $1.2 billion Ganfeng-led mining project in Jujuy.

   2. For context, the U.S. Treasury Department provided a currency swap to support Argentina’s economy last fall. At the time, it hinted that it provided this support to combat Chinese influence in the country. While the Trump administration may be successful at reducing Beijing’s economic leverage over Buenos Aires, the Argentine Central Bank’s decision to renegotiate the swap for another three years and the Milei administration’s granting of investment incentives to a Chinese company shows the limits to the Trump administration’s ability to end the longstanding Sino-Argentine economic partnership.

3. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi traveled to Ottawa for the first time in a decade to meet with Prime Minister Carney and Foreign Minister Anand. During the visit, Wang suggested that trade between Canada and China could double by 2030. Aside from trade, the two sides also reportedly discussed “consular issues, foreign interference, forced labor and human rights.” (FMPRC)

   1. Building on Prime Minister Carney’s historic visit to Beijing earlier this year, Wang Yi’s travel to Ottawa demonstrates how much Sino-Canadian relations have improved since the nadir of the Trudeau government.

   2. Looking forward to the second half of 2026, it will be important to watch whether President Xi decides to add a stopover through Canada on his planned September and December travel to the United States. A visit to Canada would further cement the improved Sino-Canadian relationship.

4. Paraguayan President Peña concluded his first trip to Taiwan by signing agreements on information security and smart technology, digital governance, and judicial cooperation. Taiwanese and Paraguayan authorities also agreedto professional education exchanges for banking executives, and the two countries’ business associations deepenedtrade and investment ties. As per usual, the Chinese government condemned the trip by calling the South American delegation “pawns of Taiwan’s independence forces.”

   1. This visit further cements the Taiwanese-Paraguayan relationship, at least through the end of President Peña’s term in office. Given the closeness of the relationship under the ruling Colorado Party, it is highly unlikely that Asunción pursues diplomatic relations with Beijing in the near future.

   2. It is notable that despite Paraguay’s economy’s traditional dependence on agriculture, the government is successfully leveraging its relationship with Taiwan to improve its technology sector.

5. The Honduran foreign minister told news outlets in mid-May that his government was still analyzing whether to flip diplomatic ties to Taiwan. The remarks came right before the country’s congress passed a law on “supervising and regulating businesses of Chinese origin that operate in Honduras.” The former foreign minister from the Castro government accused the Asfura administration of “freezing” relations with China.

   1. The Asfura administration is in a difficult spot at the moment: while Asfura promised to flip ties, a diplomatic change from Beijing back to Taipei could have economic consequences. Still, the recent congressional action on Chinese-origin businesses shows how controversial the diplomatic change remains.

6. In the face of Trump administration pressure, China reiterated its support for Cuba by donating 15,600 tons of rice and reaffirming ties during a foreign ministers meeting in New York. The Chinese foreign ministry also denouncedthe U.S. indictment of former Cuban leader Castro. Still, the U.S. government alleged that “China and Russia have in recent years expanded their intelligence operations in Cuba.”

   1. Despite their status as fellow Communist-ruled regimes, the Sino-Cuban relationship has been fraught since the Sino-Soviet split. In recent years, this frustration has shifted from ideological disagreements to frustration that Cuba has not sufficiently reformed its economy.

   2. However, the Chinese government has offered rhetorical and humanitarian assistance to the Cubans in recent years, and Chinese companies, including energy and telecom firms, operate in the country. U.S. secondary sanctions against these companies could threaten their global operations.

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Longer thoughts

The Shape of China’s LAC Foreign Policy: The Foreign Ministry

Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s (王毅) recent meetings with his Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) counterparts on the sidelines of the UN are a reminder that while numerous Chinese actors work across the hemisphere, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is at the heart of implementing Beijing’s foreign policy. To better understand MOFA’s presence, I thought it would be helpful to map out who actually is in charge of LAC policy in the ministry.

MOFA’s position in China’s foreign policy landscape

Unlike in other countries, the Chinese foreign ministry is a relatively weak state institution, as it is focused on implementing, rather than designing, China’s foreign policy. Most major foreign policy decisions are decided by the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Central Foreign Affairs Commission,1 relegating MOFA to the implementation space.

MOFA’s relatively weak position can also be attributed to its numerous competitors in the foreign policy space: aside from the usual suspects like the commerce ministry and the military, Chinese foreign policy implementation actors include the CCP’s International Liaison Department, numerous provincial and local governments, and the party’s United Front Work Department (not to mention the countless Chinese state-owned and private companies operating across the region).

That said, MOFA still plays several important roles in Chinese foreign policy. First, it uniquely runs regular press conferences that communicate the CCP’s thinking on day-to-day foreign policy issues. And like most foreign ministries, MOFA manages the PRC’s embassies and consulates throughout the region, allowing it to take the lead in hosting most in-country meetings and maintaining relationships with local officials and civil society.

The Senior Leadership

MOFA is led by Wang Yi, who has served in the role (minus a six-month break) since 2013. He is arguably one of the most powerful foreign ministers in recent decades due to his longevity and concurrent position as Director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission.

As this past month’s meetings at the United Nations show, Wang occasionally engages on LAC issues and meets with his LAC counterparts. That said, he rarely travels to the region and is clearly more preoccupied with more pressing regions and issues.

Vice Ministers

Below Wang, MOFA is led by a Secretary, an Executive Vice Minister, two Vice Ministers, and four Assistant Vice Ministers. Given its relatively marginal status in China’s foreign relations, MOFA lacks a dedicated Vice or Assistant Minister exclusively for LAC affairs.

Two of the three leading officials under Wang Yi have had at least some Western Hemisphere exposure. Publicly at least, Executive Vice Minister Ma Zhaoxu (马朝旭) has stepped back from his previous engagement with Latin America, though he has engaged quite extensively on Canadian relations over the past year with five major meetings since 2025. Vice Minister Hua Chunying (华春莹) has also had limited engagement with LAC, having engaged with a multi-party delegation from Mexico, hosted a group of young Latin American scholars, and met with Uruguay’s Deputy Foreign Minister. However, the vast majority of their public meetings over the past couple of years have been on other geographies, suggesting LAC is not one of their core concerns.

By contrast, the other Vice Foreign Minister Miao Deyu (苗得雨) appears to almost exclusively work on Africa and Middle East issues and has not publicly engaged with the region so far this year. This is particularly notable since he previously engaged quite extensively on Latin America (meeting with the Peruvian, Cuban, and Brazilian ambassadors in 2025) when he was formerly in an Assistant Minister role.

Assistant Ministers

Of the Assistant Ministers, only Cai Wei (蔡伟) and Hong Lei (洪磊) are publicly engaged on LAC issues, but Cai seems to have the lead responsibility on Latin America and the Caribbean. This makes sense given his background, as his Baidu page reports that he served at least three tours through MOFA’s LAC department, including as the unit’s Director-General.2

Why do I think Cai is among the most important regular MOFA official on LAC issues under Wang? Well, aside from his prior LAC experience, Cai was the official who led the press conference when MOFA released its third white paper on the region in late 2025, and in the past nine months he’s met with officials from Jamaica, Argentina, Suriname, Brazil, and Chile. Further signaling his LAC expertise, Cai also was the MOFA official who met with the head of the Russian foreign ministry’s Latin America and Caribbean Department when the Russian diplomat visited Beijing this past March.

Compared to Cai, Hong’s engagement with LAC appears to be more minor and ceremonial. Hong also serves as the head of protocol, where he is responsible for accepting new ambassadors. Hence, he met with the recently arrived Uruguayan,Peruvian, and Surinamese ambassadors. Still, he is likely a familiar face for the LAC diplomatic community in Beijing.

LAC-focused MOFA officials

Outside of the Vice and Assistant Foreign Ministers, MOFA also has Special Representatives — according to Baidu, these officials “enjoy the treatment as the highest leader of the government or the organization” on their particular issue. Since 2015, the MOFA has had a Special Representative lead the government’s work on LAC affairs, and since 2021 the role has been filled by former ambassador to Brazil and Mexico Qiu Xiaoqi (邱小琪).

With his lengthy experience and relatively high rank in the CCP (he’s been a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference), Qiu is possibly the most visible member of the PRC’s foreign policy in the region. Aside from his recent regional visits highlighted above, Qiu attends LAC-related events around the PRC, most memorably visiting Venezuela the weekend that Nicolas Maduro was removed from Caracas by the U.S. military. Other examples of his work include meeting with the LAC diplomatic corps in Beijing and attending the opening ceremony of the China-Latin America Sustainable Food Innovation Forum.

Working under Qiu, much of the day-to-day management of MOFA’s LAC policy in Beijing falls in the hands of the Director-General (DG) of the Latin America and Caribbean Department, former Ambassador to Mexico Zhang Run (张润). In his 30-year career, Zhang has almost exclusively focused on LAC policy, having served in Venezuela, Chile, and Argentina. He also had three stints in MOFA’s LAC department.

Zhang started the role less than a year ago but is already a fairly active force in China-LAC affairs. Most recently, he’s celebrated long-standing diplomatic relations with Guyana, called for new direct flights to Latin America, and traveled to Cuba.

Underneath Zhang, the LAC affairs department has three Deputy Director-Generals: Chen Xiaoling (陈晓玲),3 Tang Lingyun (唐凌云), and Sun Yi (孙怡). None of these officials are senior enough yet to have served as ambassadors in the region, but they all certainly have Spanish or Portuguese language skills and LAC-related experience: Chen worked as a deputy consul-general in Brazil, Tang served in Barcelona and was an alternate observer to the OAS, and Sun was a counselor at the embassy in Buenos Aires.

It’s a bit of a black box on who serves under the Deputy DGs, though prior research has suggested that each of the Deputy DGs manage a couple of divisions. In turn, each of these divisions has 4-6 desk officers working on a particular issue or country.

The Roundup

Politics and Security

• Following the trip to New York and Canada, Wang took part in the fifth China-Brazil Foreign Ministerial-Level Comprehensive Strategic Dialogue with Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira in Beijing, where the two reviewed multilateral cooperation and the political outlook for the bilateral relationship. (FMPRC)

• The Chinese ambassador to Panama held a press conference where she affirmed support for the neutrality of the Panama Canal, expressed confidence that the two countries will eventually agree to an FTA, and stated that her government would “not allow” Taiwan to establish an unofficial diplomatic mission (via a trade office) in Panama City.

• A delegation from Shaanxi province led by Xianyang Deputy Mayor Wang Hongbing traveled to Azcapotzalco, Mexico to discuss political, economic, and cultural exchanges.

• The Nicaraguan capital city of Managua signed a sister city agreement with Chengdu.

• The Chinese and Surinamese presidents exchanged words of congratulations on the 50^th anniversary of relations. (China Daily) The Caribbean president later gave an interview to Xinhua about the importance of Sino-Surinamese relations.

• The Venezuelan government issued a statement upholding its adherence to the One China Principle.

Investment, Finance, and Infrastructure

• China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) won a $115 million tender to build section 1A of the Fifth Bridge in Guayaquil, Ecuador.

• Jamaican mining minister Green traveled to China to meet with executives from Jiuquan Iron and Steel Company (JISCO) to discuss reopening the Alpart bauxite plant in St. Elizabeth.

• During a visit to Guyana, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Jacob Helberg reportedly suggested that the United States was seeking to compete with Chinese companies in the country’s bauxite sector.

• Suriname’s President Jennifer Geerlings-Simons attended an unveiling ceremony for the Power China-constructed Villages Micro-grid Solar Project Phase II.

• Despite the recent change in government, the Chinese ambassador to Bolivia, Wang Liang, suggested that Chinese businesses are still interested in investing in Bolivia but are first evaluating the country’s reforms before making investment decisions.

• The massive and controversial Chinese infrastructure-building company CHEC opened an office in Chile.

• The Chinese-funded and built National Stadium in El Salvador is reportedly 50% complete.

• Two unnamed Chinese companies are reportedly looking at building a new $300 million bridge between Argentinaand Uruguay.

Technology

• Brazilian Minister of Communications Frederico de Siqueira Filho traveled to Beijing for negotiations with Chinese companies like ZTE and SpaceSail over investments in data centers, artificial intelligence, satellite connectivity, and 5G expansion.

• The Mexican Institute of Water Technology (IMTA) signed an MOU with the Chinese Institute of Research on Water Resources and Hydroelectric Energy (IWHR) on research, innovation and technological development related to water.

Trade

• The Panamanian president suggested that Beijing and Panama City would be able to renew a maritime agreement that “gives advantages to the Panamanian fleet in” China.

• Nicaragua further officially lowered tariffs on Chinese goods in accordance with the two countries’ Free Trade Agreement. (CGTN)

• The Bolivia-China Friendship Association and the Chinese Business Chamber in Bolivia hosted a trade cooperation forum in Tarija.

• Chinese and Peruvian officials met to discuss the pending ratification of the two countries’ updated FTA.

• A meat industry delegation led by the Uruguayan Undersecretary of the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture and Fisheries met with the Chinese General Administration of Customs to regain access to the PRC market.

• A dozen Chinese-owned retail stores in the Dominican Republic that employ about 2,000-3,000 workers have been forced to shut down due to unusual extended government investigations and “increasingly strict official regulations.

• The Chinese ambassador to Quito visited Guayaquil to discuss the benefits of the China-Ecuador FTA with executives from aquaculture and banana businesses.

Taiwan

• Canadian Conservative MP Michael Chong traveled to Taiwan, prompting a diplomatic backlash from Beijing. Later, Liberal Party MP Judy Sgro announced that she is planning to lead a delegation to Taiwan this fall.

• Ten of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, including Belize, Guatemala, Haiti, Paraguay, St. Vincent, St. Kitts, and St. Lucia expressed support for Taiwan rejoining the World Health Assembly.

• Taiwanese Control Yuan President Lee Hung-chun met with a delegation from the Guatemalan Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office to discuss regional and international human rights collaboration.

• The St. Vincent Ministry of Agriculture and the local Taiwan Technical Mission launched the “Agricultural Productivity Recovery and Young Farmers’ Training Project.”

• U.S. and Taiwanese diplomats jointly hosted a Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) cybersecurity conference in Belize. Additionally, the $4.4 million Taiwan-funded road improvements to the Corozal–Sarteneja Road are reportedly underway.

• Taiwan plans to donate two electric buses to St. Kitts and Nevis. The Taiwanese government also handed overunspecified “project equipment” from the Women’s Employment, Entrepreneurship and Financial Inclusion (WEEFI) project. Meanwhile, the North American Taiwanese Medical Association (NATMA) visited Nevis for a medical mission and the Taiwan Technical Mission (TTM) held a workshop on papaya cultivation.

Culture and society

• Uruguay announced it will give visa exemptions to Chinese passport holders. The move comes as a response to the Chinese government giving Uruguayan citizens visa-free access in 2025. (Xinhua)

• The Coordination of Integration of Peasant Economic Organizations of Bolivia (CIOEC Bolivia) and the Chinese pharmaceutical company Jilin Tiansanqi Pharmaceutical Company signed an agreement on traditional herbal medicine cooperation.

• The University of Shandong, the Mexican National Institute of Anthropology and History, and the China-Mexico Cultural Development Foundation signed an agreement to create the China-Mexico Archaeological Research Center.

• Colombia received a computer equipment donation and signed an agreement seeking to explore a new solar project for vulnerable communities. The University of Antioquia also signed agreements with the Agricultural University of Southern China on research exchanges and a new agro-industrial technology and innovation center.

• The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Institute of Latin America hosted a dialogue on “civilization and governance.”

• In an effort to generate goodwill, the Chinese Embassy in Panama donated soccer uniforms, televisions, and laptops to the National Athletic Sports Society Football Club of the National Police of Panama. (Xinhua)

Analysis and opinion

• Brian Fonseca finds in Foreign Policy that “the U.S. can’t exclude China from Latin America” and instead suggests offering “countries better strategic alternatives.”

• An Evan Ellis article in The Diplomat discusses how “Chinese activities in Bolivia have deteriorated remarkably from their heyday under the populist leftist governments,” while a response article by Gustavo Nakamuro in UPI argues that “Bolivia’s troubled path with China is therefore not only a warning about Beijing’s methods. It is a warning about the fragility of states that lack the institutional strength to manage powerful outside actors.”

• Writing in Infobae, Jessica Garcia argues that “the strengthening of the relationship between China and Nicaragua shows an authoritarian convergence based on the transfer of security capacities and alignment of regulatory frameworks, accelerating the consolidation of opaque and restrictive political models.” Relatedly, Ralph Jennings reports in the SCMP that “Nicaragua could be shaping up as the next economic battleground between the two powers.”

• A piece by Rob Pierce in the National Interest on illegal Chinese fishing in the Western Hemisphere suggests that the U.S. Coast Guard should “expand joint training and targeted patrols with at-risk partners... conduct Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) operations... and enhance maritime domain awareness.

• Carlos Ruiz-Hernandez wrote for Americas Quarterly that in the context of U.S.-China rivalry, “a coherent foreign policy and a long-term strategy for the [Panamanian] Canal are necessary in times of geopolitical change.”d

• The Trinidad and Tobago Guardian published an op-ed by Mariano Browne that argued that China can provide an alternative to the United States in the Caribbean.

• Discussing the proposed trans-oceanic railroad from Brazil to Peru, Leslie Moreno Custodio and Jorge Carrascoraise concerns in Dialogue Earth about the environmental costs of the project. Also in Dialogue Earth, John Bartlett wrote about the U.S.-Chinese lithium race in Chile.

• Leila Miller and Farah Master wrote a long-form story for Reuters on how China’s fishing fleet is raising concerns about overfishing in Argentina’s fisheries.

• The Caracas Chronicles has a new piece by Andrés R. Bermúdez García that argues that the elite extraction model in Venezuela has hurt both Chinese and U.S. investment opportunities.

The Top Six Stories:

1. Paraguayan President Santiago Peña traveled to Taiwan to meet with President Lai for his first visit to Taipei as president. He announced a new Taiwan-sponsored artificial intelligence “center” in Paraguay and brought a business delegation of agriculture and finance executives on the trip. Peña reaffirmed relations with Taiwan and reportedly urged his Honduran counterpart to re-establish official ties with Taipei just before leaving for Asia. Following the trip, Beijing once again urged Paraguay to suspend diplomatic ties with Taipei.

   1. As Taiwan’s last remaining diplomatic partner in South America (and one of its largest by population and territory), Paraguay has long taken on particular importance for Taiwan’s foreign relations.

   2. Although the ruling Colorado party has been steadfast in supporting formal relations with Taipei, some in Paraguay (particularly the country’s ranching and soybean industries) have advocated for flipping recognition to Beijing to grow the country’s export and investment opportunities. Peña’s decision to bring a business delegation and announce a new AI center reflects how the two countries prioritize commercial ties to help justify the bilateral relationship.

2. New data from the Brazil-China Business Council (CEBC) found that Brazil was the leading global recipient of Chinese foreign investment (surpassing the United States and Guyana). Brazil received about 10% of China’s foreign investment in 2025, or about $6.1 billion. This was a 45% increase from 2024, and was especially centered in the mining and clean energy sectors.

   1. As the largest economy in the region, Brazil has long had a prominent place in Chinese regional engagement. These statistics reinforce the idea that as the PRC seeks to diversify its economy away from the United States and its allies, Brazil remains an essential market for PRC firms.

3. The Trump administration expanded the U.S. sanctions regime against Cuba to target foreign banks and firms that do business on the island, which could affect Chinese firms operating on the island. In response, the Chinese foreign ministry claimed the new policy was “illegal.”

   1. Despite their status as fellow Communist-ruled regimes, the Sino-Cuban relationship has been fraught since the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s. In recent years, this frustration has shifted from ideological disagreements to Chinese frustration that Cuba has not sufficiently reformed its economy. Still, the Chinese government has offered rhetorical and humanitarian assistance to the Cubans in recent years, and Chinese companies, including energy and telecom firms, operate in the country. U.S. secondary sanctions against these companies could threaten their global operations.

4. A recent New York Times feature looked at how U.S.-China competition has affected research projects, as well as possible military installations, in Argentina and Chile. In particular, the story explores how U.S. diplomacy in the Biden and Trump administrations has delayed or paused Chinese projects in the region.

   1. The story is notable both for its tracing of bipartisan U.S. resistance to the projects in both the Biden and Trump administrations, as well as the low-level diplomatic pressure Washington exerted through seemingly unrelated bilateral agreements and training exchange programs.

5. As Mat Youkee covers in his excellent The Sulaco Times newsletter, Chinese/Singaporean company Sinolam filed on April 30 an arbitration case against the American company AES over a Panamanian LNG plant. The case was recently filed in a Virginia court in late April, and it involves high-level political intrigue fit for a spy novel.

   1. Mat suggests that the case supports the contention that “Chinese investments were on the back foot as early as March 2020” and that “If the Chinese state firms and the Panamanian government are in some form of Mexican stand-off, it makes sense that it’s private companies trying to recoup their losses, rather than further Beijing’s policy preferences, that are doing the early suing.”

6. Zijin Mining Group announced it will invest $1.5 billion in copper and gold mining in the La Arena mine in northern Peru. The company also suggested that it is looking at investing up to $7.5 billion more broadly across the country despite Peru’s delicate political situation.

   1. Zijin has been a major presence in Peru’s mining sector for nearly two decades; the company purchased the Rio Blanco copper mine for $1.7 billion back in 2007.

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Longer thoughts

Missing from Trump’s China Trip: Latin America and the Caribbean

President Trump visited Beijing this week, marking the first time a U.S. President has visited China in nearly a decade. A lot of the attention will go to perennial issues like Taiwan, trade, and investment, but one notable topic won’t be on the agenda: China’s presence in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Historically, this wouldn’t have been notable. Prior U.S. administrations, including the Biden and Trump I administrations, had concerns about China’s presence in the Western Hemisphere, but no prior administration made the issue a foreign policy priority. Rather, other issues like the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, and Korean Peninsula were placed at the top of the U.S.-China talking points.

Unlike previous administrations, Trump II has at least claimed to put China-LAC issues among its top foreign policy priorities. It was physically listed at the top of the administration’s geographic priorities in the National Security Strategy, and it was memorably referenced in Trump’s inaugural address. His administration has also taken unprecedented actions to address China’s role in the hemisphere, such as imposing visa bans on Latin American officials who work closely with China and restricting China’s future economic presence via reciprocal trade agreements.

Given the rhetorical weight the administration has given to the issue, it’s at least a bit strange that the issue hasn’t been raised during Trump’s current trip. It’s not that China’s global presence doesn’t come up in leader-to-leader talks – even on the most recent visit, the Chinese Foreign Ministry reported that Trump and Xi discussed the Middle East, Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the Korean Peninsula. But for whatever reason, the issue doesn’t appear to have made the main agenda.1

There could be a number of reasons for LAC’s absence from the Trump-Xi talks, but the only clear takeaway is that while China-LAC relations might be a priority for the Trump administration in its foreign policy towards LAC, China-LAC relations rank relatively low on the U.S. engagement agenda with China itself. In other words, the Trump administration seems to view China-LAC as an issue to be dealt with by the Latin Americans, rather than the Chinese.

All that being said, I do have a few speculative theories on why:

1. The Chinese side does not have a lot of reasons to bring up the topic: they know it’s a point of contention with Washington, and there are few areas where the Trump administration would be willing to collaborate with the PRC in the region.

2. There are also much bigger fish for the Chinese to fry – Taiwan is a core interest, the Korean Peninsula is closer to home, and regions like Europe and the Middle East are dramatically more economically and politically significant for Beijing than LAC.

3. The Trump administration, at least for now, doesn’t see anything to gain from engaging with the Chinese leadership on LAC issues. They want the PRC out of specific projects and industries, but the issue is something that can be accomplished via low-level commercial and diplomatic competition. This contrasts with the managed agreements seen in other regions, such as the one Trump claims he struck to keep China from selling arms to Iran in the Middle East.

The Roundup

Politics and Security

• Panamanian President Mulino suggested that his government still maintains positive bilateral ties with China despite tensions over the ports previously operated by CK Hutchison. He suggested that issue will be solved in international arbitration. However, a week later the foreign minister told a delegation headed to China to “defend the country’s sovereignty.”

• Former Ecuadorian President Lenin Moreno returned to the country to face trial in the Sinohydro corruption scandal, for which he denied any responsibility.

• Despite the cooling of Sino-Venezuelan ties after Delcy Rodriguez took power in Venezuela, the Chinese foreign ministry reiterated its support for the country, noting that “China, as always, supports Venezuela in safeguarding its sovereignty, dignity and lawful rights.”

• A delegation of the ruling Nicaraguan Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) party traveled to Hebei, China for political and cultural exchanges.

• The PRC sent China International Development Cooperation Agency Chairman Chen Xiaodong to represent the country at Costa Rican President Laura Fernandez’s inauguration. (Xinhua)

• The Chinese government congratulated Antigua and Barbuda Prime Minister Browne on his re-election.

• A staff member for the U.S. House Select Committee on the CCP was reportedly offered over $10,000 for information related to U.S. policy towards Venezuela by a Chinese intelligence service.

Investment, Finance, and Infrastructure

• The Nicaraguan energy ministry purchased lithium batteries from Huawei to store up to 30MW of electricity to better respond to blackouts.

• The mayor of the Argentine city of Merlo met with executives from Anhui Conch Cement, one of the largest cement companies in China, to discuss possibly building a logistics center.

• Guyana Power and Light (GPL) threatened legal action against China Railway First Group if the company does not pay $140,000. China Railway caused $140,000 in losses when a construction team working on a local road caused a four-hour outage.

• A delegation from Guangdong traveled to Monterrey in Mexico to discuss investment opportunities in the city.

• U.S. officials have reportedly expressed concern about Chinese firm CMOC’s $1.7 billion investment in the Ecuadorian Cangrejos gold mine.

• The Chinese ambassador and representatives from CRRC met with a Chilean legislator to discuss the Talca-Chillán road project.

Trade and Technology

• Chinese EV manufacturer Geely exported its first cargo of Lotus EVs to Canada under the two countries’ new trade deal.

• A Colombian printed materials trade association held a trade fair and dialogue with the Chinese embassy, where the Colombian trade ministry signed a framework agreement on strategic cooperation in the sector.

• Signaling Brazil’s growing importance in China’s soybean trade, Chinese SOE COFCO announced it would double its processing capacity at its soybean processing facility in Rondonópolis.

Taiwan

• China’s ambassador to Ottawa threatened that the two countries’ relationship could be damaged if Canada sends more warships to transit through the Taiwan Strait.

• Honduran President Asfura again suggested in an interview that his administration is reviewing ties with China and considering a pivot to recognize Taipei. The Chinese foreign ministry pushed back against this claim. (Global Times)

• The Taiwanese foreign minister told the Guatemalan public finance minister that the Lai government is planning more joint collaboration programs with Washington in Central America.

• Taiwan donated two electric school buses to the St. Kitts education ministry.

• A traveling Taiwanese naval squadron passed through Puerto Quetzal, Guatemala as part of a wider trip to the region.

• The joint St. Lucia-Taiwan Community Business Revitalization Project officially launched in Babonneau.

Culture and society

• Chinese ambassador to Mexico Chen Daojing requested that Mexico speed up visa approvals for Chinese citizens.

• The Vice Mayor of the Haikou municipal government traveled to Vancouver, Canada for a tourism and culture symposium.

• Following through on a rumored policy change, the Brazilian government announced it would allow 30-day visa-free access for Chinese nationals. (Global Times)

Analysis and opinion

• Santiago Despolo suggests in El Pais that “faced with competition between China and the United States, Latin America can transform its geological advantage into a strategic advantage if it prioritizes institutionalism, added value and social and environmental protection”

• Writing for the Latin America Brief in Foreign Policy, Catherine Osborn explored how China is transforming Brazil’s car market.

• Henry Ziemer and Ryan Berg at CSIS considered whether “closer Russia-China coordination might be able to challenge U.S. security interests in LAC” through a novel tabletop exercise.

• An op-ed in Ecuadorian newspaper El Comercio argues that the country has yet to fully take advantage of the FTA with China on its two-year anniversary.

The Top Five Stories:

1. A Chinese Communist Party mouthpiece suggested that recent coercive economic actions against Panama, as well as demands on MSC and Maersk to drop their port operations in the country, are the first cases of China employing its new supply chain and extraterritorial jurisdiction regulations (discussed more below). In response to China’s recent actions, the governments of Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guyana, Paraguay, and Trinidad and Tobago joined a statement issued by the U.S. State Department noting that they are “monitoring with vigilance China’s targeted economic pressure and the recent actions that have affected Panama-flagged vessels.”

   1. Notably Honduras did not join this statement, despite the fact that the Honduran government issued a statement in early April expressing support for Panama.

   2. Sino-Panamanian tensions stem from U.S. concerns about two ports near the Panama Canal that had been previously operated by CK Hutchison, a Hong Kong company with close ties to the CCP. Earlier this year, the Panama Supreme Court ruled that CK Hutchison’s operation of the ports was illegal, prompting the Panamanian government to temporarily hand over the ports’ contracts to MSC and Maersk.

2. Brazil’s top labor inspection official, Luiz Felipe Brandão de Mello, was fired after he placed Chinese EV manufacturer BYD on a national registry of companies accused of subjecting their workers to slave labor. Days earlier, a labor court temporarily suspended the decision while the court weighed whether BYD should be held responsible for its contractor’s actions. At the same time, Panama’s labor ministry is investigating China Harbour Engineering Company Ltd. (CHEC) and China Communications Construction Company Ltd. (CCCC) for the alleged breach of labor regulations for the construction of the fourth Panama Canal bridge.

   1. Previously, the Chinese contractor building a BYD plant in Brazil was shut down by Brazilian authorities in late 2024 over forced labor allegations. The government later sued BYD and two of its contractors for “slave-like conditions” at the facility.

   2. Chinese companies have long been accused of violating local labor laws, such as workers illegally overstaying their visas in Jamaica or China State Construction Engineering Corporation violating local labor standards while building highways in Bolivia. Not every Chinese firm violates local labor laws, but these cases will likely anecdotally support a broader narrative about Chinese labor practices in the region.

3. Despite his close ties to President Trump, Ecuadorian President Noboa announced that he will officially travel to China for the second time. He noted that “we have to continue trading with everyone. We cannot deny that we have a good commercial relationship with China.” The visit is likely to occur in August, though Noboa has not confirmed whether he will meet with President Xi on the trip.

   1. Noboa made his most recent trip to China last year in June to commemorate 45 years of diplomatic relations. This trip is pretty unusual, as it is rare for an Ecuadorian president – or any Latin American leader for that matter – to return to China so quickly after a recent trip.

4. Vice Minister of the Chinese Communist Party’s International Department, Ma Hui, traveled to Argentina to meet with Chamber of Deputies members. The two sides discussed the importance of political exchanges and commercial cooperation in fields like agribusiness, energy, and mining. The Shandong Women’s Federation also visited the South American country to discuss social and commercial matters.

   1. Ma Hui is one of five vice ministers in the CCP’s International Department (which is separate from the PRC’s foreign ministry). Though he is not publicly responsible for Latin America and the Caribbean, he travels to the region and meets with LAC delegations the most of any ID leader. Recent examples include engagements with Bolivia, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru.

5. Two major Chinese mining investments made progress this month in Latin America. First, Chinese firm CMOC signed a $1.7 billion mining agreement to operate the El Cangrejos gold mine in Ecuador’s El Oro province, which has nearly 400 tons of proven gold reserves. Under the terms of the agreement, Ecuador will hold a 50% share of the project’s value and receive advance royalties of $54 million. Second, The Nicaraguan government granted yet another mining concession to a Chinese company, this time to Nicaragua Xiajing Minería Group S.A. for a 14,296 hectares concession in the Autonomous Region of the North Caribbean Coast.

   1. Both countries have vastly different relationships with the United States: Ecuador’s president has tried to ingratiate himself with the Trump administration, while the Ortega regime in Nicaragua finds itself under an increasingly strict sanctions regime. Still, both projects show that despite the Trump administration’s desire to reassert its economic and political dominance in the region, Chinese companies remain attractive partners for Latin American governments in sensitive mining projects.

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Longer thoughts

China’s New Economic Security Decrees Create New Risks for Latin American and Caribbean Businesses

In mid-April, the Chinese State Council issued two major new economic security regulations that detail Beijing’s retaliation plans against foreign economic measures like sanctions, export controls, and other trade barriers. The two regulations, Decree 835 on Countering Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction by Foreign States and Decree 834 on Industrial and Supply Chain Security, combine existing economic security regulations with new rules and institutions to systematize and expand China’s economic security toolkit.

The decrees came into immediate effect after they were published. While both documents are broad policy outlines that will require additional implementing guidelines, they are both still notable because they don’t just apply to foreign governments. Rather, the decrees also apply to companies, organizations, and governments that comply, or even conduct due diligence to comply, with a third jurisdictions’ (such as U.S.) controls.

Over the past couple of weeks, these regulations have been widely framed as a tool to address “decoupling” by the United States and its allies, but the measures are likely to have an outsized impact on Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).

Three factors for why Latin America and the Caribbean is uniquely at risk

Companies and governments across the world are at face new risks due to these two regulations, but Latin American and Caribbean governments and companies will be especially vulnerable due to three factors:

1. The Trump administration’s renewed focus on LAC: For the first time in decades, the Western Hemisphere is at the heart of Washington’s foreign policy. The Trump administration placed LAC at the top of its National Security Strategy, and the president’s most important foreign policy advisor, Secretary Rubio, is a long-standing Latin America expert. With a stronger focus on the hemisphere and an explicit goal to compete with China, LAC is already facing unprecedented pressure from the United States to pivot away from the PRC.

2. LAC’s China dependencies: China is the most important trading partner for roughly half of Latin America and the Caribbean, with LAC exports often tied to sensitive exports like minerals and agricultural products. And even for countries where China is not the most important trading partner, Chinese banks, companies, and government institutions have invested and financed billions of dollars across the region. While these commercial ties provide economic opportunity across the region, they also create vulnerabilities to Chinese economic coercion.

3. LAC’s U.S. dependencies: Although China is a major economic partner for the region, the United States remains a critical market for LAC, meaning that both LAC companies and foreign companies operating in LAC are often required to comply with U.S. economic security regulations. The United States is the single largest investor in LAC, accounting for nearly 40% of its foreign direct investment. The U.S. dollar is notably used as currency in countries like El Salvador, Panama, and Ecuador. And as the largest economy in the world, the United States is also a major export destination. Even for countries like Brazil where China is the largest trading partner, the United States is often closely behind as the second most important trade destination.

Four possible risk scenarios

1. Compliance with U.S. controls

The two decrees specifically target foreign entities that comply with economic security measures, including those from third countries. The United States has already placed numerous export controls and sanctions Chinese persons and entities. It has also placed investment controls, technology controls, and import bans on goods made with forced labor, including goods from Xinjiang, that directly affect Chinese companies.

Like other companies around the world, Latin American and Caribbean businesses and financial institutions that do business in U.S. dollars or work closely with U.S. businesses are often subject to these controls. This in turn could make them subject to Chinese retaliation through decrees 835 and 834 simply for following U.S. laws.

2. Direct or indirect U.S. pressure on LAC governments

The United States has both directly and indirectly pressured LAC governments to restrict economic engagement with Chinese businesses in sensitive sectors, such as when Panama canceled CK Hutchison’s port operations or when Costa Rica banned Huawei from its 5G networks.

The Trump administration explicitly stated in the National Security Strategy that it plans to increasingly compete with China’s presence in the hemisphere. This will likely involve pressuring LAC governments away from deep engagement with China. Moreover, provisions in the Trump administration’s signature Agreements on Reciprocal Trade explicitly call for countries to adopt stronger sanctions, export controls, and investment control regimes that could affect China.

If the Trump administration further pressures LAC governments to cancel contracts, ban Chinese technology, or impose other trade and investment controls, the decrees suggest that the Chinese government will not only retaliate against the United States; Beijing will also retaliate against LAC companies that comply.

3. Independent actions by LAC governments

Despite Washington’s prominent role in the region, LAC governments frequently impose economic restrictions on their own accord. Recent examples include Colombia tariffing Chinese steel or Bolivia canceling a zinc project due to cost overruns.

If these type of economic security actions are deemed to disrupt supply chain security or improperly extend foreign jurisdiction on Chinese companies, the decrees make clear that the Chinese government will consider retaliating. These in turn could immediately create enormous costs for businesses that comply with the LAC country’s regulations.

4. Spillover from other affected countries and companies

Even companies operating outside of countries that impose restrictions on Chinese commerce are at risk due to the new State Council decrees. For example, when the Chinese government recently retaliated against Panama by surging the number of detentions of Panamanian-flagged vessels, non-Panamanian companies with goods stuck onboard the Panamanian-flagged vessels likely faced supply chain delays and disruptions when the cargo did not arrive at their destinations on time.

Even though interregional trade in LAC is fairly weak, global supply chain and capital markets disruptions both inside and outside of the Western Hemisphere due to Chinese retaliation could reverberate downstream to companies in countries that did not impose any restrictions in the first place.

Overflight routes: a new front in China-Taiwan competition

Earlier this month, Taiwanese President Lai was blocked from traveling to Taiwan’s only diplomatic partner in Africa, Eswatini, when three African countries banned Lai’s plane from flying through their airspace. The Chinese government officially denied that it played a role in the event, but the Taiwanese government suggested that Beijing economically coerced the countries into revoking their overflight privileges.

Although the Taiwanese president has generally been unable to travel to non-diplomatic partners (aside from the United States) for decades, this appears to be the first time that China pressured a non-diplomatic partner into banning a Taiwanese president from flying through its airspace.

This precedent could create new problems for Taiwan in Latin America and the Caribbean. In particular, future trips by Taiwanese presidents (as well as vice presidents, foreign ministers, or legislative yuan speakers) to land-locked Paraguay could be imperiled, as Beijing could try to pressure Brazil, Bolivia, or Argentina into prohibiting a Taiwanese official’s plane from flying through their airspace.

The Roundup

Politics and Security

• The U.S. and Chinese embassies in Argentina got into a public dispute after the U.S. ambassador said that Washington had been “sleeping” on Beijing’s growing influence in Latin America. In response, a Chinese embassy spokesman claimed that the ambassador had “attacked and deliberately defamed the cooperation between China and Argentina.”

• The Mexican city of Guanajuato signed a sister city agreement with Guilin focused on tourism, culture, and institutional exchange.

• A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman voiced support for Cuba in the face of economic and diplomatic pressure from the United States.

• China’s ambassador to Suriname met with the police commissioner of the Police Force Suriname (KPS) to discuss protecting the local Chinese community and broader bilateral security cooperation.

• Chilean National Prosecutor Ángel Valencia attended the International Association of Prosecutors (IAP) executive committee meeting in Shanghai. While in Shanghai, he held “a series of bilateral meetings with Chinese authorities of the criminal prosecution system with the aim of strengthening coordination in the fight against organized crime, drug trafficking, fraud and illicit finances.”

Investment, Finance, and Infrastructure

• Chinese heavy machinery manufacturer Sany Group announced it will build a new factory in Campinas, Brazil.

• A group of Chinese geologists and executives from the Chinese company Great Wall traveled to Cuba to help local geologists explore possible hydrocarbons exploration opportunities.

• A new Chinese-financed hospital in Nassau broke ground. The Chinese ambassador to the Bahamas argued that the project was a key part of China’s Global Development Initiative (GDI). (FMPRC)

• Both the China-backed Aurora solar farm in Guyana and the Guyana-China friendship park were officially opened. (FMPRC)

Trade and Technology

• Due to the war in the Middle East, Chinese sulphuric acid exports to Chile dropped to zero for the first time in nearly three years. The chemical is essential for producing refined copper, and Chile relies on Chinese supply for more than a third of its sulphuric acid imports.

  • Meanwhile, China’s customs authorities banned imports of Chilean poultry due to the country’s bird flu outbreak.

• Brazilian President Lula da Silva said that his country does not prefer trading with either the United States or China over the other. The comments came as the Minister of Management and Innovation in Public Services Esther Dweck traveled to China and met with executives from Huawei to discuss AI collaboration.

• An American dredging company claimed that the Argentine government is favoring a Belgian company with Chinese ties for a contract for dredging the Paraná.

• Costa Rican trade minister Manuel Tovar told an interviewer that his government feels dissatisfied with its FTA with the PRC, especially because exports have been held up over bureaucracy, health protocols, and COVID.

• During his trip to Beijing, Canadian trade minister Maninder Sidhu discussed new opportunities in exporting EVs to Canada with executives from three of China’s largest automakers, namely BYD, XPeng and Guangzhou Automobile. Meanwhile, Canadian regulators announced they would allow more passenger flights to China, which are currently at about a third of their 2019 levels.

• U.S. autos manufacturer General Motors’ (GM) joint venture in China, SAIC-GM-Wuling (SGMW), is reportedly in talks to build a manufacturing plant in Mexico. This would give Chinese automakers new access to the North American market.

Taiwan

• Paraguayan media is speculating that the U.S. State Department revoked visas for legislators who traveled to China last October.

• Director-General of the Taiwanese Foreign Ministry Latin America and Caribbean Department Han Chih-cheng said that his government had been “cautiously and gradually” resuming relations with Honduras.

• Belize Ministry of Education, Culture, Science and Technology CEO Dian Maheia and University of Belize President Vincent Palacio traveled to Taipei in mid-April to discuss scholarships, tourism, and university exchanges.

• The Taiwanese navy goodwill fleet concluded its visit to the Caribbean in late April with stops through St. Vincent, St. Lucia, St. Kitts, and Belize.

• The Guatemalan and Belizean governments condemned Chinese pressure on East African countries that led to the cancellation of President Lai’s visit to Eswatini. Paraguay also issued a statement of support for President Lai.

Culture and society

• The Chinese and Peruvian governments finalized an agreement to provide a $14.6 million grant to Peru to finance social development projects. The funds will be directly supervised by the Development Bank of China and the National Bank of Peru.

• The Latin American Council of Social Sciences, Arts and Humanities (CLASCO) received a delegation of leaders from Chinese academic presses and journals led by the Deputy Editorial Director of China Social Sciences Press, Chen Biao.

• Cuba received another donation of rice from China as part of the country’s Emergency Food Assistance Project for Cuba. The Chinese General Sports Administration also donated sports equipment to the island country.

• The Chinese embassy in Antigua and Barbuda donated a set of solar power kits to the Caribbean country.

• The Antigua and Barbuda College of Advanced Sciences signed an MOU with Qingdao’s Vocational and Technical College of Hotel Management on culinary arts and tourism management cooperation.

Analysis and opinion

• Writing for the Diplomat, César Santos argues that “despite the campaign rhetoric, so far, there are no concrete signs of a rapprochement with Taiwan by Honduras’ new government.”

• Associate Professor Klaas Dykmann argues for the Global Taiwan Institute that “Taiwan should recalibrate its approach to Paraguay.”

The Top Six Stories:

1. Brazil’s labor ministry added Chinese electric vehicle manufacturer BYD to a registry of employers that have been accused of subjecting their workers to conditions analogous to slavery. The move will limit the company’s ability to receive state financing. It may also present new reputational risks for the company, which is looking to expand its market share and grow its investment presence on the continent.

   1. This designation has been a long-time coming. At the end of 2024, the Chinese contractor building a BYD plant in Brazil was shut down by Brazilian authorities over forced labor allegations. The government later sued BYD and two of its contractors for “slave-like conditions” at the facility.

   2. Still, BYD is expanding rapidly in the Brazilian market. The company sold more than 110,000 units in Brazil in 2025, and it is hoping to sell 250,000 vehicles in 2026. The company has a notable plant in Camaçari and has a dealership in every state, capital, and major city in the country.

2. Despite U.S. concerns about Chinese automakers gaining access to the North American market, PRC-based firms recently expanded their North American presence. First, GAC confirmed that it will be the first Chinese auto brand with an assembly facility in Mexico. Operations are expected to begin in the second half of 2026. Second, Stellantis is reportedly exploring manufacturing Chinese EVs in partnership with Leapmotor at its idle Brampton facility in Canada.

   1. The United States effectively banned Chinese vehicles through technology prohibitions in 2025, but Washington is highly concerned about Chinese vehicles entering the North American market for both economic and security reasons. Chinese automakers’ expansions across Mexico and Canada could create additional wrinkles in the upcoming USMCA review.

3. The governments of Honduras, Paraguay, and Costa Rica condemned Chinese authorities detaining and unnecessarily inspecting Panamanian-flagged ships in retaliation for the Panama Canal ports controversy. China’s foreign ministry denied that Beijing is unfairly targeting Panamanian ships and declared its intention to “firmly defend its rights and interests.”

   1. Washington claimed last month that the Chinese Ministry of Transport “imposed a surge in detentions of Panama‑flagged vessels in Chinese ports under the guise of port state control” in retaliation for the Panamanian government revoking a Hong Kong company’s port concessions near the Panama Canal.

   2. This is just the latest development in the ongoing competition between the United States and China over the ports near the canal. President Trump came into office last year vowing to address the Chinese presence near the waterway, namely relating to two Hong Kong company-run ports.

4. The Chinese-Nicaraguan Free Trade Commission, which is in charge of implementing and reviewing the two countries’ FTA, held its first meeting in Beijing. The two sides agreed to further eliminate customs duties in addition to the FTA’s existing tariff reductions. (CGTN)

   1. China and Nicaragua signed an FTA back in 2023 shortly after they re-established diplomatic relations in 2021. Although China is still a relatively minor export destination for Nicaraguan businesses, it is one of the fastest-growing markets, with 211% export growth from 2023 to 2024.

5. Canadian Finance Minister François-Philippe Champagne led a trade mission to the PRC to follow up on PM Carney’s trip and deepen economic ties. The two countries established a financial working group and pitchedexpanding its financial services presence in the PRC. A few days later, the country’s trade minister traveled to Hainan and Guangdong for the China International Consumer Products Expo (CICPE).

   1. Prime Minister Carney’s visit to China in early 2026 reinvigorated what had been a tense relationship under the previous Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau. These trips indicate that the Carney government’s desire to deepen its relationship with China as part of a broader strategy to diversify the country’s economy away from the United States continues despite the upcoming USMCA review.

6. On April 12, President Trump suggested that China should buy more oil from Venezuela rather than Iran. A few days earlier, China’s foreign ministry had complained that the design of U.S. “general licenses” for U.S. business engagement and oil imports from Venezuela has unfairly restricted Sino-Venezuelan cooperation. (CGTN)

   1. After the U.S. operation to capture Venezuelan President Maduro, the Trump administration suggested that it would “allow” Chinese oil companies to continue purchasing (and presumably producing) Venezuelan oil as long as their prices are not sold at the discount formerly offered by the Maduro regime.

   2. Venezuela was just a minor contributor to China’s oil consumption prior to Maduro’s removal; only about 3% of China’s total oil imports came from the country. Still, oil exports were essential for Venezuela’s debt repayment obligations.

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Comparing China’s LAC and Africa White Papers Reveals PRC Priorities

The PRC’s Foreign Ministry released its third policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean last December, giving new insight into Beijing’s regional priorities. At the time, I looked at how China’s policy priorities had changed from 2016, but comparing the policy paper to other regions like Sub-Saharan Africa can provide insight into the special considerations Chinese policymakers have for the region.

Although African countries have their own distinctive relationship with China, the continent’s China ties are often compared to Latin America and the Caribbean’s due to both regions’ developing country status and (relative) non-alignment with global alliances. Much like Latin America and the Caribbean, China has released three policy papers on engagement with Africa in regular intervals. While Beijing’s Latin America and the Caribbean strategy was most recently updated in 2025, the Africa policy paper, titled “China and Africa in the New Era: A Partnership of Equals” was released back in 2021. This followed similar papers published in 2015 and 2006.

The two papers cover a lot of similar ground across the four key areas of politics, economics, peace and security, and culture and society.1 Within those buckets, major areas of concern include high-level political engagements, people-to-people ties through media and education exchanges, trade and investment cooperation, and military and police engagements.

Nevertheless, there are a few notable differences, which in turn highlight China’s unique concerns for Latin America and the Caribbean:

Trade versus development assistance: different economic priorities

Perhaps unsurprising for a continent dominated by developing economies, the first subject in the Africa white paper’s economic section is development assistance, with a focus on infrastructure projects, interest-free loans, and debt repayment. Other issues like trade and agriculture development are mentioned later, but development assistance and poverty reduction are clearly at the forefront of the PRC’s framing of its economic engagement.

Latin America and the Caribbean’s paper certainly mentions development assistance and poverty reduction. However, development assistance isn’t mentioned until the 15^th sub-section (of 17) in the economic program;2 other priorities like trade, financial cooperation, energy, and manufacturing receive more attention. Additionally, advanced commercial policy areas like the maritime and aerospace sectors, market supervision, tax enforcement, and customs inspection are not mentioned as major topics all in the Africa paper. This might show that China increasingly sees Latin America and the Caribbean as an advanced market.3

China worries about Taiwan and the One China Policy

In the LAC policy paper, the concept of “One China” is referenced four times in a paragraph completely dedicated to the subject, with mentions of Taiwan by name sprinkled throughout. The Africa paper, by contrast, only mentions the concept of “One China” (without name checking Taiwan) only once offhand in a brief sentence.

This likely reflects4 geopolitical realities: more than half of Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic partners are scattered across the Western Hemisphere, while only one (Eswatini) is found on the African continent.5

It also shows the importance Taiwan holds across the region despite its lack of formal diplomatic ties. Some recent diplomatic changers (such as Panama or Costa Rica) occasionally send government officials or legislators to Taipei. Additionally, countries like Mexico have facilitated trade and investment ties despite a lack of formal relations.

The United States looms large in Latin America

One of the peculiar additions to the LAC policy paper was a section on “trilateral cooperation” that starts out with a reference to how the “China-LAC relationship does not target or exclude any third party, nor is it subjugated by any third party.” While not mentioning the United States by name, this section clearly is targeted at Washington and the Trump administration’s concerns about China’s presence in the Western Hemisphere.

Africa’s white paper, by contrast, lacks any such reference to trilateral engagement or external interference. This certainly reflects the region’s distance from the United States, as well as Europe’s different and uneven relationship with its southern neighbors compared to Washington’s relationship with LAC. Still, it’s notable to point out that this difference in awareness of other hegemonic actors in the region – even if the PRC Foreign Ministry claims it has no influence over its actions – in assessing China’s foreign policy priorities and outlook for the Americas.

The Roundup

Politics and Security

• The Argentine city of Córdoba signed a cooperation and twinning agreement with the city of Hangzhou that covers a broad range of areas, including culture, education, economics, and urban management.

• The Chilean police dismantled a large-scale copper theft ring that had shipped more than $91 million worth of copper to China.

• In an interview, Ecuadorian president Noboa suggested that while his government maintains a close security relationship with Washington, it plans to keep strong economic ties with China.

• The Peruvian government approved a new $1.5 billion naval base, built in cooperation with the United States, less than 50 miles from the Chinese Chancay mega-port.

Investment, Finance, and Infrastructure

• As part of an arbitration settlement, the Ecuadorian government officially handed over the operating rights for the Coca Codo Sinclair mega-dam to Power China for 25 years in exchange for $400 million.

• Despite lacking formal diplomatic ties, a delegation of Chinese investors met with the Cap- Haïtien Municipal Commission in Haiti. The trip was facilitated by the Haitian embassy in the Dominican Republic.

• Chinese ice cream and beverage chain Mixue opened its first location in Brazil in early April in São Paulo. The company plans to invest $590 million in the country to open 500-1,000 stores by 2030.

• The Danish-owned Peruvian fiber optic operator MiFibra expanded its strategic partnership with the Chinese technology firm ZTE to launch next-generation fiber infrastructure in the country.

• An unnamed Chinese company is reportedly planning to invest tens of millions of dollars in a new tobacco processing factory in Honduras.

• Nicaragua opened the second section of the Chinese-backed La Costanera road along the country’s coast. (CGTN)

Trade and Technology

• Mexican Economy Minister Ebrard announced a series of meetings with China to resolve trade issues. At the same time, the Mexico-China Chamber of Commerce and the Chinese Business Chamber in Mexico (CREC) signed an MOU to “promote trade, investment and the integration of value chains between Mexico and China.” Meanwhile, Mexico’s Ministry of the Economy imposed a new tariff on Chinese microwire.

• For the first time in 15 years, Chinese grain trader COFCO purchased a major bulk shipment of Argentine corn. The deal comes less than two years after PRC customs officials cleared Argentine corn exports.

• The Bolivian government will take legal action against the Chinese government to refund $30 million for the purchase of nearly two dozen barges and tugboats.

• A Guangdong business delegation traveled to Peru to explore infrastructure, mining, and agrotourism investment opportunities.

Taiwan

• Taiwan donated $5 million to Paraguay’s housing department to support more than 1,600 homes for indigenous people in the country.

• U.S. and Japanese cyber experts assisted with a U.S.-Taiwanese cybersecurity resilience conference in Guatemala.

• After the head of the Brazilian trade office in Taipei said that Taiwan is a part of China, the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged a formal complaint with the country.

• A Taiwanese naval fleet stopped through St. Kitts and is headed to St. Lucia as part of a broader goodwill tour.

• The Taiwan Technical Mission (TTM) and the St. Lucian Ministry of Health, Wellness and Nutrition co-hosted a two-day workshop on non-communicable disease treatment for healthcare professionals.

• St. Vincent and the Grenadines Deputy Prime Minister Clair Leacock is advocating for Taiwan to set up a “Constituency Development Fund” for the Caribbean nation. Meanwhile, the Taiwan Technical Mission and the Ministry of Agriculture launched the 20-week “Advanced Training Program for Young Farmers.”

Culture and society

• A delegation from the National Ocean Technology Centre (NOTC) in Tianjin, China traveled to Antigua and Barbuda to study “the development of Marine Spatial Planning (MSP)” in the country.

• The head of the Mexican Metropolitan Autonomous University (UAM) met with the Chinese ambassador to discuss holding a meeting between heads of Mexican and Chinese universities and establishing a UAM “binational cultural center.”

• The World Sinology Center in Qingdao hosted the third “China–LAC Sinology Season” session.

• The Caribbean University of the West Indies Five Islands launched a Bachelor of Science in Software Engineering with the Suzhou Global Institute of Software Technology (GIST).

• A Chinese acrobatic troupe is staging a tour across Guyana to celebrate the country’s 60^th anniversary. The tour is sponsored by the Chinese Embassy in Guyana and Chinese firm CNOOC Petroleum Guyana Limited.

• SCMP reported that former President Maduro’s capture and removal has prompted a wave of Chinese migration to Venezuela.

Analysis and opinion

• Jane Stannus argues in The Spectator that Prime Minister Carney has “sold” Canada out to the PRC.

• Writing for The Diplomat, César Eduardo Santos explores how China’s “cooperation mechanisms interact with domestic dynamics” in Central America and are pushing the region towards authoritarianism.

• Analyzing the current dispute between Panama and China over CK Hutchison’s loss of its port concessions near the Panama Canal, Arturo McFields writes in The Hill that “China’s retaliation against Panama has backfires [sic] across Latin America.”

• The Financial Times published a piece by Jude Webber, Rachel Millard, and Joe Daniels analyzing how Chinese solar technology is helping prop-up Cuba’s electrical grid.

• A new report by the House Select Committee on the CCP found that sanctioned oil, including from Venezuela, makes up roughly a fifth of the PRC’s petroleum imports.

• The Diplomat published an article by Antonio Castillo on how “China-linked criminal networks employ legal businesses to conceal illicit activities [in Chile] ranging from human trafficking to scam and drug operations.”That’s it for today! See you again in two weeks.

The Top Six Stories:

1. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) found that the recently-approved Mexican law to raise tariffs on goods from Mexico’s non-FTA partners unfairly discriminated against Chinese manufacturers. More specifically, MOFCOM found that the tariffs would result in $9.4 billion in losses for the Chinese mechanical and electrical sectors. In response, MOFCOM vowed to take appropriate actions, including through reciprocal tariffs.

   1. In part to respond to U.S. concerns about Chinese trade circumvention and in part to protect local industry as part of a broader development initiative, Mexico’s congress revised its tariff code late last year to raise duties on roughly 1,500 product lines, including electric vehicles and certain intermediate goods. Though these tariff increases affected all of Mexico’s non-FTA partners, the tariffs were broadly understood to especially impact trade with the PRC.

2. Chilean Foreign Minister Francisco Pérez Mackenna told the legislature that the Kast administration was currently evaluating a Chinese subsea telecommunications cable project that had caused friction with the United States and has not yet canceled the project. At the same time, the foreign ministry jointly reported that Pérez recently met with his U.S. and Chinese counterparts, marking the first high-level Chilean-Chinese engagement of the new Kast administration.

   1. Last month, the Trump administration imposed visa restrictions on Chilean officials involved with the Chile-China Express subsea cable. The resulting political crisis in Chile frayed relations between the outgoing and left-leaning Boric administration and the incoming conservative Kast government.

   2. Engagement with the Chinese ambassador could signal that the new Kast government recognizes the continued importance of healthy bilateral ties with Beijing, though tying the meeting in the press release to the U.S. ambassador visit likely indicates that the Kast administration is looking to balance its relationship between both nations.

3. Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry established a new trade promotion office to “serve as a platform to build public-private cooperation and create business opportunities with Taiwan’s diplomatic allies,” including those across Latin America and the Caribbean. The office will be modeled the Central America Trade Office (CATO), which hosts trade shows and trade and tourism promotional events.

   1. Taiwan often provides special privileges to its formal diplomatic partners, including through infrastructure and social services projects. However, in recent years, expanded trade ties has often focused on friendly non-official diplomatic partners like those across Southeast Asia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, India, and the United States. This initiative shows that the ROC foreign ministry remains focused on its diplomatic partners even while encouraging expanded non-official diplomatic partnerships.

4. The Honduran congress approved a motion that demands the Foreign Ministry “account for... the lack of results after three years of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China,” with legislators calling current relations with the PRC “disastrous.”

   1. The news came as former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández claimed that he was extradited in 2022 to the United States in exchange for the then-Castro administration promising not to flip ties from Taiwan to Beijing. Honduras later changed relations in 2023.

   2. Recently inaugurated President Asfura promised to re-establish formal ties with Taiwan; this pressure from the Honduran congress indicates that there is at least some support from the broader Honduran political established to pursue this foreign policy tack.

5. The U.S. Federal Maritime Commission claimed that the Chinese Ministry of Transport “imposed a surge in detentions of Panama‑flagged vessels in Chinese ports under the guise of port state control, far exceeding historical norms.” This reportedly has come as retaliation for the Panamanian government revoking a Hong Kong company’s port concessions near the Panama Canal. The U.S. State Department later issued a statementcondemning PRC actions and affirming the administration’s commitment to Panama’s sovereignty.

   1. Despite current tensions, the Panamanian Foreign Minister reaffirmed that his country was “a country open to the world” and that his country welcomes its long-standing Chinese-heritage community in a speech to the Chinese Association of Panama.

   2. This is just the latest development in the ongoing competition between the United States and China over the ports near the Panama Canal. President Trump came into office last year vowing to address the Chinese presence near the canal, namely relating to two Hong Kong company-run ports. After the Panamanian Supreme Court forced the Hong Kong company to relinquish its management of the ports, the Chinese government has both spoken out and taken action against Panama in retaliation.

6. Brazilian federal public media conglomerate Empresa Brasil de Comunicação (EBC) signed an agreement with the China Media Group (CMG) to exchange journalists and expand the CMG’s presence in the South American country.

   1. EBC and CMG had previously signed a cooperation agreement in 2019 on the sidelines of the 11^th BRICS summit. However, this updated agreement further entrenches the Chinese government propaganda outlet in the Brazilian news ecosystem.

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Longer thoughts

PRC ambassadors’ “Two Sessions” highlights include Wang Yi’s comments, innovation, and climate

In early March, China’s national legislature, the National People’s Congress (NPC), and its top political advisory body, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), met in Beijing for their annual meetings. These highly-scripted meetings – arguably the most important on the PRC’s political calendar – are termed the “Two Sessions” and featured the reveal of the country’s new 15^th Five-Year Plan and the Government Work Report.

Right after the meetings concluded in mid-March, it turned to China’s diplomats to explain the meetings and highlight how the Two Sessions might bolster local audiences. Across Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) roughly half1 of the local ambassadors wrote op-eds or spoke at press conferences to pitch what they saw as the benefits of China’s new political agenda for their countries.

How Chinese diplomats explain the Two Sessions and Five-Year Plan

Most of the op-eds and press conferences followed a similar format: explain the Two Sessions and China’s domestic context, note Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s comments on LAC, reference China-LAC cooperation and the results of last year’s China-CELAC ministerial, and conclude with a brief outline of priority bilateral cooperation issues that will benefit from the Two Sessions.

Still, while most of the articles and press conferences followed a similar script, the pieces were far from carbon copies of one another. The UOL article by the ambassador to Brazil almost entirely focused on the content of the Two Sessions, using a gimmick about “five words” that can explain the meetings. In the opposite direction, the ambassador to Dominica briefly touched on the Five-Year Plan before spending the vast majority of his Dominica News Online op-ed to highlight various areas of Sino-Dominica cooperation.

Due to the local context, ambassadors also used the articles to touch on particular areas of concern. Ambassadors to Chileand Mexico touched on the connection between the Two Sessions and China’s APEC hosting year, which is a unique concern for both countries since they’re two of the only APEC members in the region. Meanwhile, the ambassador to Costa Rica spoke about the Two Sessions to the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN) in Guatemala2 and uniquely emphasized the importance of the One China Principle.

Nevertheless, PRC ambassadors predictably avoided any possible negative impacts the 15^th Five-Year Plan could have for the region, most notably China’s manufacturing overcapacity. The CCP is trying to address the domestic dynamics (which the CCP typically calls “involution”) that has led to an explosion of cheap exports around the world. But the plan suggests that China’s economy will continue to rely on underpriced exports in the near-term, which unsurprisingly did not draw a mention from any of the diplomats.

Key themes highlighted by China’s diplomats

Regardless of the format, three key themes that ran through many of the pieces: Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s remarks regarding China’s regional foreign policy and its relationship to Washington’s concerns, technology and innovation, and climate change and the green economy.

Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s Remarks on Latin America and the Caribbean

One of the few items that were represented in basically every news conference and op-ed was Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s response to a question at a press conference on the sidelines of the Two Sessions.

In response to a Brazilian journalist about Sino-LAC relations in the context of the U.S. National Security Strategy, Wang claimed that China “never engage[s] in geopolitical schemes, nor interfere[s] in other countries’ internal affairs, nor ask[s] others to pick sides.” While he spoke more about the China-CELAC forum and areas of cooperation, most ambassadors to the region also highlighted Wang’s pointed line that “Cooperation between China and LAC countries does not target any third party and should not be subject to interference by any third party.”

The choice to highlight Wang’s remarks demonstrates how that Chinese ambassadors in the region are actively aware of U.S. concerns about the PRC’s regional influence but do not plan to step back from their ongoing political, social, and economic activities.

Opportunities for technology and innovation

Another core theme was China’s emerging technology and innovation agenda – issues that the 15^th Five-Year Plan heavily emphasized. As Dylan Wench at the German Marshall Fund noted, the new Five-Year Plan calls for China to boost artificial intelligence, support “emerging industries” like electric vehicles and quantum technology, and lead in global economic governance relating to rules for these new technologies and innovations.

Although Latin America and the Caribbean is not necessarily a global powerhouse for these innovations, PRC diplomats nearly universally highlighted China’s technological advances and their benefits for the world. Some envoys, like China’s ambassador to Chile, argued that the Two Sessions will push the PRC to further deepen science and technology cooperation through “joint research, applied innovation and talent training.” Likewise, Ambassador Wang, who serves in Jamaica, suggested that the 15^th Five Year Plan and Jamaica’s Vision 2030 connect on “digital transformation [and] artificial intelligence” as two areas of future cooperation.

These issues are nothing new – they were a major highlight of the China-CELAC ministerial last year and have been the subject of long-standing China-LAC cooperation, ranging from EV manufacturing investments in Brazil to Huawei’s presence in the region to joint research expeditions in Chile. But the connection between this long-standing area of cooperation and China’s domestic priorities emphasizes how technology and innovation will become only more important in the future.

The green economy and addressing climate change

The new Five-Year Plan notably introduces both the term “carbon peaking” and a new climate indicator for “carbon intensity,” which replaces the previous “energy intensity” indicator. Though addressing climate change and spurring the green economy are not at the heart of the plan, the document indicates that the PRC plans to continue advancing its policies to address greenhouse gas emissions and develop its green economy.

Many ambassadors referenced China’s climate achievements and carbon emissions goals, but a few of them then connected these references to bilateral cooperation in the region. Notably, ambassadors in three Caribbean countries – Jamaica, Grenada, and Dominica – drew a line between China’s advances in green technologies and possible green economy and climate resilience cooperation. The ambassador to Chile also noted that the development of a green economy stands to benefit the South American minerals producer, as many green technologies rely on Chilean-mined minerals.

Much like technology and innovation, addressing greenhouse gas emissions and spurring the green economy are long-standing areas of cooperation in the China-LAC relationship. These op-eds not only show that this cooperation is likely to continue, but it also shows where the Chinese government sees these issues as most important: small island states at risk of climate-related disruptions, as well as the mineral-producing powerhouses like Chile that stand to benefit from the future green economy.

A list of the Two Sessions op-eds and press conferences

For those interested in reading the broad array of responses, I’ve compiled a complete list of the Chinese LAC diplomats’ responses to the Two Sessions (based on the embassy’s websites):

• Antigua and Barbuda (Antigua.news)

• Bolivia (Prensa Latina)

• Brazil (UOL)

• Chile (Cooperativa)

• Costa Rica and PARLACEN (FMPRC)

• Dominica (Dominica News Online)

• Ecuador (Primicias)

• Guyana (FMPRC)

• Grenada (FMPRC)

• Jamaica (Our Today)

• Mexico (FMPRC)

• Venezuela (Ultimas Noticias)

The Roundup

Politics and Security

• Chinese President Xi sent a message of congratulations to the Latin American and Caribbean regional organization CELAC on its 10^th Summit. He used his speech to re-emphasize the policy proposals his government made at the China-CELAC summit last spring.

• Students at the Chilean Carabineros Training School for future national law enforcement officers visited the Chinese embassy for an exchange day on “police cooperation, institutional knowledge, and cultural activities” for security and training.

• The National Assembly of Ecuador’s Inter-parliamentary Friendship Group with China recently discussed strengthening legislative dialogues and expanding both cultural and education ties.

• A multi-party Bolivian legislative delegation traveled to China to meet with the CBC consortium to discuss possible lithium investments.

Investment, Finance, and Infrastructure

• The Nicaraguan government approved a new mining concession for 11,000 hectares in the Autonomous Region of the South Caribbean Coast for the Chinese company Inrun Huaxia Internacional Minería S.A.

• Barbados signed a Double Tax Agreement with Hong Kong, which clarifies which country has taxing rights over different kinds of income and provides dispute mechanisms.

• The Antigua and Barbuda government signed a contract with China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) to repave the North Sound Drag Racing Track.

Trade and Technology

• The Uruguayan economy minister told a private meeting of business executives that Washington is exerting “unimaginable” and “unsustainable” pressure for the country to “break its trade relationship with China.”

• Chinese and Brazilian agriculture trade officials came to an agreement to ease soybean sanitary rules for Brazilian exports to the PRC. The news comes after several cargoes failed to pass sanitary inspections.

• The Venezuelan foreign trade minister met with a Chinese delegation of business executives from Guangdong to discuss possible cocoa, chocolate, and coffee exports to the PRC. At the same time, the Venezuelan Minister of People’s Power for Culture discussed “bilateral cultural cooperation” with the Chinese ambassador.

• The Petro administration imposed a 35% tariff on steel and metalworking products from countries that do not have an FTA with Colombia. The tariffs will primarily affect Chinese exports.

• Honduras started exporting melons to China, with seven cargoes at an undisclosed price recently exported to the Asian country. Shrimp exports to China also recently increased in January and February.

Taiwan

• Belize signed two loan agreements with Taiwan’s ICDF to rebuild the Philip Goldson International Highway and to “modernize employment services, enhance labor market data, and break down barriers for women, youth, migrants, and other vulnerable groups.”

• The Taiwanese Deputy Minister of the Continental Affairs Council Shen Yu-chung held an interview with Guatemalan journalists, where he promised further trade and investment cooperation on the Guatemalan agriculture and Taiwanese technology sectors.

• The St. Vincent Deputy Prime Minister commemorated the 45^th anniversary of relations while on a trip to Taipei. The two sides discussed “smart healthcare, smart agriculture, youth empowerment and bilateral technical cooperation” during the visit. Both countries also announced new specialized training programs for St. Vincent law enforcement and national security personnel.

• Taiwan’s new ambassador to Belize, Amino Chi, arrived in Belmopan. He was most recently the Director-General of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Los Angeles.

• A new recycling facility that was built from support by the Taiwan Technical Mission of the Taiwan International Cooperation and Development Fund (TaiwanICDF) was opened in St. Kitts.

Culture and society

• A delegation from the Chinese state news agency Xinhua traveled to Peru to meet with executives from the Peruvian newspapers Andina and El Peruano and discuss further strengthening information exchanges.

• Cuba received a shipment of 15,600 tons of rice from the PRC, bringing total rice donations since January to roughly 30,000 tons total.

• The PRC donated 100 homes to Nicaraguan families under the ‘Nuevas Victorias’ Urbanization program.

• The Chinese Embassy in Panama donated furniture and books to the Children’s and Youth Room of the Ernesto J. National Library in Panama City. (CGTN)

Analysis and opinion

• Testifying before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Henry Ziemer spoke about “China’s evolving infrastructure strategy in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC),” with a focus on “how its port investments serve to lock in Chinese influence, secure access to critical resources and geographies, as well as hinder U.S. strategic aims in the Western Hemisphere.”

• A new issue brief from the Atlantic Council by Santiago Villa, Thayz Guimarães, and Parsifal D’Sola explores how “Latin America’s policy community reassesses the US-China balance” after the U.S. capture of former Venezuelan President Maduro.

• Paul Evans argues in The Diplomat that “the Canada-China breakthrough may have made things easier for other middle powers, like the U.K. and Germany, who have also stepped up their links with China recently.”

• Arguing that China “advanced political goals in the region through overt and covert activities,” Henry Large suggests in an article for FPRI that “China is engaging in a unique form of political warfare” throughout Latin America.

• Writing for CSIS, Ryan Berg and Henry Ziemer wrote about “fortifying the Guatemala-Taiwan partnership for development.”

• In response to ongoing mining work by a Chinese company that violates a stop-work order, Alvin Thomas argues in Dominica News Online that “Dominica’s leaders, citizens, and international partners now face an important test: whether the rule of law and environmental stewardship will prevail in the Nature Island of the Caribbean.”

• The Hill published an article by Arturo McFields arguing that “China is losing ports, power and presence in Latin America.”

That’s it for today! See you again in two weeks.

The Top Five Stories:

1. Chinese state-owned shipping company COSCO Shipping abruptly halted operations at Panama’s Balboa Port at the same time that China’s Ministry of Transportation summoned executives from the two companies (MSC and Maersk) that had taken over Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison’s ports in Panama. These developments came days after CK Hutchison filed an international arbitration claim against Panama.

   1. Prior to these developments, Panamanian President Mulino had notably expressed nonchalance about Chinese complaints about CK Hutchison losing its port concessions, saying “Nothing is going to happen, and if it does, we’ll see.”

   2. Mat Youkee from The Soulaco Times has a more comprehensive rundown on recent developments that I highly recommend.

   3. In late January, the Panamanian Supreme Court revoked Hong Kong-based firm CK Hutchison’s two port concessions near the Panama Canal. Although U.S. authorities praised the decision, the Chinese foreign ministry vowed to “take all necessary measures” to safeguard Chinese companies’ interests.

2. Three years after establishing ties with Beijing, the newly-elected Asfura administration in Honduras is considering flipping its formal diplomatic recognition back to Taiwan. Regarding the issue, President Asfura recently stated his government “must seek the best conditions, the best deals and the best relations with the countries that benefit Honduras.” Still, Honduran Foreign Minister Agüero recently met with the Chinese ambassador to vaguely talk about “bilateral matters in accordance with the interests of both countries.”

   1. Honduras held formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan until 2023, when then-President Castro announced formal recognition of the PRC. Changing relations back to Taipei would be a symbolic victory for the Lai administration, though the impact on cross-Strait stability would likely be negligible.

   2. The Sino-Honduran relationship has faced its fair share of controversies in the last 2.5 years. Recently, El Heraldo reported that a Chinese-built hospital project violated local regulations by hiring too many Chinese workers.

3. Argentine Minister of Economy Luis Caputo confirmed that construction on the $150 million Jorge Cepernic Dam had restarted after Chinese company China Gezhouba Group and Argentine firms Eling and Hidrocuyo signed a technical agreement with Energía Argentina S.A.

   1. The work was originally financed by Chinese banks and was a signature Chinese infrastructure project in the region. However, construction was paused after President Milei’s inauguration in 2023 due to Milei’s negative comments about China on the campaign trail.

   2. This (relatively) quiet announcement is another indication of how the Milei administration has warmed to China over the past 2.5 years.

4. After Washington imposed visa restrictions last month on several Chilean officials due to a Chinese sub-sea cable, then-President-elect Kast and then-President Boric withdrew from the political transition process between administrations due to conflicting views of the situation. Before Kast was inaugurated by following the aforementioned visa dispute, the Chilean government at the last minute denied the Chinese hospital ship Silk Road Ark from providing medical services onboard the ship while it was docked at Valparaíso.

   1. Governments friendly with the Trump administration, including Panama and Mexico, have taken steps over the past year to minimize Chinese investment or trade in their countries at least in part to mollify Washington’s concerns. Though Kast will be limited by Chile’s deep financial and trade ties to the PRC, these initial steps may indicate that his administration will be more amenable to (at least on the surface) minimizing ties with Beijing.

   2. The Chinese infrastructure project in question is the Chile-China Express sub-sea cable that will run from Valparaíso to Hong Kong. The cable will cost about $500 million and is being built by China Mobile, HMN Technologies, and Hengtong Optic-Electric.

5. The U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Annual Threat Assessment highlighted that “strategic competitors seek greater influence in the [Western Hemisphere] that challenges Washington” and that “China’s demand for raw materials is likely to drive continued economic outreach to Latin America.”

   1. The report came days after President Trump launched the Shield of the Americas initiative with ideologically-friendly Latin American and Caribbean leaders. Though the initiative (which as of this writing has not been formally published) is focused on hemispheric security and combatting gangs, it also reportedly serves “as a platform to push back against China’s record $518 billion trade with Latin America.”

   2. After President Trump’s summit, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that “third parties” should not interfere in the PRC’s relations with Latin America.

   3. The report and the summit both indicate that the Trump administration will continue to center China’s presence in Latin America and the Western Hemisphere as a major concern.

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President Xi outpaces Washington in welcoming LAC leaders

When it comes to diplomatic heft, Beijing has been long noted to outpace Washington when it comes to the number of embassies or ambassadors abroad. But despite the recent Shield of the Americas summit in South Florida, the United States has also been lagging, at least in Latin America and the Caribbean, in another corner of diplomacy: high-level visits by foreign leaders, especially those to the capital city’s halls of power.

Since Xi Jinping first came to power, China has easily outpaced the United States in hosting official visits to the capital.1 While these kinds of official visits to the Great Hall of the People or the Oval Office are often highly-scripted (at least, in the before Trump times) and don’t immediately impact the lives of most LAC citizens, they are still politically important.

Official visits2 to a country’s capital, especially in cities as impressive as Beijing or Washington, symbolically show the importance that China or the United States places on their bilateral relationships.3 They also provide an opportunity to finalize deliverables and deepen relationships across many different corners of the government and civil society.

So just how badly has Xi Jinping been eating the United States’ lunch in its own backyard? Of the 33 countries in Latin America, only eight of them have had their leader visit Washington more than Beijing in the last 13 years. And of those eight, only four (Argentina,4 Colombia, Costa Rica, and Mexico) even have a diplomatic relationship with Beijing.

The biggest takeaway from the graph is that for many LAC countries, especially those in the Caribbean, the United States simply isn’t competing.5

A Surinamese leader hasn’t made an official visit to Washington in more than 30 years. Similarly, both smaller Caribbean nations like Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Grenada, and Dominica, as well as larger countries like Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, simply haven’t had their leaders invited to the White House in the past 13 years.

And even when it comes to closer U.S. friends, including the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Peru, the White House simply has historically prioritized official visits less or about the same as China. Notably, a tied number of trips for El Salvador or Dominican Republic leaders really isn’t a victory when one considers that China is both significantly further away than the United States and has historically placed much less value on its relationship with LAC than other geographies (like Southeast or Central Asia).

Regardless of the reason, if the United States plans to take its National Security Strategy and DNI Annual Threat Assessment to heart and compete with the PRC across the hemisphere, it might want to consider who it gives an Oval Office invite to.

The Roundup

Politics and Security

• Vice Minister of the CCP International Department Ma Hui met in Beijing with a Bolivian delegation of deputies from the left-leaning Popular Alliance. (IDCPC)

• The mayor of the Ecuadorian city of Quevedo met with a group of Chinese officials and signed a letter of intent to facilitate the opening of a new Liaison Office for the Development of Cities of Ecuador in Shanghai.

• The Chinese ambassador to Argentina led an embassy delegation to meet with several local policymakers throughout the country, including meeting with the Tierra del Fuego Superior Court of Justice, visiting the municipal government of Río Grande, stopping through Tolhuin to meet with the mayor.

• Venezuelan newspaper Ultimas Noticias reported that Venezuelan Foreign Minister Yván Gil met with Chinese ambassador Lan Hu in late February to discuss the high-level bilateral relationship and the two country’s strategic association.

• The President of the Chilean congress’s Chile-China Political Dialogue Committee Senator Francisco Chahuán met with Chinese Ambassador Niu Qingbao to discuss strengthening the bilateral relationship. (Xinhua)

• The Mexico-PRC Congressional Friendship Group approved a work plan to institutionalize legislative exchanges and discuss issues like commercial cooperation, education, science and technology, culture and tourism, and sustainable development.

• Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla called his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi to discuss “strengthening our relationship and raising it to higher levels.”

• Several Latin American and Caribbean diplomats serving in Beijing praised China’s 15^th Five Year Plan.

Investment, Finance, and Infrastructure

• The U.S. Consul-General in São Paulo told a group of Brazilian port executives that Washington would resist a Chinese company winning the concession for the container terminal in Santos.

• Chinese company Ganfeng Lithium formally asked the Argentine government to include the Pozuelos–Pastos Grandes project (PPG) under the Large Investment Incentive Regime (RIGI). The PPG project is expected to be worth $3 billion.

• A report by Fundación del Río found that 8.5% of Nicaragua’s national territory has been granted to Chinese companies for mining concessions.

• Chinese firm Sinomach signed an agreement with Brazilian science and technology company OZ Earth to build a $39 million agricultural machinery factory focused exclusively on family agriculture in Maricá. Meanwhile, Chinese telecom company Huawei signed an agreement with the UK modular power company Aggreko to supply batteries for a renewable energy project in Brazil’s Amazonas state.

• Executives from China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) visited Colombia to meet with Ministry of Transportation officials to explore possible BRI cooperation.

• The Trinidad and Tobago cabinet approved the award of two upstream contracts to China National Offshore Oil (CNOOC). CNOOC submitted offers for offshore blocks 24 and 25 last year.

• Jiangxi Copper completed its $1.16 billion purchase of SolGold, giving it access to the Cascabel copper and gold mine in Ecuador.

• The Cuban government announced it installed more than five thousand Chinese-donated solar panels to address its ongoing power issues and difficulties purchasing fuel due to U.S. economic pressure. The Economist similarly covered the story in its most recent issue.

Trade and Technology

• After a request from the Chinese government, Brazil’s Agriculture Ministry increased inspections on soybeans bound for China. The increased scrutiny has disrupted the soybean trade with the PRC and may end up benefiting U.S. exporters.

• While Venezuelan oil exports to the United States and Europe are rising, total exports are falling due to the drop-off in oil exports to China.

• The Financial Times reported on how “Brazil’s $20 billion online food delivery industry has descended into accusations of corporate espionage and shady tactics, as competition intensifies following the arrival of Chinese-backed rivals.”

• Implementation of the Canadian-Chinese trade agreement recently started, with Canada government issuing permits to import Chinese electric vehicles starting March 1, while China suspended some of its tariffs on Canadian agricultural goods. Canadian EV company BYD is reportedly interested in either opening a factory in Canada or acquiring a local automaker to expand its market.

Taiwan

• St. Vincent’s new Deputy Prime Minister departed with a delegation for Taiwan on March 16. The delegation plans to request three vehicles to support the National Commission on Crime Prevention (NCCP) and to more broadly strengthen bilateral ties.

• The mayor of the Uruguayan city of Durazno canceled his planned trip to Taiwan and instead received the Chinese ambassador.

• The Taiwanese embassy in Belmopan donated an electric KYMCO scooter to the Belize Postal Service. Prime Minister Briceño also announced a $19.1 million grant from Taiwan for the construction of a hospital in San Pedro Town.

• Taiwan’s development agency Taiwan ICDF and the St. Kitts and Nevis government officially launched the Green Energy Transition Demonstration Project, which encompasses “power grid capacity analysis, energy policy advisory services, and the development of a smart microgrid demonstration.”

• A group of Belizean officials and business leaders traveled to Taiwan to deepen the two countries’ financial relationship.

• The Taiwan Sugar Corporation, Guatemala Próspera, and the Taiwanese Embassy in Guatemala inaugurated a classroom, health services, and an administrative office at a local school. Meanwhile, a delegation of Taiwanese coffee importers traveled to Guatemala to establish new direct commercial links with local producers.

Culture and society

• The Santiago de Cali University in Colombia opened a new Chinese Learning and Testing Center, making it the first and only PRC-accredited Chinese language teaching school in southern Colombia.

• Chilean and Chinese researchers completed their joint scientific mission to explore the Atacama Trench in the eastern Pacific.

• The PRC government donated $136,000 of medical equipment and supplies to the Barbadian Queen Elizabeth Hospital (QEH). The news came as a Chongqing-based medical team visited the Caribbean country to provide Traditional Chinese Medicine treatments.

• The Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry hosted a session between a local media group and the Media Group of China on social media management.

• Due to recent violence, the Chinese delegation forced the Mexican government to cancel the World Aquatics Diving World Cup in Jalisco.

• The PRC Chinese Agency for International Cooperation donated urea and wheat to Nicaragua to support local agricultural production.

Analysis and opinion

• The House Select Committee on the CCP published a report on Chinese-Latin American space cooperation, arguing that “The PRC’s “Belt and Road” Spatial Information Corridor into Latin America is driven by top-down national directives as a part of China’s larger space strategy.”

  • Following the report’s publication, Brazilian opposition legislators questioned the government’s knowledge and cooperation with China on the Tucan Ground Station.

• Beimeng Fu at the Substack The Southern Chinatown wrote a fascinating piece on how the Chinese internet reacted to Bad Bunny following his Super Bowl halftime show performance.

• Americas Quarterly published a piece by Brenda Estefan and José Carlos Rodríguez Pueblita that argues that “Mexicois—once again—uniquely exposed. It is the U.S.’s largest trading partner, a corridor for migration and fentanyl, and—crucially—a potential gateway for Chinese goods, capital, and technology into the U.S. market.”

• Ryan Berg argues for CSIS that the recent Shield of the Americas summit provided an opportunity for “President Trump... to amplify the administration’s early successes and continue a robust strategy to push back on China in the Americas, all in accordance with the National Security Strategy’s ‘Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.’”

• Daniela Desantis and Lucinda Elliott investigated for Reuters how the Chinese government uses lavish trips for Paraguayan decision makers to try to “woo” the country away from Taiwan.

• Writing for El Pais, Bryan Avelar suggests that Salvadorian President Bukele has taken “advantage of Chinese support to strengthen his political project” despite his close relationship with President Trump.

• Julie Radomski explored how China can support a “just energy transition in Latin America” for Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center.

• Suggesting that “China’s Latin America strategy goes well beyond Venezuela and Panama,” Winston Mok reviewed how “China’s position in Latin America is rooted in deep trade and investment links with the region’s largest economies” for the South China Morning Post.

• A new piece by Evan Ellis in The Diplomat argues that “Peru’s political crisis shows how China could militarily use the Port of Chancay against the US.”

• A China-Global South Project podcast between Eric Olander and Pedro Armada discusses the U.S.-China rivalry in Latin America and the Caribbean.

That’s it for today! See you again in two weeks.

The Top Six Stories:

1. President Trump will host a summit of friendly Latin American leaders in early March in what the media is describing as an opportunity to “spotlight” and “counter” Chinese influence in the region. President Trump will welcome leaders from countries ideologically aligned with his agenda, including Argentina, Paraguay, Bolivia,El Salvador, Ecuador, and Honduras. The summit, which is being held in Miami, will also focus on other issues like drug trafficking and organized crime.

   1. As discussed below, the administration’s few “reciprocal trade agreements” in the region have contained provisions to combat Chinese influence in the region. While the summit’s exact policy agenda has still not been revealed, these agreements suggest that the administration could take measures to encourage a pivot away from the PRC without addressing the country by name.

2. For the first time since his inauguration, Honduran President Asfura reiterated his interest in re-establishing formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan. His First Vice President later indicated that this would be a “gradual process,” as a technical team is currently analyzing current agreements with the PRC to see how the country would be affected before making a recommendation. Taiwan’s foreign ministry welcomed the news and said it would agree to re-establish ties without preconditions.

   1. Honduras held formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan until 2023, when then-President Castro announced formal recognition of the PRC. Since then, Honduras pursued (but did not complete) a Free Trade Agreement with Beijing, as well as made several notable investment and financing deals (including a $525 million dam project). Flipping diplomatic relations back to Taipei would likely imperil these economic advances, though it would likely come with its own economic incentives from Taiwan and the United States in return.

3. The United States imposed visa restrictions on three Chilean officials, including Chilean Transportation and Telecommunications Minister Juan Carlos Muñoz, who were tied to a Chinese undersea digital cable project. In response, the technocratic minister said that “We don’t discriminate with respect to the origins of different projects and analyze them based on their own merits.”

   1. Though the United States has long complained about certain investments and transactions in sensitive sectors, including telecommunications, this is the first time that I’m aware of that Washington has sanctioned a Latin American or Caribbean official for engaging with China without claiming that action was corrupt or improper. With this tool now at the State Department’s disposal, expect more visa restrictions and entity-list designations against LAC officials who “intentionally work to destabilize our hemisphere.”

   2. The planned submarine cable route, called the Chile-China Express, would run from Valparaíso to Hong Kong. The cable would cost about $500 million and be built by China Mobile, HMN Technologies, and Hengtong Optic-Electric.

4. The Peruvian Supervisory Agency for Investment in Public Transport Infrastructure appealed a Peruvian court’s January 29 decision that limited the agency’s ability to regulate, supervise, or sanction Chinese firm COSCO’s operation of the Port of Chancay. The U.S. State Department issued a Tweet that warned Peru “could be powerless to oversee Chancay, one of its largest ports, which is under the jurisdiction of predatory Chinese owners.” The Peruvian foreign minister rejected these accusations, stating that “it is absolutely clear that sovereignty is not at stake,” while the Chinese foreign ministry also pushed back, calling the U.S. concerns “rumors and deliberate slander.”

   1. Ever since it was inaugurated in late 2024 and opened in early 2025, the massive Port of Chancay has generated controversy. The port aims to eventually process 3.5 million TEUs of cargo, which would double the country’s container port capacity.

5. Two of Mexico’s under secretaries of foreign affairs and economy traveled to Beijing from February 8 to 10 to hold talks with PRC Vice Minister of Commerce and International Trade Representative Li Chenggang. The two sides focused on enhancing balanced bilateral trade flows and strengthening supply chains to better develop Mexico’s domestic industry. They also discussed strengthening political dialogue mechanisms to discuss “technological innovation, public health, and smart water management.”

   1. As noted in the last edition of Chaufa, Mexico was one of the few countries to actually saw its imports from China decrease, while Mexico’s exports grew by about 5%. Despite U.S. concerns about Sino-Mexican trade in the upcoming USMCA review (and Mexico’s recent tariffs on Chinese exports), this meeting likely indicates that Mexico continues to see China as a valuable and promising trade and investment partner.

6. Peruvian President Jeri was ousted from office just four months after coming to power in part due to a scandal involving undisclosed meetings with a Chinese businessman. The scandal, labeled “Chifagate” due to some of the meetings taking place in a Chinese restaurant (or Chifa), was revealed in January.

   1. This isn’t the first time a senior Latin American politician has been wrapped up in corruption allegations with a Chinese firm – most recently, former Ecuadorian President Lenín Moreno was prosecuted for allegedly receiving bribes from the Chinese firm Sinohydro for the construction of a major hydroelectric dam.

   2. Still, corruption in Peru isn’t uniquely a China-related phenomenon; most of Peru’s recent presidents have been impeached over corruption allegations relating to non-Chinese businesses like Odebrecht.

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Longer thoughts

The Trump admin’s trade deals seek to box out China

One year into Trump’s second term, the Trump administration’s agenda to compete with China in the region is starting to take shape. Some of this has involved threats and retaliatory sticks, like threats on the Panama Canal or the visa restrictions on Chilean officials mentioned above. But the administration has also sought to push the PRC government and Chinese companies out of strategic sectors via the carrot of “reciprocal trade agreements”.1

As of now, the Trump administration has signed “reciprocal trade agreements” with four2 Latin American countries: Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Though these agreements generally focus on addressing U.S. trade and investment concerns in local markets, such as agricultural trade barriers or intellectual property protections, the agreements do sneak in a number of provisions that directly or indirectly push back against China’s presence in these countries.

While China is never mentioned by name, it’s pretty clear the provisions on “certain countries” or “third countries” are meant to apply to China (perhaps as well as other U.S. adversaries like Russia). These measures, which are listed in the table below, can broadly be categorized into three categories: addressing unfair Chinese trade practices, aligning national security restrictions, and prohibiting Chinese engagement in sensitive sectors.

Addressing unfair Chinese trade practices

The United States, as well as countries across the region and around the world, have long been concerned about unfair Chinese trade practices that give its companies a leg up in the international trade game. Seeking to collaborate with its Latin American partners, these reciprocal trade agreements include provisions to cooperate on policies to address unfair trade practices like dumping and circumvention, uncompetitive practices by state-owned enterprises (specifically from third countries like China), and forced labor3 (which arguably could also be considered a national security concern).

Notably, there is also a clause in the Guatemalan agreement that prevents an FTA with a non-market economy like the PRC,4 which likely seeks to respond to U.S. economic and security concerns about China.

National security restrictions

Arguably the provisions with the greatest potential to disrupt Chinese-Latin American relations are the national security provisions, namely on export and investment controls.5 The wording of these provisions varies substantially from agreement to agreement, but in general they all seek to establish some coordination (or at the very least consultation) mechanisms to align U.S. export and investment controls with those in the Latin American countries.

Much will depend on how much the Trump administration leans into the restrictions, but if the administration really leans into these provisions, they have the potential to severely disrupt Chinese economic ties with these countries. New investment controls could prevent (or even reverse) Chinese investments in sensitive sectors, while export controls could be used to prevent Chinese access to Latin American goods like critical minerals.

Sector prohibitions

Aside from restrictions on civil nuclear cooperation with “certain countries” (likely meaning Russia and China), only a couple of agreements include sector-specific restrictions on engaging with China in certain sectors.

Despite having arguably the closest relationship with China of any of the four reciprocal trade agreement signatories, Argentina’s agreement includes provisions that could limit its engagement with China on digital, telecommunications, and space sectors. The only other agreement that references prohibitions on engaging with a third country in a specific sensitive industry is Guatemala’s agreement, which contains provisions to restrict future digital trade agreements with “certain” unnamed countries.

The Roundup

Politics and Security

• Brazilian prosecutors and police launched a crackdown on a Chinese electronics distribution network that laundered more than $190 million for the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) crime syndicate through a Chinese e-commerce platform.

• In a sign of détente with Canada after Prime Minister Carney’s visit to Beijng, China’s top court overturned a death sentence for a Canadian citizen.

• Argentine Foreign Minister Quirno briefly met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference. The two discussed trade and investment.

• The PRC foreign ministry continued reiterating its support for Cuba as the country faces growing economic pressure from the United States.

• China’s foreign ministry congratulated Barbadian Prime Minister Mottley on her re-election. (China Daily)

Investment, Finance, and Infrastructure

• Chinese mining firm JCHZ Mining Management Company announced it will proceed with purchasing CMH Colombia, which owns the rights to Colombia’s Alacrán copper-gold-silver mine.

• The Bolivian mining minister held a meeting with the Chinese ambassador to address irregularities with the Mutún steel complex project.

• The Nicaraguan government granted two new mining licenses to the Chinese firm XinXin Linze. The company previously received a 25-year mining concession in the country’s northern Caribbean coast in 2024.

• Despite fuel and material shortages, Chinese specialists and Cuban workers are still building a previously-planned battery park to support the country’s solar park network.

• Hong Kong firm CK Hutchison threatened legal action against Maersk after the Danish shipping company was granted the right to operate two ports near the Panama Canal that CK Hutchison had previously operated. CK Hutchison had operated those ports until a Panamanian Supreme Court ruled their concession was illegal.

• Chinese carmakers BYD and Geely are reportedly two of the finalists to purchase a Nissan-Mercedes Benz plant in Mexico.

• Bahamian Health Minister Michael Darville pushed back against U.S. Ambassador Herschel Walker’s claims that the United States could offer better terms for the current construction of a Chinese-financed hospital.

• The Chinese-donated stadium in El Salvador is rapidly progressing, with China State Construction starting to add the roof on the structure.

Trade and Technology

• Colombian President Petro blamed China for the country’s 2025 trade deficit, recognizing that the “huge trade deficit with China has not decreased due to Colombia’s entry into the” Belt and Road Initiative.

• In response to a new Chinese tariff-rate-quota on foreign beef imports, the Brazilian government is planning to set “a minimum quota of 8,000 tons per year per company, to make exports viable for smaller meat processing plants.”

• A group of high-level business executives from Dongfeng Motor Corporation traveled to Ecuador to expand the brand’s presence in the country.

• In competition with U.S. exports, Brazil shipped its first cargo of sorghum to China in more than a decade.

• CSSC Qingdao Beihai Shipbuilding and China Shipbuilding Industry Trade Company delivered a new dry dock to Grand Bahama Shipyard in the Bahamas.

Taiwan

• St. Vincent Opposition Leader (and former Prime Minister) Gonsalves claimed that the U.S. government has told the newly-elected NDP government not to pursue formal ties with the PRC.

• Despite a lack of formal ties, a delegation of Panamanian legislators traveled to Taiwan to discuss China’s coercion, as well as bilateral interests like frozen seafood trade and the transport sector.

• The Taiwanese government condemned Uruguayan President Orsi’s recent declaration of support for the One China Principle.

• In an interview, Paraguay’s president reiterated his support for relations with Taiwan.

• The Taiwanese embassy in Belmopan launched the $1.9 million Belize Multi-Hazard Risk Management Capacity Building Project. The project will enhance inter-ministerial coordination, expand multi-hazard early warning systems, strengthen resilient communities, and introduce advanced wildfire monitoring technologies. The two countries also signed an implementation arrangement for the Belize Agricultural Product Processing Innovation and Incubation Project.

• Taiwan appointed a new ambassador to Belize, current Director-General of the trade office in Los Angeles Amino CY Chi, who had previously served several tours in the country.

Culture and society

• The Chinese government donated $86 million in education technology equipment to El Salvador’s education ministry.

Analysis and opinion

• Writing in The Diplomat, Evan Ellis argued that even without diplomatic relations, “Beijing has been remarkably successful in expanding its economic and even political influence in Guatemala.” Also in The Diplomat, Juan Fernando Herrera Ramos argues that Asfura’s reconsideration of ties with the PRC “highlights the strong pull still exerted by the United States” in Honduras.

• Jared Ward writes in World Politics Review that “For China, the U.S. attack on Venezuela... highlighted that even Beijing’s most extensive investments in the [Caribbean]... were unable to create a bulwark that could ward off an intervention from Washington.”

• Brookings published a piece on “Redrawing global boundaries? The United States, China, and the viability of spheres of influence in the 21st century” with comments from William Galston, Ryan Hass, Patricia Kim, Melanie Sisson, Constanze Stelzenmüller, Thomas Wright, and Miles Yu on the U.S. and Chinese relationships with the Western Hemisphere.

• The think tanks published two pieces on Canada’s trade relationship with China, one from the Wilson Center by Anka Lee looking at how Canada as a middle power is “hedging” on China, and another by David Hart at CFR on “what Canadian and Mexican EV Imports From China Mean for the United States.”

• CEO of Global Americans Diego Area wrote for his publication that “China’s presence and influence in Peru is structural and carries immense strategic and reputational risks that can have consequences at the highest levels.”

That’s it for today! See you again in two weeks.

The Top Six Stories:

1. Uruguayan President Orsi traveled to Beijing in early February to meet with President Xi, sign roughly a dozen agreements, and start China-Mercosur FTA negotiations. The bilateral joint statement covers a number of issues, including support for China’s One China Principle and China’s repression of Hong Kong. During their bilateral meeting, President Xi recommended cooperation on the “economy and trade, finance, agriculture and animal husbandry, infrastructure construction, ICT... green development, digital economy, artificial intelligence, and clean energy.” (FMPRC) Government officials signed 11 agreements with their Chinese counterparts on topics like trade and investment and environmental cooperation. Additionally, various Uruguayan and Chinese companies, universities, and government institutions signed about 20 bilateral agreements, covering academic, cultural, science, and technology cooperation.

   1. Following the trip, Brazil signaled openness to launching China-Mercosur FTA negotiations.

   2. Uruguay has long sought an FTA with China, but negations over a bilateral FTA blew up a few years ago after other Mercosur countries complained. Without buy-in from Argentina (which has complicated relations with China given Milei’s friendship with Trump) and Paraguay (which doesn’t even recognize the PRC), an FTA is pretty unlikely in the near term.

2. The Panamanian Supreme Court revoked Hong Kong-based firm CK Hutchison’s two port concessions near the Panama Canal. Although U.S. authorities praised the decision, the PRC’s Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office condemned the decision as “shameful and pathetic” and vowed to protect Chinese businesses’ interests around the world. The Chinese foreign ministry later vowed to “take all necessary measures” to safeguard Chinese companies’ interests.

   1. The Trump administration pressured CK Hutchison into divesting from its global port portfolio, particularly its ports near the Panama Canal, after President Trump made Chinese influence near the Panama Canal a key point in his second inaugural address. Negations had been hung up over demands that Chinese state-owned firm COSCO have a major share in any port deal, so this ruling might help resolve this issue.

3. Washington and Buenos Aires signed and released the text of the U.S.–Argentina Agreement on Reciprocal Trade and Investment, which contains numerous provisions that could affect Argentina’s relationship with China. Aside from provisions on coordinating export controls and investment security, the agreement mentions that the Argentina should either prioritize the United States or avoid cooperation with unspecified third parties (which likely implicates China) on nuclear, space, telecommunications, and critical minerals cooperation. Still, following the agreement’s release, Argentina’s trade minister assured that the agreement was not meant to “box out” China from the country.

   1. This isn’t the only agreement with provisions that could try to box-out China in sensitive areas in Latin America; both the agreements with Guatemala and El Salvador contain provisions that try to exclude unnamed third countries. Still, this agreement goes further than both of those accords, probably because Argentina has long had much deeper investment, finance, and trade relations with China.

4. The Bolivian government canceled a $350 million zinc refining project that would have been built by a consortium of China ENFI Engineering Company and China Railway International Group and financed by China EXIM Bank. The country will also demand fixes for the Mutún Steel Complex, which was built by Sinosteel Equipment & Engineering.

   1. There’s a new Bolivian government in town. While it has tried to make clear that it plans to maintain good relations with the PRC, it’s decently likely that some of the deals Chinese companies made in the country over the previous ruling party’s roughly two decades of political power did not favor Bolivian interests. Much as we saw in Ecuador after Correa left power, there may be additional political controversies around Chinese-backed projects.

5. Cuban Minister of Foreign Relations Bruno Rodriguez traveled to Beijing to meet with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (FMPRC). The two discussed enhancing relations while Cuba faces substantial political and economic pressure from the United States, though China failed to make any substantive commitments to the communist country. The meeting follows earlier remarks by the Chinese foreign ministry that condemned U.S. actions (Global Times).

   1. The Trump administration is trying to ratchet up the pressure on Cuba, but China is fairly limited in the aid it can provide.

   2. Cuba has a complicated relationship with China: though they are both communist countries with mid-20th century peasant-backed revolutions, Cuba’s relationship with China is pretty new (it only came into focus after the fall of the Soviet Union). Additionally, Chinese leaders have been particularly frustrated that the Cuban government has failed to successfully implement a reform agenda.

6. Newly-released data on China’s trade flows with Latin America and the Caribbean in 2025 shows that Chinese exports to the region grew by 7% compared to the previous year. This rise in $20 billion in exports partially offset the drop in Chinese exports to the United States last year. The Associated Press reported that this trade boom encompasses both advanced technologies like electric vehicles, as well as cheap e-commerce goods. However, the AP also reported that local factories are shutting due to this flood of imports.

   1. As discussed below, the 7% Chinese export growth overlooks a lot of regional variation. Some countries like Brazil and Mexico saw their imports of Chinese goods stagnate, while others like Argentina, Cuba, and Jamaica had double-digit growth.

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Longer thoughts

China’s Trade with LAC in 2025: A Mixed Bag for the Region

A couple of weeks ago, China’s trade ministry dropped1 its 2025 trade data. A lot of the attention has been paid to China’s roughly 7% year-on-year export growth to the region2, rising from $275.3 billion to $295.9 billion. Chinese imports from the region also grew, though at a more muted 4% from $240.2 billion to $250.3 billion.

Much has been made out of how China’s export growth to Latin America, Africa, and other developing markets has helped replace decreasing exports to the United States. While this story is true, it covers up a lot of regional heterogeneity. There are four key points I want to highlight:

1. PRC exports grew in almost every LAC country, but not to Mexico or Brazil

As you can see above, almost every independent country in Latin America and the Caribbean saw their imports from China grow in 2025. The exceptions? A few small Caribbean countries, three of which recognize Taiwan (namely the Bahamas, Belize, St. Kitts, and St. Vincent). Oh, and also two of the region’s largest manufacturing powerhouses, Mexico and Brazil.

I can’t say why exactly exports dropped (slightly) to these countries, but it might be at least in small part due to these countries being the two largest FDI destinations for Chinese companies. With more and more Chinese firms investing in Mexico and Brazil, there’s less of need to import products since the goods are ultimately being made in-country.3 Still, there is more to this story that’s worth investigating.

2. Taiwan ties don’t (necessarily) stop LAC export growth to China

Something that really surprised me when digging into the data was that some of the countries with the largest export growth to the PRC were countries that don’t even have formal diplomatic ties with Beijing. Historically, a lack of political ties has been seen as an impediment to a strong trading relationship.

While it’s true that the Latin American and Caribbean countries with diplomatic relations with Taipei have pretty low absolute levels of trade, they had some of the largest trade growth. St. Vincent and the Grenadines exports to China grew from roughly $1,000 to $176,000 (a nearly 1700% increase!), while St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, Guatemala, and Haiti all saw their exports to the PRC grow by double or even triple digits.

That said, this wasn’t a uniform story across-the-board: China’s imports from Paraguay and Belize both dipped between 2024 and 2025.

3. Guyana is an export powerhouse

You can see this above, but the Chinese customs data suggests that Guyanese exports to China grew by more than 243% between 2024 and 2025. That’s probably attributable to the country’s oil boom, but it’s still incredible just how much the country’s trade is soaring.

4. China’s biggest export and import destinations remained stable

Back in 2025, China’s largest export destinations were:

1. Mexico ($89.1B)

2. Brazil ($71.5B)

3. Chile ($25.1B)

4. Colombia ($18.1B)

5. Peru ($16.3B)

China’s largest import destinations were:

1. Brazil ($116.4B)

2. Chile ($41.8B)

3. Peru ($34.7B)

4. Mexico ($20.2B)

5. Ecuador ($9.6B)

The rankings back in 2024? Exactly the same, just with slightly different amounts.

While there was a lot more variation in the year-on-year growth, the most important markets for Chinese exports and imports were remarkably stable. Additionally, they pull from more or less the same countries. The 2025 trade story appears to be one of PRC exports to the rest of the region catching up rather than a complete reconfiguration of China’s regional trade ties.

The Roundup

Politics and Security

• The Peruvian “Chifa-gate” scandal against President Jeri remains ongoing. It was recently revealed that Jeri had privately invited 21 guests to a gala at the Gran Teatro Nacional, with most of the VIPs being Chinese citizens. Jeri was also notably absent from a 2024 congressional debate over irregularities in Chinese contracts. The Chinese embassy has still not commented over whether it had authorized Chinese businessman Zhihua Yang to coordinate with Jeri.

• After opening an investigation last spring into the Catholic University of the North and the National Astronomical Observatory of China’s joint Cerro Ventarrones astronomical observatory in Antofagasta, Chile’s government canceled the project. The government argued that the project’s agreement “did not conform to the regulations.”

• Members of the Mexican Senate’s Asia-Pacific committee hosted the International China-Mexico Conference in Mexico City, where they met with academics and business leaders to discuss academic exchanges, new investments, and reinvigorating the permanent binational commission.

• U.S. Ambassador to the Bahamas Herschel Walker called on the island nation to walk away from a Chinese-financed $195 million hospital project, promising that the Trump administration would help secure a “better deal.”

• Peruvian President Jeri withdrew his congressional request to allow a Chinese naval hospital ship to stop by the country. The president blamed the change on ongoing influenza and dengue health emergencies.

Investment, Finance, and Infrastructure

• Anhui Zhongding Sealing Parts started construction on its new plant in Guanajuato, Mexico. The facility should be completed by 2027.

• China’s Tianqi Lithium Corporation will reduce its stake in Chilean lithium company SQM. The announcement comes after Chile’s Supreme Court ruled against Tianqi’s attempt to block SQM’s partnership with state-owned copper company Codelco.

• Pictures released by the Chinese embassy in Nicaragua show that the Punta Huete International Airport reconstruction has made little progress despite 18 months of work.

• After her election, China’s foreign ministry said that they are “ready to work” with Costa Rican President-elect Laura Fernandez.

• Barbadian Prime Minister Mottley inaugurated the new Hope Agricultural Training Institute in St Lucy. The facility was built with the help of a Chinese grant.

• Chinese firm Naipu Mining Machinery announced it will not complete its acquisition of a stake in CMH Colombia, which owns the development rights to the Alacrán copper-gold-silver mine.

• For the ongoing negotiations to return PowerChina to the Coca Codo Sinclair dam in Ecuador, the company has reportedly offered to replace broken and cracked equipment that had previously created controversy and affected the dam’s operations.

Trade and Technology

• Brazil ended a temporary tariff exemption that favored EVs and hybrids assembled with Chinese parts. The measure had caused tension between Brazil’s autos industry and Chinese EV manufacturer BYD.

• During a hearing before a U.S. Senate committee, Secretary of State Rubio accused China of profiting from Venezuela’s economic collapse by purchasing discounted oil.

• One of Ecuador’s largest broadband providers, Netlife, partnered with Chinese telecom firm ZTE to deploy ZTE’s Smart Cloud Platform (SCP), which will enhance Netlife’s operations.

• The Brazilian Secretary of Science, Technology, and Innovation in Health met with representatives from Chinese pharmaceutical company Sinpharm to discuss boosting “the production of medicines, vaccines, and blood products..”

• Chile ended its anti-dumping investigation into Chinese imported steel bars.

Taiwan

• The Taiwanese government donated a $3 million “social relief grant” for unspecified projects to St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The country’s prime minister expressed thanks for the donation.

• The Paraguayan Minister of Health led a delegation to Taipei, where she met with the Taiwanese Foreign Minister and visited local hospitals to “gain insight into Taiwan’s public health and social welfare systems.”

• Taiwan’s representative to Ottawa accused Canada of delaying a previously-negotiated trade agreement that covers “online commerce, energy, net-zero transition and supply chain resilience.” Although the deal has been ready since April, Representative Tseng suggested a desire not to complicate relations with Beijing has motivated the delay.

• Officials from Belize’s Ministry of Transportation met with two Taiwanese electric bus companies to look into making Belize a regional hub for the companies’ operations. Meanwhile, Taiwanese firm Ocean Star Bio-Tech signed a Letter of Intent with the Embassy of Belize in Taiwan and Taiwan’s Metal Industries Research & Development Centre (MIRDC) on converting sargassum seaweed into power.

• New Honduran president Asfura is reportedly focused on “security, economy, and institutional reforms” rather than re-establishing relations with Taipei at the start of his administration.

Culture and society

• Nicaraguan and Chinese officials, including the son of the co-presidents Ortego Murillo, inaugurated the establishment of an Association for the Promotion of Culture and Commerce in Managua.

• The head of the Dominican Republic’s badminton foundation met with the Chinese ambassador to discuss the possibility of new sports exchanges.

Analysis and opinion

• A new piece in Foreign Policy by Eduardo Porter argues that “South America’s right won’t align with Trump on China.”

• Global Taiwan Institute published a piece by Henry Large on how “Costa Rica’s, Colombia’s, and Panama’s growing diplomacy with Taiwan demonstrates how Taipei can maintain global engagement despite Beijing’s diplomatic isolation efforts, and how Latin American countries—even without formal diplomatic relations—can explore new opportunities with Taiwan.”

• Regarding the future of Taiwan-Paraguay relations, Patrick Ko writes in The Diplomat that “Taipei’s strategy built a relationship almost exclusively with Paraguay’s Colorado Party, while neglecting opposition actors. That’s not a recipe for long-term success.”

• The Hill published another piece by Arturo McFields, this time arguing that “Just one month in, this already seems like a bad year for the Chinese Communist Party in Latin America.”

• Analysis by Pablo Villalobos in Teletica on Costa Rican President-elect Fernandez’s relationships with the United States and China finds that Fernandez hopes to have “good relations” with Beijing but will prohibit any “illegal business” ties with Chinese companies.

• Bonnie Girard argues in The Diplomat that “Carney is trying to find an answer to his American problem by increasing Canada’s engagement with China. He should remember he himself called China Canada’s “biggest geopolitical risk.”

That’s it for today! See you again in two weeks.

Quote of the day

“I believe that together, we are bringing this relationship back toward where it should be.”

Canadian Prime Minister Carney, per remarks while speaking to Chinese Premier Li Qiang

The Top Six Stories:

1. During his historic visit to China (the first by a Canadian Prime Minister in over eight years), Canadian Prime Minister Carney signed a new trade and investment agreement with his PRC counterparts. The deal will lower tariffs on a limited number of Chinese electric vehicles into Canada in exchange for China removing tariffs on Canadian canola oil and seafood products. The agreement also included provisions on new investments in EVs, batteries, solar, wind, and energy storage. Both U.S. Democrats and President Trump criticized the deal, with the latter threatening a 100% tariff on Canadian exports.

   1. The trip is notable because up until Carney became Canada’s PM, Sino-Canadian ties were fairly frosty. A combination of the Trudeau government’s arrest of a senior Huawei executive, alignment with the United States on trade protectionism (such as placing a high tariff on Chinese EVs), and deepening ties with Taiwan had strained the relationship in recent years.

   2. Carney has pretty explicitly tied his desire to deepen trade and investment ties with China as a way to balance fraught relations with the United States. The vast majority of Canada’s exports go to its southern neighbor, but with increasing uncertainty due to the Trump administration’s trade (and territorial) threats, Carney has decided to reorient Canada to new commercial partners.

   3. Just before Carney’s trip, a delegation of Canadian MPs was visiting Taiwan. Seeking to prevent a diplomatic incident and “avoid confusion with Canada’s foreign policy”, two members of the delegation who are members of Carney’s Liberal Party ended their trip early.

2. Peruvian President José Jerí faces a scandal called “Chifagate” for holding a series of previously undisclosed meetings with a local Chinese businessman, Yang Zhihua.1 Yang was notably a junior partner in a $50 million China Railway Engineering Corporation highway project that later became the subject of an arbitration dispute. Peru’s ongress is now considering whether to impeach Jerí. Later, Jerí asked the Peruvian congress to allow a Chinese military hospital ship and PLA personnel to enter Peruvian waters.

   1. This isn’t the first time a senior Latin American politician has been wrapped up in corruption allegations with a Chinese firm – most recently, former Ecuadorian President Lenin Moreno was prosecuted for allegedly receiving bribes from the Chinese firm Sinohydro for the construction of a major hydroelectric dam.

   2. Still, corruption in Peru isn’t uniquely a China-related phenomenon; most of Peru’s recent presidents have been impeached over corruption allegations relating to non-Chinese businesses like Odebrecht.

3. Hong Kong firm CK Hutchison, which owns two ports near the Panama Canal, is exploring whether to split up its deal with European and U.S. investment companies. The new arrangement would give Chinese firm COSCO a larger share of the ports in Africa and a smaller share in other markets (presumably including the two near the Panama Canal). Relatedly, Panama’s Supreme Court will soon rule over whether CK Hutchison can keep its port interests in the country, which the Trump administration expects will remove the port concessions from the CCP-linked firm.

   1. The Trump administration pressured CK Hutchison into divesting from its global port portfolio, particularly its ports near the Panama Canal, after President Trump made Chinese influence near the Panama Canal a key point in his second inaugural address. The CCP has held up the port deal (which would sell the Hong Kong company’s ports to a Western consortium) and tried to pressure the administration into allowing Chinese state-owned firm COSCO into any new ownership arrangement.

4. The Trump administration suggested that it would “allow” Chinese oil companies to continue purchasing (and presumably producing) Venezuelan oil as long as their prices are not at the discount the Maduro regime formerly offered them. Still, Chinese officials have sought talks with their U.S. and Venezuelan counterparts to ensure their commercial interests, including their loans that were previously guaranteed by oil exports. In the ensuing days, PetroChina has reportedly held off from purchasing U.S.-controlled Venezuelan oil.

   1. Though China has become a major market for Venezuelan oil exports in recent years, Venezuela is just a minor contributor to China’s oil consumption: only about 3% of China’s total oil imports come from the country. Still, oil exports are key for a different reason; some of Venezuela’s remaining debt repayments to China are tied to oil exports, so U.S. interference in this market could impact Venezuela’s ability to finish repaying.

5. Despite his close ties to President Trump and U.S. pressure on LAC countries to keep Beijing at arm’s length, Argentine President Milei plans to travel to China sometime in 2026. The announcement came as Milei hailed the benefits of trade ties with China and Argentina welcomed the first full shipload of more than 5,000 cheap BYD electric and hybrid vehicles. In response to this openness to increased bilateral relations, China’s foreign ministry said the PRC “stands ready to enhance exchanges at various levels with Argentina.”

   1. Milei was publicly skeptical of China when he came into office, but last year he planned to visit China for the China-CELAC Forum to reignite bilateral ties. Ultimately the trip was swept under the rug (likely at least in part due to explicit or implicit U.S. pressure, though this was never publicly confirmed). Publicly reinvigorating ties right as the Trump administration makes its “Donroe Doctrine” policy against China a foreign policy priority is a surprising tack, but one that ultimately shows just how essential the Chinese market is for LAC.

6. As the United States has threatened regime change and increased economic pressure against Cuba, China’s foreign ministry reiterated the country’s “firm support” for Cuba and pledged $80 million in emergency financial aid for electrical equipment and 60,000 tons of rice.

   1. Despite being just one of five communist countries left in the world, Cuba’s relationship with the PRC is not as warm and fuzzy as one might expect. Cuba hosts several Chinese signals intelligence installations and regularly holds party-to-party exchanges, yet relations have also historically been strained due to ideological disputes and Beijing’s frustration over Cuba’s unwillingness to reform. Still, the Chinese government has been willing to provide nominal aid to Cuba as it undergoes unprecedented economic hardship – for example, China donated new solar plants after blackouts. But significantly more substantial aid in the face of U.S. pressure, especially military assistance, is unlikely to be forthcoming.

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Longer thoughts

Who are China’s ambassadors in Latin America and the Caribbean?

China has one of the largest diplomatic footprints in Latin America and the Caribbean, with heads of mission2 serving across 28 Latin America and the Caribbean3 countries. Understanding who Beijing is sending to lead these embassies (and their equivalents in Curaçao and Haiti) both can help us understand how China wants to portray itself across the region and the PRC’s differing foreign policy strategies across different countries.

To better understand the type of person who becomes a Chinese ambassador in the region, I drew up a dataset on the bios of all the current regional heads of mission. I’d expect that past ambassadors may have had different kinds of backgrounds, so this analysis is limited4 to China’s current foreign policy and processes. Still, it should still be helpful to give a better sense of China’s diplomatic footprint on the ground.

Generally speaking, most Chinese diplomats in the region are highly experienced professionals with at least some previous exposure to the region. That said, some countries are clearly more favored than others. The LAC countries that have “comprehensive strategic partnerships” with Beijing (think Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) tend to host ambassadors with prior LAC ambassadorial experience. By contrast, ambassadors to several smaller states (mostly in the Caribbean) are home to the diplomatic and regional novices.

The average profile of a Chinese ambassador in LAC

By my count, the average Chinese ambassador in LAC is a man in his mid-50s (53.7, to be exact) who studied languages and literature in college, started his current role in late 2023, and had at least one overseas LAC posting and one stop through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) LAC Department.

Still, these averages cover up a lot of variation. Five out of 28 ambassadors are women, and while most ambassadors are currently in their mid-50s, the youngest ambassador is 48 and the oldest is around 60. Only about half (13/28) ambassadors studied languages and literature (文學) in college – the other half studied topics as varied as science, international politics, law, and economics.

Prior ambassadorial experience

With any kind of job, organizations tend to give the most important roles to those with the most experience. Though this is purely informed speculation, I’d imagine that the Chinese Politburo Standing Committee and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prioritize those with the greatest experience for the PRC’s most important regional partners.

By that measure, it’s notable that there are only seven countries where the Chinese ambassador had previously served as ambassador in the region: Argentina5, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela. Interestingly, this list almost6 completely aligns with those with the highest rank7 in China’s diplomatic partnerships, “comprehensive strategic partners”.

I think it’s also notable who isn’t on the list: ideological allies like Cuba and Nicaragua. At least when it comes to political prioritization, major economies seem to be a greater priority for MOFA than pure ideological alignment.

Other kinds of diplomatic experience

Of course, having prior LAC ambassadorial experience isn’t the only relevant resume line for a head of mission posting. As shown in the map, about a third of China’s ambassadors may not have previously served in the region as ambassador, but they had at least either served at a regional Chinese embassy or worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Latin America and the Caribbean Department.

There’s a pretty big split between the Caribbean and the rest of the region over which ambassadors had at least some prior diplomatic experience. In both Central America and South America, all but one country in their sub-region (Ecuador in South America and Costa Rica in Central America) had at least some kind of prior LAC experience. Meanwhile, the PRC seems to care less about regional experience for the Caribbean: only the ambassadors to Suriname and the Dominican Republic had previously held a LAC-related job.

The Roundup

Politics and Security

• Brazilian President Lula da Silva held a call with Chinese President Xi Jinping just days prior to his call with President Trump. The two discussed the “unstable international situation” and how both countries were “important forces in the defense of multilateralism and free trade.”

• Despite U.S. foreign policy pressure, Venezuelan President Rodriguez declared that her country had a right to bilateral relationships with U.S. adversaries like China.

• The Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on the CCP led a bipartisan delegation to Central America, including Guatemala, El Salvador, and Panama to discuss Chinese influence in the region.

• A parliamentary delegation headed by Argentina’s libertarian deputy Juliana Santillán traveled in early January to Beijing and Shenzhen to meet with several leading Chinese technology companies and the CCP’s International Department.

• After leaving Brazil, the Chinese naval hospital ship Ark Silk Road landed in Uruguay. The ship had most recently visited Nicaragua, Barbados, and Jamaica.

• Special Representative of the Chinese Government on Latin American Affairs Qiu Xiaoqi held an event with incoming and outgoing Latin American and Caribbean diplomatic envoys in Beijing. (FMPRC)

• The Nicaraguan capital city Managua signed a sister-city agreement with Zhengzhou, the capital of Henan province.

Investment, Finance, and Infrastructure

• The Santa Cruz provincial government in Argentina confirmed that after two years of hold up, Chinese banks will disburse the $150 million needed to restart work on the massive La Barrancosa-Jorge Cepernic hydroelectric dams on the Santa Cruz river.

• Guyana’s government unveiled three new solar parks that will generate 15MW of power. The projects are a joint venture between Nanjing-based SUMEC Complete Equipment and Engineering Co. and Chinese power equipment manufacturer XJ Group Corporation.

• The Brazilian Minister of Mines and Energy met with a delegation of Chinese mining and energy companies’ representatives to explore new investment opportunities. They specifically discussed opportunities in the nuclear sector and the application of advanced technologies, including small modular reactors. (Global Times)

• China Railway Shanghai Engineering Group, the Central & Southern China Municipal Engineering Design and Research Institute Co. Ltd started construction on the $200 million Barbados Climate Resilient South Coast Water Reclamation Project in late January.

• The director of the Colombian National Planning Department met with the Chinese ambassador to explore potential infrastructure projects under Colombia’s new Belt and Road Initiative, including railroad, digital connectivity, and water sanitation projects.

• The new Bolivian energy minister reassured Chinese companies operating in the oil, gas, and lithium sectors that the current government would honor existing contracts despite the country’s warming relations with Washington.

Trade and Technology

• The Colombian Deputy Minister of Connectivity traveled to Beijing, where she met with the Ministry of Industry, the Chinese Academy of Information and Communications Technology (CAICT), and leading companies like Huawei, ZTE, and Alibaba. Her trip focused on “digital infrastructure, next-generation networks, spectrum management, satellite capabilities, cybersecurity and artificial intelligence.”

• Argentina’s plant health authorities expect their Chinese counterparts to approve access for South American stone fruit, including peaches, sometime next year. The news comes after a delegation from the Chinese Research Center for International Inspection and Quarantine Standards and Technical Regulations (GACC) and customs representatives from Shanghai and Shenyang visited the country.

• According to new data from Mexico’s statistical agency, about 19% of total car sales in 2025 in the country were Chinese EVs, representing a slight dip from 2024.

• New data shows Sino-Brazilian trade grew by 8.2% from 2024 to 2025, with total bilateral trade hitting $171 billion. By comparison, Brazil’s trade with the United States was less than half of that at $83 billion. (Global Times)

Taiwan

• In a sign that the future of Honduran-Taiwanese relations (including re-establishing diplomatic relations) are still uncertain, Taipei has still not been invited to President-elect Asfura’s inauguration. Still, Taiwan’s foreign minister said that he expects ties with Tegucigalpa to improve.

• Despite the ruling NDP’s longstanding pro-PRC position, St. Vincent and the Grenadines Deputy Prime Minister affirmed the country’s relationship with Taiwan, calling it a “hand up” rather than a “hand out.” Taiwan’s embassy recently donated a firefighting truck, 198 tons of rice and two containers of charitable goods to the Caribbean nation.

• The Belizean parliament approved another round of tariff reductions in order to come into compliance with their Taiwan trade agreement.

• Taiwan’s embassy and a U.S. nonprofit donated an unspecified amount of rice to Guatemala.

• A St. Kitts and Nevis secondary school signed an MOU with a New Taipei high school on strengthening educational and cultural cooperation.

Culture and society

• Researchers from the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Chilean University of Concepcion for the first time launched a joint research mission to study the Atacama Trench in the Pacific Ocean. (Global Times)

• 105 homes built through support from China were inaugurated in Nicaragua. The houses are part of a larger social housing project to build over 900 new structures.

• Colombian coffee chain Juan Valdez opened its first location in China, with its first store in Shanghai.

• After rumors from previous weeks, President Lula confirmed that Brazil will offer Chinese citizens 30-day visa-free access to the country for tourism and business purposes.

Analysis and opinion

• Evan Ellis gave testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives on “the impact of Chinese organized crime in Latin America on the region’s resources and environment.”

• A piece by Lingling Wei in the Wall Street Journal analyzed China’s presence in Latin America and the Caribbean, suggesting that “Beijing [is] recalculating its policy of making inroads in Washington’s backyard after its top ally [Maduro] there was deposed.”

• Wang Wen argues in The Diplomat that “The US Cannot Push China out of Latin America.” Also in The Diplomat, Emma Belmonte and Paulína Ovečková find that “Venezuela Uncovers the Limits of China’s Security Promise in Latin America.”

That’s it for today! See you again in two weeks.

Quote of the day

“This is the Western Hemisphere. This is where we live – and we’re not going to allow the Western Hemisphere to be a base of operations for adversaries, competitors and rivals of the United States”

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, per comments following the U.S. military operation in Venezuela

The Top Six Stories:

1. Following the U.S. military operation to arrest and remove Venezuelan President Maduro, the Trump administration has reportedly demanded Caracas expel Chinese advisors from the country and sever economic ties. Just after the operation, the Chinese banking regulator asked its banks to disclose their lending exposure in the country. The Chinese government repeatedly condemned the operation, with a Foreign Ministry spokeswoman telling reporters that the operation was a “typical act of bullying, a serious violation of international law, a severe infringement upon Venezuela’s sovereignty.”

   1. Just hours before the U.S. operation, President Maduro and Vice President (and now acting President) Rodríguez welcomed Chinese Special Representative for Latin America Qiu Xiaoqi and Deputy Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Latin America department Wang Hao to Caracas. The two sides broadly discussed bilateral cooperation, and the Chinese officials were reportedly stuck in Venezuela during and after the operation.

   2. Margaret Myers pointed out that the Chinese government was likely shocked by the operation. The government is also probably concerned about its debt repayment from the Venezuelan government that was originally being paid off through oil transfers, though about 90% of this debt has likely been paid off. Oil is likely less of a concern; while Venezuela has recently exported a significant amount of oil to China, Venezuela is also just a minor contributor to China’s oil consumption, with an estimated 3% of China’s total oil imports.

   3. It’s notable that while the Chinese Foreign Ministry might have issued a sharp rebuke of the Trump administration’s Venezuela military operation, its actual actions have been so far quite muted. For one of its closest partners in the region, Beijing has held off from taking any actions – from recalling its ambassador in Washington to issuing new sanctions or export controls – that would more tangibly express the Chinese government’s displeasure. This is just speculation, but it might be because Beijing is more concerned about its companies’ assets or previously guaranteed profits. It makes sense for Beijing to hold its fire until it sees how the Trump administration and Rodríguez administration deal with Chinese businesses (and then use any retaliation as leverage to maintain their commercial and financial interests).

2. Although Honduran President-elect Asfura promised to re-establish relations with Taiwan during the campaign, in a post-election interview he refused to commit to re-establishing formal ties with Taipei, saying “we have to analyze the commitments and there we will look for the best decisions for Honduras.” A future Asfura administration official called the China-Honduras FTA (and other agreements with China) “asymmetrical” and said Asfura was undecided on the FTA with China unless the agreement was proven to benefit Honduras as well.

   1. It is increasingly uncertain whether Honduras will re-establish relations with Taipei. While Asfura might have promised reversing the Castro administration’s foreign policy, business and trade ties have started adapting to the new foreign policy reality. This may be enough to stop Asfura from following through on his commitment. We’ll just have to wait and see.

   2. Although I’m sure the Taiwanese Foreign Ministry would love to have a new diplomatic partner for the positive press coverage and increased diplomatic footprint, Honduras flipping back to Taiwan really won’t change Taiwan’s political, security, or economic situation. The only gains will be marginal and symbolic.

3. After launching an investigation into global beef imports in December 2024, China’s commerce ministry announced new 55% tariffs on beef imports beyond set quotas. The duties will seriously affect Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil. The Brazilian government said it will try to negotiate with Beijing to approve other meat imports that could offset the effect of new tariffs.

   1. Beef makes up a massive portion of Argentina’s and Uruguay’s exports: 32% of Argentine exports to China and 42% of Uruguayan exports to China were just frozen beef. Brazil is a bit more diversified, but beef still makes up more than 5% of the country’s exports to China, totaling $5.7 billion in sales in 2023.

   2. Though countries will still be able to export a significant amount of beef to China under the quota, the new tariff-rate quota will limit the potential for market expansion.

4. At the end of 2025, Chinese mining companies completed several major brownfield investment deals. These include:

   1. Jiangxi Copper Corporation finalized its $1.17 billion acquisition of SolGold at the end of December, which will provide the company with access to a major copper and gold project in Ecuador.

   2. Lithium Chile Inc. will sell Argentum Lithium S.A. to China Union Holdings Ltd. for $175 million. The deal will provide China Union Holdings with access to the Arizaro salar lithium project in Salta Province, Argentina.

   3. CMOC Group, a Henan-based mining company, purchased Equinox Gold’s Brazilian operations (Leagold LatAm Holdings and Luna Gold) for about $1 billion. The deal will give CMOC, which is already the world’s largest producer of cobalt, 8 tons of annual gold production across three mines in Maranhão, Bahia, and Minas Gerais.

   4. These projects are notable as brownfield, rather than greenfield, transactions. Though Chinese companies are frequently willing to invest tremendous amounts of money into new capital, these investments are a reminder that they are also prone to hoover up existing assets from Western firms (especially in the sensitive mining sector).

5. The mayor of Panama City ordered the removal of a monument honoring the local Chinese community’s contributions to the Central American country, prompting condemnation from both the local Chinese embassy and Panamanian President Mulino. The mayor’s office said that the memorial was removed because it posed “structural risks.” The monument, which overlooked the canal, was originally erected in 2004 to mark the 150^th anniversary of the Chinese community’s arrival in Panama to build railroads and the Panama Canal.

   1. This monument notably wasn’t a feature of state-to-state PRC and Panama friendship, as Panama did not establish diplomatic relations until 13 years after the monument was built.

   2. It’s not as flashy, but Chinese embassies, both in Panama and elsewhere in the region, have long been concerned about the welfare of both Chinese citizens and heritage/overseas Chinese communities. This includes engaging with Chinese heritage and friendship organizations and providing consular services. The embassy’s decision to weigh in on this controversy reflects the PRC embassy’s prioritization of serving these historic communities.

6. Chinese state television channel CCTV broadcasted a rare clip of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) war games in the Western Hemisphere. The featured war games were from an event in central Henan province that brought together 20 military units, and the video showed the Chinese military fighting in the Caribbean, particularly near Mexico and Cuba.

   1. Though the timing of the video’s release is notable since it comes just after both the Western Hemisphere-focused U.S. National Security Strategy and the Chinese White Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean were released, war games themselves don’t reveal any new or secret Chinese military aspirations for the region. Militaries game out all kinds of contingencies, so it is no surprise that the PLA thinks through conflict scenarios in the Western Hemisphere (even if they are more secretive about it).

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Longer thoughts

The China-LAC stories I’m watching for in 2026

Unlike 2025, which featured major China-LAC developments like the fourth China-CELAC conference in Beijing and the third Chinese Foreign Ministry White Paper on the region, I’m expecting 2026 to be a year of implementing the nitty-gritty rather than making big policy announcements. Still, there are three major trends I’m looking out for:

1. Taiwan

When it comes to Taiwan’s role in the Western Hemisphere, of course I’ll be watching if a new country decides to flip official ties from Taipei to Beijing — Haiti and St. Vincent are probably the most likely of the seven regional partners. I’m also curious to see whether or not Honduras actually follows through on re-establishing ties with Taipei.

Still, I think an underrated story will be whether or not any of the seven non-official diplomatic partners (such as Mexico, Ecuador, or Brazil) dial back their unofficial cooperation with Taiwan. This could happen either by withdrawing a country’s diplomatic mission in Taipei or by moving (or shutting down) the Taiwanese trade and cultural mission in a Latin American capital. Taiwan faced a similar situation in South Africa last year, and I think there’s a decent chance China will eventually start using these unofficial missions as leverage (though it’s by no means certain that this will be the year).

2. High-level political visits

President Xi skipped what should have been a major visit to Brazil this past year for the BRICS summit, but there’s still a small chance he’ll make it to the region this year. He's already planning to come to the United States for the G20, and he also might pop over to the United States for a summit with Trump. Back in 2013, Xi used a trip to California as an excuse to stop through Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica, and Mexico. While he has done significantly less travel as he’s gotten older, I think there’s a low but non-zero chance he stops through a Latin American or Caribbean country on the way to or from the United States this year.

Other LAC leaders are planning major trips to Beijing in the next few months — Canadian PM Carney will be there this week, while Uruguay’s president will be leading a large business delegation next month. My question is who else makes the trek this year, especially as the Trump administration increasingly looks skeptically at China’s presence in the region.

A third (and underreported) story will be whether Taiwanese President Lai makes it to LAC this year. He’s only traveled to the Pacific Island nations so far, but that’s partially because he scrapped a planned Central America trip after the Trump administration denied him a transit through the lower 48. It’s an open question whether Lai will make it to the region, and much of this will depend on whether Trump will allow Lai to stopover in the United States.

3. The Trump factor and the “Donroe Doctrine”

Starting with the Panama Canal crisis and ending with the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, 2025 was the year the Trump administration elevated China’s presence in Latin America and the Caribbean to a major U.S. foreign policy concern. I’ll be looking to see which new conflicts and debates arise between Trump and other Latin American leaders over China’s regional presence.

One aspect of this will be investments and infrastructure, both for existing projects (think the Port of Manzanillo in Mexico or the Port of Chancay in Peru) and yet-to-be-announced works. Chinese military-related installations, especially the space-related infrastructure in South America, could be targeted, but so could more benign investments like Chinese mining investments. It’s difficult to predict just exactly what the Trump administration will focus on and how they’ll address it, but the general topic will certainly be in the headlines.

Washington will also likely be concerned about Chinese trade in the region, but this will manifest in several ways. Even after the new Mexican tariffs, China is expected to be a major topic in this summer’s USMCA review, with the United States pressuring Mexico on new investment and trade restrictions. The U.S. reciprocal trade agreements with Argentina, El Salvador, and Ecuador all included clauses on investment and export controls, and I’ll also closely watch if Washington puts any pressure on these countries to impose their own new restrictions on Chinese trade or investment.

4. Other issues

Trade will certainly come up in the China-LAC relationship, but I’m not all that focused on whether China will sign a new FTA in the region. Panama seems unlikely to wrap up a full agreement this year,1 while Honduras is up in the air because of the new presidential administration. Uruguay is still paused for Mercosur reasons, and El Salvador hasn’t publicly made a lot of progress recently. Rather, I’ll be watching for which countries sign small agreements that relax tariffs or phytosanitary barriers.

Economic ties grab a lot of headlines, but given their prominence in the new White Paper and the China-CELAC ministerial, I’ll also be curious to see how cultural and people-to-people ties progress. New museum, media, and academic cooperation that further PRC narratives are harder to quantify, but they can be equally (if not more) important to winning over hearts and minds. I expect even more Chinese visiting museum exhibits, arts showcases, journalist delegations, and academic conferences in 2026, and it is something I will increasingly highlight in this newsletter.

The last thing I’ll be watching for is how China’s broader domestic politics and foreign policy affects Latin America and the Caribbean. The CCP will release its 15th Five-Year Plan this March, which could affect Chinese investments, trade, and financial ties with the region. China will also host APEC this year (several LAC countries, including Peru and Mexico, are members), which will provide new opportunities for cross-Pacific engagement. While these events won’t focus on the region, they’ll likely have some second-order effects that could affect LAC for years to come.

The Roundup

Politics and Security

• Argentina officially halted a plan for a proposed Chinese radio telescope. The project was originally paused in the autumn due to U.S. opposition.

• After visiting Nicaragua and Jamaica, the Chinese hospital ship Silk Road Ark arrived in Barbados for a seven-day goodwill visit to provide medical services and host military-to-military exchanges. The ship then traveled to Rio de Janiero in Brazil.

• The (relatively new) Chinese embassy in Nicaragua opened a new consular and visa services office in Managua, which will allow Nicaraguan citizens to apply for a Chinese visa in the country rather than in one of Nicaragua’s neighbors.

• Canadian PM Carney will travel to China next week to improve bilateral ties. At the end of 2025, Carney said that while Canada is looking to deepen its relationship with China, it will put up guardrails around certain industries like “artificial intelligence, critical minerals, [and] defense.”

• The Chinese government donated unspecified electronic equipment to the Dominican Republic’s Chamber of Deputies to contribute to its “legislative processes.”

• Antigua and Barbuda’s Prime Minister discussed healthcare cooperation as a key bilateral priority when meeting China’s new ambassador. A few days later, the Chinese embassy in Antigua and Barbuda held a high-level diplomatic reception with the Governor-General, Foreign Minister, and other senior officials. Foreign Minister Greene announced new “substantial infrastructure grant and initiatives focused on the ‘Blue Economy’ for sustainable development.”

Investment, Finance, and Infrastructure

• CK Hutchison’s divestment of its Panama Canal ports to U.S. and European investment firms has hit an impasse over the Chinese government’s demand that COSCO receive majority control and veto rights.

• According to a Barbadian senator, the Queen Elizabeth Hospital in Bridgetown will acquire new cancer treatment equipment as part of a $313 million expansion that will largely be financed via loans from China Sinopharm International Cooperation.

• The Ecuadorian Ministry of Environment and Energy extended its contract with Chinese firm PetroOriental to operate in Orellana through 2040, though the company will invest an additional $36 million to social projects and exploratory activities in the region.

• A delegation from China National Chemical Engineering (CNEC) visited with the Peruvian Deputy Minister of Hydrocarbons to discuss possible projects in petrochemicals, green hydrogen and batch exploration, applying automated processes, and artificial intelligence.

• The Chinese-backed and headquartered BRICS Bank signed a $320 million deal with the Brazilian health ministry to build the country’s first public “smart hospital.”

Trade and Technology

• Mexico’s tariff increases on nearly 1,500 goods from non-FTA partners, which is largely expected to affect Chinese exports, went into effect on January 1.

• A set of routine tariff changes by the Chinese State Council will both help and hurt Latin American exporters – tariffs on shrimp will drop (especially helping Ecuador), while tariffs on frozen bluefin tuna will increase.

Taiwan

• Taiwan’s ambassador to St. Vincent and the Grenadines attended the swearing-in ceremony for the new cabinet (led by the New Democratic Party, which had been previously hostile to maintaining relations with Taipei) and later metwith the new prime minister. The new government subsequently recalled a number of ambassadors, including to Taiwan.

• Several of Taiwan’s regional diplomatic partners, including Belize, Guatemala, Paraguay, and St. Kitts and Neviscondemned recent Chinese military exercises around the island.

• The Lai administration appointed a new Taiwanese ambassador to Paraguay: Ivan Lee (李岳融), who most recently was representative to Mexico. The current ambassador will return to Taipei to lead the Latin America department.

• Taiwan donated 252 motorcycles and 10 radio patrols valued at roughly $1 million to Guatemala’s interior ministry.

• The Taiwanese company Overseas Engineering Company (OECC) handed over the new JNF General Hospital to St. Kitts and Nevis.

• The Taiwanese embassy in Paraguay donated nearly 3,000 toys to the Ministry of Children and Adolescents to distribute to local children for Christmas.

Culture and society

• The Brazilian government is reportedly considering giving Chinese citizens visa-free entry. If it does so, it will join Suriname and Ecuador as the only South American countries that have previously offered visa-free entry.

• Nicaraguan journalists and government officials joined with their Xinhua counterparts for the China-Nicaragua Media and Cultural Cooperation Forum in Managua.

• An official from the Cuban Ministry of Culture signed a framework on strengthening cultural cooperation with Shenzhen’s Deputy Minister of Culture, Radio, Television, Tourism, Sports of Shenzhen Ding Zhongyuan.

• ECCI University in Bogota and the local Chinese embassy held a dialogue between Chinese and Colombian youths on culture and science.

• Hainan Province donated electric bicycles to various Antigua and Barbuda government ministries and the ⁠Antigua and Barbuda College of Advanced Studies.

Analysis and opinion

• The Center on Global Energy Policy published an excellent piece by Erica Downs and Luisa Palacios on the impact of recent U.S. operation in Venezuela on China’s energy consumption and Venezuela’s debt. The New York Times also published a substantive history on Chinese loans to Caracas.

• Responding to the recent CCTV video showing Chinese war simulations in the Caribbean, Evan Ellis wrote in Infobae about how Chinese military planning could affect the region.

• Ryan Berg, Henrietta Levin, and Bonny Lin wrote a piece for CSIS on the PRC’s recent third policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean.

• The Hill published an op-ed by Arturo McFields that argues “China is furious over geopolitical changes in Latin America.”

• A new piece of analysis from the Atlantic Council by Kitsch Liao, Nik Foster, and Santiago Villa proposes new policy recommendations for the United States to respond to Chinese pressure and coercion against Taiwan’s remaining formal diplomatic partners.

• Several publications ran pieces on the future of Sino-Honduran relations given Asfura’s recent election and promises to re-establish ties with Taipei. These include an article by Alonso Illueca for the China Global South Project and an article by Juan Fernando Herrera Ramos for The Diplomat.

That’s it for today! See you again in two weeks.

Quote of the day

“It’s not China. It is not aimed at China... Our interest is not to generate conflict with any country in the world; we respect China a lot and have very good relations with them. The reason for these adjustments to the law is to strengthen the national economy””

Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, per comments made about recently passed tariffs on Mexico

The Top Five Stories:

1. The PRC Foreign Ministry (MFA) released its new White Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean on November 10. (Global Times) The new White Paper is fairly similar to the last edition1 (released in 2016), with references to five core areas of engagement: solidarity, development, civilization, peace, and people-to-people connectivity. Still, these areas are renamed, consolidated, and detailed somewhat differently than the 2016 paper. Some more significant changes include references to recent Chinese foreign policy initiatives like the BRI and GDI, as well as more assertive language on Taiwan. In response, Taiwan’s foreign ministry rebuked the document’s reference to Beijing’s One China Principle.

   1. As further discussed below, this paper largely reinforces and summarizes recent trends in China’s regional foreign policy rather than sets a new course. Many of these were previewed this year at the China-CELAC ministerial in Beijing in Xi’s keynote speech and in the joint declaration. For example, the new priority sub-issues, namely civilizational exchange, international financial institutions (IFIs), anti-corruption, and non-proliferation/the regional prohibition on nuclear weapons were mentioned in these documents earlier this year.

2. The Trump administration released on December 4 its National Security Strategy, which unusually sets combatting Chinese influence in the Western Hemisphere as one of Washington’s top foreign policy priorities. More specifically, the White House identified “a Hemisphere that remains free of hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets” as a key component of the new “Trump Corollary” to its interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. The strategy plans to achieve this goal by enlisting existing partners and expanding the United States’ appeal regionally.

   1. The National Security Strategy (NSS) is any administration’s defining foreign policy document, though historically the strategy has been more of a laundry-list of issues and policies rather than a winnowing down of major areas of concern.

   2. Neither the Trump 2017 nor the Biden 2022 strategies ranked general Western Hemisphere engagement as a priority, nor did they significantly mention China’s regional engagement in their discussion of foreign policy in the Americas.

   3. Trump’s first NSS came the closest to aligning with this year’s China-LAC focus when it said “Competitors have found operating space in the hemisphere. China seeks to pull the region into its orbit through state-led investments and loans.” Still, the strategy did not suggest specific measures to combat Chinese influence. Meanwhile, Biden’s strategy only noted “We will also assist partners in facing security threats... including from... malign actors [that] seek to gain military or intelligence footholds in the region.”

3. After making some modifications, Mexico’s congress approved President Sheinbaum’s proposed tariff reform. The new law will raise duties on roughly 1,400 items produced by non-FTA partners, including China. While Sheinbaum claimed that the reform was not aimed at the PRC, the country is easily Mexico’s largest non-FTA trading partner. In response, the Chinese commercial ministry called on Mexico to “correct its wrong practices of unilateralism and protectionism at an early date.”

   1. Despite Sheinbaum’s protestations, this tariff reform is pretty clearly aimed at the PRC.

   2. Part of this is because Sheinbaum’s domestic agenda includes beefing up the Mexican manufacturing sector; for more than a quarter century, China has been Mexico’s competitor when it comes to exporting to the United States. With additional tariffs on consumer and intermediate goods, companies investing in Mexico will have a larger incentive to produce more parts and final goods in the North American country.

   3. Still, a non-insignificant motivator is probably the upcoming USMCA review in 2026. Washington has complained for years now about Mexico being a backdoor to cheap Chinese imports – just last week, US Trade Representative Greer called Mexico an “export hub” for China (as well as Vietnam and Indonesia). New tariffs that reduce Chinese and other Asian imports would go a long way to mollifying these concerns.

4. A number of Chinese construction companies were linked to criminal complaints, whistleblower accusations, and investigations over the past week. These include:

   1. A judge from the Ecuadorian National Court of Justice ruled in favor of taking former Ecuadorian president LenínMoreno to trial over bribes that he allegedly received from Chinese contractor Sinohydro.

   2. The Bolivian Highway Administration said it detected China State Construction Engineering of irregularities in the San José de Chiquitos - San Ignacio de Velasco highway project.

   3. A whistleblower accused the Chinese company Sumec Complete Equipment and Engineering Company of irregularities in the bidding process to build a hospital in Huancavelica, Peru.

   4. A Bolivian union warned that China Machinery Engineering Corporation (CMEC) had violated workers’ rights, testifying that the company was connected to “work safety failures.”

   5. A few researchers have looked at whether Chinese companies violate anti-corruption measures, workers’ rights, and environmental safeguards more than local or non-Chinese international firms, though the evidence is ultimately pretty mixed and inconclusive.2 Whether or not Chinese firms are worse in the aggregate, these high-profile cases will further damage Chinese firms’ reputation for flagrant environmental, labor, and corruption abuses.

5. The two major Honduran presidential candidates who had suggested they would re-establish ties with Taipei currently hold the lead in elections (the count still remains too close to call as of this writing, although the right-wing Nasry Asfura holds the lead). As a result, Taiwan’s foreign minister said that Taiwan looks forward to re-establishing diplomatic relations with Honduras, stating “We have continued to maintain channels of communication with all camps.” In response, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman referenced the various projects the PRC had undertaken in Honduras in recent years. (Global Times)

   1. Honduras was the most recent LAC country to recognize Beijing over Taipei,3 which would make it all the more symbolically notable if a new president was to re-establish relations with Taiwan. Practically, however, official recognition wouldn’t mean much for Taiwan other than a new source for shrimp and coffee, another country signing letters on its behalf at the UN, and a new official embassy. For Honduras, the main impact will be on Chinese development assistance, infrastructure projects, and private investment.

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Longer thoughts

A tale of two strategies

As mentioned above, the PRC’s new Latin America and the Caribbean white paper largely continues the previous 2016 white paper’s priorities and strategies. This continuity reflects both the stability of Xi’s foreign policy over the past decade and the document’s comprehensiveness. That said, there are a few notable changes:

• The order is much more compact, the issue areas for bilateral cooperation are aligned with President Xi’s recent CELAC speech, and certain issues are reorganized to new sections (tourism was split from education as a “cultural” issue, for example).

• New priority issues are added or upgraded, namely: tax cooperation, market supervision, development assistance (as an economic issue), reforming international economic organizations (such as IFIs, APEC, and the WTO), non-proliferation export controls, anti-corruption, cybersecurity, and “mutual support of core interests.”

• The language around Taiwan is much stronger, with a reference to opposing “Taiwanese independence” and a full write-up of Beijing’s “One China Principle.”

• The paper explicitly mentions the four major “global” initiatives (the Global Civilization Initiative [GCI], Global Development Initiative [GDI], Global Governance Initiative [GGI], and Global Security Initiative [GSI]) as well as Belt and Road “cooperation”.4 The four global initiatives did not exist in 2016, while the BRI was not applied to the region at that time.

• Specific forums, including on trade, tourism, sub-national engagement, and defense were identified as key means of expanding China-LAC cooperation.

• New details were added to many sections to provide more specific areas of cooperation. For example, the current “aerospace” sub-section mentioned the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System and China’s manned space/lunar exploration program as key areas of future engagement. By comparison, the 2016 “space” section was much more vague. Other examples include a reference to sister cities in the sub-national governance sub-section and currency swaps in the financial sub-section.

A longer (though not completely comprehensive list) of changes are in the interactive table below:5

The Roundup

Politics and Security

• The Chinese and Cuban Communist parties held their 7^th theoretical seminar on December 3. The seminar focused on “practices and experiences to promote socialist modernization through scientific development planning.”

• The Brazil-China Parliamentary Group visited Beijing and other Chinese cities in early December, where they met with officials from China’s legislature, commercial ministry, and trade promotion office. They discussed agriculture trade, climate change, and tourism.

• Bolivia’s new foreign minister told a Fox News interviewer that his country “seeks a new partnership with the United States while repositioning itself in the region and working to reduce its dependence on China.”

• Representatives from 24 LAC countries traveled to Beijing as part of a tour for the “National Coordinators of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC).” Officials met with Chinese companies and government institutions, including the foreign and commercial ministries, the Ministry of Education, the Chinese Agency for International Cooperation for Development (CIDCA), and the Chinese Development Bank.

• China’s foreign ministry again condemned U.S. military actions in the Caribbean, with a spokesman stating that Beijing “opposes the interference of external forces in Venezuela’s internal affairs.”

• Bloomberg reported that “at least three Colombian presidential candidates, four senators and a minister have been on” through China this year as part of an intensifying diplomatic relationship between the two countries. It came as the Colombian vice foreign minister attended the IX Chinese-Colombian Dialogue, which was hosted by the Sino-Colombian Chamber of Commerce.

• Uruguayan President Orsi provided new updates on his upcoming trip to China. He recently told a group of businessmen that the trip will likely be in February, and that he plans to bring a delegation of business executives to explore possible commercial opportunities.

Investment, Finance, and Infrastructure

• A delegation of Jiangxi business executives and government officials traveled to Puchuncaví in Chile to explore possible copper investment opportunities.

• Chinese-backed improvements on the Augusto C. Sandino International Airport in Nicaragua started earlier this month. The project is led by China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC).

Trade and Technology

• China and Brazil moved forward on the China–Brazil Joint Laboratory for Radio Astronomy Technology. The institution will be a collaboration between CETC’s Network Communications Research Institute and Brazil’s Federal University of Campina Grande and the Federal University of Paraíba.

• U.S. Trade Representative Greer said that “Canada and Mexico should not be used as export hubs for China” when discussing upcoming USMCA negotiations at a conference in Washington.

• The world’s longest direct commercial flight (with stops) from Shanghai to Buenos Aires launched earlier this month. The China Eastern flight to Argentina has a stopover in New Zealand.

• Sanya, Hainan hosted the second China-Latin America and the Caribbean Sustainable Food Innovation Forum, where the Yazhouwan National Laboratory signed MOUs with agricultural research institutions from Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Chile. (China Daily)

• Express shipments of Chilean cherry exports to China doubled in 2025 (compared to last year), maximizing freshness for this highly-demanded commodity.

Taiwan

• Six of the eight Taiwanese diplomatic partners who spoke up for Taiwan at Interpol’s annual General Assembly meeting in November were from the Western Hemisphere, namely Belize, St. Kitts and Nevis, Guatemala, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Paraguay.

• The Panamanian foreign ministry pushed back on rumors that Taiwan might be allowed to open a commercial office in the country.

• Costa Rican presidential candidate Eliécer Feinzaig called for re-establishing diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The Chinese embassy in San José called the comments “a political show.”

• The St. Kitts and Nevis Ministry of Health signed an MOU with Taiwan’s IntelliGen Technology Co. on healthcare modernization.

• U.S. Chargé d’Affaires Karin Sullivan met with the Taiwanese Ambassador to St. Vincent in the country to discuss “regional development, economic opportunity, and good governance.”

• The Taiwanese foreign ministry congratulated St. Lucian PM Philip Pierre and his ruling Labour Party (SLP) on winning another majority in the country’s elections.

• At a charity event in São Paulo, the local Taiwanese community led by the local Taiwanese commercial office donated more than 5,000 food baskets to Brazilian NGOs.

Culture and society

• The Chinese embassy and the Bahamas tourism ministry co-hosted the second annual China-Bahamas Kite Festival in Goodman’s Bay.

• Chinese journalists from the All China Journalists Association (ACJA) visited the EL Peruano’s and the Andean Agency’s headquarters to discuss the Peruvian journalists’ “use of technology and artificial intelligence (AI) in the work of the media.”

• China sent another aid package to Cuba to help families affected by Hurricane Melissa, this time with “mattresses, ceiling sheets and solar lamps.”

• The Chinese naval hospital ship Silk Road Ark continued providing medical services in Jamaica over the past couple of weeks. (PRCMND) The Chinese foreign ministry also donated various “humanitarian items” to the Caribbean country. (FMPRC)

• Antigua and Barbuda’s government signed seven agreements with China’s Hangzhou Normal University and its affiliated hospital. The PRC also donated 1,500 solar-powered street lamps to Antigua and Barbuda.

• A new “China-Venezuela Friendship Square” was inaugurated in Caracas, with playgrounds and outdoor fitness parks.

Analysis and opinion

• The U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control held a hearing on “Dirty Money: Chinese Organized Crime in Latin America,” featuring testimony by Ray Donovan, Leland Lazarus, and Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown.

• The Economist published a piece about how “Canada is now mulling how to re-engage” with China due to Trump’s trade policy and Prime Minister Carney’s new administration. The magazine also published an article on the Chinese-built cricket stadium in Grenada.

• Writing about Venezuela, The Diplomat, Tom Harper suggests that “U.S. intervention in Latin America could put China’s growing influence there in jeopardy. That might be the real goal.”

• John Calabrese, a professor at American University, argues that “Trump’s hardline push in Latin America strengthens China” in an op-ed for ThinkChina.

• In his regular column for the China-Global South Project, Alonso Illueca wrote about how “Chile’s Election Puts China’s Lithium Ambitions to the Test.”

That’s it for today! Happy holidays, see you in the new year.

Quote of the day

“I want to reiterate that China categorically rejects the interference of external forces in Venezuela’s internal affairs under any pretext, and will continue to resolutely support Venezuela, as always, to safeguard its sovereignty and national security, dignity of the nation and social stability”

Chinese President Xi Jinping, per a birthday letter to Venezuelan leader Maduro

The Top Five Stories:

1. St. Vincent and the Grenadines Prime Minister Ralph Gonsalves’s Unity Labour Party lost the country’s general election, giving the opposition New Democratic Party (NDP) an opportunity to govern for the first time in 24 years. The NDP previously advocated for recognizing Beijing, although its election manifesto did not include any language on the issue this year. Taiwan’s ambassador immediately congratulated Prime Minister Friday on his election.

   1. In the days after the St. Vincent election, Taiwan’s foreign ministry sounded an optimistic note when the Deputy Foreign Minister said Taiwan “will remain vigilant but confident in our continued relationship” with St. Vincent. There is certainly precedent for a Caribbean party that had previously advocated formal relations with Beijing deciding instead to maintain a relationship with Taipei: when the St. Lucian Labour Party1 returned to power in 2011, it decided to maintain ties to Taipei despite having previously flipped formal relations when the party was in power back in 1997.

   2. Newly elected Prime Minister Godwin Friday has previously visited China (such as during his trip to Beijing and Shanghai in 2018), and under his watch as opposition leader he has personally argued that Taiwan is a part of China under the NDP’s One China Policy. That said, he reportedly downplayed this foreign policy position during the campaign and (as of this writing) has not made notable public comments on the issue after the election.

2. The Chinese Navy hospital ship Silk Road Ark stopped through Jamaica the weekend of November 29 to provide reconstruction support following Hurricane Melissa. The ship carries 104 medical professionals and has been traveling around the Caribbean in recent weeks.

   1. This stopover is part of a regional reconstruction effort by the PRC. Recently, the Chinese Foreign Ministry donated the first of six batches of food aid and emergency supplies to Cuba, while the Chinese ambassador in the Bahamas announced a financial contribution from the from the China–Caribbean Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Fund for post-Melissa reconstruction. Meanwhile, the Silk Road Ark was most recently in Nicaragua as part of a broader regional tour.

3. Chinese customs officials paused soy imports from five Brazilian soy exporters after they claimed they detected pesticide-treated wheat mixed into a shipment. The news comes just after China restarted importing soybeans from the United States due to the U.S.-China trade truce.

   1. While it’s certainly possible that the soybean shipments contained significant amounts of a pesticide that is prohibited in China, historically the PRC has used the excuse of phytosanitary regulation violations as a pretext to achieve a broader policy goal. In this case, the timing (and the Trump administration’s cheering for the ban) indicates that the measure might be a temporary measure to push Chinese importers to buy more American soy to achieve their purchase commitments.

4. A group of Panamanian deputies traveled to Taiwan for the first official trip by legislators since Panama City broke off official ties with Taipei in 2017. The delegation, which was led by an independent deputy, met with Legislative Yuan president Han Kuo-yu and discussed strengthening their respective democracies. Similarly, a delegation of Colombian Senators and Congressman visited Taipei to meet with Foreign Minister Lin. The legislators reportedly suggested establishing a Colombian diplomatic office in Taiwan.

   1. In response to the Panamanian visit, China’s foreign ministry predictably complained about the trip, prompting pushback both from the Panamanian foreign ministry and the U.S. ambassador. That said, President Mulino refused to endorse the trip or to be drawn into a conflict between China and Taiwan. And in response to the Colombian visit, President Petro was forced to delayhis trip to China and issue a response reaffirming his administration’s commitment to the CCP’s One China Principle.

5. President Xi sent a letter to Venezuelan President Maduro for the South American leader’s birthday expressing support for the country “to safeguard its sovereignty and national security.” Relatedly, the Chinese Foreign Ministry condemned U.S. “interference of external forces in Venezuela’s internal affairs.”

   1. The PRC has long supported the Maduro (and previously the Chávez) regime in Venezuela, so this development isn’t new or surprising. Still, the U.S. military build-up in the Caribbean provides the CCP with a distraction from its own military aggression in its near abroad (such as around Taiwan, Japan, or in the South China Sea). For example, the Beijing Daily recently ran an op-ed criticizing the U.S. Navy build-up in the Caribbean.

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The Roundup

Politics and Security

• A PRC Ministry of Defense delegation discussed academic and strategic cooperation activities with the Center for National Higher Studies (CALEN), the National System of Peacekeeping Operations (SINOMAPA) and the National School of Peace Operations of Uruguay (ENOPU).

• A new Chinese ambassador, Jiang Wei, recently arrived in Antigua and Barbuda. She most recently was the Consul General in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

• The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service helped Peru seize 10,000 individual shark fins destined for China, marking one of the largest wildlife trafficking operations in Latin American history.

• Members of the Ningbo judiciary sat down with Rio de Janeiro judge João Batista Damasceno and the president of the Brazil-China Chamber of Integration of Development and Trade (Cidicom). During the meeting, Judge Batista Damasceno explained how Brazil’s judicial system functions.

Investment, Finance, and Infrastructure

• About a decade after the project was completed, Ecuador is renegotiating the terms of its contract with PowerChina for its operation and maintenance of the Coca Codo Sinclair dam

• The Nicaraguan mining ministry officially approved on November 26 six new mining concessions totaling 44,000 hectares to the Chinese firm Brothers Metal.

• The longstanding $1.6 billion legal dispute between China Construction America, Inc (CCA) and the Bahamas casino resort Baha Mar’s original owner BML Properties finally ended with a “comprehensive agreement” between the two parties.

• Colombia was officially accepted as the Chinese-led Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank ‘s (AIIB) 111^th member.

Trade and Technology

• In a move that will largely impact Chinese steel exports, Canada reduced its quota on non-FTA partner steel from 50% to 20% of 2024 levels.

• Trinidad and Tobago Homeland Security Minister Roger Alexander suggested that China’s social media controls could provide an example for the country’s internet regulations.

Taiwan

• The Haitian and Guatemalan public health ministers were both in Taiwan in late November, where they met with the Taiwanese foreign affairs minister to discuss ongoing cooperation and donations.

• Taiwanese Environment Minister Peng Chi-ming met with his Paraguayan counterpart in Asuncion to discuss climate governance and a previously-signed MOU on climate. Legislative Yuan Deputy Speaker Johnny Chiang also traveled to South America with a delegation of Taiwanese lawmakers, and a group of Paraguayan officials led by Deputy Foreign Minister Verdún visited Taipei.

• The ROC ambassador in Haiti made an unspecified financial donation to the country for “improving urban cleanliness” and “the economic empowerment of women from vulnerable neighborhoods.”

• Several of Taiwan’s regional diplomatic partners, including Belize, Paraguay, Haiti, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, and Guatemala spoke up in support of Taipei at the COP30 summit in Brazil.

• Taiwan and the Pan American Development Foundation (PADF) launched the EcoYouth Initiative in both St. Lucia and St. Kitts to nurture science and math education.

• The Taiwanese Tron-e Energy Technology Corporation donated two electric buses to St. Kitts, while the Taiwanese foreign ministry donated advanced digital equipment that will support the Digital Identity Authentication Project.

Culture and society

• Academic leaders from the Shandong Academy of Governance traveled to Argentina to meet with researchers from the Center for Chinese Studies of the Institute of International Relations of the National University of La Plata. Uruguay and China also strengthened academic ties after officials from Beijing Forestry University went to the country. The Federal University of Paraíba (UFPB) in Brazil also received a delegation from the Chinese science and technology ministry.

• A few days before presidential elections that could lead Honduras to flip relations back to Taipei, China donated $7.62 million of agriculture mechanization equipment for coffee farmers to the Honduran agriculture ministry.

• The Cuban sports minister traveled to China to meet with the President of the Chinese Olympic Committee and the Chinese Institute of Sports Sciences to better understand how Chinese athletes and coaches apply science to sports development.

• Chinese oil company CNOOC financially supported a Chinese medical team that donated two non-invasive ventilators to Guyanese patients.

• More than 300 politicians, business people, and academics from China and Brazil attended the III Bahia-China Forum in Salvador, the capital of the Brazilian state of Bahia. (Xinhua)

• Venezuela, China, and Cuba signed a trilateral cooperation agreement on tourism exchange promotion and commercial cooperation. Caracas and Beijing also signed an accord on academic exchanges.

Analysis and opinion

• A piece by Han Zhen in the China-Global South Project looks at how “a WeChat public account for the Chinese community in Chile, offers a close look at how the fundraising machinery for those security system works, and how fragile it has become.”

• Amanda Coletta wrote about how “Trump’s tariffs are pushing Canada closer to China and India” for the Washington Post. And at CBC, Lisa Xing wrote about three “ways Canada and China can reset their relations in Trump’s new trade world.”

• César Eduardo Santos argued in The Diplomat that “U.S. strategy appears to have overlooked a central component of China’s projection in the hemisphere: Beijing’s ability to weave deep and durable networks with political, intellectual, and social elites in Mexico and the broader region.”

• Citing Ryan Berg, Kejal Vyas and James Areddy suggest in the Wall Street Journal that China’s support for Venezuela as the United States increasingly threatens the Maduro regime is hollow due to Beijing’s preoccupation with its broader foreign policy and trade interests.

• The Chinese ambassador to Dominica wrote an article for a local newspaper about how the CCP’s upcoming 15^th Five-Year Plan will benefit the island nation, specifically focusing on climate change and infrastructure projects. (FMPRC)

• The Diplomat published a piece by Patrick Ko that argues that “China is entrenching itself in the Brazilianindustrial base and consumer economy, with implications for Chinese influence across the continent”

That’s it for today! See you in two weeks.

Quote of the day

“Each engagement [with Taiwan] provides us, as a young and ambitious nation, with an opportunity to learn, grow, and explore new ways to advance our own development.”

Saint Kitts and Nevis Prime Minister Terrance Drew, per remarks upon arriving in Taiwan

The Top Five Stories:

1. Chinese Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang traveled to South America to meet with regional leaders and to attend the COP30 summit in Brazil. First, he stopped through Uruguay to meet with President Orsi and other government officials, where they discussed economic, technical, and commercial cooperation and signed an agreement on customs matters. Orsi also announced plans to visit China early next year, likely before March 2026. (Xinhua) Days later, President Lula welcomed Ding to COP30 in Belém. (Xinhua)

   1. The most notable result from Ding’s trip was something China declined to do: contribute to Brazil’s signature Tropical Forest Forever Facility, which had aimed to raise $25 billion at COP30 in Belém. However, Beijing did express support for the idea of the facility.

   2. Ding Xuexiang is one of President Xi’s close confidants, having joined the Communist Party’s highest body in 2022 and worked alongside Xi for roughly two decades. This appears to be one of his few, if not his first, visit to Latin America despite his multiple international visits abroad this year (including Russia, France, and the Netherlands).

2. China’s antitrust regulator approved a joint venture for lithium production in the Atacama Salt Flat in Northern Chile between Chilean state copper giant Codelco and Chilean private company SQM, clearing the last regulatory barrier for the agreement. The approval requires the companies to provide a minimum supply of lithium to Chinese buyers “on fair terms, at prices that do not exceed a certain percentage of the benchmark market price.” The details of the agreement are confidential.

   1. Though the deal was between two Chilean companies, the arrangement required the sign off of China’s State Administration for Market Regulation because of the companies’ global operations. Chile, the European Union, Brazil, Japan, South Korea and Saudi Arabia also had to approve the agreement. Chinese firm Tianqi, which owns about 22% of SQM, had previously opposed the joint venture.

3. Saint Kitts and Nevis Prime Minister Terrance Drew traveled to Taiwan on November 13, marking his third visit to the country. During the trip, Drew signed a new sister cities agreement between Taipei and Basseterre and visited a local Taiwanese hospital. Days before the visit, Taiwan donated occupational therapy equipment and supplies to JNF hospital.

   1. St. Kitts and Nevis has long been a close diplomatic partner of Taiwan’s, with relations dating back to a few months after the country gained independence in 1983. For those questioning whether Taiwan’s diplomatic partners will continue their formal ties with the ROC, this probably indicates that St. Kitts will continue being a close friend of Taiwan for at least the near future.

4. The Chinese Foreign Ministry donated supplies to countries across the Caribbean that were affected by Hurricane Melissa. Donations included: 5,000 photovoltaic energy kits to Cuba, $85,000 to the Bahamas, and $3.1 million towards hurricane preparedness and recovery efforts in Jamaica.

   1. Chinese trade and investment often gets all the attention, but when major disasters strike (especially earthquakes and hurricanes), it’s fairly common for the local Chinese embassy to make at least a symbolic donation to express support.

5. As part of the China International Import Expo (CIIE), Colombian commerce ministry officials signed an agreement to give Colombian coffee, bananas, and cocoa farmers access to the Chinese market. Similarly, China granted access to Peruvian bananas and pomegranates. Meanwhile, the Chinese ambassador to El Salvador announced that ongoing free trade negotiations were making progress and could result in a final agreement as early as next year.

   1. With the United States erecting tariffs on its closest trade partners (all three of these countries have longstanding FTAs with Washington), Chinese tariff and non-tariff barrier relief on symbolic goods like coffee and bananas not only creates new market opportunities for these countries, but it also provides a new point of contrast with the Trump Administration.

The Take

The Trump Administration (maybe) gains a new tool on China in Latin America

Last week, the Trump administration announced a slew of new trade deals and tariff exemptions, including with four Latin American countries (specifically El Salvador, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Argentina). New exemptions for household staples like bananas and coffee got the most press coverage, but tucked away in these four country-specific agreements are new export controls and investment security provisions that might escalate U.S.-China regional competition.

All four agreements have slightly different wording, but let’s take Ecuador’s agreement as an example:

“The United States and Ecuador are committed to strengthening economic and national security cooperation... through complementary actions to address non-market policies as well as combatting duty evasion and cooperating on investment security and export controls.”

China is never mentioned by name, but with most of U.S. export control and investment security concerns revolving around the PRC, this provision is probably aimed at aligning the U.S. export control and investment security regime with Ecuador’s trade and investment policies.

This could entail the Trump administration demanding that Ecuador (or the other three Latin American countries with these sorts of agreements) stop exports of minerals or industrial goods to a set of Chinese companies. Alternatively, it could provide a basis for demands to pause a new investment or merger that the United States claims could threaten its national security (think a major new port like the one in Chancay or purchase of electrical grid infrastructure).

Still, there will likely be limits to this approach – the agreement never actually calls for complete alignment, just “complementary actions”. Moreover, it would likely have to be an extreme case for Washington to actually go through with ripping up an agreement over a single export control or investment security case.

But with U.S. concerns about Chinese trade and investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, these kinds of agreements could be a new step in U.S. efforts to reduce China’s regional presence.

A Brazilian Workers’ Party CCP trip shows why ending U.S. democracy support was a mistake

Down in the round-up, I highlight a story about how a delegation from the ruling Brazilian Workers’ Party (PT) bopped around China earlier this month at the behest of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) International Department.

This isn’t the first time that a PT delegation has engaged closely with its CCP counterparts – backed in 2023, PT sent a delegation to Beijing that met with Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi. And while the CCP has so far refrained from supplying and supporting authoritarian communist movements the way it did back during the Cold War, these trips are part of a larger trend of party-to-party engagement (like through the China-CELAC political party forum) that reportedly include teaching lessons from the CCP’s governance model.

For those that care about democracy and the rule of law, any kind of political party meetings where leaders learn about the Chinese Communist Party’s Leninist party-state system is concerning. While this PT-CCP meeting is not unique, it is a reminder that former U.S. efforts to support political parties and democratic civil society around the world, including through USAID and NED, were essential missions in the face of authoritarian actors taking similar actions.

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The Roundup

Politics and Security

• At the invitation of the CCP’s International Department, a delegation of party leaders from the ruling Brazilian Workers’ Party (PT) traveled to Guangzhou, Hebei, and Beijing to find new areas of cooperation on “strengthening institutional action, ecological and humanly sustainable energy transition and sovereign development.

• The Nicaraguan Army received a PLA delegation led by the Deputy Director of the Office of International Military Cooperation, Major General Ye Jiang in early November. A week later, the Chinese hospital ship CNS Silk Road Ark stopped through the Central American country.

• Shandong CCP Provincial Committee member Zhang Haibo led a delegation to Buenos Aires for the China (Shandong) - Argentina Economic and Trade Exchange Conference. The Shandong Gold Group and the San Juan Provincial Institute of Mining Explorations and Operations also signed an MOU on industry and mining. (CGTN)

• The Chinese foreign ministry condemned recent U.S. military actions against supposed Latin Americandrug traffickers, saying that China “stands against the moves that undermine peace and stability in the LAC (Latin American) region and opposes unilateral and excessive enforcement operations against other countries’ vessels.”

Investment, Finance, and Infrastructure

• Argentina’s Salta Province authorized China’s Ganfeng Lithium to execute its Pozuelos-Pastos Grandes (PPG) project with Lithium Americas. The project is valued at more than $2 billion.

• BYD’s Corporate Vice President suggested that the company was considering reviving its plans to invest in a manufacturing plant in Mexico, possibly using a facility that was previously owned by Nissan.

• A new Chinese-donated 35MW solar park in Artemisa was inaugurated on November 12, with CubanPresident Díaz-Canel and Chinese Ambassador Hua at the ceremonies.

• On the sidelines of COP30, Antigua and Barbuda signed an agreement with China for 1,500 new solar-powered street lamps.

Trade and Technology

• Mexico was forced to again delay its plans to impose tariffs on nearly 1,500 tariff lines after opposition from the private sector and some ruling-party members paralyzed debate in Congress.

• The 18^th China-LAC Business Summit was held in Zhengzhou, Henan in early November, focusing on issues like intelligent agriculture and ecological transit (People’s Daily). A few days later, Hunan hosted a summit with LAC countries on the sidelines of the importer’s fair in Shanghai.

• On the sidelines of the Shanghai 2025 Expo, Chinese officials signed a trade deal with their Venezuelancounterparts to bilaterally eliminate tariffs on roughly 400 products.

Taiwan

• Taiwanese Deputy Legislative Speaker Johnny Chiang led a tri-partisan delegation of lawmakers to Paraguay (and the United States) to “check on Taiwan-Paraguay economic, agricultural, educational and health-related cooperation projects.” At the same time, Taiwan donated $20 million to finance hospital construction in Asunción.

• Relations with Taiwan have become a major issue in the Honduran presidential election, with two opposition candidates pledging to re-establish official ties with the ROC.

• Belize’s Ministry of the Environment launched a new project to “monitor and respond to the influx of Sargassum along the coastline” with financial backing from Taiwan.

• The Taiwanese Export-Import Bank loaned $20 million to St. Lucia “to expand access to affordable housing and strengthen essential community infrastructure.”

Culture and society

• The PRC lifted its COVID-era freeze on tourism groups visiting Canada. A few days later, Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that China was willing to restart “exchanges” and cooperation with Ottawa.

• A delegation from Guizhou met with Mexican congressional deputies to discuss increasing cultural and film cooperation.

• The Honduran disaster relief agency received 358 food rations, valued at more than $27,000, from the Chinese embassy.

• Vice-Minister of Education Xiong Sihao gave opening remarks at the China-CELAC Forum of Education Development in Beijing in mid-November, and eight intergovernmental and inter-university cooperation agreements were reportedly signed. (China Daily)

• Representatives from the Zhejiang Daily Press Group traveled to Peru to meet with journalists from Editora Peru to discuss journalistic and editorial work.

Analysis and opinion

• Writing for CNN, Lex Harvey argued that the Trump Administration’s trade policy is pushing Canada closer to China.

• Henry Large wrote for the Global Taiwan Institute that Guatemala “obtained crucial economic assistance from Taiwan and improved relations with Washington” because of its relations with Taipei.

• Small Wars Journal published an article by Leland Lazarus and Guido Torres titled “Development or Dependence? Rethinking China’s Economic Playbook in the Americas.”

• As part of a broader article on Bolivia’s foreign policy under a Paz Administration, Gabriela Keseberg Davalos argues in Americas Quarterly that “Under the MAS government, Bolivia leaned heavily toward Beijing... Untangling this dependence could be complex and potentially harmful to Bolivia’s fragile economy.”

That’s it for today! See you in two weeks.

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Read Chaufa Archives

Today’s edition covers October 20 to November 3.

Quote of the day

“Perhaps China has the influence here because the US has not pressed its case here. As far as I’m aware, in all of my ministry’s interactions with the Chinese, there’s been no quid pro quo.”

Bahamas National Security Minister Wayne Munroe, per interview with an NBC News journalist in a report examining The Bahamas’ fight against human smuggling

This Week’s Top 5 Stories:

1. Signaling a desire to thaw nearly a decade in tense relations, Canadian Prime Minister Carney held a meeting with President Xi on the sidelines of the APEC Summit in South Korea. This marks the first meeting between a Canadian PM and Chinese President since 2017. The discussion prioritized reopening the Chinese market to Canadian agricultural products like canola oil and pork. The two sides also addressed multilateral cooperation and people-to-people ties. (FMPRC)

   1. Carney’s policy to ease tensions with China comes as the Trump administration threatened new tariffs on Canadian goods to an Ontario advertisement campaign and Trump’s refusal to negotiate with Carney’s team. While Carney’s position on improving relations with China pre-dates recent U.S.-Canada tensions, the Trump administration’s position has likely hastened the urgency of the Sino-Canadian détente.

2. As part of the ongoing financial deal between Argentina and the United States, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is reportedly trying to leverage U.S. support for curbing “Beijing’s influence by encouraging Argentina’s leaders to strike deals with U.S. companies as a way to jump-start infrastructure projects and investments in key sectors such as telecommunications.” Relatedly, a Chinese-built radio telescope that was developed through a Sino-Argentine partnership is apparently delayed due to U.S. concerns.

   1. It was previously reported that the United States was hoping to reduce Chinese influence in Argentina by pushing the country to end its currency swap arrangement with the People’s Bank of China. However, pressuring Argentina to limit its Chinese investments, especially in sectors like infrastructure and mining, marks a serious escalation in U.S.-Chinese competition in the country.

3. Following on BYD’s heels, Zhejiang Geely bought a 26.4% stake in Renault’s Brazilian subsidiary in order to gain access to the company’s industrial and commercial resources. Geely will also produce its own vehicles alongside Renault autos at the Ayrton Senna plant in São José dos Pinhais.

   1. BYD often gets the headlines, but Geely closely trails the famous EV company as a Chinese auto powerhouse. In 2025, Geely was the second-largest seller of autos in China, just after BYD.

   2. The Renault-Geely collaboration dates to a 2021 partnership in South Korea, while general cooperation in Brazil was announced in February 2025.

4. The Nicaraguan National Assembly passed a law on Special Economic Zones specifically related to China’s Belt and Road Initiative to try to induce more Chinese investments. The assembly also approved a $54 million loan from CCCC to finance a new wind power plant.

   1. Since establishing formal diplomatic relations in 2021, the Ortega regime has swiftly sought to leverage its relationship with Beijing to support its authoritarian political project. Major investments and construction projects, such as bridges, airports, and energy plants, have become the cornerstone of the Sino-Nicaraguan relationship in recent years, and Managua has hastened these projects by bending the rules for PRC firms. Still, the flashiest proposed Chinese project – a bioceanic canal that would compete with Panama – shows no signs of coming to pass.

5. Cuba extradited Chinese cartel broker Zhi Dong Zhang, who had been implicated in the Chinese-Mexican fentanyl trade, back to Mexico. He had previously been under house arrest in Mexico, but had slipped under a wall to escape. After his return to Mexico, he then sent on to the United States for prosecution.

   1. China is a key source of fentanyl precursors that are shipped to Mexico and eventually on to the United States, prompting many of the Trump (and Biden) administration’s concerns with both countries. Earlier this year, the Trump Administration imposed unprecedented tariffs on Mexico and China (and Canada!). This type of law enforcement cooperation will not fix the issue, but it could ease concerns.

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The roundup

Politics and Security

• Li Zongyuan, Director General of the CCP’s Museum of History, met with Cuban President Díaz-Canel in Havana to discuss inter-party ties and China’s reform experience.

• U.S. government documents show that Venezuela requested “expanded military cooperation” with China to counter “the escalation between the U.S. and Venezuela.”

• Newly-elected Bolivian President Rodrigo Paz expressed his desire to strengthen bilateral relations and trade in a meeting with the Chinese ambassador.

• Nicaragua’s government approved the PLAN medical ship, Ark Silk Road, to make a month’s-long stop at Corinth port starting on November 1 to provide medical services and trainings.

• Chinese Ambassador Zheng met with the Chief of Staff of the Barbados Defense Force to review military exchanges and cooperation. (FMPRC)

• Certain Ecuadorian National Assembly members who are part of the Sino-Ecuadorian Friendship Group met with the Chinese ambassador to discuss trade, infrastructure, agriculture, and cultural cooperation.

• President Xi appointed Yang Shu as the next Ambassador to Grenada and Sun Xiangyang as the Ambassador to Ecuador. (Global Times) (Ecuador 221)

Investment, Finance, and Infrastructure

• The Panama Canal Authority officially kicked off the process to select new operators for new terminals on either end of the canal. Both Chinese and non-Chinese companies are expected to participate in the process.

• During a meeting with Ambassador Yang Yang, Guyanese President Ali reportedly invited more Chinese investment in the Caribbean country. Relatedly, labor minister Keoma Griffith met with Chinese Embassy trade counsellor Li Hanqing to discuss “expanding skills training opportunities.”

• The town of Alberto Adriani is constructing a new solar project as part of a Sino-Venezuelan energy cooperation agreement.

Trade and Technology

• Chinese soybean importers purchased 10 cargoes of Brazilian soybeans for December and another 10 for the spring after prices dropped due to the U.S.-China trade truce. The truce reportedly included Chinese purchase commitments for soybeans.

• In the face of U.S. concerns about Chinese telecommunications equipment in friendly countries, one of Colombia’s largest telecommunications companies launched a new initiative to build a new optical network.

• The Chilean Fruit Exporters Association signed an MOU with a Chongqing wholesale market to boost Chilean fruit exports to China.

• The Venezuelan fishing ministry signed an agreement with a Chinese fishing vessel association on promoting joint projects in fisheries and aquaculture. (Telesur)

• The 18th China-LAC Business Summit was held in Henan, with special participation by a Uruguayanmayor and several senior CCP leaders.

Taiwan

• The Peruvian Ombudsman, Josué Gutiérrez, traveled to Taiwan for a series of meetings and invited Taiwanese officials to Peru. In response, the Chinese embassy issued a series of protests.

• A new $700 million port in Kingston, St. Vincent was officially inaugurated on October 25. The project was partially funded by loans from Taiwan’s Export-Import Bank.

• A tourism delegation from 12 Taiwanese travel agencies visited Belize to help jumpstart the Taiwanese-Belize travel industry. Meanwhile, Belize’s Minister of Constitution and Religious Affairs traveled to Taipei to discuss bilateral cooperation with Taiwan’s Foreign Minister.

• The Taiwanese city of Taoyuan donated an ambulance to the Paraguayan capital city.

• The Ladelin (Delcer) Women Farmers Association in Choiseul in St. Lucia received a donation of irrigation equipment from the Taiwan Technical Mission in the country.

• Taiwan’s mission in Belize supported a cell phone repair workshop to “provide self-employment opportunities” to women and girls in the south of the country.

• After Paraguayan legislator Hugo Meza called for exploring ties with Beijing, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman called for Taiwan’s diplomatic partners to recognize the PRC. Later, the Taiwanese ambassador to Asuncion lamented that several Paraguayan lawmakers had recently traveled to the Mainland and called Taiwan a Chinese province.

Culture and society

• The Chinese Foreign Ministry donated $28 million to Ecuador to strengthen economic revitalization and support local entrepreneurs.

• The Chinese Ambassador to Tegucigalpa and the Honduran Foreign Minister signed an MOU on facilitating Chinese tourism groups.

• The Chinese Red Cross donated thousands of emergency kits to Cuban families affected by Hurricane Melissa.

• As part of its international tour, the National Ballet of China gave a masterclass in Mexico City to local ballet students. (Xinhua)

• A delegation of Shanghai labor leaders traveled to Brazil to meet with their counterparts and to highlight Shanghai’s industrial transformation.

Analysis and opinion

• Writing for La Prensa, Kleymer Baquedano reports on how local Honduran clothes and shoes makers are managing competition with a cheap flood of Chinese goods.

• Leland Lazarus argues for Americas Quarterly that Taiwan “is reinforcing its partnerships in the hemisphere as China increases pressure ahead of upcoming elections.”

• The Heritage Center published Steven Bucci’s op-ed about “the threat of Chinese investment in the Americas,” with extensive discussion of a Chinese construction project in Jamaica.

• Madeline Craig-Scheckman wrote a paper for the National Bureau of Asian Research on the geopolitics of Peru’s Chancay port. At the same time, NBR published a paper by Hugh Harsono on China-Brazil ties and emerging technologies.

That’s it for today! See you in two weeks.

CPSI Newsletters

Chaufa - Open to Everyone

Hi! Welcome to Chaufa, a China-Western Hemisphere Newsletter by CPSI. Today’s Edition covers September 18 to 24…

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3 years ago · 2 likes · Ethan Knecht

Check out the latest issue below, and subscribe below to keep up on the latest in China’s and Taiwan’s relationships with the Western Hemisphere:

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Starting next week, we’ll be joining the Caribbean Progress Studies Institute as one of their several excellent newsletters. Subscribe there for more content about China + LAC as well as the Caribbean.

Quote of the day

“Over the past year, the friendship between Guatemala and Taiwan has notably flourished… This strong enduring and supportive friendship has resulted in actions that have contributed to the economic and social development, peace, and prosperity of both peoples”

Ambassador Oscar Adolfo Padilla Lam, per Taiwan News on Guatemala’s independence day

This Week’s Top 5 Stories:

1. Venezuela’s president concluded several agreements with China on economy, trade and tourism, science and technology, and civil aviation this week during a visit to Beijing. They also upgraded their ties to a “all-weather strategic partnership.” (Global Times)

2. Chongqing hosted the China-LAC 2023 Digital Technology Cooperation Forum on the sidelines of the Smart China Expo, while Argentina hosted the VI Forum for Dialogue between the Civilizations of China and Latin America and the Caribbean.

3. Prime Minister Holness went out of his way to deny that Chinese infrastructure loans were a large portion of Jamaica’s debt burden during the opening ceremony for the Chinese-funded May Pen to Williamsfield leg of Highway 2000. (Jamaica Observer)

4. China hosted the first Seminar for Economic and Trade Cooperation between Chinese Provinces and Brazilian States, which resulted in notable local meetings for the states of Ceará and Paraná. (People’s Daily)

5. Chile’s Codelco is ending its long-term copper concentrate contracts with Chinese clients to diversify and restructure its sales. (Reuters)

The roundup

Politics and security

• The G77+China held a leader’s meeting in Havana in advance of the UN General Assembly, which resulted in Mexico rejoining the group. (Telesur)

• During Mexico and Central American countries’ National Days, Chinese delegations visited the region. These included: a PLA delegation to Mexico (as well as a celebration at the PRC embassy), a PRC National Assembly delegation to El Salvador, and the same delegation traveling to Nicaragua.

  • Ambassador Zhang also visited the head of the Mexican Assembly of Deputies to discuss political, commercial, and cultural ties. (Quadratin)

• Costa Rica’s president rescheduled his trip to China, which was originally planned for November. It is likely to occur now in 2024 to give more time for fleshing out the agenda.

  • Quick note: Though the government claims its unrelated, the postponement comes as San Jose recently prevented Huawei from joining the country’s 5G bidding.

• China’s ambassador to Chile met with that country’s agriculture minister to visit cherry farms and discuss agricultural cooperation. (El Diario Santiago)

Trade and investment

• China National Offshore Oil Corp joined Exxon and Hess in submitting a joint bid for newly-opened oil blocks in Guyana. (Associated Press) (Reuters)

• Paraguay’s economic minster complained that China is taking advantage of economic slowdowns around the world to gain access to natural resources in developing countries. (Infobae)

Taiwan

• Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Wu recently traveled to St. Kitts and Nevis to celebrate the country’s 40 years of independence and diplomatic relations with the ROC.

• The government of St. Vincent and the Grenadines signed a $120 million contract with Taiwan’s Overseas Engineering and Construction Company for a highway rehabilitation project. (St. Vincent Times)

• St. Lucia’s Prime Minister launched an accountability investigation into why a loan from Taiwan’s Ex-Im Bank was redirected into a private bank account rather than the government’s consolidated fund. (St. Vincent Times)

Culture and society

• Four doctors from the newly built China-Dominica Friendship Hospital recently started an eight-week medical training course in Guangzhou. (China Daily)

  • Quick thoughts: This emblematic of the transition from the BRI to the GDI – a refocusing on providing lower-cost trainings and services instead of expensive infrastructure.

• Beijing’s embassy in Antigua and Barbuda sponsored a table tennis festival and donated about $7,500 to a local charity for agriculture work.

• China’s embassy in the Dominican Republic a bus and various technology equipment to a local sports team. (Momento Deportivo)  

• Grenada’s embassy in China recently sponsored a culture day at a kindergarten in Beijing. (Global Times)

Analysis and opinion

• Facundo Robles writes for the Wilson Center that “China’s role is shifting from lender to debt collector” across Latin America and the Caribbean.

• Writing for Dialogo Chino, Rebecca Ray argues that as Ecuador looks to diversify away from oil, China can still contribute to the country’s economy.

• A new analysis for Insight Crime looks at how Chinese gangs are making inroads in Chile.

• Gabriel Honrada argues in the Asia Times that China’s upgraded signals intelligence facility in Cuba increases global nuclear risks.

• In an editorial, the St. Lucia Voice argued that St. Lucia and Taiwan are very different countries, but the Caribbean country should try to emulate Taiwan’s strong citizen security and education systems.

That’s it for today! See you next week.

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Quote of the day

“Between China and Venezuela there is an exemplary relationship, it is a model of relationship, of what must be the relationship between a superpower like China, the great superpower of the 21st century and an emerging, heroic, revolutionary and socialist country like Venezuela”

Venezuelan President Maduro, per Xinhua

This Week’s Top 5 Stories:

1. Venezuelan President Maduro traveled to China for the first time in five years in a bid to revive his country’s economy and join the BRICS before next year’s presidential elections. (Reuters) (Bloomberg) (Telesur) (AP)

   1. The visit comes days after Venezuela’s Vice President and Oil Minister traveled to Shanghai to meet with business and government officials.

2. The China-CELAC Digital Technology Cooperation Forum was held in Chongqing, with Vice Minister Zhang Yunming speaking to the group of Latin American and Caribbean representatives. (iChongqing) (CRI) (TN8)

3. The Canadian government tasked a judge to launch a formal inquiry into China’s (and Russia’s) electoral interference, to which China threatened “public consequences.” (Reuters) (Bloomberg)

4. While on a trip to Beijing, Argentina’s energy minister signed an MOU on the creation of a “research center on natural resources and… the exchange of officials, scientists, academics, and specialists.” (Gobierno de Argentina) (Telesur) (Telam)

5. Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with his Grenadian counterpart this week, discussing the One-China principle, their shared Global South heritage, and Grenada’s economic development (including through the BRI and GDI). (Xinhua) (CGTN)

The roundup

Politics and security

• The United States and Canada each sailed a ship through the Taiwan Strait as part of a freedom of navigation operation. (ABC News)

• The Dominican Republic’s Director-General of Customs met with the Chinese Ambassador to discuss trade and coming to a possible agreement on cooperation and mutual assistance in customs matters. (Presidencia)

• The first Chinese ambassador to Honduras officially presented his credentials. (France24)

• The MOFA Deputy Director for Latin America pinned the blame of the fentanyl crisis on the United States when asked about China’s responsibility for the flow of precursors flowing through Mexico. (Milenio)

Infrastructure, investment, and finance

• A Bolivian legislator complained that his country had overpaid for poor-quality materials for a security infrastructure project in 2019 from China National Electronics Service Company Limited (CEIEC) that had been financed by China Ex-Im Bank. (EJU)

• Great Wall Motors (GWM) entered the Mexican market and announced they were looking at building a production facility in the country in the next two years. (Mundo Ejecutivo)

• 3 of the 4 consortiums approved to bid for Line 2 of the Bogota metro in Colombia are Chinese firms: CRRC, CHEC, and CREC, while the first trains from CRRC for a light rail line in Mexico City arrived this week.

Trade and technology

• A medical delegation from Chongqing traveled to the Barbados for a year-long health mission. This is the fifth health mission to head to the island. (Xinhua)

• Uruguay’s Minister of Industry is in China for the China International Fair for Trade in Service (CIFTIS) in Beijing and the Smart China Expo in Chongqing to discuss sustainable development. (People’s Daily)

• Brazil’s Chief of Staff to the trade ministry traveled to Xiamen, as did local officials such as from Manaus, for the China International Investment and Trade Fair. (Governo do Brasil) (Em Tempo)

Taiwan

• A high-level U.S. delegation led by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs Erikson traveled to Belize for three days, where he said that the United States recognizes and supports Belize’s diplomatic ties with the Republic of China (Taiwan). (BBB)

Analysis and opinion

• AS/COA Vice President Eric Farnsworth argues that given China’s rise in the region and economic turmoil that the Biden Administration should pursue a more aggressive trade and economic cooperation agenda with Latin America and the Caribbean. (Barrons)

• Grenada’s Foreign Minister Joseph Andall sat down with the Global Times for an interview to discuss bilateral relations, the one-China policy, Confucius Institutes, and the BRI & GDI.

• Writing in Dialogo Americas, Sabina Nicholls analyzes China’s port investment expansion across Latin America and the Caribbean.

• Louis Moyston argues in the Jamaica Observer that Jamaicans should avoid mistreating Chinese business owners on the island, but also in turn argues that “China as a country is not an enemy of Jamaica.”

Weekend Thoughts

Why the Venezuela Visit Matters

Maduro’s recent visit to Beijing is just the latest in a series of signs that China-Venezuela relations are on the up-and-up. Venezuela’s impoverished economy and inability to pay its debts had slowed the relationship in recent years, and so the recent travel by a CCP delegation in May and Maduro’s trip this weekend show that China and Venezuela are back into each other’s arms.1

The timing of the visit shows the importance Beijing places in its relationship with Caracas. First and foremost, the reception provided an excuse for Xi’s absence at the G20 in India this weekend. Second, given that China is in the midst of an economic slowdown and unlikely to be able to provide the aid and demand for oil that powered the Venezuelan economy last decade, the trip shows that the relationship is not just economically-motivated, but also ideologically and politically-driven. And third, though likely a coincidence, the embrace of one of Washington’s most irritating neighbors provides a counterpoint to President Biden strengthening U.S. ties with Vietnam, one of the PRC’s often irksome neighbors.

The trip also shows a broader trend in the China-Latin America relationship: while the CCP typically refrains from pushing for regime change,2 it is more than happy to prop up dictators and authoritarianism. China is not the root of Venezuela’s democratic woes (blame goes to Maduro and Chavez for that), but as Maduro gears up for re-election, it is clear that Beijing has no qualms in tilting the scales to maintain Venezuela’s undemocratic status quo.

Chatting about the One-China Policy

The Global Times interview with Grenada’s foreign minister was unusually focused on the One-China policy, with one quarter of the questions devoted to the issue despite Grenada recognizing Beijing nearly two decades ago. This does not appear to be just a Grenada phenomenon. Other Caribbean countries (such as Guyana, Dominica, Jamaica, and Suriname) also seem to be prompted to discuss the issue in interviews or statements, or have the issue mentioned by the resident PRC ambassador, to an unusual degree.3

Meanwhile, in other Latin American countries, the issue often gets referenced in passing, but does not have the same all-encompassing focus as in the Caribbean. For example, from recent meetings readouts from Ecuador’s and Argentina’s presidents with Xi mention offhand at the very bottom of the statement that each country “firmly pursues the one-China principle” without further elaboration. This is despite both countries still hosting Taiwan trade offices and with Argentina holding a reciprocal mission in Taipei.

One possible reason for this is a comment Foreign Minister Andall made in the interview (emphasis added):

In the Caribbean, the vast majority of CARICOM countries have diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. There are a few others who have not yet come on board, but we're confident that will change soon…. resisting the one-China principle is like trying to push back a tsunami with your hands. This is an irreversible trend.

Of course, Caribbean officials are more than just pawns — they have their own agency to make these statements, and clearly see it in their national interests to state One-China talking points. But given that a plurality of Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic partners are in the Caribbean, PRC officials may be encouraging their Caribbean counterparts to emphasize their embrace of the one-China as a means to place pressure on countries like St. Vincent and Belize.

This is just an anecdotal observation — more rigorous, quantitative research should likely be done to see whether Beijing and MOFA place a greater emphasis on the One-China issue in the Caribbean than elsewhere in Latin America. But the interview with Grenada’s foreign minister indicates this at least deserves further investigation.

That’s it for today! See you on Tuesday for another roundup.

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Quote of the day

“The core of this future lies in 5G and other technologies… Huawei will be an important piece, which we will support to make more investments and contribute to this new era”

China’s Ambassador to Brazil Zhu Qingqiao, per remarks at a Huawei event

Top stories, in brief:

1. The China-CELAC Digital Technology Cooperation Forum was held in Chongqing on September 4, with Vice Minister for Industry and Information Technology Zhang Yunming speaking to the group of Latin American and Caribbean representatives. (iChongqing) (CRI) (TN8)

2. Venezuelan Vice President Delcy Rodríguez and Oil Minister Pedro Tellechea traveled to Shanghai to meet with business, government, and BRICS bank officials to try to increase oil production in advance of next year’s elections. (Bloomberg) (Telesur) (Oil Price) (EFE)

3. Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with his Grenadian counterpart this week, discussing the One-China principle, their shared Global South heritage, and Grenada’s economic development (including through the BRI and GDI). (Xinhua) (CGTN)

The roundup

Politics and security

• Argentine Minister of Science, Technology and Innovation, Daniel Filmus, met with his Chinese counterpart to prepare agreements on lithium, student exchange, and energy transition for President Fernandez’s visit in October.

• A delegation from the PRC National Commission for Development and Reform and several Chinese biotechnology businesses met Cuban president Díaz-Canel and participated in the XII Meeting of the Joint Working Group on Cuba-China Biotechnology. (Presidencia de Cuba) (Prensa Latina)

• Costa Rican president Chaves issued a decree requiring any 5G services in the country must be contracted from countries that signed the Bucharest convention, effectively banning Chinese 5G providers like Huawei. (Seminario Universidad) (AR) (Nacion)

• The Royal Canadian Mounted Police is investigating former Royal Canadian Air Force pilots who are reportedly training People’s Liberation Army air force pilots. (Global News)

• Three LAC countries (El Salvador, Grenada, and Honduras) signed the United Nations Convention on the International Effects of Judicial Sales of Ships in Beijing this week. (Marine Link)

Trade and investment

• Dominica’s Prime Minister Roosevelt Skerrit announced that China would fund $30 million worth of construction for six new schools on the Caribbean island. (The Daily Herald)

• The Port of Guangzhou in Guangdong Province opened its first direct shipping route to Brazil. (Comex)

• Following the recent establishment of relations, Honduras shipped its first two tons of coffee to China. (Proceso)

  • Meanwhile, shrimp producers are still worried about their livelihoods due to the sudden lack of access to the Taiwanese market. (Hondudiario)

• During his recent visit to Durango, the Chinese ambassador to Mexico met with local business leaders to discuss the benefits of the region as an investment destination. (Newsweek Espanol)

• COSCO gave a press briefing about the ongoing progress of the Port of Chancay in Peru, stating that the project is about 45% complete. The company aims to complete the project by Peru’s APEC host year in 2024. (Infobae) (Mundo Maritimo)

Taiwan

• Hon Hai Precision Industry Co. (also known as Foxconn) established a strategic partnership with the Mexican state of Chihuahua to provide trainings and foster innovation in advanced technologies. (Focus Taiwan)

Culture and society

• The PRC embassy in the Bahamas is supporting the country’s second-ever Dragon Boat Festival at the end of the September. (EW News)

That’s it for today! See you this weekend for another roundup and some analysis.

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Quote of the day

“I was very clear with China that… patience is wearing thin among American business. They need and deserve a predictable environment and a level playing field. ”

U.S. Secretary of Commerce Raimondo, per remarks to CBS State of the Nation

Top stories, in brief:

1. The Honduran Council of Private Enterprise issued a report warning that “it is crucial that Honduras resists handing over the national management of critical infrastructure to any foreign country” like China. (El Heraldo)

2. The governor of Argentina’s Jujuy province met with executives from Shanghai Eletric Power Construction Company to discuss expanding local power plants’ capacity by 200MW with support of China Ex-Im bank.

3. On his regular TV program, Venezuelan president Maduro praised China as “the main emerging economic power in this 21st century.” (Que Pasa)

The roundup

Politics and security

• China’s ambassador to Mexico traveled to the state of Durango recently as part of a business mission with eight PRC companies. He highlighted opportunities for Chinese investment on the trip. (Posta)

• The Governor of Alagoas and the Deputy Governor of the Brazilian state of Tocantins are heading to Xiamen to attend China’s International Investment and Trade Fair to promote their states’ agribusiness. (Conexaoto) (Gazetaweb)

Infrastructure and investment

• The Peruvian embassy in China hosted a breakfast workshop on how Chinese companies and organizations could support the ongoing construction of the Chancay megaport. (Andina)

• Vinto Metallurgical Company in Bolivia reported that it was about to sign a cooperation agreement in October with one of four Chinese companies to build a zinc refining plant. (Americas Economia)

Trade and technology

• Voice of America reports that Nicaragua will be able to export 71% of its products to China following the recently signed bilateral FTA.

• A delegation of Cuban scientists visited the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Shanghai Mental Health Center following an April agreement on neurotechnology and bioengineering research. (Prensa Latina)

• The Chilean Salmon Technological Institute went on a public-private mission to China with the support of its government’s embassy in Beijing to increase bilateral trade in seafood. (Aqua)

Culture and society

• BioCubaFarma announced a joint venture with unspecified Chinese partners to transform an abandoned cinema into a cultural center in Havana. (DDC)

Opinion and analysis

• The Wall Street Journal editorial board expressed concern about Taiwan’s recent expulsion from the Central American parliament, warning that “Beijing has also used economic coercion to get its way abroad.”

• Margaret Myers has a new piece in Just Security about the recent BRICS summit, finding that “Despite the fanfare surrounding the event, the summit was mostly effective in highlighting the considerable divergence in views held by the current five BRICS members.”

• Writing in Mongabay, Timothy Killeen reviews China’s role in the development of hydroelectric dams in Ecuador.

That’s it for today! See you on Thursday for another roundup.

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Quote of the day

“Since the two countries resumed diplomatic relations, we have witnessed leapfrog development in bilateral relations… China is ready to work with Nicaragua to promote bilateral relations to a new height and bring more benefits to our peoples.”

MOFA Spokesman Wang Wenbin, per remarks to the press

This Week’s Top 5 Stories:

1. Brazilian oil giant Petrobras announced that it would a launch a new Chinese subsidiary in order to boost ties with the PRC. (Reuters)

   1. The news comes days after Petrobras signed four MOU’s with China Energy, SINOPEC, CNOOC and Citic Construction. (Reuters) (UOL)

2. China and Nicaragua signed a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement covering trade of goods, services and market access for investment on Thursday. (Reuters) (France 24)

3. China’s ambassador met with the Dominican Republic’s Minister of the Interior and Police, Jesús Vásquez Martínez, to provide trainings for police, including how to use Huawei security equipment. (Presidencia de DR)

   1. The PRC Embassy will similarly sponsor 25 Trinidad and Tobago policemen to study Mandarin Chinese for a year, reportedly to strengthen the relationship with the local Chinese community. (Loop News)

4. The Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise, a government investigator, is launching investigations into 14 firms (like Hugo Boss and Walmart) associated with Chinese forced labor in Xinjiang. (China Project)

5. Bolivia and China agreed to a new export protocol that will allow for 15,000 tons of Bolivian chia to be exported to the PRC. (La Razon)

The roundup

Politics and security

• The governor of the Mexican state of Yucatan, Mauricio Vila Dosal, met with the Chinese ambassador to discuss infrastructure investment, energy sustainability, and new commercial investments in the state. (Infolliteras)

  • The Chinese embassy in Mexico City also recently hosted its fourth forum for the heads of local universities. (Xinhua)

• China hosted a group of UN ambassadors, including from Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, to visit Tibet this past week. (Reuters)

  • Quick thoughts: Visits to Xinjiang have been quite common, but as Reuters notes, diplomatic trips to Tibet are a bit more unusual.

• The Chinese Embassy in Canada belatedly released a readout from Cuban President Díaz-Canel’s meeting with President Xi on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit on August 23. (Chinese Embassy)

• Xi sent a congratulatory message to the Bahamas’s new Governor-General, Cynthia Alexandria Pratt, noting that he hoped that her administration would take the relationship “to new levels.” (BNN)

• The outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Guyana expressed concern about China’s growing footprint in the Caribbean country and the wider region. (Loop News)

• Beijing’s new ambassador to Colombia, Zhu Jingyang, recently arrived in Bogota to start his new assignment. (El Tiempo)

Infrastructure, investment, and finance

• Suriname’s president sent his foreign minister to China to hopefully conclude debt renegotiations. (DBS)

• Chinese nickel and steel firm Tsingshan announced that it would build a $120 million electrochemical plant in Argentina's Jujuy province. (BNA)

• Panama City’s metro Line 3, which is being tunneled by Chinese firm CRTG, is about 42% complete and is on track to be completed by 2026. (Foco Panama)

Trade and technology

• Chinese auto manufacturer is looking to expand into the Mexican market by opening a network of local car dealerships. (Autonews)

• Ecuador released the full text of its Free Trade Agreement with China. (La Hora)

Taiwan

• Following a Taiwanese trade and business delegation touring Mexico in June, BN Americas sat down with Shao-Lin Hu, the director of the economic division of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Mexico, to discuss how Taiwan business hope to take part in the U.S.’s near shoring trend.

• The Paraguayan minister of foreign affairs met with the Taiwanese ambassador to discuss bilateral relations, including the exchange of technology and new investments. (MRE)

• St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Taiwan signed two MOU’s on improving the Caribbean country’s agriculture sector. (Searchlight)

Analysis and opinion

• A new report out of CSIS by Ryan Berg and Rubi Bledsoe argues that while Chinese development assistance in the form of flashy infrastructure projects may get more media attention, Taiwanese assistance in Latin America and the Caribbean is often more meaningful and impactful.

The Backgrounder

The Origins of the PRC-Brazil Relationship

With the recent news about Petrobras growing relationship, it seemed like an opportune time to look back on what prompted Brazil’s military dictatorship to flip relations to the People’s Republic of China in 1974.

Like many countries, Brazil’s ambassador fled Mainland China in 1949 following the establishment of the PRC.1 For the 1950s and early 1960s, Brazilian engagement with China meant engagement with Chiang Kai-Shek’s Republic of China. Until 1974, Brazilian-Chinese relations almost exclusively meant relations with the ROC.

That said, the administrations of Jânio Quadros (1961) and João Goulart (1961-1964) did tentatively explore contact with Beijing. Goulart traveled to the PRC in the waning days of the Quadros administration for a trade mission. This resulted in the signing of a Trade and Payments Agreement, and it led the way to a Chinese commercial delegation’s visit to Brazil in 1962.

As the Cultural Revolution wound down in the PRC in the early 1970s, Brazil’s outpost in Hong Kong began to produce a series of reports suggesting that engagement with the PRC might be possible and desirable. Parts of Brazil’s foreign ministry started to tilt to engage with China, choosing to send a diplomat on a private commercial mission in 1972 and to side with China on lowering its bar for entry into the United Nations.2 However, the military dictatorship was still hesitant to break ties with the ROC, largely due to ideological reasons.

The official flip in relations got underway with cocktail party at the Greek embassy in Moscow following Nixon’s historic visit to China. After a Chinese diplomat expressed interest in establishing diplomatic ties to his Brazilian counterpart at the party, Itamaraty’s Head of the Africa, Asia and Oceania Department led an official commercial mission to Beijing and Guangdong under instructions to begin negotiations on establishing relations.3 This inclination to strengthen ties was further supported by broader foreign policy agreements between the PRC and the Geisel administration on multilateralism, the use of coalitions like the G77 to advance development, and standards for international agreements on oceanic boundaries.

Later that spring, Brazilian President Geisel cajoled his national security council into unanimously approving a change in relations. Some in the army had been hesitant to recognize the communist country, but the newly-elected president had a different view of foreign policy than his predecessors and was insistent on getting his way. By the time a trade delegation from China arrived in Brazil in August, Brazil was ready to accept Beijing’s One China principle and exchange ambassadors.

(Much of the above is a summation of the China chapter in Leticia Pinheiro’s book Foreign Policy Making Under the Geisel Government)

That’s it for today! See you on Tuesday for another roundup.